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Chapter 1                             INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is an investigation of gradability in the nominal domain, aiming to 
uncover whether and how gradability is manifested in the nominal domain, as well 
as the implications this could have for theories of the representation of gradability.
Gradability  has  been  studied  mostly  within  the  adjectival  domain,  where 
different proposals have been made as to its semantic and syntactic representation, 
though the cross-categorial  nature of gradability has  also been recognized (Sapir 
1944, Bolinger 1972, Bresnan 1973, Maling 1983, Doetjes  1997, Sassoon 2007a 
etc.). To arrive at a proper understanding of gradability and its representation, its 
cross-categorial nature must indeed be fully acknowledged and its manifestations 
across the various categories systematically investigated. Since such an undertaking 
would extend well beyond the limits of one dissertation, we will confine ourselves to 
a study of gradability in the nominal domain here, hoping to make in this way one 
step in that direction.
While in the adjectival domain there is consensus as to what gradability is and 
how  it  can  be  diagnosed,  the  manifestations  of  gradability  become  much  less 
straightforward outside of this domain. It is not easy to find unequivocal criteria 
based on which nouns can be characterized as gradable. As will be shown in this 
dissertation, different tests single out different sets of nouns as being gradable. The 
environments that have been  claimed at some point or other to involve gradability 
often turn out  to  be sensitive to other  factors  such as  the expression of a  value 
judgment, or the evaluation of whether a property holds or not, rather than to 'pure' 
gradability. Even in those cases which at first sight seem to provide most reliable 
indications of the gradable nature of nouns, such as the type of modification seen in 
a big idiot, the facts do not ultimately support an analysis of the respective modifiers 
as  adnominal  degree  modifiers  or  operators,  and  what  looks  like  a  degree 
interpretation  (i.e.  an  interpretation  that  is  similar  to  those  obtained  by  degree 
modification in the adjectival domain) is brought about by different mechanisms. In 
sum, the gradability of nouns turns out to be much more elusive than in the case of 
adjectives, and much harder to access and manipulate grammatically, if at all. This 
will lead us to conclude that, at the lexical level, nouns are fundamentally different 
from adjectives with respect to gradability, more precisely, that they lack the kind of 
gradability we know from the adjectival domain.
This chapter will first introduce the notion of gradability and the ways it has been 
approached in the literature, mainly in relation to the adjectival domain, as well as 
from a cross-categorial perspective. The second part of the chapter tackles the basic 
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question of how to identify a gradable noun. This section will give an overview of 
the tests for gradability in the nominal domain that have been used in the literature  
and  show  the  difficulties  that  emerge  as  to  finding  reliable  diagnostics  and 
establishing the status of nouns from this points of view.  It thus serves to set the 
scene  for  the  rest  of  the  dissertation.  Section  3  provides  an  outline  of  the 
dissertation. 
1 Background and preliminary remarks
Gradability  has  been  mostly  approached  in  relation  to  adjectives,  where  it  is 
signalled by the availability of modification by specialized elements, such as  very 
(e.g.  very  smart),  and  by the  possible occurrence of  the  adjective  in  specialized 
degree  constructions,  such  as  the  comparative  (e.g.  smarter  than  John).  Various 
semantic and syntactic proposals have been put forth in the literature in order to 
capture this phenomenon. The first part of this section will review the ways in which 
gradability in the adjectival domain has been approached, briefly outlining the main 
semantic approaches to the phenomenon.
Although to a lesser extent, the cross-categorial nature of gradability has also 
been recognized. This has  been based on two types of  observations.  On the one 
hand,  there  are  modifiers  like  more  etc.  which  can  modify  not  just  gradable 
adjectives, but can also combine with other syntactic categories as in He ate more 
soup than me and He works more than his brother. On the other hand, expressions 
can  be  found  in  these  other  lexical  categories  as  well  which  seem  to  denote 
properties that  may be conceived of as holding to a higher or lesser degree.  For 
example, one may be more or less of an idiot, one may like something more or less 
etc.  A consideration  of  the  cross-categorial  nature  of  gradability  has  immediate 
consequences for its (semantic and syntactic) representation. These  issues  will be 
introduced in the second part of this section,  with particular focus on the nominal 
domain.
A note on the terminology used is in order before proceeding. Throughout this 
dissertation we will use the term "gradable" to refer to expressions which denote 
properties that may hold of entities to a higher or lower degree, or whose domain is 
ordered (see also coming sub-sections for a more precise definition). These have 
also  been  referred  to  in  the  literature  as  "degree"  (Bolinger  1972)  or  "scalar" 
expressions (e.g. Matushansky 2002a,b,c a.o.). We will, however, reserve the term 
"degree" for those expressions which can modify or operate on gradable expressions 
and give rise to this particular sort of interpretation. Therefore, we will be talking 
about "degree words/  modifiers/  operators/  constructions"  to  refer  to expressions 
such as very, too, comparatives etc. As for "scalar", we take it to be a more general 
term which simply describes an expression that has some relation to a scale in the 
sense  of  Horn  (1972,  1989).  There  are,  for  example,  expressions  which  are  not 
gradable themselves and are not degree operators either, but which are scalar in the 
sense  that  they  may  introduce  a  scale.  (Even-elements,  for  example,  have  been 
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analysed by Giannakidou (2007) a.o. as imposing an ordering of individuals on P, 
the predicate of the clause, with respect to a likelihood scale.)
1.1 An introduction to gradability: 
the view from the adjectival domain
Gradability has been studied mostly in the adjectival domain, in relation to a sub-
class of adjectives. In this section we will introduce the notion of gradability and the 
ways it has been approached in the literature, mainly from the adjectival perspective. 
We  will  subsequently  turn  to  considering  gradability  from  a  cross-categorial 
perspective in §1.2, mainly in relation to the nominal domain, which is the focus of 
this dissertation.
Adjectives are generally assumed to fall into two categories, gradable and non-
gradable (Sapir 1944, Bolinger 1972, Maling 1983, Bierwisch 1989 etc.), depending 
on how easily the properties they express can be viewed as holding of their subject 
to a greater or lesser degree. This is reflected in different distributional patterns with 
respect to degree expressions. Compare, for instance, (1) and (2): 
(1) a. an intelligent child 
b. a {very/ more/ less} intelligent child
 
(2) a. a parliamentary speech
a'. an Italian film 
b. *a {very/ more/ less} parliamentary speech  
b'. *a {very/ more/ less} Italian film
A gradable predicate such as  intelligent  in  (1) expresses  a  property that  may  be 
manifested to a greater or lesser degree and is thus compatible with modifiers or  
constructions that express varying degrees of the respective property, such as  very 
and the comparative, respectively. In contrast, non-gradable predicates like those in 
(2) are either true of an individual or not and, as such, cannot co-occur with degree  
modifiers like very and be used in degree constructions such as the comparative.
It should be noted, however, that the distinction is not as clear-cut as it may seem 
at  first  sight,  and  under  certain  circumstances  non-gradable  predicates  can  be 
coerced into a gradable use (in the presence of degree modifiers like very, too etc.). 
Consider the following example: 
(3) He is so Italian! 
In this  sentence,  the individual  is  said to  'have  many of  the properties  typically 
associated with being Italian', rather than being said to simply have the respective 
nationality. The adjective is shifted into a gradable meaning. Even in (2)b above, the 
adjective  Italian could plausibly  be  coerced  into  a  gradable  meaning  so  as  to 
describe a film that is not Italian  per se, but has a number of properties typically 
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associated with Italian films. This shift in meaning has been referred to as "scalarity 
coercion" (cf. Matushansky 2002b).
There are two main approaches to gradability in the literature: degree-based and 
degree-less ones.  In  a  degree-based approach adjectives  have a degree argument 
(Cresswell  1976,  von Stechow 1984 etc.),  or  are analysed as  functions mapping 
objects  to  degrees  on  a  scale  (Bartsch  and  Vennemann 1973,  Kennedy 1999a,b, 
2007a). In this type of approach, a sentence such as John is tall will mean something 
like  'John  is  tall  to  a  degree  d',  or  'John's  tallness  equals  d'.  In  degree-less 
approaches,  the  meaning  of  an  adjective  is  that  of  a  context  sensitive  or  vague 
predicate  (Klein  1980,  1982,  Larson  1988,  Van  Rooij  2008,  to  appear,  Doetjes, 
Constantinescu  and  Součková 2011).  As  such,  tall would  correspond  to  'a 
contextually  determined  set  of  tall  individuals'.  In  what  follows  we  will  briefly 
outline each of these approaches. 
1.1.1 Degree-based approaches to gradability
Degree-based, or 'relational', theories of gradability take gradable adjectives to have 
an additional open variable slot of semantic type d (degree) (Seuren 1973 , Creswell 
1976,  Hellan  1981,  von  Stechow  1984,  Heim  1985,  1995/1999,  2000,  2006, 
Bierwisch 1989, Kennedy 1999, Lechner 1999, Matushansky 2002a,b,  Bhatt  and 
Pancheva 2004 a.o.). Most authors who opt for a relational account take degrees to 
be part  of the argument structure of gradable adjectives,  in addition to e.g.  their  
external  argument,  therefore  their  semantic  type  is  <d,<e,t>>.  Alternatively, 
gradable adjectives have been analysed as measure functions from individuals to 
degrees, hence, of semantic type  <e,d> (Bartsch and Vennemann 1973, Kennedy 
1999a,b, 2007a).
On either version, the degree variable is explicitly written into the lexical entry 
of the adjective.1 x is A will be true if the projection of x on the scale associated with 
the adjective A is at least as high as the norm or standard degree ds, for the relevant 
comparison class,  which is the subset of the domain which is selected in a given 
context, and with respect to which A(x) is interpreted.
As for the sort of objects degrees are, two main views have emerged: they have 
been analysed either as points on a scale, by analogy with temporal arguments (von 
Stechow 1984,  Heim 1985 etc.),  or  as  intervals  (Seuren  1973,  Bierwisch  1989, 
Kennedy 1999, Schwarzschild 2005, Schwarzschild and Wilkinson 2002).
In a degree-based system, adjectives do not start out as predicates of type <e,t> 
and have to be turned into predicates at some point of the derivation. If they are of  
type <d,<e,t>>,  then the <d> argument  must  be  bound first,  before  the  external 
argument is merged.2 In case an overt degree operator, such as the comparative, is 
present, this degree operator will bind the degree variable and turn the adjective into 
1 For an account of the theta-relations involved, see Zwarts (1992), Doetjes (1997).
2 The same holds in the alternative measure-function analysis, on which they would be of semantic 
type  <e,d>.  For  reasons  of  simplicity,  however,  we  will  henceforth  only  illustrate  the  degree-based 
approach with the <d <e,t>> type.
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a predicate. The comparative structure is usually analysed as involving a comparison 
between degrees, as in (4)a (cf. Kennedy and McNally 2005: 369).3
(4) a. [[-er/more than da]] = λA λx. ∃d [ d > dc ∧ A(d)(x) ]
b. Chris is taller than Alex is [AP e] 
c. ∃d[d > da ∧ tall(d)(Chris)] 
(where da is the maximal degree such that Alex is d-tall) 
Similarly, measure phrases have been argued to saturate this position. This has in 
fact been one of the most important arguments in favour of postulating the degree 
argument position in adjectives (cf. Kennedy 1999a, but see Schwarzschild 2005 for 
a different view).4 In the absence of an (overt) degree operator, turning the adjective 
into  the  right  semantic  type  is  taken  care  of  by  a  null  degree  operator,  pos.  In 
addition, pos makes sure the adjective gets a non-neutral interpretation. As shown in 
(5), the comparative in  (5)a does not entail  (5)b, i.e. that Chris is tall. This is so 
because the positive in (5)b is interpreted non-neutrally, as in (5)c. The non-neutral, 
"above the standard or average" interpretation is attributed to the presence of pos.
(5) a. Chris is taller than Alex is.
b. Chris is tall.
c. Chris is taller than a contextually determined standard of tallness .
d. Chris is [pos tall] 
In fact, as will be discussed in the next sub-section, most of the criticism against the 
degree-based approach has been directed at the postulated null operator  pos,  both 
due to considerations pertaining to the adjectival domain and to considerations that 
arise when gradability beyond the nominal domain is taken into account.
This  semantics  of  gradable  adjectives  is  usually  associated  with  a  particular 
syntax, namely with the projection of a particular functional structure, the Degree 
Phrase, which hosts the elements performing the relevant semantic operations. There 
are two main views in the literature in this connection. On one view, DegP occupies 
the Spec position of the AP and the comparative or other dependent clauses are 
complements to Deg0 (Bresnan 1973, 1975, Jackendoff 1977, Heim 1985). On the 
alternative view, Deg0 takes AP as its complement (Abney 1987, Corver 1990, 1997, 
Zwarts 1992 etc.).5 Doetjes (1997) and Neeleman, van de Koot and Doetjes (2004) 
argue for the necessity of making syntactic distinctions among degree expressions, 
3 For a quantificational account of degree operators such as the comparative, equative,  too,  enough 
etc., see von Stechow 1984, Heim 1985, 2000, Matushansky 2002a, Meier 2003 a.o. 
4 See also Svenonius and Kennedy (2006) for a different implementation of the analysis of the syntax  
and semantics of measure phrases
5 See Bhatt and Pancheva (2004) for a recent discussion and evaluation of the two approaches and a 
solution  to  their  problems by  proposing  an  intermediate  analysis  in  which Deg is  base-generated in 
SpecAP, without  a  complement,  thus  allowing it  to  be  adjacent  to  the  adjective  (as  in  the  Deg 0-AP 
analysis), while the complement clause is late merged in the position where the degree operator is moved 
to its scope position by quantifier raising (QR) (which accounts for the surface position of the clause) (but 
see Grosu and Horvath 2006 for criticism of such an approach).
Other types of structures have also been proposed in the literature: Lechner (1999) proposes that AP  
is in the Spec of DegP, and Izvorski (1995) proposes a DegP-shell analysis. 
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roughly in terms of their being heads or adjuncts, which reflects their selectional 
properties: the former would exclusively select adjectives, while the latter would be 
compatible  with  all  syntactic  categories  as  long  as  they  have  the  right  sort  of 
meaning.
1.1.2 Degree-less approaches to gradability
1.1.2.1 Vague predicates and degree functions
According to degree-less, or "vague predicate", theories, gradable and non-gradable 
adjectives are expressions of the same semantic type: they denote functions from 
objects to truth values, and are interpreted as properties of individuals (cf. Kamp 
1975, Klein 1980, 1982, Larson 1988, Van Rooij  2008, to  appear).  What  makes 
gradable adjectives special is that their domain is inherently organized as a partial 
ordering  along  some  dimensional  parameter.  Such  adjectives  will  partition  the 
domain, according to a contextual norm value or standard, into a positive extension, 
including those individuals to whom A applies, a negative extension, which contains 
those individuals to whom A does not apply, and an extension gap, including those 
individuals  for  whom  A(x)  is  not  defined.  In  other  words,  while  non-gradable 
adjectives denote complete functions, gradable adjectives denote partial functions.
For example, take a domain D of some model as being made up of John, Peter 
and  Bill,  and  assume  an  ordering  of  D  according  to  the  dimension  of  height. 
Suppose Alex's height is 1.60m, Chris' 1.76m, and Bill's 2.01m. This will result in 
the set {Alex, Chris, Bill,}. A gradable adjective such as tall partitions this ordered 
domain into subsets relative to a standard s, whose value can vary from context to 
context. For example, Chris could be tall for a teenager, but short for a basketball 
player.  In  the  latter  context,  tall might  impose  a  partitioning  into  the  positive 
extension cell tallpos = {Bill} and the negative extension cell tallneg = {Alex, Chris}. 
Then, the proposition Bill is tall comes out as true in the given context, because Bill 
∈ tallpos. 
In a degree-less approach, therefore, adjectives such as tall are interpreted as the 
property of being tall, where what counts as tall depends on the context. In this type 
of analysis, the relation between the subject of predication and the degree to which 
the property denoted by the adjective holds of the subject is not directly encoded in 
the semantics of the adjective, but specified indirectly via the ordering of the domain 
and the contextual  standard value.  In other words,  gradability is  not  a matter of 
degrees  but  a  matter  of  the  presence  of  a  (salient)  ordering.  Consequently,  the 
adjective does not have a degree argument.  As such,  pos is  not  necessary in the 
positive form, and relations between degrees are not made use of in the semantics. 
Instead,  degree  structures,  such  as  the  comparative,  are  represented  as  relations 
between degree functions. 
A degree function performs the role normally played by context, in the sense that 
it fixes the denotation of the adjective, ultimately determining how the domain is to  
be partitioned. To illustrate, consider a comparative such as Chris is taller than Alex 
is in (6)b. The contribution of the comparative here is to partition the domain of tall 
in such a way that Chris in (6)b is tall and Alex is not. Klein (1982) captures this by 
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making use of quantification over degree functions, and defining the comparative in 
terms of a combination of conjunction and negation:6
(6) a. x0 >ζ x1 iff ∃δ [(δ(ζ))(x0) ∧ ¬(δ(ζ))(x1)] 
(where >ζ defines the comparative relation for a vague predicate ζ, and δ is a 
degree function) 
b. Chris is taller than Alex is [AP e]
c. ∃δ[(δ(tall))(Chris) ∧ ¬(δ(tall))(Alex)] 
According to (6)c, (6)b is true in case there is a degree function that, when applied to 
tall,  induces a  partitioning of  the domain so that  the positive extension includes 
Chris, while the negative extension includes Alex.7
In order to make this work, one has to make sure that the degree functions that 
can be made use of are consistent. This is taken care of by the Consistency Postulate  
in (7) (Klein 1982: 126): 
(7) Consistency Postulate (CP) 
∀x0∀x1∀Q [∃δ [((Q))(x0) ∧ ¬δ(Q))(x1)] → ∀δ [(δ(Q))(x1) → δ(Q))(x0)]] 
(where Q is a predicate variable, and δ is a degree function) 
This is a general constraint to which possible degree functions are subject. For an 
example like Chris is taller than Alex this will exclude the possibility that there exist 
two different degree functions such that one of them would make Chris taller than 
Alex  while  the  other  would  make  Alex  taller  than  Chris.  Without  the  CP,  this 
problematic possibility might arise, given the use of the existential quantifier in (6)a. 
One of the advantages of such a degree-less approach is that it does not need to 
posit the null pos marker for the unmodified form of the adjective. Klein argues that 
a theory without pos has to be preferred, as proposals that make use of pos "fail to 
account for the fact that across a wide variety of languages the positive is formally 
unmarked in relation to the comparative" (Klein 1980: 2). In his view, pos is merely 
a device to "fix the semantics". However, one could object to this that  pos in  (5) 
might be seen as a default degree operator that introduces a standard of comparison, 
and  as  such  might  be  predicted  to  usually  surface  as  a  null  operator  cross-
linguistically.
On  the  other  hand,  one  of  the  problematic  parts  of  Klein's  theory  is  the 
interpretation of the  than-clause.  When looking at  the properties of  than-clauses, 
there is strong evidence in favour of treating them as involving an operator–variable 
structure: the  wh-operator may be overt in some languages (e.g. Italian, Bulgarian 
etc.), and than-clauses display typical locality effects (cf. Ross 1967, Bresnan 1975, 
Chomsky 1977, Pinkham 1982 , Izvorski 1995, Kennedy and Merchant 1997 etc.). 
The  operator–variable  structure  is  easily  captured  by  degree-based  approaches, 
6 We have replaced Klein's original  d  for degree function with  δ, following Doetjes, Constantinescu 
and Součková (2011), in order to avoid confusion with degrees, which are usually represented as d. 
7 The difference between the contextual partitioning obtained in the positive, and that induced by a 
degree function is that the latter is bipartite, it does not contain an extension gap. In other words, the  
result of applying a degree function to a gradable adjective is a complete function. 
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which treat the than-clause as involving abstraction over degrees. In contrast, under 
a Klein-type approach, which maps the information contributed by the  than-clause 
into a structure containing a conjunction plus a negation, it is less obvious how the 
properties of than-clauses can be accounted for. There is, however, a recent proposal 
within the degree-less framework which solves this compositionality issue, namely 
that of  Doetjes, Constantinescu and Součková (2011), which will be presented in 
more detail in the next sub-section.8
1.1.2.2 A neo-kleinian approach to gradability
As discussed above, one of the criticisms against degree-less approaches such as 
Klein (1982), which represent comparatives in terms of conjunction and negation of 
degree functions, was that it cannot compositionally account for  than-clauses. An 
alternative degree-less account that circumvents the problems faced by the original 
Kleinian  analysis,  while  still  not  requiring  the  postulation  of  additional  covert 
operators, has  been recently proposed by  Doetjes,  Constantinescu  and  Součková 
(2011) and Doetjes (2009). 
As usual  in a degree-less approach to gradability,  the meaning of a gradable 
expression  is  that  of  a  context-sensitive or  vague predicate. Gradability  is  not  a 
matter of degrees but a matter of the presence of a (salient) ordering, and degree 
structures are represented as relations between degree functions. These can easily be 
translated into set  inclusion relations.  This is  shown in  (8),  where δ is  a  degree 
function and A stands for a gradable adjective:9
(8)     δ1 >A δ2  iff  δ1(A) ⊂ δ2(A)
(where >A expresses an ordering relation between δ1 and δ2 corresponding to 
'being more restrictive/informative')
8 There is also a different type of degree-less approach in the literature: Neeleman, van de Koot and 
Doetjes (2004) propose an alternative formalization, based on second-order quantification, according to 
which a gradable adjective is a set of properties ordered by strength (but otherwise identical). Since a  
gradable adjective like  tall denotes a set of predicates (expressing a variable degree of length, ranging 
from zero to infinity), it cannot be directly applied to an individual; a set must first be selected from this  
set  of sets.  This  is  what  merger  of a degree  expression achieves. In  the  absence of  an overt  degree 
expression, i.e. in the case of APs in the positive form, a covert operation must be postulated to reduce the 
adjective to a single property. This is parallel to the role pos plays in turning the AP into the right sort of 
predicate in degree-based approaches. The need for this sort of mechanism therefore makes this approach 
prone to the same sort of criticism that has been raised in connection with degree-based approaches. 
Bale (2006) similarly proposes representing gradability in terms of equivalence classes, i.e. the set of  
all  individuals  which  are  in  an  equivalence  relation  with  respect  to  a  particular  ordering  relation  
corresponding to an adjective. Equivalence classes have also been used to define degrees in the degree-
based  framework  by  Cresswell  (1976).  Bale's  own account  is  situated  in  between  the  two types  of 
approaches. He does not make use of degrees to define the basic type of gradable adjectives, but defines  
them as relations between individuals (e.g. beautiful is the relation x has as much beauty as y), which still 
makes them fundamentally different from non-gradable adjectives. Subsequently, though, the equivalence 
classes forming the basic scale associated with an adjective are mapped to degrees (on a universal scale);  
and degree structures, such as the comparative, are defined as relations between such degrees. 
9 Or, alternatively: δ1(A) ∩ δ2(A) = δ1(A), where δ1(A) ≠ δ2(A)
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As already mentioned, the degree functions that can be made use of are subject to a 
general constraint, namely the Consistency Postulate (cf. Klein 1982) repeated here 
for convenience:
(9) Consistency Postulate (CP) [=(7)]
∀x0∀x1∀Q [∃δ [((Q))(x0) ∧ ¬δ(Q))(x1)] → ∀δ [(δ(Q))(x1) → δ(Q))(x0)]] 
(where Q is a predicate variable, and δ is a degree function) 
As shown by  Doetjes, Constantinescu and  Součková (2011), as a result of the CP, 
the degree functions are nested: they are ordered with respect to one another, from 
least  to  most  restricted,  or  maximally  informative.  The  ordering  between  the 
different δs reflects the ordering in the domain of the adjective. This is illustrated in 
Figure 1, where the upward arrow indicates that the highest ordered individual is on 
top and the brackets indicate which individuals are included when a given degree 
function applies to the ordered set A (corresponding to a gradable adjective) which 
consists  of  the  individuals  a,  b,  c and  d.  The  most  restricted,  or  maximally 
informative, degree functions are those which, when applied to a gradable adjective, 
result in the most restrictive subset that includes the individuals which are ordered 
highest. This would thus correspond to the highest, or maximal, degree in a degree-
based approach. In the situation depicted in Figure 1, for instance,  δ1  is the most 
restrictive, or maximally informative, degree function.10








Figure 1: The ordering of degree functions (Doetjes, Constantinescu and Součková 
2011)
For  a  more  concrete  example,  consider  the  English  expressions  quite,  very, 
extremely etc.:  they  correspond  to  degree  functions  which  can  be  intrinsically 
ordered with respect  to one another.  In fact,  the ordering of these expressions is 
independent of the adjective to which they are applied: quite > very > extremely, that 
is, extremely always results in a more restricted set than very etc. Note that when a 
10 Note that Doetjes, Constantinescu and Součková (2011) define the ordering relation in terms of more 
or less  restricted. Thus, δ1 <A δ2 expresses that  δ1 is  more restricted than δ2, while the  than-clause 
introduces a minimality operator, which selects the minimal or most restricted δ out of the set defined by 
the operator variable structure in the  than-clause. Here, we use the adapted version adopted by Doetjes 
(2009),  where  the  ordering  between  the  functions  ranges  from  the  minimally  informative  to  the 
maximally informative degree function (cf.  Beck and Rullmann 1999). This makes the analysis more 
transparent to readers used to degree-based approaches.
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less restrictive degree function (e.g. quite) is applied to an adjective, this will result 
in a set which includes the subsets that would result from applying a more restrictive 
degree function (e.g. extremely): e.g. δextremely ⊂ δquite. In other words, the individuals 
that are ordered highest in the domain will also be included in the subsets resulting 
from applying the less restrictive degree functions. This is in fact how monotonicity 
can be expressed in such a degree-less approach, as compared to a degree-based 
approach which would say that a set of degrees will include all lower degrees.
Unlike  Klein's  original  approach,  the  alternative  proposed  by  Doetjes, 
Constantinescu  and  Součková  (2011)  captures  the  semantic  contribution  and 
structure of the  than-clause, thus removing one of the weak points of the original 
degree-less  approach.  Doetjes  et  al.  propose  that  clausal  comparatives  involve  a 
comparison of degree functions, thus making use of the ordering relation between 
the degree functions. More precisely, the than-clause defines the most restrictive, or 
maximally informative, degree function that, when applied to the adjective in the 
main clause, results in a set including its subject. In order for the comparative to be 
true, there should be a more restrictive  or informative degree function that, when 
applied to A, includes the subject of A. A simplified version of the analysis is given 
in (10)b, where δ2 is the maximally informative degree function including Carmen 
when applied to tall and is provided by the than-clause; >tall expresses an ordering 
relation between δ1 and δ2 corresponding to 'being more restrictive, or informative' 
as defined in (8).11
(10) a. Alice is taller than Carmen is 
b. ∃δ1[(δ1(tall))(Alice) & δ1 >tall δ2]
The immediate advantage of this modification of Klein's theory is that it predicts 
that  than-clauses  involve  an  operator  variable  structure,  as  they  involve  an 
abstraction  over  degree  functions.  The  exact  way  the  than-clause  is  interpreted 
depends on the type of comparative involved: (i) ordinary clausal comparatives as in 
(10)a;  (ii)  subcomparatives  involving absolute  comparison (such  as  The table  is  
longer than it is wide); and (iii) subcomparatives with a relative interpretation (e.g. 
Ben  is  funnier  than  Steve  is  rich –  cf.  Kennedy's  1999a,  2001  "comparison  of 
deviation", or Bale's 2006, 2008 "indirect comparison"). 
Doetjes, Constantinescu and Součková (2011) and Doetjes (2009) show that this 
analysis can account for certain other phenomena at least as well as degree-based 
approaches, in particular for comparative phenomena such as cross-polar anomalies 
(i.e. the impossibility to directly compare adjectives of opposite polarity: ??Alice is  
shorter than Carmen is tall), comparison of deviation, incommensurability. These 
are phenomena in connection with which the introduction of degrees as new objects  
in  the  ontology  had  been  argued  to  be  necessary.  Kennedy  (1999a),  but  also 
Bierwisch (1989), argue that an analysis in terms of a partitioning of the domain is 
not sufficient to account for them. See Doetjes, Constantinescu and Součková (2011) 
and Doetjes (2009) for details.
11 Given the scenario depicted in figure 1, if A is tall, a is Alice and c is Carmen, the sentence will come 
out as true, as the maximally informative δ such that δ(tall) includes Carmen (c) is δ3, and there is a more 
informative δ such that δ(tall) includes Alice (a) (namely, δ1 or δ2).
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 In this dissertation, we assume a degree-less approach to gradability is, a priori,  
the simplest  type of  account,  as  it  does  not require any additional  semantic  and 
syntactic machinery, and this advantage becomes clearer especially when gradability 
across  categories  is  considered.  Nevertheless,  alternative  approaches  will  be 
discussed whenever such considerations are relevant. 
1.2 Gradability beyond the adjectival domain
Although most of the semantic and syntactic work on gradability has focused on 
adjectives,  remarks on the cross-categorial  nature of  gradability can be found as 
early as  Sapir  (1944) and Bolinger (1972),  in  particular,  who studies  gradability 
across categories in depth (though he does not provide a formal account), as well as 
in Bresnan (1973),  Maling (1983),  Doetjes (1997),  Paradis  (2001),  Kennedy and 
McNally (2005), Sassoon (2007a). In this section we will raise the question of where 
gradability is to be found outside of the adjectival domain. The discussion serves to 
introduce some of the issues that will be addressed in this dissertation.
There are two directions from which gradability has been approached outside of 
the adjectival domain. One is prompted by the observation that cross-linguistically 
degree modifiers can be found which can combine with other lexical categories as 
well.  These  are  expressions  such  as  more,  enough, less  in  English, trop 
'too(much/many)' in French,  atât 'so(much/many)' etc. in Romanian. These are the 
so-called "degree quantifiers", to use the term introduced by Doetjes (1997), which 
can combine with (gradable) adjectives, (certain types of) verbs, and with plural and 
mass nouns:12
(11)  [English] [French] [Romanian]
a. more intelligent trop intelligent atât de inteligent
'too intelligent' 'so intelligent'
b. more wine (than water) trop de vin atâta vin
'too much wine' 'so much wine'
c. more books (than pens) trop de livres atâtea cărţi
'too many books' 'so many books'
d. to sleep more (than Peter) trop dormir a dormi atât 
'to sleep too much' 'to sleep so much'
Note that while  (11)a is about the degree (of intensity) to which a property holds, 
and which is said to exceed the degree to which someone else is intelligent, the cases 
illustrated in (11)b-d involve quantity readings, or what Bolinger (1972) would call 
"extensively" gradable interpretations. (11)b, which contains mass nouns, compares 
amounts of stuff, while  (11)c, with plural nouns, compares the number of entities. 
Verbs pattern with nouns: (11)d is not understood in terms of the degree to which the 
12 See  Corver  (1997a,b),  Doetjes  (1997)  and  Neeleman,  van  de  Koot  and  Doetjes  (2004)  who 
distinguish two classes of degree expressions, based on distinct syntactic behaviour: those degree words 
that can only combine with APs and those that can combine with other lexical categories as well (though 
they provide different accounts).
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property denoted by the verb is manifested in an entity, but in terms of "quantity" of  
the activity, i.e. in terms of the temporal duration of sleeping, which is said to exceed 
that of Peter's sleeping. And in examples like  eating more, the comparative would 
apply to one of the verb's arguments, i.e.  more  refers to the quantity of the object 
(food) that is consumed.  In sum, in examples such as  (11)b-d, degree quantifiers 
measure and compare along a scale of quantity, while in  (11)a they make use of a 
scale that corresponds to (the intensity of) a property. 
A  second  type  of  observation  is  that  other  lexical  categories  also  include 
expressions  that  seem to identify  a  scale  in  their  lexical,  conventional  meaning, 
corresponding to a property that may hold of individuals to a higher or lower degree 
(of  intensity),  in  a  similar  way to  gradable  adjectives.  They  may be  said  to  be 
"intensively" gradable (cf. Bolinger 1972). Consider the following examples:
(12) a. a big idiot [English]
b. un gros con [French] 
a big idiot 
'a big idiot'
c. un mare nătărău. [Romanian] 
a big idiot 
'a big idiot' 
The adjective big seems to contribute a (high) degree interpretation: a big idiot is 'a 
very idiotic person'. In other words, the relation between the adjective  big and the 
noun it modifies seems to parallel the relation of a degree modifier (e.g. very) to an 
adjective – e.g.  very idiotic.  This  shows that  there are nouns which allow us to 
conceive of them as holding of an entity to varying degrees. In this they contrast 
with ordinary nouns, such as person, lawyer etc.; predications involving such nouns 
are typically felt to imply that the entity in question either is or is not identified by 
the noun. That is, someone is or is not a lawyer; "they may be a good lawyer or a 
bad one, but their being good does not make them more a lawyer, nor their being 
bad, less" (Bolinger 1972: 15).
A similar distinction is found in the verbal domain. Compare (11)d to (13) below. 
One may eat, sleep, dance etc. or not, but whether one eats or dances slow or fast, or 
much or  little,  is  not  reflected  in  degrees  to  which  entities  manifest  the  verbal 
property  (cf.  Bolinger  1972:  15).  Eat,  sleep,  dance are  non-gradable  verbs,  and 
expressions  like  more etc.  only  refer  to  the  quantity  consumed  or  the  temporal 
duration of the activity. However, there are verbs which express processes or states 
that may hold of their subjects to various degrees. One can, for example, like, love, 
appreciate  etc. something or someone to a higher or lower degree. Such verbs are 
gradable. For example, (13)a is interpreted as stating that the degree to which Peter 
likes chocolate exceeds the degree to which his brother likes chocolate.  (13)b  and 
(13)c  similarly  compare  extents  to  which  the  properties  expressed  by  the  verbs 
(appreciate, interest) are manifested in entities.13
(13) a. Peter likes chocolate {more/ less} than his brother. 
13 Examples (13)b,c are from Doetjes (2008) and Sassoon (2007a), respectively. 
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b. John appreciated the comments less than he should.
c. Today's film interested Dan more than yesterday's film did.
In sum, these two facets of gradability may be summed up by saying that there 
are two types of scales with respect to which degree modifiers can be interpreted,  
namely  the  scale  of  quantity,  as  in  (11)b-d,  and  the  scale  corresponding to  (the 
intensity of) a property (or 'quality scale'), as in (11)a, (12) and (13). Focusing now 
on the nominal facts, (11)b,c and (12) suggest that gradability in the nominal domain 
becomes relevant at two different levels in the DP structure, in two different ways. 
That  is,  the  two types  of  scales  seem to  be  available  in  different  layers  of  the  
structure to different types of expressions. When expressions such as  more, which 
are used as degree modifiers in other contexts, combine with nouns, they appear  
high in the DP structure and only give rise to quantity readings not pure degree 
readings. Pure degree (intensity) interpretations in the nominal domain are realised 
by means of modification by (certain types of) adjectives, that are located lower in  
the DP structure (big idiot,  complete fool,  great patience, amazing courage  etc.). 
This is illustrated in  (14), which shows that  the two types of expressions, namely 
degree quantifiers and "degree adjectives", can co-occur within the same DP  and 
they do so in this specific order.
(14) a. more big idiots [English] 
b. {plus/ trop} de grands cons [French] 
more/ too.many of big idiots 
'{more/ too many} big idiots' 
c. atâţia mari nătărăi [Romanian] 
so.many big idiots 
'so many big idiots' 
Moreover, degree quantifiers like more have to appear at this higher structural level 
within the DP, they cannot appear lower in the DP structure. They only select mass 
and plural nouns, and cannot give rise to pure degree interpretations. 
(15) a. *a more idiot [English] 
b. *un {plus/ trop} idiot [French] 
  a  more /too.much idiot 
c. *un atât de nătărău [Romanian] 
  a so.much of idiot  
This distinction in terms of structural position and the associated difference in 
interpretation  is  not  found  in  the  adjectival  domain.  The  facts  reviewed  so  far 
already raise certain questions. First of all, how can the cross-categorial distribution 
of  (certain)  degree  modifiers  be  captured,  while  also  taking  into  account  the 
somewhat different interpretations they give rise to in the different contexts, namely 
degree of (intensity of) a property and (degree of) quantity, as illustrated in (11)a vs. 
(11)b,c above? And how to explain the fact that  in the nominal domain they are 
actually  restricted  to  a  quantity  scale?  This  is  quite  puzzling.  Their  exclusive 
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compatibility with plural and mass nouns suggests that they are sensitive to a certain 
semantic  property  of  nouns,  namely  cumulative  reference  (cf.  Doetjes  1997)  or 
monotonicity  as defined on the part structure of nouns (cf.  Schwarzschild 2006), 
while  this  property  does  not  condition  gradability  in  the  case  of  adjectives  (see 
discussion in Doetjes 1997). Some suggestions in this connection will be made in 
the concluding chapter of this dissertation. A more basic question that arises is: what 
should "gradability" be used for in the nominal domain? Which nouns are gradable,  
and based on which criteria can they be categorized as such? This  is the  question 
that will in fact occupy us in the rest of this dissertation. It will already be addressed 
in section 2 of this chapter where the tests for gradability proposed in the literature  
will  be  presented.  From that  brief  overview  it  will  become apparent  that  these 
diagnostics are not unproblematic. In chapters 2-4, we will re-examine some of these 
environments  in  more  detail  and  show  that  in  fact  they  are  not  good  tests  for 
gradability and do not provide conclusive evidence in favour of the existence of 
gradable structure in nouns that would be (completely) parallel to what we know 
from the adjectival domain. Finally, the facts briefly above raise the question as to 
how  gradability  is to  be  represented  in  the  nominal  domain,  semantically  and 
syntactically, especially in view of the two types of interpretations found at different 
levels in the structure and realised by different means. What is the relation between 
degree of a property and quantity? Some suggestions in this respect will be made in 
the  concluding  chapter,  where  we  discuss  the  consequences  that the  (negative) 
results of the investigation carried out in this dissertation have for the representation 
of gradability.
Similar issues arise in connection with the verbal domain: the locus and nature of 
gradability,  the  consequences  the  choices  made  with  respect  to  the  semantic 
representation  of  gradability  will  have  on  the  syntactic  structures  assumed,  the 
interaction  with  other  semantic  and  syntactic  components  or layers  of  verbal 
structure etc.  A significant  amount of work has  already been done in  the verbal  
domain  (see,  among  others:  Abusch  1986,  Dowty  1991,  Doetjes  1997,  Hay, 
Kennedy  and  Levin  1999,  Vanden  Wyngaerd  2001,  Caudal  and  Nicolas  2005, 
Kennedy  and  Levin  2008,  Rappaport-Hovav  2008,  Rothstein  2008,  Levin  and 
Rappaport-Hovav 2010),14 though still more research is needed to shed more light on 
gradability in this domain. 
Indeed,  for  a  full  understanding  of  gradability,  a  systematic  study  of  its 
manifestations across all categories is needed. This dissertation will take a step in 
this direction, by examining gradability in the nominal domain. The aim we start out 
with seems to be a rather simple one: we would like to know which expressions, if 
any, can be taken to be gradable in this domain. This is why, in the second part of  
this  chapter,  we  will  review  the  tests  that  have  been  used  in  the  literature  for 
diagnosing nominal gradability. As it turns out, these diagnostics raise a number of 
problematic issues which will provide the ground for the rest of this dissertation.
14 In the verbal domain, a lot of focus has been on the semantics of degree achievements, which has  
received both degree-based (Hay, Kennedy, and Levin 1999, Kennedy and Levin 2008, Rappaport-Hovav 
2008, Levin and Rappaport-Hovav 2010, Rothstein 2008) and degree-less analyses (Abusch 1986).
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2 Identifying gradability in the nominal domain 
The aim of this section is to delimit the domain of investigation to be carried out in 
this  dissertation.  In  order  to  do  so,  it  is  necessary  to  identify  the  semantic  and  
syntactic properties that can be used as diagnostics for gradability in the nominal 
domain and that could motivate  (the linguistic relevance of)  a distinction between 
gradable  and  non-gradable  nouns.  Several  possible  tests  for  nominal  gradability 
have been proposed in the literature. These include the types of interpretations nouns 
receive when they are used in particular environments, such as wh-exclamatives (cf. 
Bolinger 1972, Milner  1978 a.o.)  and with what  have been argued to be degree 
operators, namely  such,  quite (cf. Bolinger 1972, Matushansky 2002b,  Birner and 
Kaplan 2004 a.o.). Another type of test consists of the availability of certain types of 
adjectival modifiers (i.e. "degree adjectives") which can give rise to degree readings 
(cf.  Bolinger  1972,  Matushansky  2002b,  Morzycki  2009).  Finally,  another 
diagnostic  for  gradability  has  been  taken  to  be  their  distribution  in  particular 
syntactic structures, such as the  N of an N construction (cf. Bolinger 1972, Milner 
1978, Matushansky 2002c a.o.) and as nominal predicates with  seem (cf. Bolinger 
1972, Matushansky 2002b). In §2.1-§2.3 we will examine each of these tests in turn, 
showing how they have been used in the literature, as well as confronting them with 
new data. This is a necessary step especially since not all of these tests have always  
been applied to all of the same types of nouns in the different works that we will be 
referring  to.  For  example,  while  Bolinger  (1972)  studies  the  distribution  and 
interpretations of a large variety of English nouns in all these environments (though 
less in  N of an N structures),  Milner  (1978) only concentrates  on epithet  nouns, 
including nouns like idiot, in  the  N of  an N construction (also mentioning their 
behaviour in wh-exclamatives). Morzycki (2009) only looks at nouns like idiot and 
eater which  can  be  modified  by  adjectives  such  as  big in  a  degree  sense. 
Matushansky (2002b) takes a cross-categorial perspective on gradability ("scalarity", 
in her terminology), but she only briefly mentions diagnostics such as interpretation 
and distribution in  wh-exclamatives, with the degree operators  such and  quite, and 
degree adjectives like utter, while trying to account for the behaviour of seem. 
Closer  scrutiny  reveals  that these  tests  yield  diverging  results,  which  raises 
questions as  to the gradable/  non-gradable status  of  certain nouns,  and/or  to  the 
reliability of some of  the tests,  as will  be discussed in more detail  in  §2.4.  The 
discussion suggests that a more careful and systematic investigation is needed in 
order to sort out cases of genuine gradability from those of only apparent gradability, 
and the genuine tests for gradability from those that are better treated in a different 
way. In the coming chapters, therefore, we will re-examine these tests in more detail  
and propose, in fact, that they should be analysed in quite radically different ways. 
This section, therefore, is intended to set the scene for the issues that will be 
dealt  with in this dissertation,  by critically  evaluating the received view on (the  
diagnostics for) gradable nouns.
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2.1 Wh-exclamatives, such, quite and more of an N
This sub-section will examine the first type of environment which has been claimed 
to  point  to  a  linguistic  distinction  between  gradable  nouns  and  ordinary,  non-
gradable common nouns. This includes  wh-exclamatives, structures with  such  and 
quite containing unmodified nouns, as well as structures of the type much/ more of  
an  N.  These  have  been  argued  to  give  rise  to  different  types  of  interpretations 
depending  on  the  type  of  noun used.  Consequently,  the  different  interpretations 
found  in  the  context  of  these  elements,  which  have  generally  been  analysed  as 
degree operators, can be used to identify the type of noun, namely gradable vs. non-
gradable.  In  addition,  in  the  case  of  such,  this  difference  in  interpretation  also 
correlates with a difference in distribution: it has been claimed that only when such 
structures contain gradable nouns can they be used as exclamatives and with result 
clauses.
2.1.1 Wh-exclamatives
It has been argued that nominal  wh-exclamatives (i.e. those containing unmodified 
nouns) receive different types of interpretations depending on the type of noun used 
(Bolinger 1972, Milner 1978, Ruwet 1982, Matushansky 2002b etc.); this distinction 
in interpretation can thus be used as  a test  to identify the type of noun, namely 
gradable or non-gradable. 
Consider, to start with, the following example:
(16) What an idiot John is!
In this example, the exclamation is about the degree to which John has the property 
denoted  by  the  nouns  idiot. The  sentence  is  equivalent  to  one  containing  the 
corresponding adjective: how idiotic John is! In other words, the wh-exclamative is 
interpreted as intensifying some gradable property inherent to the lexical meaning of 
the noun,  namely idiocy. Bolinger (1972) calls this the  "intensifying" use of  what; 
we will henceforth refer to it as the "internal degree" interpretation. Now compare 
this to the following example:
(17) What a guy John is!
Here, John is simply identified as a particular type of individual, as characterized by 
some external  property  which  is  left  implicit.  Being  a  guy is  assumed,  and  the 
surprise is directed at this implicit quality, external to the fact of being a guy, such as 
being  extraordinarily  or  surprisingly  reckless,  inventive,  amusing  etc.  Bolinger 
(1972) calls this the  "identifying" use of  what. This label is somewhat misleading 
though, since with  wh-exclamatives there is always a sense of intensification. The 
difference between cases like (16) and (17) lies rather in whether the property which 
triggers the exclamation is contained in the meaning of the noun itself, or whether it  
is external to the lexical meaning of the noun and is to be somehow inferred from 
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the context. For this reason, we will use the term "external (degree)" interpretation to 
refer to the sort of interpretation found in examples like (17).
Bolinger (1972) notes that  what  may have an external reading in  (16) too: the 
sentence could be uttered when what is unexpected is not the high degree of idiocy,  
but some other property someone who is idiotic may be distinguished by – e.g. he is 
a very friendly idiot. Nevertheless, this is not an easily available interpretation (cf.  
also  Matushansky  2002b);  the  degree  interpretation  is  clearly  the  default  one. 
Crucially,  however,  the reverse is  not  found: the internal  degree interpretation is 
simply not available in (17). 
(18) Therefore, while the external interpretation is available to practically any 
noun, of any type, [+/-mass], [+/-human], concrete or abstract,  the internal degree 
interpretation is restricted to a subset of common nouns. Intuitively, these are nouns 
that include a gradable property in their lexical, conventional meaning which can be 
targeted by what. These are then assumed to be gradable nouns. The nouns which do 
not allow the internal  degree interpretation and can only give rise to an  external 
interpretation in wh-exclamatives, such as (17) above, are taken to be non-gradable. 
They  include  no  inherent  gradable  property  in  their  meaning  which  can  be 
intensified by  what; the entity under discussion is simply identified  as a particular 
type of N, and the evaluation is always made with respect to some external property 
that has to be recovered from the context.15 In sum, this test for gradability consists 
in the availability of the internal degree interpretation in  wh-exclamatives. This is 
what would identify nouns as gradable.
The example in (16) has already illustrated a sub-class of such nouns, namely 
those which categorize individuals via a salient gradable property, and which are 
often  derived  from  or  otherwise  related  to  gradable  adjectives.  Other  examples 
include  fool,  genius, (jazz-)enthusiast  etc.,  as well as certain nouns derived from 
other  gradable  nouns  (e.g.  blunderer)  or  from gradable  or  non-gradable  activity 
verbs by means of the agentive suffix –er (e.g. liar, eater etc.):
(19) a. What a blunderer!
b. What a liar John is!
c. What {an eater/ a drinker} John is!
(19)a expresses surprise at what serious, embarrassing mistakes or how many such 
mistakes  someone  makes;  (19)b  exclaims  at  how  much  someone  lies  or  what 
outrageous lies they tend to tell; and (19)c at how much someone eats or drinks. So 
some inherent gradable meaning seems to be targeted with these nouns too, with the  
difference that, in cases like (19)c especially, it is a notion of quantity that seems to 
be built  into the meaning of  the nouns,  rather  than a  gradable property such as 
idiocy.  Another  subclass  of  nouns that  qualify as  gradable  according to  this  test 
consists of mass nouns such as  nonsense,  misbehaviour,  abundance  (cf.  Bolinger 
1972), and the whole series of abstract mass nouns naming properties or qualities, 
such as wisdom, courage, dedication, patience etc. (cf. Van de Velde 1996, Tovena 
15 The sense of the evaluation is not predetermined; it may be either positive or negative, depending on 
context, and usually indicated by the intonation. So (17) above for example may be interpreted as 'what a 
great guy' or 'what an awful guy'.
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2001).  The examples  below get  an  internal  degree  interpretation,  where  what  is 
exclaimed at is the high degree of nonsensicality and courage, respectively:
(20) a. What nonsense he's talking!
b. What courage they showed!
In  addition  to  these  two  classes  of  nouns,  there  is  another  large  and  more 
heterogeneous class of nouns that have been claimed to give rise to internal degree 
interpretations; we include here (mostly count) nouns denoting (abstract or concrete) 
objects,  such  as  smell,  prize,  deal,  bargain,  effort,  scowl,  difficulties; mistake, 
failure,  success,  blunder,  masterpiece,  blaze,  inconvenience,  extremes,  trivialities, 
harangue,  flare-up,  appetite;  stink,  fragrance,  boon,  gyp;  disaster,  chaos, 
impertinence, mess etc. (cf. Bolinger 1972):16
(21) a. What a {deal/ bargain} we got!
b. What efforts they had to make!
c. What a mistake he made!
d. What a failure their enterprise was!
In sum, all the nouns illustrated in (16), (19)-(21) would qualify as gradable by 
this test  since they can receive an internal degree interpretation, though they may 
differ  somewhat  with  respect  to  how  salient  or  easily  accessible  the  relevant 
interpretation is. 
An interesting class of nouns is that of nouns denoting professions. Consider the 
following examples:
(22) What a {doctor/ attorney/ monarch/ teacher/ informant} John is!
These examples all give rise to an external interpretation. What is interesting to note 
is that the most prominent interpretation is one in which what is being exclaimed at 
is the quality with which John performs the respective jobs, i.e. he is good or bad as 
a  doctor  etc.  Unlike  other  non-gradable  nouns,  a  profession  noun  makes  easily 
available what we may call the 'function' dimension along which the individual can 
be evaluated. Interestingly, informants in fact find examples of profession nouns in 
wh-exclamatives significantly easier to interpret (in the absence of any other overt 
modifiers) than other non-gradable nouns such as person, house, dress etc.
Profession  nouns  have  also  been  claimed  to  give  rise  to  other  types  of 
interpretations  in  wh-exclamatives.  Bolinger  (1972:72-73)  points  out  that  in  an 
example like (23) below the exclamation may refer to the essence of being a lawyer 
– he is the perfect example, the embodiment of a lawyer; he is the perfect lawyer. In 
other words, it receives what may be called a prototypical interpretation. 
(23) What a lawyer John is!
16 Both  interpretations  may be  available  in  fact,  but  nouns  may differ  as  to  how salient  or  easily 
accessible either one of these interpretations is – see Bolinger (1972) for extensive discussion of the data.
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It  seems  that  unlike  in  the  usual  external  interpretation,  in  this  prototypical 
interpretation the property targeted by the wh-exclamative can be retrieved without 
the help of context.17 However, it is not completely clear that this should be treated 
as a different sort of interpretation. Given that in the usual cases the interpretation 
can be paraphrased by means of adjectives such as extraordinary,  outstanding etc., 
and that with profession nouns it is the quality as an N that is being evaluated, it is  
not unlikely that this may come close to understanding that  x is a 'perfect N'. The 
picture is also complicated by the existence of yet another type of interpretation. 
Consider the following examples:
(24) What a {lawyer/ prince/ scholar/ informer/ clown} John is!
The nouns in these examples may be interpreted metaphorically or figuratively. The 
exclamation applies to the subject's having properties stereotypically associated with 
being N, for example being a litigious person in the case of  lawyer, a nice, well-
mannered fellow for prince, a very knowledgeable person for scholar, someone who 
tells on people for  informer, and a funny fellow for  clown (cf. Bolinger 1972, see 
also Matushansky 2002b). John is not an actual lawyer, prince, scholar, informer or 
clown; and the examples may be paraphrased by  –like adjectives: 'John is lawyer-
like' etc. In this respect, this type of interpretation differs from the interpretations 
discussed in relation to examples (22) and (23) above, where John has the respective 
profession.  In  other  words,  there  seems  to  be  a  difference  in  truth-conditions 
between them. Note also that not all profession nouns can have such uses – cp. e.g 
(22) to (24). The availability of such interpretations depends not only on lexical or 
semantic  factors,  but  also  on  pragmatic  ones;  it  depends  on  speakers'  world 
knowledge,18 and as such it is expected that they would be encountered more easily 
with  nouns  that  refer  to  professions  that  are  more  readily  associated  with 
stereotypical  images  due  to  clear  social  status  or  to  being  associated  with  one 
particularly  clear  function  (e.g.  making  people  laugh  in  the  case  of  clowns).19 
However, nouns which refer to the same or very similar professions may behave 
differently  with  respect  to  whether  such  a  figurative  interpretation  is  (easily) 
available, as witnessed by pairs such as lawyer vs. attorney, informer vs. informant 
etc.20, where the former but not the latter have such uses.
17 Bolinger (1972) also notes that the same type of interpretation is encountered in (i) where the noun is  
prosodically stretched:
(i) That man's not just a lawyer, he is a l a w y e r !
This is particularly interesting since the same prosodic treatment is typically accorded to gradable nouns 
such as  idiot, fool  etc., while a non-gradable noun like  lad  would not be prosodically stretched in the 
predicate:
(ii) a. *He's a l a d !
b. He's a f o o l !
18 Consequently, we also expect the profession nouns that have such uses to differ to some extent from 
one language to another. In Romanian but not in English, for example, engineer may be used figuratively 
to indicate that someone does not have a very imaginative or flexible thinking.
19 We will return to a more detailed discussion of stereotypical interpretations in chapter 3. 
20 It seems that the nouns in these pairs which allow the relevant interpretation are those that are more 
general terms, possibly hyperonyms in the respective semantic field, while those that do not are more 
specific or specialized either in terms of their meaning or of the registers in which they are used (e.g.  
lawyer vs. attorney or sollicitor;  scholar or artist  vs. teacher or painter etc.); sometimes this difference 
24 CHAPTER 1
Such  metaphorical  or  figurative  interpretations,  whereby  an  individual  is 
attributed properties stereotypically associated with being N, can also be found with 
other basically non-gradable nouns, whether [+human] (e.g.  man, boy, child, baby 
etc.) or [-human] (e.g. hut, palace, pigsty etc.). Nouns are normally used in this way 
to convey some kind of evaluation, whether positive or negative, and are thus close 
to epithets.21
(25) a. What a {man/ baby} John is! 
b. What a {palace/ pigsty} this place is!
To conclude,  this  section has  shown how the interpretations obtained in  wh-
exclamatives may be used as a test for gradability and which nouns would qualify as  
gradable by this  test.  In  addition to  nouns that  quite  straightforwardly encode a 
gradable property in their lexical meaning, such as  idiot, jazz-enthusiast,  courage, 
blunder, mess etc., another class that seems to give rise to the relevant interpretation 
is that of nouns that receive figurative stereotypical interpretations which seem to 
correlate  with  some  sort  of  evaluation  (e.g.  pigsty  etc.),  i.e.  the  case  of 
(quasi-)epithet uses. In chapter 3 we will return to a discussion of wh-exclamatives 
and suggest that they involve a mechanism which arguably applies in the same way 
to  both  gradable  and  non  gradable  nouns.  As  for  figurative  stereotypical 
interpretations and (quasi-)epithetic uses of nouns, questions will arise concerning 
their status when other tests are considered too, namely such, and especially N of an 
N. The issue will be taken up in the re-examination of N of an N in chapter 2 and in 
the analysis of such in chapter 3, where it will be argued that these are not gradable 
meanings.
2.1.2 Such 
Another possible test for gradability consists of the possible co-occurrence, under a 
particular  interpretation,  with  such.  Similarly  to  wh-exclamatives,  it  has  been 
observed that with such there is a difference in available interpretations depending 
on the type of noun used. In fact, based on this observation, it has been proposed in 
the literature that there is a distinction between a kind or  "identifying" such  and a 
"degree" or  "intensifying" such (Bolinger  1972,  Carlson  1977,  Siegel  1994, 
Landman and Morzycki 2003, Wood 2002, Landman 2006 a.o.).22 
correlates with a difference in the morphological make-up of the nouns (e.g. informer vs. informant). The 
latter  aspect  will  not  be  investigated  here;  for  more  discussion  of  (the  availability  of)  the  type  of 
interpretation found in examples like  (24) above, see chapter 2 (§3.3.1.2,  §3.3.2.2). chapter 3 (§3.4.1), 
chapter 4 (§2.1).
21 Epithets are noun phrases used to characterize the nature of an individual (e.g.  bastard, sissy, jerk  
etc.;  often  based  on  stereotyped  metaphors:  trash,  wreck,  angel,  jewel,  mouse,  pig,  dog etc.)  and 
contribute mainly affective meaning, which is typically negative: contempt, anger, irony etc. (cf. Bolinger 
1972, see also Milner 1978, Ruwet 1982, and chapter 2 for a discussion of epithets). As such, when they 
are used in exclamatives, there is no ambiguity as to the orientation of the evaluation (cf. Milner 1978).
22 Bolinger  (1972)  actually  points  out  that  while  "identifier" such  identifies  a  particular  (type  of) 
individual, "intensifier" such also identifies, though not with a particular individual, but with a particular 
degree, and the difference can be assigned to the semantic component of the noun that is determined by 
such: "individuality" with non-gradable nouns, "degree" of some quality with gradable nouns.
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Consider the following example taken from Bolinger (1972):
(26) Such a person always frightens me.
Here,  such  is  used to identify a particular type of individual based on (or,  more 
precisely, by co-reference with) some external property that is to be recovered from 
the linguistic or extra-linguistic context, i.e. anaphorically or deictically. This is the 
"identifying" use of  such, or the  "kind" such. In  (27) below, on the other hand, a 
different interpretation is available:
(27) We cannot hire such an idiot. 
This example can be interpreted in terms of the high degree to which the property 
denoted by the noun, namely idiocy, holds of the individual in question.  Such an 
idiot is equivalent to a structure  containing the corresponding adjective: 'someone 
who is  so idiotic'. This is the "intensifying" use or  "degree" interpretation of  such, 
which parallels the interpretation of what in (16) in §2.1.1.
Just as in the case of wh-exclamatives, the availability of a degree interpretation 
has  been  taken  as  a  test  to  identify  gradable nouns.  As  noted  above  for  wh-
exclamatives, a kind interpretation may be available with gradable nouns too, as in 
(27), though maybe not as prominently. In other words, kind such can be used with 
any noun. But, crucially, there are nouns which are only compatible with kind such 
and not with degree  such; for example, no degree interpretation is available with 
nouns like person in (26). The nouns that do not allow the degree interpretation and 
can only give rise to a kind interpretation are assumed to be non-gradable nouns.
Unlike  wh-exclamatives,  where there is  always some sense of intensification, 
even if in relation to an external property, kind  such  receives a completely neutral 
kind interpretation ('a person of that kind') without any additional tinges of meaning. 
Under this interpretation,  such  NPs cannot in fact be used in exclamatives, while 
degree  such  can. They also resist the use of result clauses, again in contrast with 
degree such, and combine instead with as-clauses. In other words, the difference in 
interpretation correlates with an additional difference in distribution. The contrast is 
illustrated below:
(28) a. *He is such a person that I can't trust him. [kind]
b. *He's such a person!
(29) a. He is such a fool that I can't trust him. [degree]
b. He is such a fool!
The nouns which were seen to allow the internal degree interpretation in  wh-
exclamatives  can  also co-occur  with degree  such,  i.e.  with result  clauses  and  in 
exclamatives, on a degree interpretation of such. These are [+human] gradable nouns 
like  idiot,  fool,  genius,  enthusiast,  liar, eater  etc.,23 and [-human] nouns, including 
23 Bolinger also notes the following examples of compound agentive nouns that can be intensified in the 
same way:
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mass and count nouns – e.g.  nonsense;  courage,  patience  etc.;  smell,  prize,  deal, 
bargain, effort etc.; mistake, failure, success, blunder, masterpiece, blaze, extremes, 
trivialities, appetite etc.; stink, fragrance, boon, gyp; disaster, chaos, mess etc. Some 
examples are given below, which may be compared with examples (19)-(21) in the 
previous sub-section.24
(30) a. We can't afford to hire such an eater to wait on customers; he wants to 
sample everything in the candy counter.
b. He is such a liar!
(31) a. He was talking such nonsense that everybody laughed at him.
b. He showed such courage in battle that he was awarded the highest 
distinction.
(32) a. He spent such a fortune on it that he went bankrupt. 
b. He committed such a blunder that the department lost prestige. 
c. There was such a {stink/ mess} in the room!
By contrast, the nouns that came out as non-gradable according to the previous 
test cannot be used with with degree such in this way, as illustrated in (33), but can 
only co-occur with the anaphoric or deictic  kind use of such, as in (34). These are 
[+human]  or  [-human],  count  or  mass,  concrete  or  abstract,  nouns,  such  as 
individual,  person, guy,  lad  etc.,  house,  dwelling;  dress,  telescope;  scent,  award, 
purchase,  sale,  transaction,  attempt(s),  expression,  situation  etc.,  wine etc.; 
information; behaviour etc..
(33) a. *It is such a telescope! (that everyone would want to have it)
b. *They made such attempts!
(34) a. We need such a telescope (as they have at the other station).
b. They have been trying to improve the education system by introducing 
new reforms for years now, but all such attempts have failed so far.
Nouns  referring  to  professions,  such  as attorney, doctor, farmer,  postman, 
monarch, teacher, informant etc., are also incompatible with degree such:
(35) *He is such a postman!
However, some examples are found, such as the ones in (36). Matushansky (2002b) 
claims that  (36)a is  interpreted as 'such a  typical linguist',  a paraphrase which is 
similar to the prototypical interpretation identified above for wh-exclamatives. 
(i) a. He is such a woman-chaser.
b. He is such a weaver of lies.
24 Examples (30)a, (31)a, (32), and (33)b are taken from Bolinger (1972).
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(36) a. He's such a linguist! (he'd ask for grammaticality judgments even while 
the plane he's on is being hijacked!)
b. But I'm such a linguist that I'd start subconsciously mimicking the sounds 
they'd make.
In the previous sub-section some doubts were expressed as to whether this is the 
proper way of understanding such examples, or whether this interpretation can be 
reduced to one of the other types of interpretations identified, namely the external 
interpretation of  wh-exclamatives (which, in the case of profession nouns is most 
saliently restricted to an evaluation of the quality which which a given individual 
performs  the  respective  job  or  function)  or  the  figurative,  stereotypical 
interpretation. We are now in a position to provide an answer to this question in 
relation  to  examples  like  (36).  The  former  interpretation  basically  rests  on  the 
possibility of retrieving and interpreting an implicit external property. This strategy 
is not available in structures with such, as shown by the ungrammaticality of non-
gradable nouns in the specific contexts (e.g.  (28),  (33),  (35)).  Otherwise, i.e. if the 
option to fill in a contextual property were available, they should be acceptable, just 
as  they  are  in  wh-exclamatives,  and  only  receive  a  different  interpretation.  This 
suggests that this is not  how the interpretation found in (36) is obtained. The latter 
sort of interpretation, however, is found in the typical degree such contexts. That is, 
if a noun can be construed in a figurative sense, in which it would describe someone 
who  has  properties  stereotypically  associated  with  being  N,  then  it  becomes 
compatible with degree such, i.e. with result clauses and exclamations. Just as noted 
in connection with wh-exclamatives, such metaphorical, stereotypical interpretations 
can be obtained with (certain) profession nouns, such as  prince,  lawyer,  scholar, 
informer,  clown etc.,  but also with non-profession  nouns,  whether [+human] or [-
human], such  as man,  baby,  child  etc.,  hut,  palace,  mansion;  hovel,  pigsty  etc., 
including nouns which are typically used as epithets. These are all illustrated in (37)-
(40).
(37) He is such a clown!
(38) Don't be such a baby!
(39) a. Their new house is such a palace!
b. Those '50s Cadillacs were such boats! (you couldn't ride in them for a 
few minutes without getting sick!)
(40) a. She is such an angel!
b. He is such a {lamebrain/ bastard}! 
We would like to propose, therefore, that cases like He's such a linguist!, which 
have been claimed to have a prototypical interpretation, in fact share the same sort of 
interpretation  exhibited  by  examples  like  (37)-(40),  namely  one  which  involves 
stereotypical  properties associated with N. In the case of  linguist,  these could be 
showing  extraordinary  sensitivity  to  or  interest  in  language,  including  sounds, 
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grammar etc. In fact, if one allowed for prototypical interpretations, it would be hard 
to explain why not just any noun that denotes (a set of) objects which come with 
prototypes, or prototypical examples, but which lack stereotypical associations, (e.g. 
bird etc.), can be used with degree such:
(41) #This robin is such a bird!
We would  like  to suggest  that  the  apparent  difference  in  interpretation  between 
examples like (36) and (37)-(40) stems from an independent difference concerning 
the individuals they are predicated of. If the individual referred to by the subject DP 
is already an actual N, then predicating  such an N of this individual will result in 
what looks like a prototypical interpretation. This is because the sentence ends up 
being about someone who is an actual N, i.e. has the core, definitional properties of 
N (e.g. the respective job in the case of  linguist), as well as having stereotypical, 
non-essential properties usually associated with being an N.25 It is this conspiracy of 
factors that makes the respective individual look like the perfect exemplar of the 
category denoted by the N, i.e. the prototypical N. In case the individual denoted by 
the  subject  DP is  not  actually  an  N,  however,  the  sentence  will  only  contain  a 
predicate  that  attributes  stereotypical,  non-essential  properties  of  N  to  that 
individual.  This  is  the figurative use of  the nouns in  (37)-(40) (and  (24)-(25) in 
§2.1.1). While a figurative use implies a stereotypical interpretation, the reverse does 
not hold: a stereotypical interpretation does not necessarily imply a figurative use.  
Nothing excludes that in the domain covered by the stereotypical interpretation of a 
noun N there will also be individuals that are actual Ns, as long as they exhibit the  
required type of properties too, i.e. stereotypical properties associated with the kind.
Judging  by  the  distribution  and  interpretation  in  wh-exclamatives  and  with 
degree  such,  it  can be observed that  nouns which can be viewed as  encoding a 
gradable property in their meaning (cf. examples (27), (29)-(32)) and nouns with a 
stereotypical  interpretation  pattern  together.  In  fact, Bolinger  (1972)  and 
Matushansky (2002b) argue that  the latter  are gradable (uses  of)  nouns.  If  these 
stereotypical interpretations are to be regarded as shifts in meaning, then one way to 
capture this is to say that they arise as the result of scalarity coercion triggered by 
the degree operator  such, as proposed by Matushansky 2002b, for example. What 
would happen in such cases is the following: attempting to combine a non-gradable 
noun with a degree modifier results in a type mismatch; the repair strategy is  this 
type-shifting operation, which changes the meaning of the non-gradable nouns so 
that  they  can  be  interpreted  as  gradable.  In  other  words, basically  non-gradable 
nouns are coerced into a gradable meaning. In Matushansky's view, the meaning 
shift that is typical of scalarity coercion,  whether in the nominal domain or in the 
adjectival domain (cf.  He's so Italian), corresponds to 'having many of the  typical 
properties  associated with'  being N or A,  where "the notion of  a  prototype or  a 
stereotype comes into play". 
25 Note that we will  not have much to say about  prototypes in this dissertation, hence we will  not 
elaborate any more on the exact sense in which this notion is used in e.g. prototype theory – cf. Kamp and  
Partee (1995).
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The discussion above shows that this cannot be (completely) correct, since, in 
fact,  an  interpretation in  terms of  prototypical  properties  cannot  be  obtained.  In 
chapter 3, we will discuss this class of interpretations in more detail and show that  
stereotypical meanings are in fact not gradable, in the sense that the domain of these  
nouns is not ordered (i.e. the individuals in the domain are not ordered by degrees of 
a property). Moreover, it will be shown that such interpretations are also found in the 
absence of  such,  which argues against an analysis in terms of scalarity coercion, 
which views these meanings as 'created' due to the use of the degree operator. It will  
in fact be argued there, more generally, that such itself is not a true degree operator. 
2.1.3 Quite 
A third test that has been used to identify gradable nouns is their possible occurrence 
with  quite – once again  under  a  particular  interpretation.  Similarly  to  wh-
exclamatives, quite can be used with a variety of nouns, but the interpretation differs 
depending on the type of  noun it  modifies  (Bolinger 1972, Matushansky 2002b, 
Birner and Kaplan 2004), and the availability of a  degree interpretation has been 
taken to identify a noun as gradable in this context too.
The examples below show that nouns which came out as gradable according to 
the tests considered previously can also be modified by quite (some of the examples 
are taken from Bolinger 1972, Matushansky 2002b, Birner and Kaplan 2004). In all 
of these examples,  quite has been claimed to be interpreted as indicating a high 
degree to which the property denoted by the noun holds.26 
(42) a. Adam is quite a genius.
b. John is quite a fool. 
c. He is quite a giant.
d. He's quite a drinker.
(43) a. It was quite a flop. 
b. Quite a temper he's got!
c. They left quite a mess behind.
d. His new book was quite a success.
Quite is generally assumed to be a degree modifier which denotes a high value on a 
scale27.  When it modifies gradable nouns, it can be interpreted with respect to the 
26 It is not always clear where and how the line between gradable and non-gradable nouns is drawn.  
Matushansky (2002b) claims that the interpretation of the quite an N construction differs depending on 
the inherent gradability of the noun modified, but subsequently adds that it is interpreted as indicating a 
high degree to which the predicate holds "if the predicate noun expresses personal evaluation". If nouns 
expressing personal evaluation are assumed to be scalar, one may wonder whether expressing personal 
evaluation and being gradable are one and the same thing, and/ or what the environments she examines  
actually test for. The issue of the blurry borders between the notions of evaluation and gradability will  
come up again in the course of this investigation – see chapter 2 for discussion in the context of N of an N 
constructions.
27 It seems, however, that the particular intonation and context may influence the exact interpretation of 
quite. Thus, in examples like (i), it may be interpreted, depending on intonation, either as indicating high 
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scale  identified  in  their  conventional  meaning  (cf.  Bolinger  1972,  Matushansky 
2002b, Birner and Kaplan 2004).
Quite, however, can also modify ordinary,  non-gradable nouns, as illustrated in 
(44). Such examples have been argued to receive a different interpretation. They do 
not convey the extent to which the referent is an N; instead, the interpretation can be 
paraphrased as 'a remarkable N' (cf. Bolinger 1972, Matushansky 2002b, Birner and 
Kaplan 2004).28
(44) a. That's quite a shirt.
b. That (building/ house) is quite a building.
c. He's quite a guy. 
d. That's quite a car!
The objects referred to in (44) are remarkable, exceptional, or noteworthy in some 
way. Birner and Kaplan (2004) propose that, in such cases, quite is interpreted with 
respect to an external, contextually salient scale; as Ns, the objects referred to in 
such examples rank high on some (unspecified) scale. In this respect, they resemble 
(the external interpretation of)  wh-exclamatives. The shirt, for instance, might be 
one  that  is  particularly  ornate,  expensive,  tacky,  old  etc.  (Birner  and  Kaplan 
2004:93). Similarly, the object referred to in (44)d must be an impressive car; more 
often than not, it would be for some incredible design or technical feature.29 In sum, 
the sentences assert that the objects referred to somehow stand out among cars due 
to some feature they have, or their quality, as shirts/ buildings/ guys/ cars.
Consider now the following examples containing profession nouns:30
(45) a. William is quite a doctor – last time he performed a surgery, he operated 
on four patients at once!
b. Martin is quite a linguist.
As Matushansky (2002b) puts it, (45)a "does not mean that William is a doctor to a 
high degree whatever that might mean, but rather that he is an exceptional doctor". 
(45)b  is  also  interpreted  in  terms  of  Martin  being an  excellent  linguist.  For the 
sentence to be felicitous, he has to have published an impressive number of papers, 
or  sacrificed  his  life  in  the  field,  or  done  something  else  that  is  outstanding.  
Therefore,  such  examples  seem  to  involve  an  interpretation  like  'remarkable/ 
impressive (as  an)  N'.  As also  seen  in  the  case of  wh-exclamatives,  with nouns 
degree (i.e. intensifying) or low degree (i.e. attenuating the intensity of a gradable property).
(i) He is quite {an idiot/ a genius}. 
In addition, an example like (ii) [see (44)d] may be used to convey either a positive or a negative attitude 
of the speaker:
(ii) That's quite a car you've got there.
28 Examples (44)a,b are from Birner and Kaplan (2004) and Bolinger (1972), respectively.
29 But it could also look ridiculous, for a car – maybe it is as high as a bus, or it is tiny and very slow  
and some people would be inclined to even call it a car. It would then be outstanding in a reversed sense 
(cf. fn.  27 concerning the possible  positive or negative interpretation, depending on the context, and as 
indicated by the intonation). This is probably best treated as a case of irony where the speaker implies the 
opposite of what s/he says. 
30 Example (45)a is from Matushansky (2002b).
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denoting professions the salient dimension which is picked by default is the quality 
with which the individual in question performs the respective job, function etc. In 
fact, speakers report that a sentence like (45)b would not be felicitous if Martin were 
remarkable in some respect totally unrelated to being a linguist, for example if he 
were a very eccentric person (i.e. 'a linguist and an eccentric person').31
To sum up, the nouns that come out as gradable according to this test, namely 
those  that  give rise  to  a  degree  interpretation with  quite,  are  the  same as  those 
identified by the wh-exclamative and such tests. Differently from the previous tests, 
however,  nouns used with figurative,  stereotypical  interpretations are  not  always 
easily allowed, though not completely excluded either. In chapter 3, we will return to 
a discussion of  quite, and suggest extending the interpretation of  quite  in terms of 
evaluating an individual as being 'remarkable as an N' (i.e. the sort of interpretation 
that has been associated with its occurrence with non-gradable nouns) to all cases.
2.1.4 Much/ more of an N
Another environment which may bring out a distinction between gradable and non-
gradable  nouns  is  what  we  will  call  predicative  partitive  structures.  These  are 
structures  which  tend  to  appear  in  predicate  position  or  in  positions  where  a 
predicative, i.e. property, (re-)interpretation is possible. They consist of a quantity 
expression (e.g. much)32 and the preposition of, so they appear to have the structure 
of a (pseudo-)partitive. But unlike ordinary (pseudo-)partitives, they combine with 
an indefinite singular NP. An example is given below:
(46) He's more of an idiot than I thought.
Although these structures have not received much attention in the literature (but 
see  Bolinger  1972,  Sassoon  2007a),  they  are  interesting  they  enable  the  use  of 
expressions  like  much,  little,  more,  less etc.  with  nouns  on  a  non-quantity 
interpretation, which is the interpretation they usually get in the nominal domain: 
these structures seem to quantify over properties rather than measuring the size of 
the usual  sets  of entities  in  terms of quantity.  This makes them more similar  to 
degree modifiers, therefore, and raises the question whether this is indeed how they 
should be treated. This issue will be taken up in chapters 3 and 5. In what follows, 
we  will  briefly  examine  the  distribution  and  interpretation  of  these  expressions 
relative to various classes of nouns with a view to seeing whether this can be used as 
a test for gradability.
Unlike degree  such,  and similarly to  wh-exclamatives (and  quite), predicative 
partitive structures  may be used with a  variety of nouns. The meaning has been 
31 This parallels the subsective interpretation of adjectives in cases like a beautiful dancer, i.e. when it 
is interpreted as 'beautiful as a dancer', as opposed to the intersective interpretation (i.e. 'beautiful and a 
dancer'). 
32 The first slot of the structure can be occupied not only by much, but also by little, something, or by 
such elements modified by degree words like too, how, enough, very, terribly, comparative forms etc. As 
Bolinger (1972) points out, this structure enables the incorporation of degree words that are not otherwise  
used as (degree) modifiers of nouns. 
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argued to differ along similar lines, depending on the type of noun, namely gradable 
or not (e.g. Bolinger 1972), so this is what makes the basis of this potential test for 
gradability.
The following examples (taken from Bolinger 1972) show that nouns that have 
come out as gradable according to the previous tests can be used in these structures:
(47) a. He's more of a fool than I thought.
b. She's too much of a blunderer for me to feel comfortable with her.
c. He was as much of a liar as all the other church founders. 
d. He's {somewhat/ something} of a nitwit, don't you think?
(48) a. How much of an adventure was it?
b. He's less of a burden than it was feared he might be.
c. It was so much of a failure that he decided never to try again. 
d. It's too much of a nuisance.
The interpretation of such examples has been argued to be in terms of the degree to 
which the property denoted by the NP (e.g. foolishness, shock etc.) holds of a given 
individual.  This  is  similar  to  the  interpretation  obtained  when a (corresponding) 
adjective is modified by a degree word (e.g. 'more foolish', 'how adventurous', 'that 
shocking',  'less  burdensome',  'too  annoying' etc.)  or  when  a  degree  adjective 
modifies the gradable noun (e.g. 'a bigger/ worse fool' etc.). (cf. Bolinger 1972)
The examples below contain nouns that qualify as non-gradable according to the 
previous tests:33
(49) a. It isn't much of a telescope.
b. The BMW is more of a car than the Smart.
(50) a. How much of a doctor is he?
b. Martin is more of a linguist than anyone I know. 
The interpretation of these examples has been argued to be different from (47)-(48). 
According to Bolinger (1972),  (49)a can be paraphrased as 'for something called a 
telescope, it hardly deserves the name'. He also notes that in (50)a, for example, the 
interpretation cannot be paraphrased in terms of a corresponding adjective modified 
by a degree word, e.g. '*how medical is he?', as in (47)-(48) above. The examples in 
(49)-(50) can, in fact, be understood as saying something about the appropriateness 
of applying the description expressed by the noun to the individual in question,  in 
virtue of the individual exhibiting the qualities or attributes that typically go to make 
a telescope, a car, a doctor, or a linguist (as Bolinger himself suggests in connection 
with example (50)a), or meeting the requirements for being called a telescope, a car, 
a doctor, a linguist.34,35
33 Examples (49)a and (50)a are from Bolinger (1972).
34 These  include, for  example,  better  quality  – not unexpectedly,  especially  for  the  nouns denoting 
professions (similar effects have been seen in wh-exclamatives and with quite). Better quality also seems 
to contribute to a car coming closer to the idea one might have of a typical, or "real" car.
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Predicative partitive structures therefore seem to quantify over the set of all and 
any properties that may be associated with a noun. This includes prototypical and 
stereotypical properties. The former case is illustrated in (51), which asserts that the 
robin is more appropriately called a bird than a penguin, in virtue of it having more 
of the properties prototypically associated with the kind bird than the penguin, i.e. 
approaching the prototype more than the penguin. In this they differ from such, for 
example, which does not allow for prototypical interpretations:
(51) The robin is more of a bird than the penguin.
(52) #This robin is such a bird! [=(41)]
The latter case is illustrated in (53), which shows that these structures are also easily 
used  with  nouns  under  a  metaphorical,  figurative  interpretation.36 In  all  these 
examples, what counts for the appropriateness of being called an N is properties 
stereotypically associated with being a child,  a boy, a palace,  a boat,  though the 
individuals in question are not actual children, boys, palaces, or boats.
(53) a. Marlene is still terribly much of a child.
b. How much of a pigsty is your room?
c. The old Cadillac that my grandpa owned was more of a boat than my 
dad's old Lincoln Continental.
In  sum,  predicative  partitive  structures  have  been  argued  to  be  interpreted 
differently depending on the type of noun, and as such to identify gradable nouns. 
The type of interpretation seen in (47)-(48) seems to be about the degree to which 
the property encoded in the lexical  meaning of  the nouns holds.  Take  idiot,  for 
example;  idiots  are  individuals  characterized  by  idiocy,  which  is,  intuitively,  a 
gradable property,  given that  it  may be manifested to differing degrees.  Thus, if  
someone is characterized by more idiocy, s/he will be more of an idiot, and the other 
way round. This degree interpretation seems to be restricted to nouns that also came 
out as gradable according to other tests,  and not available to other (non-gradable) 
nouns. With the latter types of nouns,  the interpretation is rather in terms of the 
appropriateness of calling the individual in question an N. It has been shown in this 
section that any properties associated with the noun, including stereotypical ones 
(often associated with figurative uses) as well as prototypical ones, count for this  
evaluation. As such, these structures have a very wide distribution, much wider than 
Note  also  that  such  nouns  cannot  be  used  with  degree  such  (unless  they  can  be  assigned  a 
stereotypical interpretation), as illustrated by the contrast in (i) below:
(i) a. *He is such a lawyer that I know he will win the case. 
b. He is enough of a lawyer to win the case.
b'. He was too much of a lawyer not to be able to win that case. (Bolinger 1972)
35 This makes the interpretation of these structures similar to metalinguistic comparison, where what is 
compared is not the extent to which two individuals satisfy a certain property, but the appropriateness of  
applying one or the other description to an individual, as illustrated in (i):
(i) My problems are more legal than financial.
See chapters 3 and 5 for more discussion of predicative partitive structures.
36 Examples (53)a,b are from Bolinger (1972).
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what has been seen with  such,  quite,  as well as degree adjectives,  which will be 
considered in the next sub-section. This makes this potential test for gradability less 
reliable – less of a clear indication of the gradability of nouns. These structures will 
be re-examined in chapter 3 (along with  wh-exclamatives and  quite-structures), as 
well  as  in  the  concluding  chapter  where  we  discuss  the  consequences  for  the 
representation of gradability.
2.2 Degree adjectives
Another phenomenon which has been argued to be restricted to the class of gradable 
nouns, and which can, therefore, be used to identify such nouns is modification by 
certain adjectives with a degree interpretation. To start with, consider the following 
examples:
(54) a. a big idiot
b. a terrible braggart
c. a complete idiot 
In  these  examples,  the  adjectives contribute  a  (high)  degree  interpretation.  For 
example,  a big idiot is  'a very idiotic person'. In other words, the relation between 
the  adjective  and  the  noun  it  modifies  parallels  the  relation  between  a  degree 
modifier (e.g.  very,  terribly etc.) and a gradable adjective (e.g.  idiotic etc.).  This 
reading differs from the regular use of the adjectives illustrated below: 
(55) a. a big lad
b. a terrible doctor
c. a complete description
In  these  examples  the  adjectives  big,  terrible  and  complete  receive  their  literal 
interpretation: in  (55)a  big  is  refers  to physical  size,  terrible  in  (55)b negatively 
evaluates  the quality of  the doctor,  while  complete  in  (55)c  describes  something 
which is not missing any of its component elements.
The difference in interpretation correlates with a difference in the type of nouns 
modified. More precisely, the nouns illustrated in  (54) and  (55) are nouns which 
were shown to be gradable and non-gradable, respectively, by previous gradability 
tests. So the availability of the degree reading of such adjectives identifies gradable 
nouns.
"Degree adjectives"  make up a rather  heterogeneous class.37 Bolinger (1972), 
Paradis (2001) show that the adjectives that are most often adapted to this use are 
the ones that refer to extremes, or embody the notions of absoluteness and extremity 
(what Bolinger calls "hyperbolic boosters"). In this section we will mainly focus on 
the distribution of three classes of adjectives on the relevant degree reading. The 
37 It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  use  of  these  adjectives  is  often  collocational  in  nature  and, 
consequently, there are many lexical irregularities in their distribution, as well as some differences across 
English and Romance among otherwise similar adjectives. More examples will be provided in chapter 4. 
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first class consists of adjectives which in their literal sense express size (e.g.  big, 
great, huge, colossal, enormous etc.). The second class includes adjectives which in 
their  basic  use  express  purity,  totality  and  veracity  (utter,  pure,  total,  complete, 
perfect,  sheer, true,  real,  veritable,  positive,  regular,  absolute,  outright etc.). The 
third class of adjectives that will be discussed includes adjectives which, in their 
literal  use,  express  psychological  or  sensory  impact,  singularity  and  quality 
evaluation  (surprising,  astonishing,  amazing,  terrific,  incredible;  remarkable; 
exceptional,  extraordinary,  unusual;  awful,  terrible,  horrible,  unspeakable, 
wonderful,  gorgeous,  magnificent etc.);  we  will henceforth  refer  to  these  as 
"evaluative adjectives". As often noted in the literature (Doetjes 1997, Paradis 2001, 
Katz 2005 a.o.), these modifiers seem to lose most of their lexical meaning and only 
retain the high degree component. As can be easily seen, most of these adjectives 
also have adverbial counterparts that can be used as degree modifiers of gradable 
adjectives and verbs or of the entire nominal predicate:  utterly,  totally,  completely, 
real/ly,  absolutely,  surprisingly,  incredibly;  extraordinarily,  unusually;  awfully, 
terribly  etc.  Size adjectives  do not  (all)  have  such direct  adverbial  counterparts, 
though semantically they seem, at least intuitively, to correspond to degree modifiers 
like much and very (but see Morzycki 2009 for a different view).
Taking as a starting point the results of the previous tests, it can be observed that 
degree  adjectives  may  modify  both  [+human]  gradable  nouns  (e.g.  idiot,  fool,  
enthusiast, genius etc.; eater, drinker etc.) and [-human] gradable nouns, both mass 
and  count  (e.g. nonsense,  courage,  negligence etc.;  deal,  bargain,  effort  etc.; 
mistake, failure, success, blunder, masterpiece, blaze, extremes, trivialities, appetite 
etc.; boon, gyp; disaster, chaos, mess etc.)38 (cf. Bolinger 1972, Van de Velde 1996, 
Tovena  2001,  Giry-Schneider  2005,  Grossman  and  Tutin  2005,  Marengo 2005, 
Morzycki 2009). Below are examples of all three classes of adjectives modifying 
nouns from each class:
(56) a. a {big/ enormous/ huge} {idiot/ jazz enthusiast/ beer-drinker}
b. great {courage/ patience}
c. an {enormous/ huge} {problem/ blunder}
(57) a. a {complete/ real} {fool/ idiot}
b. real {courage/ nonsense}
c. a {complete/ total/ real} {failure/ success/ blunder}
(58) a. a {terrible/ amazing} {fool/ coward/ bore/ blunderer}
b. {incredible/ amazing} {courage/ patience/ nonsense}
c. an {awful/ terrible} {mess/ failure}
38 When  an  abstract  mass  noun  denoting  a  property  is  modified  by  adjectives  like  great  the 
interpretation is equivalent to that obtained when a quantity expression like a lot is used (cf. Van de Velde 
1996). This may be why the two types of expressions cannot co-occur, unlike with other types of nouns:
(i) [English] [French]
a. great courage a'. un grand courage
b. a lot of courage b'. beaucoup de courage
c. *a lot of great courage c'. *beaucoup de grand courage
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There  is  another  class  of  nouns  that  seemed  to  behave  like  gradable  nouns 
according to (some of) the other gradability tests reviewed, namely nouns that are 
interpreted in terms of stereotypical properties associated with the respective class  
(on a possibly figurative, metaphorical interpretation). An important difference now 
arises once the test of modification by degree adjectives is applied. Consider the 
following  examples  which  contain  nouns  that  were  shown  to  allow  such 
interpretations: 
(59) a. a big {lawyer/ man/ child/ palace}
b. a terrible {lawyer/ linguist/ prince/ clown/ man/ child}
These examples show that these nouns cannot be modified by degree adjectives on 
the relevant interpretation. The resulting interpretation is fundamentally different. In 
(59)a,  with  big, only  the  basic,  literal  meaning  is  available,  namely  size,  either 
concrete, physical size (as with man and palace), or more abstractly as importance 
or fame (as with lawyer, linguist). In (59)b the nouns can also only be interpreted in 
their  basic,  literal  meaning  and  the  adjective  terrible  also  receives  its  basic 
qualitative,  evaluative  interpretation:  the  examples  say  something  about  the 
professional  or  personal  quality  of  the  individuals. Consequently,  the  nouns  so 
modified cannot be used in examples parallel to examples with such encountered in 
§2.1.2, which would require a figurative, stereotypical interpretation of the nouns. 
The contrast is illustrated in (60) and (61):
(60) a. Their new place is such a palace!
b. Don't be such a child (about it), dad!
(61) a. Their new place is a big palace.
b. Dad is a big child.
The stereotypical interpretation of  palace  and  child  is not available in  (61).  When 
acceptable, (61)a forces a literal interpretation, where the place is said to belong to 
the category of actual palaces that are large in size. Such a literal interpretation is 
totally deviant in (61)b though.
One adjective which stands out in this context is the adjective  real: unlike the 
other  degree  adjectives  considered  above,  real  can  modify  nouns  used  with  a 
figurative interpretation (it  embraces metaphorical extensions – cf. Bolinger 1972 
from whom example (62)a is drawn):
(62) a. He is a real lawyer, the way he goes about proving his case.
b. This boy is a real clown!
c. Their new house is a real palace!
d. This place is a real pigsty!
In this, it also differs from the closely related adjective true: the entity described by 
true must belong to the category that is named and is then described as typical of its 
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essence. Thus, while in (62)a he may be just a student, in (63) he must be a lawyer 
by profession.
(63) He is a true lawyer, a credit to his profession.
The adjective  true  does not seem to be sensitive just to gradability, but to another 
sort of meaning, as suggested by the contrast between the following sets of examples 
which contain nouns that are otherwise non-gradable (cf. Bolinger 1972 who notes 
that it is restricted to gradable nouns and "semantically rich" non-gradable nouns):39
(64) a. It was a true symphony.
b. I had a true vacation.
c. A true doctor would not prescribe that kind of treatment.
(65) a. ?He's a true farmhand.
b. ?That is a true telescope.
c. ??That's a true car. 
In fact, real can also modify nouns that do not qualify as gradable by other criteria:40
(66) That's a real car!
In chapter 4 we will examine the distribution and interpretation of the adjectives 
true and real in more detail and argue that they are in fact not true degree adjectives,  
in the sense that they do not depend on, or make use of, a gradable meaning, i.e. the 
presence of an ordering of the individuals in the domain of the noun with respect to  
the  degree  that  a  gradable  property  holds  of  them.  This,  however,  raises  an 
additional  question,  concerning  the  (non-)gradable  status  of  nouns  interpreted 
stereotypically  (possibly  figuratively):  since  the  only  adjective  that  seems  to  be 
compatible with them finally turns out not to be a degree adjective, then it may be  
concluded that the test of modification by degree adjectives excludes this set of noun 
interpretations  from  the  realm  of  gradability.  Does  this  mean  that  the  tests 
considered in the preceding sub-sections, which seemed to accommodate this class 
of nouns, would also need to be analysed in a different way? This is, in fact, what  
will be argued for in chapter 3 (for independent reasons).
It  should be noted that  modification by degree adjectives is  often marked by 
lexical variations and restrictions, and some problematic cases arise too in relation to 
some of the (non-figurative uses of) nouns that came out as gradable according to 
other tests. There are irregularities among [-human] count nouns with respect to the 
acceptability  or  exact  interpretation  of  some  of  these  adjectives.  Consider  the 
following examples which contain nouns that have qualified as gradable according 
to previous tests:
39 The examples in (64) and (65)a,b are from Bolinger (1972).
40 The example in (66) is also significant in that it also points to a difference between real  and such. 
While the examples in (62) contain nouns that, on a similar interpretation, can be modified by such, the 
noun car cannot: 
(i) #That's such a car!
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(67) a. *a {big/huge} stink
a'. ??{huge/ great} trivialities 
b. a terrible smell 
b'. a terrible mistake
These nouns do not seem to accept modification by adjectives like big, terrible etc. 
in  the  relevant  degree  sense.  With  adjectives  of  size  the  result  is,  however, 
infelicitous, as in (67)a-a'. In (67)b-b', with the adjective terrible, an interpretation in 
terms of qualitative evaluation is available. For example,  a terrible smell  is most 
easily understood as a bad smell, as opposed to a pleasant smell, i.e. the adjective is 
interpreted in its  regular modificational  sense.  With  mistake,  the intended degree 
interpretation  is  more  likely  than  a  purely  qualificational  interpretation  of  the 
adjective terrible (or even bad) since we do not normally contrast bad mistakes with 
good mistakes (cf. Bolinger 1972). The regular qualificational interpretation is not 
completely excluded, however, as one may oppose  terrible mistakes  to  harmless/  
insignificant  mistakes  etc.  In  addition,  other  restrictions  may  be  noticed.  For 
example,  certain  [+human]  nouns,  especially  those  derived  from (activity)  verbs 
(e.g.  eater, drinker  etc.), but not only, cannot be modified by adjectives of totality, 
though they accept other degree adjectives:
(68) *a {complete/ perfect} (cheese-)eater
Finally, there are often rather collocational restrictions occurring in these adjective-
noun combinations: 




In sum, however, if one puts these idiosyncrasies aside, some patterns emerge 
quite clearly, and the test of degree modification by adjectives appears to be the most 
restricted  one  so  far,  in  the  sense  that  it  applies  to  the  nouns  that  qualified  as  
gradable to the previous two tests too, with the exception of figurative, metaphorical 
interpretations of nouns. They seem to only combine with those nouns that quite 
straightforwardly include a gradable property in their lexical  meaning (e.g.  idiot, 
fool, enthusiast, eater, mess, blunder etc.), or directly name such a property (as is the 
case  with  abstract  mass  nouns  referring  to  properties  –  e.g.  courage,  patience, 
negligence etc.). In chapter 4, such modification will be re-examined in more detail 
in order to see whether it provides evidence in favour of the existence of adnominal 
degree modifiers/ operators.
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2.3 N of an N and seem
The  two  contexts  that  will  be  presented  in  this  last  sub-section  involve  more 
complex syntactic structures, where gradability would become relevant outside of 
the N. These consist of the possible occurrence of nouns in the first slot of the so-
called N of an N construction (e.g.  that idiot of a doctor) and in the non-sentential 
complement  of  seem  (e.g.  He seems  a  fool.).  While  the  former  is  found cross-
linguistically,  the latter  context  and its  restrictions are rather  specific to English. 
These possible tests for gradability turn out to be the most problematic. This is why 
they  will  be  only  briefly  examined  here  and  will  be  provided  a  more  detailed 
account in chapter 2, which will completely exclude them as tests for gradability.
2.3.1 N of an N 
There  is  a  line  of  research in  the  literature  which  claims  that  the  N  of  an  N 
construction  illustrated  in  (70) is  a  typical  environment  for  gradable  nouns  (cf. 
Bolinger 1972, Matushansky 2002c, Corver 2008 a.o.), i.e. only gradable nouns can 
appear in  the  first  slot  of  the  construction  (henceforth,  N1);  non-gradable  nouns 
cannot, as ilustrated in (71).41
(70) a. that idiot of a doctor
b. that fool of an engineer
(71) a. *that lad of a brother of yours 
b. *that lawyer of a son of yours
This suggests that the possible occurrence of nouns in the N1 slot of the N of an 
N construction can be used as a test for gradability. However, the results turn out to 
diverge  from  the  outcome  of  the  tests  considered  so  far,  and  cross-cut  the 
distinctions arrived at previously.
To start with, there are nouns that categorize individuals based on a gradable 
property  which  came out  as  gradable  according  to  the  previous  tests  but  which 
cannot be used as N1s:
(72) a. ??*that (jazz-)enthusiast of a doctor 
b. *that eater of a doctor 
Similarly, among the [-human] nouns identified as gradable before, some but not 
all can be used as N1s, and the distinctions do not seem to follow any of the possible 
sub-classes identified before in terms of how salient the degree interpretation is in  
contexts such as wh-exclamatives.
(73) a. that mistake of a {relationship/ child}
41 The examples in (70)-(71) are from Bolinger (1972).
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b. a failure of an attorney
(74) a. *that problem of a decision
b. *that success of an attorney
c. *that mismatch of a fixture
d. *that {stink/ fragrance} of a breeze 
Abstract  mass nouns denoting properties can generally not be used as N1,  as 
indicated by (75), though we do find the noun nonsense used as N1, as in (76):
(75) *that wisdom of a saying
(76) that nonsense of a definition
The problem with examples like (75) may be that mass nouns are generally not good 
as N1 in  N of an N, unless they  can undergo a mass-to-count shift associated to a 
change in meaning from designating the property to a concrete instantiation of it, i.e. 
denoting an individual which is characterized by the respective property, as in (77), 
which refers to a 'beautiful boat/ performance'. For the examples in  (72) and  (74), 
however, such an explanation is not available, and the reasons for the differentiated 
acceptability must still be sought elsewhere. 
(77) a beauty of a {boat/ performance}
More  complications  arise  in  the  data.  Consider,  for  instance,  the  following 
examples: 
(78) a. a peach of a day
b. a flower of a girl
c. one hell of a story
The nouns are used metaphorically here, though it is hard to identify exactly what 
properties they attribute to the given individuals, apart from conveying some sort of 
emotive, subjective evaluation, either positive or negative. According to other tests, 
these nouns do not qualify as gradable: they cannot be modified by degree adjectives 
like  big, as shown by  (79).  This is  not  surprising given that  it  has  already been 
shown that nouns under a figurative, stereotypical interpretation are generally not 
compatible with modification by degree adjectives. But, in addition, some also fail 
to  combine  with  such,  which  was  seen  to  be  otherwise  compatible  with  noun 
interpretations of a similar sort (i.e. figurative, stereotypical), as shown in (80).
(79) a. #The day was a big peach.
b. #The girl is a big flower.
c. #The story was {a/ one} big hell.
(80) a. ??The day was such a peach!
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b. ?That girl is such a flower!
c. ??The story is such (a) hell!
In  sum,  the  proposal  that  occurrence  in  the  N1 position  is  determined  by  the 
gradability does not seem to be straightforwardly supported by the data. In chapter 
2,  section  2, we will re-examine N of an N constructions in more detail and show 
that it is in fact not gradability, but a different factor, namely the expression of a  
value judgment, that determines the possible occurrence of a noun in the N1 position. 
As such, occurrence in the N of an N construction is not a test for gradability.
2.3.2 Seem 
The  last  potential  test  for  gradability  to  be  considered  consists  of  the  possible 
occurrence of nouns in the complement of seem. It has been argued in the literature 
that when seem takes a non-sentential complement, generally assumed to be a small 
clause,  only gradable expressions can be used (e.g.  Bolinger 1972, Maling 1983, 
Matushansky 2002b). The examples below illustrate the basic contrast between the 
acceptability of gradable adjectives,  nouns and prepositional  phrases in the small 
clause complement of seem, and the unacceptability of non-gradable expressions.42,43
(81) a. The music seems nice. [gradable AP] 
b. His nationality seems irrelevant. 
(82) a. *The music seems choral. [non-gradable AP]
b. *His nationality seems British.
(83) a. What he writes seems nonsense. [gradable NP]
b. He seems a {genius/ fool}
(84) a. *What he writes seems history. [non-gradable NP]
b. *He seems a {wizard/ doctor}.
(85) a. Lee sure seems out of his mind. [gradable PP]
b. Lee sure seems under the weather. 
(86) a. *Lee sure seems out of the house. [non-gradable PP]
b. *Lee sure seems under the old apple tree. 
The ungrammatical  examples above become good if  to be  is supplied, which 
shows that the restriction only applies to small clause complements of seem. 
42 Note that plural count nouns are not normal after seem:
(i) a. The thing he did seemed a mistake.
b. *The things he did seemed mistakes. 
In addition, while NPs of the right type are generally accepted in the small clause complement of seem in 
British English and Canadian English, they are generally rejected in American English. 
43 Most  of  the  examples  in  (81)-(86) are  taken  or  adapted  from  Bolinger  (1972),  Maling  (1983), 
Matushansky (2002b). 
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(87) a. The music seems to be choral.
b. He seems to be a doctor.
c. Lee seems to be out (of the house).
The examples also improve if an expression of approximation, or a degree modifier,  
is used, i.e. an expression which shows the degree of applicability of the predicate, 
as in (88) (Bolinger 1972, Matushansky 2002b). The addition of a degree modifier 
has been argued to trigger scalarity coercion, which changes the meaning of the non-
gradable  expressions  so  that  they  can  be  interpreted  as  gradable  (Matushansky 
2002b). As a result, the expressions count as gradable and can be used in the small 
clause complement of seem.
(88) a. The music seems almost choral.
b. You'd seem such a linguist!
The picture is, however, more complicated than it might look at first sight. And 
the complications in the data do not seem to follow a distinction between gradable 
and  non-gradable  expressions  along  the  lines  suggested  by  the  tests  considered 
previously. For example, adding an adjective seems to improve examples containing 
non-gradable  nouns,  as  illustrated  in  (89)a.  However,  not  all  adjectives,  even  if 
gradable,  behave  alike  with  respect  to  licensing  a  noun  in  the  small  clause 
complement of seem (Matushansky 2002b), as illustrated in (89)b:
(89) a. Eric seems a {capable/ good/ lousy/ exceptional} {wizard/ doctor/ 
dancer}.
b. Eric seems a {*French/ *tall/ ??handsome} {wizard/ doctor/ dancer}.
Conversely, adding an adjective to a gradable noun seems to remove the ability of 
that DP to appear in the complement of seem (Matushansky 2002b), though, again, 
this does not hold for all adjectives, as shown in (90).
(90) a. Eric seems a {*French/ ??handsome} fool.
b. He seems {a big fool}/ {a real idiot}.
In  addition,  one  may  find  examples  of  nouns  which  came  out  as  gradable 
according to other tests, but which do not seem to be able to occur in the small  
clause complement of seem (though they can otherwise be used predicatively):
(91) a. ??He seems a cheese-eater.
b. ??Her new perfume seems a stink to me. 
On the other hand, there also seem to exist cases of non-gradable nouns that are 
acceptable in this environment, as illustrated in (92) and (93).
(92) a. He seems a Christian.
b. He seems an artist. 
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(93) a. This seems the end for us.
b. This seems the way to do it.
Note also that the nouns in  (92) are not interpreted figuratively, like those in  (94) 
below; the latter show that nouns under this interpretation are also allowed in the 
small clause complement of seem.
(94) a. This house seems a palace after the shelters where we have passed our 
nights for the last couple of weeks.
b. This child seems a clown (at times).
In sum, such facts shed doubt on the view that distribution in the small clause 
complement of seem is determined by the gradability of the lexical items involved, 
hence on the reliability of this possible gradability test. In chapter 2,  section 3, we 
will  investigate  the  distribution  and  interpretation  of  expressions  in  the  small 
complement of seem in more detail and show that an alternative account is needed.
2.4 Summary and discussion of results 
It can be observed from the discussion in the preceding sub-sections that the various 
gradability tests that  have been proposed turn out to yield different results.  This 
raises questions concerning the status of the nouns involved and/or the reliability of 
the tests themselves. In what follows we will summarize the results of the tests, as 
well as indicating the problematic issues that arise from this brief examination.
Among the tests for gradability discussed, the N of an N and seem tests turn out 
to be rather problematic: their results do not seem to pattern in any obvious way 
with the others, which makes their reliability as tests for gradability questionable. 
Modification by degree adjectives seems to be the most restricted test, in spite of 
certain idiosyncrasies and irregularities. Degree adjectives seem to provide a good 
indication  of  inherent  gradability.  The  nouns  which  can  be  thus  modified  are 
generally a subset of the nouns that come out as gradable according to other tests,  
namely,  wh-exclamatives,  such,  quite,  and predicative partitive structures.  Degree 
adjectives  thus seem to be good candidates  for  elements  that  function as  degree 
operators or modifiers in the nominal domain, similarly to expressions like very or 
terribly in the adjectival domain. Recall, however, that for real, it was suggested that 
its distribution and interpretation do not seem to be reducible to gradability. Finally, 
the distribution of  wh-exclamatives,  quite, and  predicative partitive structures with 
respect to classes of nouns seems to be very wide.  Consequently, it is hard to use 
them in order to single out a specific class of nouns that we might want to classify as 
gradable.
Among the classes  of  nouns or  noun interpretations discussed,  a  problematic 
case is that of figurative, stereotypical interpretations, including epithets, or epithetic 
uses of nouns. These pass some, though not all of the tests reviewed. Nouns under  
such interpretations can be used in wh-exclamatives and with degree such, but they 
cannot be modified by degree adjectives with the exception of the adjective  real. 
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There are two logically possible ways to approach these facts.  One would be to 
regard  them as  gradable  meanings,  possibly  as  the  result  of  scalarity  coercion, 
whereby basically non-gradable nouns are coerced into a gradable meaning. This 
would be triggered by the  wh-degree operator or by the degree operator  such (as 
proposed e.g. by Matushansky 2002b), as well as real, while other degree adjectives 
would not be able to coerce the meaning of the modified nouns in this way. This 
would  account  for  their  differentiated  distribution  in  these  environments. 
Alternatively, it might be concluded that figurative interpretations are not gradable, 
and then real and the other two tests would need to be analysed in a different way. 
Putting these problematic cases aside, the results of the tests examined in this 
section may be summarized as in Table 1 below which indicates the classes of nouns 
that come out as gradable according to most tests: 
Type of noun Examples
I. [+human]
[+count]
categorize, or qualify, 
individuals based on a 
gradable property
idiot, fool, genius, coward, 




denote qualities, states, 
situations, emotions, or 
other sorts of more or less 
abstract objects
courage, patience, negligence 
etc.; chaos, disorder etc.
nonsense, mess, flop, fiasco,  
disaster; surprise, shock, shame,  
appetite, extreme, difficulty;  
stink, fragrance, boon, gyp; 
mistake, failure, success, blunder, 
masterpiece, inconvenience, 
appetite; deal, bargain, effort etc.
Table 1: nouns that qualify as gradable according to most tests
Class I contains nouns which categorize, or qualify, [+human] individuals based 
on a gradable  property.  They are  generally  derived  from or otherwise related to 
adjectives (e.g. idiot, enthusiast etc.), derived from gradable or non-gradable activity 
verbs (e.g. liar, eater etc.), or from other (gradable) nouns (e.g. blunderer). Class II 
contains [-human] nouns of various sorts. At least some of the nouns in class II may 
be understood as qualifications applying to [-human] entities in a parallel way to 
how  the nouns in  the first  class  denote  [+human] individuals  characterized by a 
property:  e.g.  mess,  flop,  fiasco  etc.  qualify  objects  or  situations  via  a  certain 
property or state, similarly to how nouns like idiot,  fool  etc. categorize individuals 
via a property. Their meaning can often be paraphrased in terms of a more general 
term (a hyperonym) plus an adjective expressing some kind of qualification: e.g. 
deal/  bargain – 'advantageous transaction';  fortune –  'great  wealth/  large sum of 
money', failure – 'unsuccessful attempt' etc. The presence of a gradable property in 
the  meaning  of  the  nouns  can  be  quite  transparent  since  they  are  often 
morphologically derived from or otherwise related to an adjective or a verb. This is 
particularly  clear  with  abstract  mass  nouns  denoting  qualities,  such  as  courage, 
patience, wisdom etc., but also with nouns like extremes, difficulty etc.
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To conclude, on the one hand, it has been shown that there is a general category 
of  nouns that  seem to qualify as  gradable  based  on their  similar  behaviour  (i.e. 
interpretation and distribution) in certain environments. On the other hand, it  has 
also been shown that some problematic issues arise concerning the reliability of the 
tests  reviewed,  and  there  are  indications  that  some of  the  tests  should  be  given 
alternative accounts. The discussion in this second part of the chapter thus provides 
the ground for the coming chapters, as outlined in the next section.
3 Outline of the dissertation
In  chapter  2  we  examine  two  environments  that  have  been  claimed  to  involve 
gradability,  and  where  gradability  would  be  relevant  for  the  well-formedness  of 
more complex structures containing the nouns, namely N of an N constructions (e.g. 
that idiot of a doctor) and the small-complement of seem (e.g. He seems a fool.). In 
§2.3 it was already pointed out that using these as tests for gradability appears to be  
rather problematic in the sense that their results do not seem to pattern in an obvious 
way with those of the  other tests. This is why we start out with these cases:  we 
would like to  know immediately whether  they say anything about gradability  in 
nouns or  whether  they  should  be  eliminated  as  possible  tests  for  gradability.  In 
chapter 2 it will be argued that that the distribution of nouns in these contexts is not 
determined by gradability – whether at the lexical or syntactic level – but by other 
factors  which  partly  overlap  with  gradability  and,  under  certain  circumstances, 
create similar effects. In the case of N of an N constructions, it will be shown that the 
necessary and sufficient condition for a noun to occur in the first slot of the structure 
is that it can express a value judgment. As for  seem, this will be argued to be an 
epistemic verb that contains an evidential meaning component. The restrictions on 
its  small  clause  complement  will  be  shown  to  follow  from  the  necessary 
compatibility with the uncertainty of assessment involved in the meaning of the verb 
combined with certain limitations that exist on what may be used as evidence based 
on which one can evaluate whether a property holds;  these limitations do not exist 
when it  comes to evaluating complex situations  or propositions,  as expressed by 
sentential  complements  –  hence  the  lack  of  restrictions  on  these  complements. 
Gradable expressions are only a subset of  the  expressions that may occur in this 
environment; in addition, it is no the case that all gradable expressions automatically 
make  good  small  clause  complements  to  seem.  Consequently,  these  two 
environments will be excluded as tests for gradability. The distribution of nouns in 
these contexts cannot be used evidence in favour of positing a gradable structure in 
their semantics or of a degree projection in their syntax. These two case studies 
show how various factors may conspire so as to make believe that gradability and 
degree are involved.
Chapter 3 focuses on an examination of "degree" such and argues that it is not a 
degree operator. Its distribution will be shown not to be limited to gradable nouns, or 
nouns  that  can  be  modified  by  other  (potential)  degree  modifiers,  and  the 
interpretation not to be in terms of degree. It will be argued instead that all instances 
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of  such, including the so-called "degree" such, are in fact cases of kind-reference. 
What accounts for the differences in distribution (and interpretation) between the so-
called "degree"  and "kind"  such is  that  the semantics of  the former comes with 
particular requirements concerning the construal  of sub-kinds it  can select. More 
precisely,  this  such  selects  salient  sub-types  that  can  be  identified  by  natural 
consequences,  which may be explicitly expressed by result clauses or left implicit, 
as in the exclamative use. Once again, gradable nouns are only a subset of the nouns 
that make available the required sort of sub-types. Consequently, co-occurrence with 
such in exclamatives or with result clauses is not a test for gradability either. This  
proposal immediately raises questions concerning other structures which have been 
analysed in  a  similar  way to  such in  the literature,  namely  wh-exclamatives  and 
quite-structures, as well as predicative partitive structures (i.e. more of an N). These 
will be briefly examined in the last part of the chapter, where it will be suggested  
that  they  offer  no  evidence  for  the  presence  of  gradable  structure  in  nouns that 
would be similar to that found with gradable adjectives.
Chapter  4  turns  to  an  examination  of  degree  adjectives,  which,  from  the 
overview in section 2 of this chapter, appeared to offer the most reliable test for  
gradability and the most promising candidates for adnominal degree expressions. 
However,  the  more  detailed  investigation  of  degree  adjectives  in  three  classes 
(namely, size adjectives,  real-type adjectives and evaluative adjectives) will  shed 
doubt  on  this  starting  hypothesis.  It  will  be  shown  that  the  distribution  and 
interpretation  of  size  adjectives  do  not  support  a  degree  analysis  of  these 
expressions,  but rather favour an alternative account in terms of (abstract) size of  
properties, on which the adjectives do not manipulate gradable structures in a way 
that  would  be  parallel  to  what  happens  in  the  case  of  degree  modification  of 
gradable adjectives.  Real-type adjectives will also be argued not to be adnominal 
degree  operators,  but  rather  epistemic/  evidential  adjectives.  As  for  evaluative 
adjectives, the facts are less conclusive. They may be analysed as adnominal degree 
modifiers, but the facts do not exclusively require such an analysis. In addition, they 
also show differences as compared to their adverbial counterparts that function as 
degree modifiers in the adjectival domain (e.g.  terribly  etc.).  An alternative, non-
degree account is possible,  which capitalizes on their evaluative meaning. In sum, 
the behaviour of "degree adjectives" does not provide conclusive evidence for the 
existence of adnominal degree operators  or modifiers. Even though in these cases 
similar interpretations are obtained to those obtained in the adjectival domain via 
degree modification, they are brought about by different mechanisms. This suggests 
that there is no parallel between the nominal and adjectival domains with respect to 
gradability, whether semantically or syntactically. 
The  investigation  carried  out  in  chapters  2-4  points  to  the  same  conclusion, 
namely that there is a fundamental difference between nouns and adjectives with 
respect  to  gradability,  and  that  nominal  gradability  is  an  illusion  rather  than  a 
grammatical reality. Chapter 5, the concluding chapter, discusses the implications of 
these results  for  a  theory of  gradability  that  wants  to  account  for  the  difference 
between the two domains. 
Chapter 2 GRADABILITY VS. EVALUATION
1 Introduction
This chapter consists of two case studies: we will examine N of an N constructions 
(e.g. that idiot of a doctor) and the small clause complement of the verb seem (e.g. 
He seems a fool.), both of which have been claimed to be environments that involve 
gradability. It will be shown, however, that it is not gradability that determines the 
possible occurrence of nouns in these contexts, but rather something different, which 
can be subsumed under the term  "evaluation". The way evaluation plays a role is 
different in the two cases.  N of an N constructions,  which are studied in section 2, 
are sensitive to  the expression of a value judgment. This will be argued to be the 
necessary and sufficient condition for a noun to occur in the first position of N of an 
N  constructions.  In  the  case  of  seem,  which  will  be  examined in section  3,  the 
evaluation has to do with assessing whether a property or a situation holds or not.  
This is an evidential and/or epistemic notion that will be shown to play a role in the 
distribution of expressions in the small clause complement of seem.
2 N of an N 
2.1 Introduction
As discussed in chapter 1  (§2.3.1) the possible occurrence of a noun in the first 
position (henceforth N1) of the  N of an N construction, illustrated in  (1), has been 
claimed  to  depend  on  whether  the  noun  is  gradable  or  not  (cf.  Bolinger  1972, 
Matushansky 2002c). 
(1) that idiot of a doctor
In  chapter 1, however, questions were already raised concerning the reliability of 
this test for gradability in light of the diverging results obtained as compared to other 
gradability tests, such as the test of modification by degree adjectives. 
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In this section we will examine more carefully the overall interpretation of the 
construction, and, more in particular, the contribution of and semantic constraints on 
the nouns that occur as N1, in order to reveal the factor(s) that determine the ability 
of a noun to occur in this position. It will be shown that in fact it is not gradability  
that constitutes a prerequisite for a noun to occur as N1 in these constructions, but 
rather the expression of a value judgment (along the lines of Milner 1978, Ruwet 
1982, Den Dikken 2006, Villalba and Bartra-Kaufmann 2010). Moreover, it will be 
shown that gradability and the expression of a value judgment (generally referred to 
as "evaluation" in the literature), are not the same, but partly overlap, which explains 
the often mixed views we can find in the literature.
2.2 Gradability and value judgement in the literature 
on N of an N
The ways  in  which  the  N of  an  N  construction  is  treated  in  the  literature  vary 
considerably.  Nevertheless,  three  main  types  of  approaches  can  be  identified 
depending on the notions used in characterizing the constraints on possible N1s.44 In 
one  view,  occurrence  of  a  noun as  N1 in  these  structures  depends  on  its  being 
gradable, either inherently or due to coercion. A different line of thought takes the 
essence of the interpretation of these constructions to be the expression of a value 
judgment. In other works, the two notions are combined or used interchangeably.
This sub-section will give an overview of the literature, focusing on the notions 
that  are used in describing potential  N1s,  i.e.  gradability and the expression of  a 
value judgment. It will be revealed that some confusion is often found in studies on 
N of an N, which seems to stem from the lack of a necessary distinction between the 
two notions. It should be noted in this context that even when there is no confusion 
within one particular study and only one notion is made use of, there is often no 
discussion of or direct argumentation against the alternative views. In addition, a 
clear  definition  of  the  terms  used  and/or  discussion  of  the  notions  they  cover, 
especially  in  contradistinction  to  other  notions  used  elsewhere,  are  generally 
missing. Hence, there is almost no discussion of the relation between gradability and 
the expression of a value judgment, which, as it turns out, is essential for a proper 
understanding of the interpretation of N of an N constructions and of the factors that 
determine the possible occurrence of a noun as N1.
44 Note that a distinction is sometimes made in the literature between different types of  N of an N 
constructions, often based on different criteria, hence drawing the lines in different places (e.g. Napoli 
1989, Doetjes and Rooryck 2003, Den Dikken 2006). In all cases, however, at least one of the types  
identified is argued to involve gradability, or evaluation, or both. We will mostly abstract away from these 
distinctions in this section, as we will argue that one notion is relevant for all types (see §2.3). 
We will also not discuss the syntactic analyses proposed (e.g. whether a predication or modification 
relation is assumed to underlie these structures), since a syntactic account of these constructions is beyond 
the scope of our work. We will only retain the insights concerning the interpretive contribution of the N 1, 
and the ensuing characterization of the class of possible N1s.
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2.2.1 Gradability
As discussed in chapter 1, the gradability view on N of an N constructions has been 
most notably expressed in Bolinger (1972). He argues that only gradable nouns can 
be  used  as  N1 in  this  structure,  as  shown  by  the  contrast  in  (2).  He  includes 
figurative,  or metaphorical, uses of inherently non-gradable nouns in the class of 
gradable (uses of) nouns, as illustrated in (3):
(2) a. that fool of an engineer
b. *that lad of an engineer
(3) a. that baby of a brother of yours 
b. that box of a house
Similarly, Matushansky (2002c) argues that nouns which naturally appear as N1 are 
gradable, while nouns that are not natural N1 may be coerced into being gradable. 
She analyses the N of an N construction as a modificational structure containing an 
emotive  exclamative  operator,  which  she  defines  as  a  special  type  of  degree 
operator.  Consequently,  on  this  account,  it  is  the  exclamative  environment  that 
imposes  certain  gradability  constraints  on  the  construction  and  the  N  of  an  N 
construction is predicted to  end up  having a high degree interpretation  given the 
presence of the degree operator.
There  is  also  a  different  type  of  approach  in  the  literature,  centred  on  the 
expression of value judgment, which we will now go on to consider.
2.2.2 Value judgment
There is another line of research that takes the essence of N of an N constructions to 
be the expression of some sort of emotive, personal, or subjective, evaluation.45 The 
value judgment has been shown to be typically negative (e.g. insults) (cf. Milner 
1978,  Ruwet  1982),  though not  exclusively so.  The use of  nouns in  N of  an N 
constructions is thus akin to epithet (uses of) nouns. Epithets are noun phrases used 
to characterize the nature of an individual (e.g.  idiot, bastard, sissy, jerk  etc.), and 
45 A note on terminology is in order here. In the relevant subset of works referred to in this section the  
term "evaluation" is most often used to describe the interpretive contribution of N 1. However, using terms 
such as "evaluation" and "evaluative" is confusing, especially in the context of a discussion that also 
includes references to gradability. This is because the same term is used in other works to refer to a 
subclass  of  (gradable)  adjectives  (e.g.  beautiful,  interesting,  industrious  etc.),  in  contradistinction  to 
dimensional adjectives (e.g. long, tall, wide, short etc.) (cf. Bierwisch 1989), while in other studies it is 
used to refer to the standard-related or non-neutral interpretation of adjectives in e.g. the positive form 
(cf. Rett 2008a,b). The evaluation present in the case of N of an N constructions is of a different nature, 
and refers to the expression of a value judgment, which involves subjective appraisal and can be more or 
less emotionally-charged. See  §2.3.1 for a definition.  Therefore, we will  refrain from using the term 
"evaluation", and favour instead the more straightforward term "value judgment". In the overview of the 
literature in §2.2.2 and §2.2.3, however, the term "evaluation" will still be used at times, since this is the  
term employed in the works referred to. 
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may be stereotypical; they contribute mainly affective meaning, which is typically 
negative: contempt, anger, irony etc.46
Milner (1978), for example, looking at French data, claims that only a closed 
class of nouns, which he calls  noms de qualité  ('quality nouns'), can appear as N1. 
These are nouns like imbécile, which are claimed not to have their own extension or 
definition out of context, being inherently connected to the speech situation (hence 
having no referential autonomy, similarly to pronouns). They are claimed to be non-
classifying  nouns  and  to be marked with a [+quality]  feature in the lexicon that 
distinguishes them from ordinary classifying nouns. Milner points out that no other 
nouns can appear in the first position of such structures, unless they undergo a shift  
in meaning with stylistic effects; he treats such examples as cases of recategorization 
("changement de catégorie", "calembour syntaxique"), as in  ce tyran de Paul 'this 
tyrannical Paul'.
Ruwet (1982) argues that almost any nouns can be inserted in the N1 slot, as long 
as they are understood as insults. Hence, the class of nouns admissible as N 1 is that 
of  possible  epithets.  He  argues  against  the  two-way  lexical  distinction  Milner 
proposes, and claims that it is an illusion stemming from the fact that Milner only  
discusses extreme cases in his examples: profession nouns like professeur, as non-
quality, on the one hand, and nouns like idiot, salaud, as quality nouns, on the other. 
Instead, Ruwet shows that there is in fact a continuum between these. He proposes 
that  all  nouns  have  their  own  semantic  content,  which,  associated  with  certain 
pragmatic  conditions  and  general  world  knowledge,  determines  whether  or  how 
appropriately  a  noun can  be  used  in  affective  contexts,  such  as  the  N of  an  N 
structure,  which  he  takes  to  be associated  with  a  semantic  rule  that  contains  a 
(generally unfavourable) value judgment.
Recently,  a  similar way of viewing the semantic contribution of N1 has  been 
adopted by Den Dikken (2006),47 who argues that  N1 can be any noun denoting 
something that is deemed suitable to compare N2 to and that the (often metaphorical) 
comparison  on  which  such  constructions  are  based  is  always  evaluative,  often 
negative (see also Villalba and Bartra-Kaufmann 2010):48
(4) a. a jewel of a village
b. an idiot of a man
46 Note that much work in syntax has focused on those epithet phrases which consist of a noun (phrase) 
accompanied by the definite article (e.g.  the idiot,  the bastard) or a demonstrative (e.g.  this/that idiot, 
this/that bastard), and which can be used as anaphors (cf. Jackendoff 1972, 1977, Lasnik 1976, 1989,  
Chomsky  1981,  Huang  2000,  Aoun  and  Choueiri  2000,  Corazza  2005  a.o.).  This  aspect  of  their 
behaviour, which has in fact come to be regarded as their defining characteristic, is illustrated below:
(i) Johni promised to come, but the idioti missed the train.
In this sentence,  idiot  is understood as an anaphor, inheriting its value from  John; in addition, it also 
attributes to John the property of being an idiot. 
However, it has also been argued that such behaviour is not limited to epithet phrases, as it is in fact 
more widely displayed by  "incomplete descriptions" such as  the man (Higginbotham 1985), as well as 
other definite descriptions, though with some differences (see e.g. Corazza 2005).
An examination of the anaphoric properties of such phrases lies, however, outside the scope of our 
investigation.
47 The approach proposed by Den Dikken (2006) combines Milner's and Ruwet's insights for different 
subsets of the data (see Den Dikken 2006 for details).
48 The examples in (4) are from Den Dikken (2006).
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c. a horror of a story
d. that schoolmaster of a man
In (4d), for example, schoolmaster stands for a set of (typically negative) properties 
that  schoolmasters  are  stereotypically  thought  to  have  (e.g.  being  authoritarian, 
correcting people all the time etc.), much as in its epithetic use in copular sentences 
like He's a real schoolmaster.
In  sum, these  works  characterize N1s  as  expressing a  value  judgment,  hence 
taking them to be similar or even identical to epithets or epithet uses of nouns.49 
However, they do not address at all the alternative view presented above which takes 
gradability to be the condition on N1s. A notable exception in this sense is Villalba 
and  Bartra-Kaufmann  (2010),  who  explicitly  argue  that  these  constructions  (in 
Spanish)  do  not  involve  degree  quantification  but  evaluation,  which  is  lexically 
encoded, and hence highly idiosyncratic. This is the type of view we will defend too, 
but  first  we  will  also  review  a  different  type  of  approach  that  is  found  in  the  
literature.
While the analyses reviewed so far take either gradability or the expression of a 
value judgment to be the essence of the N of an N construction, in other works the 
two notions are combined, collapsed or used interchangeably. It is to a discussion of 
such works that we turn now.
2.2.3 Gradability and value judgment collapsed50
A first example of the lack of a proper distinction that characterizes some of the 
literature presents itself in the work of Napoli (1989). On the one hand, she argues  
throughout that the nouns used as N1 in these constructions must be predicates that 
express an evaluative judgment of the N2. This, she notes, may be inherent in the 
meaning of the noun or not; in the latter case, it may come about by means of e.g. 
modification, "metaphorical  extension or  association".  Thus, she  adopts the view 
that  "predicates  fall  naturally  into an evaluative and a non-evaluative class  with 
respect to their distribution and other properties" (Napoli 1989:192). However, when 
referring  to  other  works  in  which  this  distinction  among  predicates  has  been 
proposed, she also mentions Maling (1983) and points out that she "uses the term 
gradable" (Napoli 1989:192). The problem here is that Maling talks about gradable 
predicates as standardly defined, while Napoli is talking about evaluative predicates, 
initially defined as expressing an "evaluative judgment". Unfortunately, she does not 
comment  on the observed terminological  difference  ("evaluative"  vs.  "gradable") 
and whether it also reflects any other (semantic and/or syntactic) differences, hence 
49 Note that such a view cannot be upheld if "epithet" is understood in the sense in which it is generally  
defined in the syntactic literature, i.e. in terms of their anaphoric properties – see footnote 3 above, since  
not all N1s can function as epithets in this way. 
50 This combination of the two notions is also transposed into the syntax, in the role assigned to the 
syntactic projections proposed in the representation of these structures. In many of the works referred to  
here  (Doetjes  and  Rooryck  2003,  Vinet  2003),  the  particular  interpretation  assigned  to  N  of  an  N 
constructions is linked to a syntax involving an EvaluativePhrase claimed to be used in the sense of 
Cinque 1999, Ambar 2002, 2003. This projection, however, ends up being used in a double role, both as  
an evaluative phrase and as a (high) degree phrase.
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whether her  term "evaluative predicate"  covers  the same class  of  expressions as 
"gradable predicate".
Hulk and Tellier (2000) instantiate a somewhat similar case. They claim that N of  
an N  constructions always  convey evaluation, subjectiveness, or affectivity on the 
part  of  the  speaker  (i.e.  amusement,  irony,  indignation,  affection).  Hence,  the 
nominals that can occur in this construction are those that may bear an [affective] 
feature.51 At certain points in their account, however, some lack of clarity creeps into 
the claims made or the terminology used. For example,  they add that only those 
nouns that lend themselves to "scalar evaluation" can be N1s. It is unclear whether 
the use of this term should be understood as implying that N1s need to be both scalar, 
i.e. gradable, and evaluative, or whether it simply refers to evaluation which is scalar 
in the sense that it may differ in strength. In addition, they explicitly say that N of an 
N  constructions do not involve a high degree interpretation, and do not postulate 
degree phrases in the syntax or a (semantic) gradability condition on N1. However, 
they do not discuss at all the possible role of gradability (suggested by the term 
"scalar evaluation") or explicitly argue against a possible degree account either. This 
makes their position somewhat unclear.
The notions of gradability/degree and evaluation are most notably collapsed in 
the analysis proposed by Doetjes and Rooryck (2003),52 at least for one class of the 
constructions they investigate, and which they label "pure degree".  Here are some 
examples provided by Doetjes and Rooryck (2003):
(5) a. Ton phénomène de fille est distraite. [French]
your phenomenon of daughter is absent-minded
'That character of a daughter of yours is absent-minded.' 
b. Ce bijou de Marie est absolument exquise.
this jewel of Marie is absolutely marvellous
'This jewel of a Mary is absolutely marvellous.'
They  note  that  phénomène  and  bijou  have  completely  lost  their  original  lexical 
meaning  and  only  contribute  a  strongly  positive  or  negative  evaluation  of  fille  
'daughter' and a highly positive evaluation of Marie, respectively. They claim that, as 
such,  these nouns express  high or  low degree of  quality,  and that  this  is  a  pure 
degree reading.
The notions of "evaluation" and "degree" (of a quality) are used interchangeably 
in this account. Evaluation is translated in terms of degree, and vice versa, as can be 
seen from their claims that N1s express "an evaluation in terms of high degree over 
the qualified noun" (p.  285), and that "in the qualitative domain, 'pure degree' is  
interpreted  as  a  strongly  positive  or  negative  evaluation"  (p.  285).  At  any  rate,  
"degree" is used to cover more or, rather, different things than it normally does when 
standardly  used  to  talk  about  e.g.  gradable  adjectives.  Therefore,  while  we will  
retain the intuition that N1 contributes a strongly positive or negative evaluation, we 
51 Similarly to Milner (1978), who distinguishes between "quality" and "non-quality" nouns, they claim 
that nouns divide into two subclasses: those that may bear the [aff] feature and those that may not; this 
account therefore faces the same sort of problems – see Ruwet 1982 for criticism of such an approach. 
52 See also Vinet (2003) for a very similar approach to N of an N constructions, combining the notions 
of evaluation and degree, without a discussion of the relation between the two.
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consider it necessary to disassociate this from the expression of "pure degree", as 
will be shown in more detail in §2.3.
Finally,  Corver (2008) looks at a family of constructions including  N of an N 
constructions and "evaluative vocatives" (e.g. you idiot!) and claims that the nouns 
that can be used there are (and, in fact, must be) "evaluative epithet nouns" in that 
their "use is intended as a judgment of value".  These nouns have "an evaluative  
function", as well as "an intensifying meaning and may be qualified as [gradable] 
noun[s]". Therefore, the notions of evaluation and gradability are also combined in 
this characterization of potential N1s as epithets, which, apparently, are required to 
be both evaluative and gradable.
To conclude, this sub-section has shown, firstly, that two recurring notions are 
used  in  the  literature  on  N  of  an  N  constructions,  namely  evaluation  (i.e.  the 
expression of a value judgment) and gradability, and, secondly, that sometimes there 
is confusion in handling these notions: they are combined or used interchangeably,  
with no clear distinction being made. Even in the works where only one notion or  
the other is used, there is no discussion of the relation between them, which makes it 
hard to identify the exact factor determining the possible occurrence of a noun as N1. 
This is a gap that needs to be filled. In order to gain a proper understanding of N of  
an N constructions, and of the constraints on possible N1s, we need to clarify and 
distinguish these two notions. Only then can we proceed to identifying the decisive 
factor enabling a noun to appear in the  N of an N  construction. This is what the 
remainder of this section will undertake.
2.3 The  essence  of  N  of  an  N:  value  judgment,  not 
gradability
The aim of this sub-section is two-fold. First of all, we will show that the expression 
of a value judgment and gradability are distinct, yet intersecting, notions, hence the 
confusion often found in the literature.  Secondly,  we aim to show that  it  is  the 
expression of a value judgment that is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for 
N1, while gradability is neither necessary nor sufficient. For ease of exposition, we 
will  structure  our  argumentation  following  the  syntactic  complexity  of  the 
expression occupying the first slot of the  N of an N construction, starting with an 
investigation  of  non-modified  nouns  as  N1,  and  going on  to  examine  modified 
nouns, as well as cases where the first slot is solely occupied by an adjective. For  
each of these cases it will be shown which is the sufficient and necessary condition 
for an expression to occur in this position.
2.3.1 Clarifying the relevant notions
Before trying to isolate the factor that determines the ability of a noun to occur as N1 
in the N of an N construction, we need to clarify and distinguish between the notions 
that have been claimed to play a role.
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First  of  all,  the  notion of  "evaluation"  which  we take  to  be  relevant  for  the  
interpretation of N of an N constructions refers to the expression of a value judgment 
(along the lines of Milner 1978, Ruwet 1982, Den Dikken 2006, Villalba and Bartra-
Kaufmann  2010).  Such  speaker-based  evaluation  is  necessarily  subjective,  or 
emotive  in  some  sense.  Examples  of  expressions  that  convey  a  value  judgment 
include "affective" adjectives, and expressives in general:
(6) a. this damned dog [English]
b. ce foutu professeur [French]
this fucking teacher
'this fucking teacher'
Similar expressions can be found in the nominal domain – e.g. E devil, or F sapristi, 
diable  etc. Here are some examples from English, French and Dutch which show 
that such expressions can occur in the first slot of the N of an N construction: (7) and 
(8) express a negative value judgment, while (9) conveys a positive judgment.
(7) that devil of a child [English]
(8) a. cette sapristi de femme [French]
this good.grief of woman
'this damned woman'
b. ce diable de moteur
this devil of engine
'this wretched engine'
(9) een kei van een meid [Dutch]
a cobble of a girl
'a fantastic girl' 
We take this as a first indication that N1s in N of an N constructions do not merely 
denote  a  property  that  is  attributed  to  an  individual,  but  they  express  a  value 
judgment of the quality of the individual referred to by the N2. Such evaluation may 
differ in polarity, i.e. it can be either positive or negative (in fact more often than not 
negative,  as already mentioned in  §2.2.2).53 More evidence in this  sense will  be 
provided in the coming sub-sections.
Gradability,  on the  other  hand,  is  a  notion  that  applies  to  those  expressions, 
usually adjectives, which  express properties that can manifest in differing degrees 
and,  as  such,  are  compatible  with  degree  modifiers  like  very  and  degree 
constructions like the comparative, which express varying degrees, or intensities, of 
the respective property.
53 It has been shown extensively in the literature that the value judgment is typically negative (so most 
N1s are pejorative and are interpreted as insults – cf. Milner 1978, Ruwet 1982, Napoli 1989, Den Dikken 
2006 etc.), though there are also cases of positive evaluation, as can be seen from many of the examples  
used in the main text. (See Ruwet 1982 for discussion of the rather idiosyncratic behaviour of positively 
evaluative nouns, and Ruwet 1982, Napoli 1989, Corazza 2005 for discussion of various factors that may 
influence the positive vs. negative interpretation of N1, such as the choice of determiner.)
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(10) a. John is (very) tall. 
b. John is taller than Mary. 
 
In the case of nouns, the previous chapter has shown that there are certain classes of 
nouns which come out as gradable according to several tests, one of them being 
modification by degree adjectives. Here are some examples:
(11) a. a big (cheese) eater
b. a big jazz enthusiast
These  examples  show that  nouns  like  enthusiast,  eater etc. can  be  modified  by 
adjectives  like  big  in  a  degree  sense.  That  is,  the  interpretation  of such 
modificational structures occurs  seems to  parallel the interpretation  obtained when 
an adjective  is modified by a degree word like  very. So  a big jazz-enthusiast, for 
instance, is 'someone who is very enthusiastic about jazz'. 
The  examples  in  (10)-(11) and  (6)-(9) show,  respectively,  that  there  are 
expressions  which  are  only  gradable,  without  expressing  a  value  judgment,  and 
expressions  which  only  express  a  value  judgment  without  being  gradable.  To 
illustrate the latter point, take the adjectives in (6), for example: they do not accept 
degree modification, as illustrated below, which indicates that they are not gradable:
(12) a. *this very damned dog [English]
b. *ce très foutu professeur [French]
  this very fucking teacher
All this suggests that gradability and the expression of a value judgment are distinct  
notions. 
However, the two categories intersect to some extent, in the sense that there are 
also expressions which are gradable as well as expressing a value judgment. A quite 
clear  case  (and  one  of  the  typical  examples  used  in  discussions  of  N of  an  N 
constructions) is the noun idiot, which categorizes individuals based on a gradable 
property, namely idiocy, and came out as gradable according to all the tests reviewed 
in chapter 1 (section 2). That this noun also expresses a value judgment is obvious 
particularly in its use as an epithet, for example in evaluative vocatives:
(13) a. John missed the train again, {the/ that} idiot!
b. You idiot!
If gradability and the expression of a value judgment are distinct notions (though 
intersecting in the way illustrated above), it is to be expected that there are contexts 
in which either one or the other will be exploited. Here we will argue that the N of  
an N is one such environment, which requires the expressions occurring in its first 
slot to convey a value judgment.
In  the  next  three  sub-sections,  it  will  be  shown  that  gradability  is  neither 
sufficient  nor  necessary,  and  that  it  is  the  possible  expression  of  a  (positive  or 
negative)  value  judgment  that  is  the  sufficient  and  necessary  condition  for  the 
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occurrence of  an  expressions in the first  position of the  N of an N  construction, 
whether it is a non-modified noun, a modified noun or an adjective.
2.3.2 Non-modified nouns as N1: [N1] of N2
In this sub-section we will examine N of an N constructions containing unmodified 
nouns  in  the  first  slot  and  aim  to  show that  the  requirement  imposed  on  these 
expressions is that they express a value judgment. To start with, consider again our 
first example:
(14) that idiot of a doctor
As already discussed above, the N1 used in this example, idiot, is gradable as well as 
expressing a  value  judgment.  Consequently,  based  on  such  examples  we cannot 
isolate the decisive factor that enables the noun to occur as N1. We need to tease the 
two apart in order to see which one is the sufficient and necessary condition for N1.
First of all, we will show that gradability is not sufficient for N1. Evidence for 
this comes from the fact that not all gradable nouns can be N1, as illustrated by the 
following examples repeated here from chapter 1 (§2.3.1):
(15) a. ??* that (jazz-)enthusiast of a doctor 
b. *that eater of a doctor 
(16) a. *that problem of a decision
b. *that success of an attorney
c. *that mismatch of a fixture
d. *that {stink/ fragrance} of a breeze 
(17) *that wisdom of a saying
The intended interpretation of such examples would be something like 'a doctor who 
is enthusiastic about jazz',  'a fragrant breeze',  or 'a problematic decision',  'a wise 
saying'  etc.,  similarly  to  (14) which  is  interpreted  as  'a  doctor  who  is  idiotic'. 
However, the examples are ungrammatical; this sort of meaning cannot be expressed 
in the shape of an N of an N construction with these nouns occupying the first slot. 
This is so in spite of the fact that the examples contain nouns which come out as 
gradable according to almost all other gradability tests reviewed in chapter 1, such 
as modification by degree adjectives (cf. (11)). As for (17), it could be objected that 
mass nouns generally cannot occur as N1 in N of an N constructions and this is what 
rules  out  the  example.  However,  mass  nouns  can  undergo  a  mass-to-count  shift 
associated with a change in meaning from designating the property to a concrete 
instantiation of it, i.e. denoting an individual which is characterized by the respective 
property. Following such a shift, some originally mass nouns can occur as N1, as 
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illustrated in (18), which is interpreted as 'a beautiful {boat/ performance}' (cf. also 
Hulk and Tellier 2000 for French):54
(18) a beauty of a {boat/ performance}
For some reason, though, this does not seem possible in  (17). Moreover, this still 
does not explain the unacceptability of the other examples given above.
Having suggested that gradability is not sufficient for a noun to occur as N1, we 
will now show that it is not necessary either. This can be seen from the fact that N1 
need not be gradable. Consider the following examples: 
(19) a. a box of a house
b. a stealth submarine of a car
c. that balloon of a {head/ bridal gown/ building}
d. that tower of a {song/ burger/ cake/ man}
These  examples  do not  receive  a  (high)  degree  interpretation,  as  predicted by a 
degree approach such as Matushansky (2002c) (cf. §2.2.1). (19)a, for example, is not 
about a house which is 'a box to a high degree', or one which is 'very box-like'. In all  
these examples the N2 is somehow qualified by metaphorically being compared to 
N1. We will shortly make more precise what the exact contribution of the N1 in such 
examples is. First though, let us mention one more fact which suggests that these 
nouns are not gradable. This consists of their failure to pass other gradability tests. 
For instance, they cannot sustain modification by adjectives  like  big  in a degree 
sense as shown in (20)-(21). Big can only receive a concrete, size interpretation, not 
a degree one, and the nouns do not receive the interpretation they get in (19). These 
examples are not about being a box, submarine etc. to a high degree or about being 
very box-like,  submarine-like etc.;  they are simply about boxes, submarines, etc. 
which  are  large  in  size.  As  such,  the  examples  in  (21),  which  would  require  a 
figurative interpretation of the nouns, are not acceptable.55
(20) a. a big box
b. a big stealth submarine
c. a big balloon
d. a big tower
(21) a. #This house is a big box.
54 Note however that the gradability of these nouns in fact becomes questionable when they are used in 
the N1 position. This can be seen from the fact that, although these nouns are gradable when shifted to the 
count interpretation too, when used in the N1 position, modification by adjectives such as  big does not 
contribute a degree interpretation in relation to N1. Instead, such adjectives are interpreted literally, i.e. in 
terms of size, with respect to N2:
(i) that big beauty of a boat [big boat]
(ii) une énorme saleté de moustique [a big mosquito]
an enormous filth of mosquito
'a huge filthy mosquito' 
55 Modification by size adjectives like big will be examined in more detail in chapter 4 (section 2); an 
explanation for these facts will be proposed there.
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b. #This car is a big submarine.
c. #{His head/ That building} is a big balloon.
d. #{That song/ burger} is a big tower.
Based on the evidence presented thus far, we can conclude that gradability is 
neither sufficient nor necessary for a noun to occur in the N1 position of the N of an 
N  construction. In what follows, we will show that it is  the expression of a value 
judgment that is the sufficient and necessary condition for N1. 
Upon  closer  consideration  of  the  grammatical  examples  above,  it  can  be 
observed  that  what  they  all  share  is  the  expression  of  a  value  judgment.  The 
examples  in (19) in  particular  attest  to  the  fact  that  the  expression  of  a  value 
judgment is sufficient for a noun to occur as N1. As already demonstrated, none of 
the nouns in these examples is gradable; they all, however, clearly convey some sort  
of  value  judgment,  either  positive  or  negative.  Take  (19)a,  for  instance:  the 
qualification of a house in terms of a box – whether understood with respect to size 
or  shape  – conveys  a negative  value judgment  (unless  one  can  come up with a 
scenario in which looking like a box would be desirable so that that box of a house  
could  acquire  a  positive,  appreciative  value).  The  presence  of  this  type  of 
interpretation is enough to make the examples grammatical. This is particularly clear 
with nouns that lose (all or most of) their lexical content and only end up expressing 
a general positive or negative value judgment. Consider the examples in (22) below 
(most of them taken or adapted from Napoli 1989): 
(22) a. a pearl of a sister
b. one hell of a story
c. a flower of a girl
d. a peach of a day
In (22)a, for instance, the speaker is expressing a general positive value judgment of 
Maria as a sister of lovely or valued qualities (similar to 'a sister as lovely as a pearl') 
(Napoli 1989: 229).
Similar facts are found in other Germanic and Romance languages. Consider, for 
instance, the following Dutch and French examples:56
(23) a. een dijk van een {huis/ salaris} [Dutch]
a dike of a  house/ salary
'a hell of a house/ salary'
b. een dijk van een {vrouw/ film/ idee}
a dike of a  woman/ movie/ idea
'a hell of a woman/ movie/ idea'
(24) a. ce bijou d'église [French]
this jewel of.church
'this jewel of a church'
56 The examples in (24) are from Doetjes and Rooryck (2003).
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b. ce bijou de Marie
this jewel of Mary
'this jewel of a Mary'
In (23)a, dijk seems to retain some of its lexical content, so that an interpretation in 
terms of a (positive) evaluation based on some concrete properties (e.g. size) can be 
obtained, resulting in a meaning similar to  massive.  In  (23)b, however,  dijk  only 
expresses a  general, extremely positive value judgment,  similarly to  fantastic.  In 
other words, it seems to have lost all of its other semantic features, i.e. no specific 
properties  related  to  being  a  dijk are  retained,  or  in  any  way  relevant,  for  the 
interpretation.57 (This  type  of  interpretation  in  terms  of  a  general  positive  value 
judgment is also available in (23)a). As for the French examples, as pointed out by 
Doetjes  and  Rooryck  (2003:280),  while  (24)a  can  be  paraphrased  in  terms  of  a 
comparison ('the quality of the church is such that it resembles a jewel') where bijou 
retains part of its lexical meaning, for (24)b it is hard to maintain that 'Marie is like a 
jewel'  without  losing  the  lexical  interpretation  of  bijou  'jewel'.  A  qualitative 
comparison between animate and inanimate entities is much harder to interpret as a 
true comparison. Thus, the use of bijou 'jewel' here only involves a highly positive 
value judgment of Marie.58
Recall  also,  in  this  context,  the  examples  in  (7)-(9),  repeated  here  for 
convenience:  they  host  in  the  N1 slot  expressions  that  clearly  only  make  an 
expressive, affective contribution:59
(7) that devil of a child [English]
(8) a. cette sapristi de femme [French]
this good.grief of woman
'this damned woman'
b. ce diable de moteur
this devil of engine
'this wretched engine'
(9) een kei van een meid [Dutch]
a cobble of a girl
'a fantastic girl' 
57 This is also unlike the way metaphors are generally conceived to work (cf. Henry 1971, Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1990, 1994, 1996; for a different type of approach to metaphor, see Recanati 2003,  
Romero and Soria 2007 a.o.). 
58 Interestingly, the expressions that occupy the N1 slot in some of the examples in this sub-section 
cannot be used in this way outside of the N of an N construction, e.g. in predicate position, sometimes not 
even with such, which can otherwise be used with nouns under a figurative interpretation (see chapter 1, 
§2.1.2). This is the case for the Dutch noun dijk, as well as some of the English nouns (e.g. peach – ??The 
day was (such) a peach.;  hell  - ??*That story was {(such) a/ one} hell.). This suggests that the sort of 
interpretation found is not simply exploited in the  N of an N  construction, but actually created in this 
environment. 
Note also that sapristi cannot be used predicatively at all, as pointed out by Hulk and Tellier (2000) 
and Doetjes and Rooryck (2003), who even question its status as a noun.
59 The examples in  (20)-(21) have demonstrated that the nouns in  (19) are not gradable; the facts are 
completely parallel concerning the nouns used in the other examples, i.e. (22)-(24), as well as (7)-(9). 
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The facts discussed so far make it clear that the expression of a value judgment is 
sufficient  for  a  noun to occur as  N1.  It  remains to  be  shown that  this  is  also a 
necessary condition.
To start with, recall, for instance, the examples in (15) above, repeated here for 
convenience:
(15) a. ??* that (jazz-)enthusiast of a doctor 
b. *that eater of a doctor 
These examples, which contain gradable nouns, are ungrammatical unless we can 
construe a possibly figurative, metaphorical meaning under which the nouns could 
be interpreted as conveying some sort of value judgment. While for a noun like 
eater it is not easy to construe such an interpretation, other agentive –er nouns are 
more likely to have such uses; even for  eater such epithet uses may be coined in 
compounds, as illustrated below:
(25) a. that {dancer/ performer} of a politician
b. that man-eater of a woman
Likewise, the examples in  (16), partly repeated below, can be contrasted with the 
examples in (26):
(16) a. *that problem of a decision
b. *that success of an attorney
(26) a. that mistake of a relationship/ child 
b. a failure of an attorney
What  makes  the  difference  between  the  grammatical  examples  in  (26) and  the 
ungrammatical ones in (16) above is that the nouns in (26) have a judgmental value, 
which is clearly negative in connotation; this is lacking in (16). While this is quite 
straightforward in the case of  (16)b vs.  (26)b, the nouns  problem  and  mistake in 
(16)a and (26)a seem to be quite similar at first sight and would not be expected to  
behave  very  differently.  However,  we  would  like  to  suggest  that  the  contrast  
between (16)a and (26)a can be explained by the fact that problem, unlike mistake, 
does  not  necessarily  have  a  negative  judgmental  connotation.  Problem is  more 
objective,  and  can  be  used  to  simply  make  a  factual  observation  (similar  to 
challenge), while  mistake  is generally felt as making a rather negative comment. 
Note  also,  in  this  context,  the  difference  in  interpretation  when  a  (positive) 
evaluative  adjective  is  used  to  modify  the  two nouns,  as  in  a nice/  fascinating  
problem and  a nice/  fascinating mistake.  In  the  former case we are  referring to 
something  which  presents  us  with  a  challenge,  but  which  is,  at  the  same  time, 
intriguing,  fascinating (in terms of  its  contents,  the implications,  the quest  for  a  
solution etc.). In the latter case, we are referring to a mistake, and the adjective is  
speaker-oriented, in the sense that it conveys the speaker's attitude, possibly ironic 
(in fact exclusively so with nice), rather than describing the intrinsic qualities of the 
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object. In sum, the former can be used in a positive sense, while the latter retains a 
negative flavour coming from the choice of noun.
The  facts  illustrated  in  (26) also  point  up  another  problem for  a  gradability 
approach to  N of an N  constructions,  such as the one put forth by Matushansky 
(2002c)  who assumes that  the  structure  involves  a  degree  operator.  Recall  from 
§2.2.1 that, while Matushansky expresses the intuition that these constructions also 
involve  an  emotive  dimension  of  meaning,  she  in  fact  reduces  the  entire 
phenomenon to the presence of a (special) degree operator in the syntactic structure. 
This would predict  that  occurrence in this  position should  always trigger  a  high 
degree interpretation of N1, given the contribution of the degree operator. This is, 
however, not the case. The sentences in  (26) above, for example, are not about an 
attorney who is 'a failure to a high degree', or a relationship/ child that is a 'high 
degree mistake'. Instead, the attorney is judged as a failed one/ a failure, and the 
relationship as  being a mistake,  and these qualifications carry a particular  (here: 
negative) value judgment. The same holds, in fact, for all the examples considered 
so far.
More data clearly indicating that it is the expression of value judgment that is the 
essence of  the  interpretation of  N1s  comes from Villalba  and  Bartra-Kaufmann's 
(2010) discussion of Spanish N of an N constructions. They take it to be a lexically 
encoded, and hence highly idiosyncratic, property of the nominal. Typical instances 
involve  negative  evaluative  nominals  like  idiota 'idiot',  bruja 'witch',  gilipollas 
'asshole',  burro 'silly'  (lit.  'donkey'),  whereas  non-evaluative  nouns  like  médico 
'doctor'  or  político 'politician'  are  forbidden.  Crucially,  when  a  deprecatory 
morphological  marker like -ucho or  -astro is  added, the  N of  an N  construction 
becomes perfect:60,61
(27) a. #el {médico/ político} de tu hermano [Spanish]
 the   doctor/ politician of your brother
b. el {medicucho/ politicastro} de tu hermano
the  bad.doctor/ bad.politician of your brother
'that disaster of a doctor that your brother is'
So far, we have shown that the expression of a value judgment is the sufficient 
and necessary condition for a non-modified noun to occur as N1. In what follows we 
will show that when N1 is modified, the effect of the modifier (i.e. adjective) on the 
acceptability of the [A N] in the first slot of the N of an N construction depends on 
the same aspect of meaning, i.e. whether it can convey a value judgment.
60 Villalba and Bartra-Kaufmann (2010) also note that the contrast has nothing to do with gradability, as  
neither nominal is gradable:
(i) *Juan es muy {médico / medicucho}. 
  John is very {a doctor/ bad.doctor}.
61 The examples in (27) are from Villalba and Bartra-Kaufmann (2010).
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2.3.3 Insertion of adjectives in the first position: [A (N1)] of N2
The preceding  sub-section  has  shown that  a  noun can  only  be used  in  the  first 
position of the N of an N construction if it can express a (positive or negative) value 
judgment; this is the necessary and sufficient condition. We will now show that this 
conclusion is confirmed by an examination of cases where a noun is modified in the 
N1 position,  or  when  an  adjective  is  used  on  its  own  in  the  first  slot  of  the  
construction.
To start with, compare the following examples:
(28) a. *that eater of a doctor
b. that huge eater of a doctor
The contrast  between the two examples suggests that  modification can license a 
noun as N1 that otherwise would not be able to occur in this position. The question 
is: what is the decisive contribution of the adjective: that it  is gradable or that it 
contributes a value judgment? Just like in the previous sub-section, we need to tease 
the two apart in order to see which one is the sufficient and necessary condition for 
an adjective to be able to license a noun in the N1 position.
First of all, we will show that gradability is not sufficient. This can be seen from 
the fact that simply adding a gradable adjective does not automatically license a 
noun as  N1,  as  shown by  (30) in  comparison with  (29).  The fact  that  these are 
gradable adjectives is indicated by the availability of degree modification in (31).
(29) a. *that eater of a doctor
b. *a duck of a president
c. *that problem of a {decision/ financial crisis}
(30) a. ?that big eater of a doctor
b. *a/that friendly duck of a president
c. *that interesting problem of a {decision/ financial crisis}
(31) a. a very big eater
b. very friendly
c. a very interesting problem 
On  the  other  hand,  gradability  is  not  necessary.  This  is  shown  by  cases  of 
modification  by  affective,  or expressive,  adjectives  (e.g.  English  damned  etc., 
French foutu, sacré, fameux, beau, pauvre etc., but also prétendu, soi-disant). Such 
adjectives can license as N1 nouns that otherwise would not be able to occur in this 
position, as shown by the contrast  between  (32) and  (33),  although they are not 
gradable, as shown again in (34) below:62
(32) a. *that democrat of a mayor [English]
62 The examples in (33) are taken or adapted from, or inspired by, Ruwet (1982).
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b. *ce linguiste de Noam [French]
  this linguist of Noam
b'. *ce {démocrate/ médecin} de Paul
  this   democrat/ doctor of Paul
(33) a. that damned democrat of a mayor [English]
b. ce sacré linguiste de Noam [French]
this bloody linguist of Noam
'this bloody linguist of a Noam'
b'. ce prétendu {démocrate/ médecin} de Paul
this pretended   democrat/ doctor of Paul
'this pretended democrat/ doctor of a Paul' 
(34) a. *a very damned democrat [English]
b. *le plus sacré linguiste [French]
  the most bloody linguist
b'. *un très prétendu {démocrate/ médecin}
  a very pretended   democrat/ doctor
In  what  follows,  we  will  show that  the  expression  of  a  value  judgment  is  the  
sufficient and necessary condition. That it is sufficient can already be seen from the 
acceptability  of  "affective"  adjectives  in  (33).  These adjectives  are not  gradable. 
They only express the speaker's attitude. So it is due to this particular semantics that 
they can license nouns which may be completely neutral in terms of value judgments 
and would otherwise be barred from the N1 position (e.g. democrat, linguist, doctor  
etc.): the [A N] combination will be interpreted as a whole as conveying a value 
judgment, namely a depreciatory one. The examples in (35) illustrate similar cases, 
where the adjectives contribute a negative attitude (e.g. despise):63
(35) a. a lame duck of a president
b. a {sorry/ lame /poor} excuse of a man
Finally, if an adjective can be interpreted as expressing a value judgment (possibly 
in addition to being gradable), then it can also license a noun as N1. This is in fact 
the case for (28)b above, which is to be contrasted with (30)a.64 Conversely, if such a 
value-judgmental interpretation is missing, as in  (30) above, the examples are not 
acceptable.65 This shows that the expression of a value judgment is necessary.
63 Example (35)a is from Napoli (1989).
64 Such adjectives seem to be "emotive" adjectives (cf.  Vendler 1968 who classifies adjectives like 
horrible,  awful,  delightful etc.  as "emotive" adjectives,  and notes that other adjectives,  like  beautiful, 
lovely as well as ugly, dirty etc. may also carry an emotive load), or "evaluating" (or quality) adjectives 
(cf. Cinque 1994, Hetzron 1978; e.g. English beautiful, French joli), or adjectives expressing "subjective 
comment" (cf. Scott 1998, 2002; e.g. nasty, magnificent, beautiful, great, excellent etc.). These adjectives 
seem to be (a subset of the class of) evaluative adjectives distinguished by Bierwisch (1989), or "extreme" 
adjectives (cf. Cruse 1986, Paradis 2001, Morzycki 2010). 
65 A treatment of such adjectives as degree modifiers of the gradable nouns (a view suggested in chapter 
1, and to be examined more seriously in chapter 4) would also raise a problem for a (high) degree analysis 
of N of an N constructions (such as Matushansky 2002c): the fact that adding a degree modifier improves 
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In sum, the investigation of modified N1s has shown that, when an adjective can 
license a noun in this position, which otherwise would not be able to occur here, the 
sufficient and necessary condition for it to do so is, once again, the expression of a  
value judgment, not gradability.
Additional evidence that supports this conclusion comes from a related structure, 
where the first slot is only occupied by an adjective, i.e. A of N constructions. These 
are not found in English, but they exist in Romance languages, e.g. Romanian and 
Spanish (especially when N2 is a proper name or a personal pronoun). Consider the 
following examples:
(36) a. ??înaltul de Petre [Romanian]
    tall.the of Peter
b. ??slabul de Petre
    thin.the of Peter
(37) a. săracul de {mine / Petre} [Romanian]
poor.the of   me / Peter
'poor me / poor Peter'
b. pobrecitos de nosotros [Spanish]
poor of us
'poor us'
On the one hand, the first series of examples contain clearly gradable adjectives (like 
înalt 'tall', and slab 'thin'), but are not acceptable, thus showing that gradability is not 
sufficient  for  an  adjective  to  occur  in  this  position.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
acceptability of (non-predicative) adjectives like  poor,  which are not gradable, in 
(37) shows that  gradability  is  not  necessary.  These examples  also show that  the 
expression  of  a  value  judgment,  or  speaker  attitude,  however,  is  a  sufficient 
condition, since this is what the meaning of these adjectives only consists of.  That 
this is also a necessary condition is shown by the fact that if, possibly in addition to 
being gradable, an adjective  can also convey such a (subjective) value judgment, 
then it may occur in the construction. Contrast, for example, the ungrammaticality of 
the (dimensional) adjectives înalt 'tall' and slab 'thin', which tend to be rather neutral, 
in (36) above, with the grammaticality of the corresponding words derived by means 
of an augmentative suffix,  namely  înăltan  'very tall (person)'  and slăbănog  'very 
skinny (person)':
(38) a. înăltanul de Petre [Romanian]
tall.AUG.the of Peter
'that really tall Peter'
b. slăbănogul de Petre
thin.AUG.the of Peter
'that really skinny Peter'
the examples is unexpected in such an analysis where a (high) degree projection is assumed to be present  
in the structure in all cases. 
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The difference between  (36) and  (38) lies in the contribution of the augmentative 
suffix,  which  adds  a  negative  connotation,  plausibly  related  to  the  idea  of  an 
(undesirable) excess in height etc. as compared to some average or standard (in fact 
înăltan or slăbănog may be used to indicate that the individual is 'too much taller/ 
skinnier than would be normal').66 The ungrammatical examples in  (36) above can 
also be contrasted with the acceptable example in  (39) below, which contains the 
adjective  gras  'fat',  which expresses a property that is conventionally regarded as 
rather negative; the presence of this negative connotation (which is absent in  (36)) 
licenses the use of the adjective in the first slot of the construction:
(39) grasul de Petre [Romanian]
fat.the of Peter
'that fat Peter'
All these examples show that what makes the difference between acceptable and 
unacceptable  examples  of  A of  N  constructions,  in  those  languages  where  such 
structures exist, is the presence vs. absence of an interpretation in terms of value 
judgment. Gradability does not play a role. This confirms the conclusion that  the 
ability to convey a value judgment is the sufficient and necessary condition for an 
expression to occur in the first position of these constructions.
2.3.4 Final remarks on the interpretation of N1
It has been shown in the preceding sub-sections that the essence of the N of an N 
construction is the expression of a value judgment. As such, possible N1s are those 
nouns that have or can acquire such an interpretation. The value judgment may be 
inherent in the meaning of the noun, i.e. some nouns (whether gradable or not) make 
a value judgment easily available due to their inherent, lexical meaning. Such an 
example  is  idiot which  categorizes  individuals  based  on  the  (gradable)  property 
idiocy, which is an intrinsically negative quality, hence the negative value judgment 
this noun is associated with by definition. Another example is provided by  tyran 
'tyrant', which, as shown Ruwet (1982), can be used as N1 both with a metaphorical 
interpretation and a non-metaphorical one:
(40) a. Ce tyran de Hiéron terrorisait Syracuse. [French]
this tyrant of Hieron terrorised Syracuse
'This tyrant Heron terrorised Syracuse.' 
66 Note that a similar contrast is found in Italian, where neutral agentive nouns like mangiatore 'eater' 
do not like to appear as N1 (unless they are modified), while the nouns derived from the same verb by 
means of the augmentative suffix (e.g. mangione 'big eater') do:
(i) a. ??/*questo mangiatore di Gianni
this eater of Gianni
b. questo mangione di Gianni
this eater.AUG of Gianni
'this huge eater (of a) Gianni'
And recall also the Spanish examples in (27). 
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b. Ce tyran de Paul terrorise sa famille.
this tyrant of Paul terrorises his family
'This tyrannical Paul terrorises his family.'
If a value judgment is not inherent in the meaning of the noun, as in the case of 
basically neutral nouns the lexical meaning of which involves no value judgment,  
such as schoolmaster, box, doctor etc., it may come about by means of modification 
(by e.g. affective adjectives – cf. (33), (35)), by adding an evaluative suffix (as in the 
Spanish  examples  in  (27)),  or  as  the  result  of  a  shift  in  meaning,  usually  by 
"metaphorical extension or association" (cf. Ruwet 1982, Napoli 1989) (e.g.  (19), 
(22)-(25)). 
Some  supplementary  observations  may  be  added  that  further  support  the 
conclusion that what is necessary is for N1s to be able to express a value judgment, 
as well as showing other aspects correlated with this sort of interpretation. First, as 
pointed out by Napoli (1989), those inanimate objects which are colloquially used 
with the sense of a value judgment can appear in the N1 position, while the names of 
inanimate objects which are typically used for specific purposes are not generally 
employed with such an interpretation and are,  therefore, also barred from the N1 
position. This is illustrated for Italian and English by the contrast between the (a)  
and (b) examples below (with the exception of (41)a', the examples are from Napoli 
1989):
(41) a. un fiore di ragazza [Italian]
a flower of girl
'a flower of a girl'
a'. un capolavoro di quadro
a masterpiece of painting
'a masterpiece of a painting'
b. *un tulipano di ragazza
  a tulip of girl
  '*a tulip of a girl'
b'. *un quadro d'opera d'arte 
  a painting of work of art
  '*a painting of a work of art'
(42) a. a pistol of a lecturer
b. *a revolver of a lecturer
Similarly, proper names (and pronouns) cannot occur as N1 in these constructions 
precisely  because  they  cannot  be  used  to  convey  value  judgments.  The  only 
exception are proper names that by connotation have become evaluative in this sense 
(Napoli 1989):
(43) a. *quello Carlo d'uomo
  that Carlo of.man
  '*that Charles of a man'
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b. un Hitler d'uomo
a Hitler of.man
'a Hitler of a man'
In addition, as Villalba and Bartra-Kaufmann (2010) remark, what counts as a 
proper expression of value judgment has a cultural conditioning. They note, in this 
sense,  the contrast  between the masculine  brujo 'wizard'  and the  feminine  bruja 
'witch', illustrated below. Whereas the latter is easily and frequently used in N of an 
N constructions, the former is awkward (and unattested), because of the fact that it 
has no pragmatically attributable negative interpretation:
(44) a. la bruja de mi suegra [Spanish]
the witch of my mother-in-law
'that witch of a mother-in-law of mine'
b. #el brujo de mi suegro
  the wizard of my father-in-law
Moreover, speaker-variation can sometimes be observed in correlation with the 
availability of an interpretation in terms of value judgment. Napoli (1989) notes that 
while in many cases the value judgment is inherent in the word for all speakers (as 
in most of the examples above), sometimes speakers will vary, which influences the 
acceptability  of  the  example.  Consider  (45) below,  for  which  Napoli  reports 
variation that she puts down to the fact that "for many speakers the word sexist is not 
(yet) inherently evaluative" (p. 224):
(45) a sexist of a director
Another  interesting  property  of  the  interpretation  of  N1s  in  N  of  an  N 
constructions is the fact that it  varies depending on the choice of N2.  This could 
already be seen in the variable interpretation of the N1s in the Dutch and French 
examples in (23)-(24) above. More examples illustrating this point are given below 
for English:
(46) a. a cupboard of a house
b. a cupboard of a man
(47) a. a whale of a time
b. a whale of a lesson
c. a whale of a tale
d. a whale of a bug
e. a great white whale of a hotel
f. a whale of a problem
g. a whale of a mystery
h. a whale of a woman
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It can be observed that the exact relevant properties that make up the basis for the 
value judgment  may differ  for  the same N1 with different  N2s.  In  (46)a what  is 
relevant is size (namely, insufficient or small, and possibly crammed, space), while 
in  (46)b it is shape,  and, possibly, also (large)  size. In  (47) it can be shape, size, 
quality etc. What stays constant throughout, however, is that the N of an N conveys a 
negative or positive value judgment, with a greater or lesser emotive load.
Note that these facts constitute a problem for a degree approach, which would 
take such figurative meanings to be the result of scalarity coercion triggered by the 
presence of a degree operator. According to Matushansky (2002c),  as a result of 
scalarity coercion the nouns would come to express properties typically associated 
with being N, with the notions of stereotype or prototype coming into play. It is not  
obvious, however, how, for the same N1, it could yield a different output depending 
on the choice of N2. In addition,  it is also sometimes rather hard to determine  the 
relevant properties that would be "stereotypically associated with being N1"; this can 
be seen in the case of cupboard in  (46) or  peach  in  (22)d –  a peach of  a  day. 
Prototypicality does not seem to play a role here either. Moreover, in some cases, 
there is  a  strong connotational  value.  Take  (47)e for instance:  white whale  is  an 
allusion to Moby Dick, hence, we are not simply dealing with a big hotel, but with  
one that is unmanageable etc.; someone without knowledge of the relevant fiction, 
however, would not be able to interpret the example in this way, and would probably 
only  get  a  size  +  colour  qualification  out  of  it. In  sum,  the  dependence  of  the 
resulting interpretation of  N1 on the choice of  N2 is  hard to  capture on such an 
approach.  It  is  also,  in  fact,  rather  unexpected  given  that  scalarity  coercion  is 
supposed to be triggered by the presence of a degree operator that combines with N1, 
and then the [Deg + N1] as a whole acts as a predicate or as a modifier of the N2 
(depending on the analysis one adopts). Finally, note that the cases where N 1 loses 
all  of  its  lexical  semantic  content,  and  ends  up  expressing  only  a  very  general 
positive or negative value judgment (recall examples  (22)-(24), as well as  (7)-(9)) 
also present a problem for such a degree account since there is no property related to 
being N1 which can be identified.
Before concluding the section, we would like to add a note on the source of the 
confusion sometimes found in the literature between "evaluation",  defined as the 
expression of a value judgment, and degree. In our view, the confusion stems from 
the  fact  that,  although  the  expression  of  a  value  judgment  and  gradability  are 
distinct, they are intersecting notions, in the sense that there are expressions which 
are gradable as  well  as  expressing a value judgment  (e.g.  idiot).  If  one chooses 
examples containing such expressions in the first slot of the N of an N construction, 
it is not easy to pinpoint which is the relevant factor enabling the expression to occur 
in this position. In addition, it is likely that what has been confused is the (possibly 
varying) strength of appreciation or depreciation carried by the "value-judgmental" 
expression and the high degree of a property the respective expression denotes or is 
associated with. This is because strong appreciation or depreciation and high degree 
may be associated by inference – though such implications are not necessary. Thus, 
an expression of high degree, such as  very beautiful  or  very stupid  or even  very/  
extremely tall, to take simple examples from the adjectival domain, may implicate, 
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or be associated with, a strongly positive or negative value judgment.67 Conversely, a 
strong judgmental expression may be understood in the sense that property holds to 
a high degree. For example, the use of an evaluative vocative such as that idiot! may 
be interpreted as implying that (the speaker thinks that) the individual in question is 
'very idiotic'. In other words, the strength of speaker involvement as suggested by 
the use of a value judgmental expression may be taken to reflect the degree to which 
the property expressed applies.
2.4 Concluding remarks
The investigation carried out in this section has yielded two main findings. 
First of all, it was shown that "evaluation", understood as the expression of a 
value  judgment,  and  (pure)  gradability,  understood  as  referring  to  the  possibly 
varying degrees to which a property may hold, can and should be distinguished. This 
can be done in spite of the fact that the classes of expressions they delimit intersect 
to some extent, in the sense that there are expressions which are gradable and may 
express a value judgment at the same time (e.g. idiot). This is significant as it fills a 
gap in the literature on the topic of N of an N constructions, which had led to some 
confusion in the characterization of the N of an N construction.
Secondly, once this distinction has been established, the exact requirement on the 
first slot of the  N of an N construction can be identified. It  has been shown that 
possible  N1s  must  be  expressions  that  lend  themselves  to  being  interpreted  as 
expressing a value judgment (usually negative, but not exclusively so), irrespective 
of  whether  they  are  gradable  or  not.  In  other  words,  the  expression  of  a  value 
judgment is the necessary and sufficient condition on N1, while (pure) gradability is 
neither sufficient nor necessary.
Consequently, occurrence in the N1 slot of the N of an N construction cannot be 
used  as  a  test  for  nominal  gradability.  This  is  rather  an  environment  where 
expressive/emotive evaluative meanings are exploited or even created.
3 Seem 
3.1 Introduction
The second case we examine in this chapter is the distribution of expressions in the  
non-sentential (i.e. small clause) complement of  seem in English. As discussed in 
chapter 1, it has been claimed in the literature that only gradable expressions can be 
used  in  this  environment  (Bolinger  1972,  Maling  1983).  Matushansky  (2002b), 
however,  shows  that  the  facts  are  more  complicated  and  argues  that  semantic 
67 For a discussion of expressives and their possibly varying degree of expressivity, or strength see, for 
example, Potts (2007).
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selection alone (i.e. lexical gradability) cannot account for the restrictions that are 
found. Instead, she proposes a syntactic degree account, claiming that seem requires 
the presence of a DegP in its small clause complement in the syntax. 
The main consequence of  such an account,  which requires  the presence of  a 
DegP, is  that  the small  clause complement of  seem  will have to contain either a 
gradable noun or a noun modified by a gradable adjective, since these are the types 
of  elements  that  are  assumed to project  a  DegP in  the  syntax  in  Matushansky's 
account.68 Alternatively, it will have to contain a noun or adjective that has become 
gradable by means of scalarity coercion triggered by the presence of a  (covert or 
overt) degree operator. 
In this section, we will re-examine (the core idea of) Matushansky's syntactic 
degree account in light of some additional empirical facts and show that her proposal 
cannot account for (all) the data or makes the wrong predictions. This will lead us to 
suggest  an  alternative  way  of  capturing  the  restrictions  on  the  small  clause 
complement of seem in which gradability, either lexical semantic or syntactic, does 
not play a role. 
3.2 The syntactic degree account and its problems
3.2.1 Introducing the syntactic degree account
The following examples illustrate the basic contrasts, presented in chapter 1, which 
led to the claim that  only gradable nouns and adjectives are acceptable in the non-
sentential complement of  seem, as in  (48), while non-gradable ones are not, as in 
(49) (cf. Bolinger 1972, Maling 1983):
(48) a. Eric seems a fool. [NP]
a'. What he writes seems nonsense.
b. The music seems beautiful. [AP]
b'. His nationality seems irrelevant. 
(49) a. *Eric seems a {man/ wizard/ doctor/ dancer}. [NP]
a'. *What he writes seems history. 
b. *The music seems choral. [AP]
b'. *His nationality seems French. 
Matushansky (2002b), however, draws attention to some complications in the data. 
For example, adding adjectives like good, capable, bad etc. to a non-gradable noun 
improves the examples in (49)a significantly:
(50) Eric seems a {capable/ good/ lousy/ exceptional} {wizard/ doctor/ dancer}.
68 Prepositional phrases can also occur in this position, but we will not discuss these cases here.
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As also noted by Bolinger (1972),  adding a degree modifier to the non-gradable 
adjectives in  (49)b, as well as to nouns,  makes them acceptable,  as illustrated in 
(51).  In  addition,  Matushansky observes  that  comparatives,  equatives  etc.  are 
possible in the small clause complement of seem, as illustrated in (52).69
(51) a. The music seems almost choral. 
a'. Eric seems exceptionally French. 
b. You'd seem such a linguist!
(52) a. Frank Sandow seems (twice) as tall as Lady Karle.
b. She seems more eager to learn than you are.
This is significant since, as a whole, these predicates can no longer be considered 
gradable.  Let  us  see  why.  Matushansky  adopts  a  degree-based  approach  to  the 
semantics and syntax of gradable predicates,  which takes them to be of type <d, 
<e,t>>,  and to project  a  DegP in the syntax (even in  the case of the unmarked, 
positive form, for which a null degree operator is posited). On such an account, at 
the point of the derivation when  seem  is merged with its complement, the degree 
argument of the adjective has been bound by the equative, or comparative, operator.  
No longer having an unsaturated degree argument, it no longer counts as a gradable 
predicate.
Based  on  such  facts,  Matushansky  concludes  that  semantic  selection  alone 
cannot account for the restrictions on the small clause complement of  seem, so  a 
simple lexical gradability approach cannot be maintained. She argues, instead, that i t 
is necessary to  separate the underlying (i.e. lexically specified) gradability of the 
lexical head of a predicate from its syntactic behaviour, hence from the licensing of 
a  predicate  in  the  complement  of  seem.  She  proposes  that  what  licenses  the 
complements in the examples above is the presence of a DegP in the syntax (e.g. 
containing the equative or comparative operator).
In Matushansky's syntactic degree account,  seem is treated as a case of lexical 
ambiguity: there is an epistemic  seem, which takes an IP/ CP complement, and a 
perception  seem,  which takes a small clause complement. The restrictions on the 
small  clause  complement  of  perception  seem  are  formulated  as  a  syntactic 
requirement:  "Perception  verbs,  including  the  perception  seem,  are  lexically 
specified for an uninterpretable [degree] feature. This feature is checked by (covert) 
QR of a DegP from its complement." (Matushansky 2002b: 256)
In  the  next  sub-section  we  will  show  how  Matushanky  accounts  for  the 
complications in the data that she notes, and point out some problems that arise from 
the analysis she proposes. 
3.2.2 Some problems 
In  addition  to  the  contrasts  illustrated  in  (50)-(51) above,  Matushansky (2002b) 
points to some more complications in the data. Despite what (50), may suggest, it is 
69 The examples in (51)-(52) are from Bolinger (1972) and Matushansky (2002b).
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in fact not  the case that simply adding an adjective to a non-gradable noun will 
automatically  improve the examples,  as  shown by  (53),  though adding a degree 
modifier to the adjective does, as illustrated in (54) (examples taken or adapted from 
Matushansky 2002b):
(53) a. Eric seems a {*French/ *tall/ ??handsome} {wizard/ doctor/ dancer}.
b. ?Eric seems a handsome man. 
(54) a. Eric seems an exceptionally {French/ handsome}{wizard/ doctor/ 
dancer}. 
b. Eric seems a more {French/ handsome} dancer than anyone I have ever 
met. 
Matushansky  (rather  misleadingly)  calls  the  adjectives  in  (53)-(54) "dimension" 
adjectives,  and  those  in  (50) above  "value"  adjectives  (which  seem  to  include 
evaluative adjectives  generally interpreted subsectively). "Dimensional" adjectives, 
unlike  "value"  ones,  require  an  overt  degree  operator  to  license  inherently  non-
gradable DP-complements of  seem.  However,  with certain light head nouns or if 
stressed, they also function as licensers (as in  (53)b vs.  (53)a); she also notes that 
examples containing "dimension" adjectives are better than those with nationality 
ones (compare French and handsome in (53)a).
These facts raise certain questions, which Matushansky tries to address. We will 
consider two of them here, and show that the solutions she offers to these problems 
are  unsatisfactory,  and  raise  additional problematic issues  that  cast  doubt  on the 
analysis.
Before  considering  these  issues,  we  need  to  introduce  two  ingredients  of 
Matushansky's account. Firstly, she claims that a degree operator in the complement 
of seem cannot be interpreted in situ and needs to undergo Quantifier Raising (QR). 
This movement is in fact caused by two factors: (i) there is a type mismatch between 
the  degree  operator  and  its  complement  (as  generally  assumed  on  the 
quantificational view of degree operators – cf. Heim 2000); (ii) the feature on seem 
needs to be checked. Secondly, she argues that in order to extract an item out of a DP 
(which is assumed to be a phase), it must first be raised to its periphery, presumably  
to Spec,DP.
The first question raised by the data above on an account like Matushansky's is: 
why is it impossible to use the DegP of the adjectives in (53) to license the noun in 
the complement of  seem? Her answer is that, for whatever reason, the null degree 
operator  present  in  (certain  classes  of)  adjectives  cannot  be  raised  in  the  way 
indicated above. This,  however,  reveals an inconsistency in the account, since at 
other points in the paper, and for other contexts, she in fact claims that the degree  
operator present in the DegP of positive adjectives does generally need to raise for  
interpretability. In addition, she offers no explanation for the contrast between (53)a 
and  (53)b. The second question then arises: if the default null degree operator of  
positive  adjectives  projected  within  a  DP,  as  in  (53),  cannot  check  the 
uninterpretable feature of  seem,  then (i)  why can gradable nouns (for which she 
assumes a similar syntax-semantics) appear in the complement of seem, and (ii) how 
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come there is a class of adjectives that do not require an (overt) degree operator to 
license  non-gradable  DP-complements  of  seem,  as  in  the  (50) examples?  Her 
answer, building on Bierwisch (1989), is that "value" adjectives  like those in  (50) 
and gradable nouns contain a different kind of degree operator than the null operator 
proposed for positive "dimension" adjectives  such as those in  (53). However, the 
proposed typology of gradable adjectives, namely "dimension" and "value", does not 
fully match the classifications proposed in the works she refers to, namely Bierwisch 
(1989). In addition, she does not discuss the actual properties/nature of the special 
null  degree  operator  postulated  for  the  sub-class  of  value  adjectives  and  its 
interaction with  or relation to the null degree operator postulated for the positive 
form of gradable adjectives in general.
Having  pointed  out  these  problematic  aspects  of  the  analysis  proposed  by 
Matushansky (2002b),  we will,  in  the  remainder  of  this  section,  mostly  abstract 
away from other details concerning the particular technical implementation, and will 
mainly focus on the core idea of the proposal and its predictions in the light of some 
additional empirical facts.
3.2.3 Measure phrases
Matushansky  (2002b)  points  out  that  adjectives  modified  by  measure  phrases 
(henceforth MP),  as in  (55),  are not possible in the small  clause complement of 
seem. But when a MP contains its own degree operator such as almost, about etc., as 
in (56), it becomes possible (all examples below are from Matushnsky 2002b):
(55) a. *Frank Sandow seems 5'10'' tall.
b. *Thumbelina seems two inches tall. 
c. *Mount Everest seems {8848 m/ 8.8 km/ 29,028 feet} high.
(56) a. Frank Sandow seems {almost/ about} 5'10'' tall.
b. Thumbelina seems about two inches tall.
Based on these contrasts, she argues that adjectives modified by MPs are "absolute" 
predicates,  i.e.  they  are  not  gradable.  Therefore,  their  syntax  does not  involve  a 
DegP  projection,  and  they  are,  consequently, barred  from  the  small  clause 
complements of  seem. When a degree operator is present, however, as in  (56), it 
licenses the entire AP in the complement of  seem (even if the degree operator is 
actually embedded in the specifier of AP). This effect is similar to the influence of 
explicit scalarity coercion in other contexts, e.g. APs and DPs – recall the examples  
in  (51) and  (54),  where adding a  degree  modifier  licenses  an  adjective or  noun 
which could otherwise not appear in the small clause.
These facts, however, may also be taken to support an alternative, vagueness-
based, view. Such a view would link the ungrammaticality of (55) to the fact that the 
precision of the measure phrases used is too high for the embedded proposition to be 
epistemically or perceptually at issue. This would amount to treating seem similarly 
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to the seem of other languages (e.g. Modern Italian sembrare),70 which imposes no 
gradability restriction on its complement. In these languages  or dialects  sembrare/ 
seem means 'it can be deduced from perceptual evidence that P holds'. The constraint 
then becomes a pragmatic one of perceptual or epistemic uncertainty. 
But Matushansky rejects this view, on the basis of two arguments. Firstly, she 
points out that using smaller, larger or different units of measurement, as in (55)c, or 
even  a  vague  plural,  as  in  (57) below,  which  should  have  influenced  the 
grammaticality if it truly relied on precision of perception, has no effect. Secondly, 
measure phrases used as part of a comparative are grammatical in the complement of 
seem as in (58) (both examples are from Matushansky 2002b).
(57) *Mount Everest seems thousands of meters high.
(58) Thumbelina seems two inches taller than expected. 
She  uses  this  as  evidence  in  favour  of  her  view that  in  the  case  of  adjectives 
modified by MPs no DegP is projected. They will, therefore, not make good small 
clause complements to seem. In cases like (58), however, there is a DegP hosting the 
comparative, and the whole phrase can be licensed as a complement.
We would like, however, to raise some objections to Matushansky's arguments. 
First of all, her judgment of the example in (57) is questionable: speakers we have 
consulted as well as internet and corpus searches show that such examples are in fact 
acceptable:
(59) a. It seems years to me since I have seen you.71
b. A place where the hustle and bustle of city life seems thousands of miles 
away.72
c. But as they sit here, they seem a million miles from their tranquil 
Northwich base.73
More in general, in fact, it is not completely correct to say that adjectives modified 
by MPs are not allowed in the complement of seem.74 We do find such examples, as 
illustrated below. Interestingly, they get an interpretation of the type 'X seems very 
A' or '(much) A-er than it/he/she (really) is':
70 Or  the  seem  of  other  dialects  such  as  Victorian  English,  written  media  English  according  to 
Matushansky (2002b). 
71 Source: http://www.classicreader.com/book/2438/1/ 
72 Source: http://www.atlasdowel.com/pages/blog/ 
73 Source: British National Corpus
74 As  already  indicated,  Matushansky  (2002b)  excludes  MP  modification  from  the  domain  of 
gradability, and argues that no DegP is projected in these cases; hence such expressions are barred from 
the small clause complement of seem, contrary to fact as can be seen from the examples in the main text.
In other works on the syntax and semantics of gradable adjectives and MP modification, however, it 
has been argued that MPs are in fact hosted within degree projections – cf. Kennedy 1999a, Kennedy &  
Svenonius (2006). Adopting such a view of the syntax of MPs would still not be able to rescue a syntactic  
degree approach to seem, since, if all MPs were to involve a DegP, then all examples should be equally  
grammatical (or ungrammatical), which is not the case either.
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(60) a. O'Callaghan is that rare actor who seems ten feet tall on stage; his 
sublimely talented, effervescent performance is reason enough to see the 
show…75
b. She's got a stride that seems 60 feet long. It's effortless.76
c. The table seems 20 feet long. There is no eye contact between them.77
The interpretation, and hence acceptability, of such examples seems to be facilitated 
by certain factors.  One is expressing or implying a contrast  between appearance 
(wrong  or  false  impression) and reality  (real  dimensions),  as  in  (61).  Another  is 
turning the predicate into a stage-level one, or one that is otherwise relativized or 
can be evaluated with respect to different times and/or locations (e.g. by the addition 
of temporal adverbs), as in (62).
(61) a. Notice how the front of the van distorts into a circle and seems 20 feet 
long.
b. Although he is only five and a half feet tall, when he shares his thoughts 
his face becomes animated, his arms start moving about and he seems 
seven feet tall, larger than life.78
c. She is standing on a small pedestal hidden under her gown and seems 
eight feet tall.79
d. … she was so polite and so short, about five foot three, nothing like her 
character here, who seems twelve feet tall and so powerful!80
e. Also, the dust jacket on my edition features a painting by T. Thompson in 
which the proportions are all wrong and the boat seems 100 feet long, not 
72.81
(62) a. For a guy who seems 100 feet tall when he's fighting, I could not believe 
how short Wanderlei Silva was in person.82
b. He seems ten feet tall at points and I think that is really how you would 
feel if you came face to face with him.83
c. Sister G is only four feet, ten inches tall. But sometimes she seems six 
feet tall as this reporter soon discovered.84
These may all be regarded as means of introducing some relativization with respect 
to  different  times  or  possible  worlds,  which  creates  room  for  imprecision  and 
epistemic  uncertainty.  We  would  like  to  suggest  that  this  is  what  makes  them 
compatible with the meaning of seem, which encodes epistemic uncertainty.
75 Source: http://www.johnnyocallaghan.com/press.htm 
76 Source: http://www.bloodhorse.com/…articles/30050/wilson-can-put-stamp-on-big-woodbine-meet
77 Source: http://www.mnblue.com/laurie+coleman+edited+into+her+husbands+ad 
78 Source: http://www.mindfulhealthinstitute.com/Pillars_Mindful_Health.htm 
79 Source: http://www.scribd.com/doc/13651346/The-EightFoot-Bride-an-original-screenplay 
80 Source: http://www.amazon.com/.../product-reviews/B002ZG4Q5W?pageNumber=20
81 Source: http://www.amazon.ca/product-reviews/0393046133 
82 Source: http://communities.canada.com/saskatoonstarphoenix/print.aspx?postid=279055 
83 Source: http://reversethieves.com/2008/07/21/batman-gotham-knight-pow-splat-kerplop-flurb/ 
84 Source: http://www.mcintoshwriting.com/portliferow/ABOUT_US/SisterG.htm 
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Still, there is indeed a contrast between the two following examples that needs to 
be accounted for:85
(63) a. *John seems 5 foot 8 tall.
b.  John seems two inches taller than his brother. 
In view of the grammaticality of the examples in  (59)-(62) above and the sort of 
interpretation associated with them, we can in fact maintain that (63)a is indeed out 
due to the precision of the measure, just like Matushansky's examples given in (55) 
above, for that matter. As for (63)b, it is likely that the comparative has scope over 
the  measure  phrase,  and,  since  comparatives  are  generally  allowed  in  the 
complement of seem, this example is (not unexpectedly) also grammatical; it is (the 
meaning of) the comparative that is primarily visible, and not the MP differential.  
Admittedly how exactly this works needs to be made more precise. 
To sum up, the distribution of adjectives modified by MPs in the small clause 
complement of  seem does not conform to Matushansky's description of the facts 
and, as such, it does not support the syntactic degree account she proposes. Instead, 
the facts seem to favour the type of approach she rejects, namely the one based on 
vagueness, or imprecision.
We will next examine the main prediction of the syntactic degree account and 
show that it actually runs amiss of the facts.
3.2.4 Non-gradable expressions in the complement of seem
The syntactic degree account requires the presence of a DegP in the small clause 
complement of seem. Consequently, this complement will have to contain either an 
inherently gradable noun or adjective, since these are the types of elements that can 
project  a  DegP in the syntax; or it  should contain a noun or  adjective that  have 
become gradable due to scalarity coercion triggered by the presence of a degree 
operator. Therefore, the case of basically non-gradable expressions which can appear 
in the small clause complement of seem becomes an essential testing ground for the 
syntactic degree account and its predictions. In this sub-section, we will examine the 
case of  adjectives,  and show that  the syntactic  degree account makes the wrong 
prediction with respect to the acceptability of some data and/or to the interpretation 
assigned to certain examples. We will also briefly consider some cases of DPs that 
are clearly inherently non-gradable, and which cannot be claimed to have coerced 
gradable meanings either.  We will give a more precise indication of what we think 
85 The examples in  (63) are from  Matushansky (2002b).  However, not all speakers agree with these 
judgments. On the one hand, (63)b is not completely fine. On the other hand, (63)a may become better if 
a context can be created where there is doubt as to his height. Such judgments are in accordance with the 
facts illustrated in (60)-(62) as well as confirming the explanation we propose for (63). Normally, the MP 
used in  (63)a is too precise to be used with  seem; however, if the context can be manipulated so as to 
force doubt or uncertainty of evaluation (cf. also the influence of contrast or relativization with respect to 
time and/or location illustrated in (61)-(62)), this may override the precision of the MP and the example 
becomes better. If this is easier to do in (63)b, it is presumably due to the use of the comparative which 
the MP modifies, as we suggest in the main text.
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the appropriate interpretation of the cases of non-gradable adjectives is, as well as 
examining the case of nouns, in §3.3.1.1 and §3.3.1.2, respectively.
Consider the following example containing a basically non-gradable adjective:
(64) Lucy seems Spanish.
Matushansky (2002b) treats such examples as cases of scalarity coercion, whereby 
the  adjective  becomes  semantically  gradable,  meaning  something  like  'having 
(many) properties (stereo)typically associated with being Adj'. Hence, Lucy seems to 
have  some  properties  one  would  stereotypically  associate  with  being  Spanish, 
without that  necessarily referring to her actual  nationality. (This is similar to the 
interpretation obtained when such normally non-gradable adjectives are used in the 
context  of  overt  degree  modifiers  like  very  or  in  the  comparative  etc.  – cf.  the 
discussion  around  example  (3) in  chapter  1,  §1.1)  As  a  result,  the  adjective  is 
assumed to also project a DegP in the syntax thus qualifying for use in the small 
clause complement of seem.
Therefore, the expectation under the syntactic degree account would be that the 
basically non-gradable expressions that can occur in the small clause complement of 
seem should have the interpretation normally associated with scalarity coercion. In 
what follows we will test this prediction by examining more examples of adjectives 
that are generally taken to be non-gradable. Consider first the following examples 
containing nationality adjectives, similarly to (64) above.86
(65) a. The name seems French. 
b. The accent seems French, but there is something strange about it.87
c. Her accent seems Spanish.88
The adjectives in these examples cannot be said to have become gradable and to 
have acquired the type of interpretation associated with scalarity coercion. Instead, 
they retain their basic nationality interpretation, and the examples simply convey 
uncertainty  as  to  whether  the  referent  belongs  to  the  respective  category  (i.e. 
nationality)  or  not.  (65)b,  for  instance,  could  be  uttered  in  a  context  where  the 
speaker is not sure about whether the accent is actually French because s/he cannot  
hear  it  properly;  it  is  not  about  the accent  exhibiting properties  (stereo)typically 
associated with being French. The examples could be paraphrased as 'I {think/ am 
not sure} the {name/ accent} is {French/ Spanish}';  in other words,  based on the 
available evidence the speaker cannot decide with certainty  whether it  should be 
assigned the respective nationality.
The next  sets  of  examples  contain relational  adjectives  which normally have 
classificatory uses (generally assumed to map kinds into sub-kinds – cf. Bosque and 
Picallo 1996,  McNally and Boleda 2004 a.o.) that are taken to be basically non-
gradable:
86 The same observation can be made in connection with the attributive use of such adjectives, which is 
normally excluded:
(i) The collocation seems a Spanish borrowing (to me).
87 Source: http://gaming.thecasavants.com/char.htm 
88 Source: http://garabatoz.deviantart.com/art/Paulina-vs-Trixie 
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(66) a. The basic problem seems mathematical; their members constitute less 
than 15 percent of the House of Commons...89 
b. What to do about setting posting limits? do you see this as an anti-spam 
method? I really don't know what to do with it. The problem seems 
mathematical to me.
(67) a. The type of music seems classical, but I like how Lionhead adds sort of a 
fantasy element to it.90
b. At times, her music seems classical in its form and structure, and at 
others, her soaring, skating vocal dancing seems almost angelic. 91 
c. His music seems classical to me, but I'm not sure.92
The examples of unacceptable adjectives in the complement of seem given in (49)b 
from Bolinger (1972) (see also chapter 1), are in fact of this type. As (66) and (67) 
show, however,  we do find grammatical  examples containing such adjectives.  In 
fact, Matushansky (2002b) remarks, in a footnote, that the examples indicated as 
ungrammatical in Bolinger (1972) are odd, rather than completely ungrammatical. 
Significantly for us here, again, the interpretation of these adjectives does not seem 
to  go  along the  lines  proposed  for  cases  of  scalarity  coercion  by  Matushansky. 
Rather  they seem to somehow stretch the  concept. For  example,  as  soon as  the 
nature of a problem can be conceived of as being open to evaluation, examples like 
(66) are possible,  and the interpretation they get  is  something like 'this problem 
belongs to the general realm of mathematics' but based on the available evidence or 
knowledge, the speaker cannot make an unequivocal decision; and likewise for (67). 
The uncertainty of assessment which is at stake is quite straightforwardly indicated 
by the second part of the sentence in (67)c: I'm not sure.
Finally, here are more examples containing other adjectives which are generally 
considered to be non-gradable,  such as  pregnant,  or absolute,  such as  dead, and 
whose use in the complement of seem cannot be regarded as the result of scalarity 
coercion:
(68) a. The man seems dead.93
b. The woman seems pregnant.
c. The bar seems closed to me... big padlocks on door during supposed 
opening hours… 
d. The case seems closed.94
e. The store seems open only 2-3 days per week.95
89 Source: http://www.nytimes.com/1987/05/15/world/tories-experiment-in-ailing-scotland.html 
90 Source: http://lionhead.com/forums/p/240229/3042281.aspx 
91 Source: http://www.johneverson.com/bug6.htm and http://www.popstops.net/dcdbox.htm. 
92 Source: http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20080921162723AAHB6q3 
93 Here are some complete examples found on the internet:
(i) a. A body has been found in the left corner of the bar. The man seems dead but we don't have a 
cause of death. (http://www.roleplaygateway.com/roleplay/the-multiverse/characters)
b. In the end Peaches the man seems dead or passed out while androgynous Peaches cleans her 
face in front of a mirror. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Downtown_%28Peaches_song%29)
94 Source: http://www.thefreelibrary.com/cafe+serves+up+vivid+characters+surroundings 
95 Source: http://www.yelp.com/user_details?userid=jZjVBILxo-KVSbMQPFKuMg 
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Dead, for example, in  (68)a does not receive the type of gradable interpretation it 
does  in  cases of  overt  degree modification like  more dead than alive,  where its 
meaning is coerced; it is not the case here that the man could be more or less dead in 
(68)a. All the adjectives in (68) retain their basic, literal meaning. What is involved 
is uncertainty in ascertaining whether the property holds. 
Finally, we would like to bring in some nominal cases which present a serious 
problem to the syntactic degree account proposed by Matushansky (2002b), as well 
as a simple gradability approach in fact (cf. Bolinger 1972, Maling 1983). These are  
cases such as those illustrated in (69), which do not seem to contain an expression 
that could be argued to project a DegP in the syntax, or that could be considered to 
be gradable in the first place.
(69) a. This seems the end for us.
b. Wind seems a species of light.96
c. And this seems the explanation of the fact that the marine shells […] are 
much larger than the shells of the same species now inhabiting the 
weakly-saline Caspian.97
d. This seems the sense of "God is love" Wallace is considering.98
e. There is plenty of that brand of homespun common sense that seems a 
trait of chemical engineers of that generation (regular readers of 
ChemTech will feel at home with this book).99
f. This seems {the way to do it/ the only way out/ the only option}. 
g. This proposal seems the opening shot in an upcoming campaign against 
any measure that doesn't offer Omaha's black community autonomy over 
their home district.100
In all these cases it could hardly be claimed that gradable meanings are involved. 
What  is  at  stake  is,  just  like  in  the  examples  containing  basically  non-gradable 
adjectives considered above, uncertainty as to whether the (abstract) entity under 
discussion has been correctly identified as being what the definite DPs express.
In  sum,  closer  examination  of  the  interpretation  of  basically  non-gradable 
adjectives that may occur in the complement of seem shows that the main prediction 
of the syntactic degree account is not borne out. Grammatical examples of basically 
non-gradable  adjectives  are  not  necessarily  interpreted  in  a  sense  that  would 
correspond  to  the  meaning  predicted  by  Matushansky  if  they  were  subject  to 
scalarity coercion triggered by the presence of a degree operator. The same holds for 
the examples of non-gradable DPs. Therefore, what is at stake is not having a higher 
or  lower  degree  of  a  property,  or  a  bigger  or  smaller  amount  of  properties 
(stereo)typically associated with A or N, but rather uncertainty as to whether A or N 
applies or not (given the available evidence).
In view of the problems facing the syntactic degree account, and of the additional 
facts  that  have been presented so far,  it  becomes desirable to find an alternative 
96 Source: British National Corpus
97 Source: The Encyclopaedia Britannica on http://books.google.com/ 
98 Source: http://secularoutpost.infidels.org/2011/01/say-what.html 
99 Source: British National Corpus
100 Source: http://newnebraska.blogspot.com/2007/01/sifting-through-ops-mess.html 
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account. In the remainder of this section, we will suggest a possible direction, which 
takes seem to always be epistemic.
3.3 Towards an alternative account
In this section we would like to show that an epistemic analysis of  seem  can be 
maintained, and that the restrictions on its small clause complement stem from how 
properties  (as  expressed  by  AP or  DP),  differently  from  propositions  (IPs),  are 
evaluated.  We  suggest  that  the  evaluation  of  properties  requires  encyclopedic 
knowledge that can be expressed either in terms of "objective", definitive criteria, or 
in terms of "subjective" criteria.  Expressions denoting properties defined by means 
of the second strategy  are compatible with the epistemic uncertainty encoded by 
seem and can, therefore, appear in its small clause complement.
3.3.1  Two types of predicates
It was shown in the previous section that the small clause complement of seem is not 
restricted to lexically gradable expressions or  expressions that  may be argued to 
project a DegP in the syntax. It was also shown that  the grammatical examples of 
basically  non-gradable  expressions  (mainly  adjectives) in  the  small  clause 
complement of  seem  (e.g.  (65)-(67)) do not involve a shift in the meaning of the 
adjective in  the sense of  a  gradable interpretation.  They suggest  instead  that  the 
meaning of  seem involves uncertainty in assessing whether the property expressed 
applies  to  a  given  individual,  or,  in  other  words,  uncertainty  as  to  whether  the 
instance referred to is of the type denoted by the AP or DP. What seems to matter, 
therefore, for the acceptability of these expressions in the small clause complement 
of  seem is that they (come to) express  properties whose application in particular 
circumstances may be subject to uncertainty.  We  would like to  propose that what 
underlies this is whether the property expressed by the adjective can be verified by 
"objective" or  by  "subjective" criteria. In  what  follows  we  will  illustrate  the 
distinction between the two types of predicates in the adjectival and nominal domain 
and show that it  indeed correlates with the possible occurrence of adjectives and 
nouns  in  the  small  clause  complement  of  seem.  We  will  also  show  how  a 
"subjective"  interpretation  may be  introduced  and  license  the  use  of  "objective" 
predicates, which would otherwise not be able to occur in this environment. 
3.3.1.1 The interpretation of non-gradable adjectives 
The difference between the two types of expressions can be most easily illustrated 
by comparing the adjective dead,  whose possible occurrence in  the small  clause 
complement  of  seem  was  shown  in  (68)a,  and  its  antonym,  alive,  which  is 
ungrammatical in the small clause complement of seem when it is used in its basic, 
literal sense:
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(70) He seems alive *(and well).
We propose that what underlies this contrast is a difference in the types of criteria 
that may verify the two properties. There are various "subjective" criteria which are 
normally associated with death and may be used towards establishing death. These 
possible  "signs"  of death  include e.g. that the person  is not breathing, that s/he is 
lying motionless on the floor, or that blood is pooling under him/her, etc. These may 
vary over different contexts/ possible worlds;  it is not the case that in all possible 
worlds these properties (criteria) are exclusively associated with death.  On the one 
hand, therefore, such a  "subjective",  vague condition is normally  sufficient for the 
property  dead to be predicated with reasonable certainty.  On the other hand, such 
conditions also  allow  room  for  uncertainty  in  establishing  death in  certain 
situations.101 This makes the adjective compatible with the uncertainty expressed by 
seem. By contrast, to establish that someone is alive, there is one definitive criterion 
that must be satisfied: if the person is still breathing, s/he is ipso facto alive. In other 
words, a definitive condition, one that is both necessary and sufficient, is required to 
conclude that someone is alive, but a vague condition may be enough to conclude 
that someone is dead. Expressions denoting properties defined in the latter, but not 
in the former, way are compatible with seem. 
What  underlies  the  acceptability  of  the  examples  in  (66)-(67) are similar. 
Although these cases involve concepts that are generally considered to be sharp (e.g. 
mathematics/ mathematical, classical music), if the nature of certain objects can be 
stretched or somehow made fuzzy, by the introduction of "subjective" criteria, such 
expressions become acceptable in the small clause complement of seem. Take (66)a, 
for  instance.  What  it says  is  that  the  problem exhibits  some  properties  that  are 
normally, superficially associated with mathematics, such as involving numbers or 
calculations, and that are normally sufficient for predicating the respective property 
of an object.
Sets of vague, "subjective" conditions are typical of predicates whose boundaries 
are fuzzy and difficult to establish with certainty, while definitive conditions apply 
to predicates that have clear-cut defining characteristics.102 The former, but not the 
latter, are compatible with seem. What is at stake in such examples is uncertainty as 
to whether the respective property applies, i.e. whether the conditions for predicating 
it are satisfied – e.g. due to insufficient access to evidence.  As already shown, the 
distinction between these two types of predicates cross-cuts the distinction between 
gradable and non-gradable expressions.  In §3.3.2.2 we  will discuss in more detail 
the relation between such criteria and the properties they verify as well as the role 
they play in the evaluation of the predication.
101 Of course there are also  "objective",  definitive conditions that allow to establish death (medically/ 
scientifically) with certainty, such as  the  absence  of any neural  activity,  but  the  point  is  that  for  the 
layperson, a vague condition allows for the property 'dead' to be predicated with reasonable certainty.
102 Johan  Rooryck  (p.c.)  suggests  that  the  distinction  between  the  two types  of  predicates  may be 
illustrated by using the test of contradiction. In (ia), the evaluation that Sue was dead can be contradicted 
quite easily.  That is not the case for the sentence in (ib),  where adding the second sentence leads to 
infelicity. 
(i) a. We saw that Sue was dead, (but it later turned out that she wasn't).
b. We saw that Sue was alive, (#but it later turned out that she wasn't).
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3.3.1.2 The case of nouns in the small clause complement of seem
Similar observations can be made about the distribution and interpretation of nouns 
in the small clause complement of seem.
Recall first the contrast usually pointed out in the literature:
(71) a. Eric seems a fool.
b. *Eric seems {a man/ a doctor}. 
The nouns used in these examples may indeed contrast in terms of gradability; for 
instance, a noun like  fool  consistently passes, while nouns like  doctor fail various 
gradability tests, such as e.g. modification by degree adjectives. 
Consider now, however, the contrast between the following sets of examples:
(72) a. He seems a Christian.
b. He seems an artist. 
c. He seems a gambler.
d. He seems {a Casanova/ a ladies' man}.
e. He seems {a friend/ an ally}.
(73) a. *He seems an Anglican.
b. *He seems {a painter/ a doctor}. 
c. *He seems a blackjack player. 
d. *He seems a polygamist.
e. *He seems an enemy.
It is highly questionable that the difference in acceptability between these two sets of 
examples is due to (non)gradability. Applying other gradability tests to these nouns, 
such as modification by degree adjectives, gives diverging results. In each set there  
are nouns that seem to admit such modification (e.g.  a big gambler, a big/ huge 
enemy), and others that do not (e.g. *a big Christian/ ally/ polygamist etc.). If both 
occurrence  in  the small  clause  complement  of  seem  and modification by degree 
adjectives are taken to be due to gradability, then their differing results require an 
explanation.
We propose that, just as in the case of adjectives examined previously, it is not 
gradability  that  plays  a  role  in  the  acceptability  of  nouns  in  the  small  clause 
complement of seem. Instead, the explanation of the contrast lies in the same type of 
difference  as  noted  above.  Namely,  the  nouns  in  the  first  series  involve  more 
complex, and vague, sets of  "subjective" criteria based on which one can decide 
whether an individual belongs to the respective category. As such, there is  more 
room for uncertainty of assessment, which makes them compatible with the meaning 
of  seem. The nouns in  (73), on the other hand involve definitive, clear-cut criteria 
that verify whether the properties apply or not (e.g. relevant diploma in the case of 
doctor).The contrast  between  (72)a and  (73)a also suggests that  hyperonyms are 
more likely to be verified by vague criteria than hyponyms, which are more specific.
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3.3.1.3 Modification 
Interestingly, under particular conditions, expressions that are normally barred from 
the small clause complement of seem may be licensed in this environment.
One type of factor  which influences the acceptability of examples containing 
measure phrases, dimensional adjectives, or nouns that are normally not very good 
with seem is the use of negation and focus (e.g. using the particle only or contrastive 
stress on seem).103 Compared with the unacceptable examples in (74), the examples 
in  (75) and  (76) show  the  effect  of  negation  (either  used  on  its  own,  or  in 
combination  with  contrast/focus  or  with  temporal  modification), and  of  focus, 
respectively.104
(74) a. *He seems a tall man.
b. *He seems a {radical/ doctor}.
c. *Obama seems a Bill Clinton.
(75) a. He doesn't seem a tall man (but his legs seem long).
b. He doesn't seem a radical.
c. Obama doesn't seem a Bill Clinton quite yet.
(76) a. He SEEMS a tall man, but in fact he is wearing platform shoes.
b. He only SEEMS a tall man.
c. He only SEEMS a doctor.
It is not clear how these facts could be accounted for either in a simple gradability 
approach  to  seem  (e.g.  Bolinger  1972)  or  in  a  syntactic  degree  analysis  like 
Matushansky's, which requires the presence of a DegP to check an uninterpretable 
degree  feature.  It  is  not  likely  that  negation  or  focus  could  be  influencing  the 
gradability of the complement of  seem, or that such elements could (syntactically) 
check  a  degree  feature.  The view we have suggested  above can  offer  a  way to 
understand them. As usual, focus determines the introduction of a set of alternatives. 
We  suggest  that  in  the  cases  under  investigation  here  the  alternatives  that  are 
introduce bear on the conditions for verifying the properties that are being evaluated. 
In case this is a property defined by "objective", definitive criteria (e.g. doctor), this 
will result in forcing the addition of alternative, "subjective" criteria consisting of 
properties  superficially  associated  with  the  respective  property  (which  would 
normally not count towards concluding that the property holds of an individual).  
This is what creates room for uncertainty about their applicability and makes them 
compatible with  seem.  Thus, an example like  (76)c  will say that the individual in 
103 Modifiers like sure, which have an epistemic interpretation, also have a similar effect.
104 Here are some additional examples. (i) contains the focus particle only and MPs in the small clause 
complement, and (ii) shows that contrast enables a DP containing a non-gradable and non-vague noun 
modified by a nationality adjective to appear in this environment:
(i) a. But if someone with longer arms uses the same string at arms' length, suddenly it only seems 
8 inches long! (http://www.meteorobs.org/maillist/msg09977.html) 
b. Sometimes, he has to remind himself that she only seems ten feet tall because she carries her 
head that high. (http://fanfictioncdn.fictionpressllc.netdna-cdn.com/community...) 
(ii) To an outsider their province seems a French dependency, a French colony, rather than part of 
France. (http://www.gourmet.com/magazine/1940s/1947/08/alsace) 
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question may exhibit such superficial properties, but not satisfy the actual definitive 
criterion  for  qualifying as  an N.  As a  result,  such examples  will  imply that  the 
individuals are in fact not A or Ns. As already pointed out (cf. §3.2.3), an explicit or 
implied  contrast  (between  apparent,  superficial  and  actual  properties)  often 
facilitates the use of expressions in the small clause complement of  seem.  Seem, 
therefore, ends up being used when one lacks the grounds for using be.105
Consider now the following contrast:
(77) a. *She seems a Catholic. 
b. "And though she seems a Catholic in public, I have a strong suspicion that 
in private she is a Lutheran"106
The  contrast  introduced  by  the  two  PPs  in  public vs.  in  private restricts  the 
application of the predicate: it applies under this restriction, but not in other cases. 
This has the effect of introducing uncertainty about the subject's Catholicism, thus 
turning a predicate that is evaluated in terms of definitive criteria out of context into 
a predicate that responds to vague, "subjective" criteria, i.e. Catholic in public, not 
Catholic in private. 
The same sort of effects (i.e. of contrast and "relativization" obtained by means 
of  temporal  or locative  modification)  were  already  noted in examples of measure 
phrases and non-gradable adjectives used in the small clause complement of seem in 
§3.2.3 and §3.2.4 – cf. examples (61), (62), (67)b etc.
3.3.2 The alternative view
The proposal we would like to suggest in view of the facts observed so far consists  
of two parts, both of which go against the claims made by Matushansky (2002b).  
First, gradability, either lexical or syntactic, has been shown not to be a prerequisite 
for expressions occurring in the small clause complement of  seem.  Instead, what 
underlies  the distribution of  expressions in this environment  whether the criteria 
verifying  the  applicability  of  the  predicate  are  "subjective",  vague  criteria 
(consisting  of  properties  normally/  superficially  associated  with  the  property 
expressed by the predicate in question) or "objective", definitive criteria.  If  an AP, 
NP or PP predicate is verified by the first type of criteria, it is compatible with seem. 
We argue that this is because  seem is always epistemic and includes an evidential 
meaning component, namely it involves the expression of uncertainty and inference, 
and the expressions in its small clause complement need to be compatible with the 
uncertainty of assessment inherent in the meaning of seem. The vagueness inherent 
in gradable expressions will make them good candidates; however, it is not the case 
105 This  suggests that the verbs  seem  and  be may be regarded as forming a scale,  similarly to  how 
quantifiers  like  all  and  some  are  assumed  to  be  related  to  a  scale.  As  such,  there  may  be  scalar 
implicatures holding between them. Thus, we have (i)a in a parallel way to (i)b:
(i) a. He SEEMS but is not {a doctor/ a tall man}.
b. Some, but not all, answered my question.
106 Source:  Alison Shell,  Catholicism,  Controversy and the English Literary Imagination,  1558-1660 
Cambridge University Press, 1999.
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that only gradable predicates are, nor that all gradable predicates are vague in a way 
that makes them compatible with seem.  In what follows, we will first examine the 
epistemic nature of  seem and subsequently show what accounts for the particular 
restrictions on its small clause complement. 
3.3.2.1 Seem is always epistemic/ evidential 
Recall that Matushansky (2002b) claims that  seem  is a case of lexical ambiguity: 
there  is  an  epistemic  verb  seem, which  takes  IP  or  CP  complements,  and  a 
perception verb  seem, which takes  small  clause  complements.  She  discusses  the 
difference in interpretation between the two on the basis of the following examples:
(78) a. The squire seems sick.
b. The squire seems to be sick.
c. It seems that the squire is sick.
She claims that (78)a cannot be felicitously used if there is no perceptual evidence 
available. For example, one cannot enter a room, look at Kleenexes and medicine 
bottles strewn all over the floor and utter this sentence. One can, however,  utter 
(78)b  or  (78)c  under  such  circumstances.  She  concludes  that  (78)a  implies 
perception of the subject's condition by the experiencer (I perceive that P holds), 
while (78)b and (78)c, which are truth-conditionally and pragmatically identical, are 
epistemic deductions (from what I see I conclude that P holds). 
However,  this  is  not  a  completely  accurate  rendition  of  the  interpretation  of 
(78)a. Such examples are not simply factual statements of perception (of P holding),  
unlike similar examples with verbs of perception such as  look, sound  etc.  which 
simply involve the attribution of a property based on visual or oral perception. Seem, 
even  when  it  takes  a  small  clause  complement,  as  in  (78)a,  also  implies  some 
epistemic evaluation of the evidence available, i.e. based on the available evidence it 
is inferred that P may hold. So the paraphrase Matushansky proposes for (78)b-c in 
fact extends to (78)a too. If there is a difference between the two, it does not consist 
of the absence vs. presence of an epistemic meaning component.
In addition,  her  definition of  seem  as  a  verb of  perception needs to be wide 
enough to include what she calls "metaphorical" uses, such as (79), where it is quite 
unclear that it is actually perception that is involved.
(79) The law seems unfair. 
Thus,  the  line  between  an  epistemically  derived  conclusion  and  a  perceptually 
derived  one  becomes  almost  impossible  to  perceive.  In  fact,  Matushansky 
acknowledges  that  she  finds  it  "next  to  impossible  to  formulate  the  difference 
between [the two]" (p. 225). She also notes that the distribution of epistemic seem 
encompasses that of perceptual seem. This significantly weakens her argument, and 
casts doubt on the proposed distinction between two verbs.
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We would like to suggest instead that all instances of seem share a basic semantic 
core  which  consists  of  an  epistemic/  evidential  meaning  component:107 seem 
expresses the modal value of uncertainty, correlated with the evidential notion of 
inference.108 What differs is the level on which this meaning component operates. In 
case  seem  takes a sentential, IP or CP, complement,  this meaning component will 
operate on full propositions, or complex situations. When seems takes a small clause 
complement,  it  will  apply to  the  predication  expressed  by the  small  clause.  We 
assume that  seem  is a raising verb in all cases,  which may select for a sentential 
complement (infinitival or finite clause) or for a bare small clausal complement. For 
the  small  clause  complements,  which  we  are  interested  in  here,  we  adopt  Den 
Dikken's (2006,  2008)  analysis  of  bare  small  clauses  as  phrases  headed  by  a 
functional  head RELATOR. The  small  clause  predicate  is  the  complement  of  this 
functional head, while the subject is base-generated in its specifier, but subsequently 
raises to the subject position of the main clause predicate.109 The structure of (78)a 
would therefore be as schematically represented below:
(80) … [VP seems [RP tthe squire [ RELATOR [sick]]]]
Small  clauses  are,  therefore,  quintessential  predications,  and  the  epistemic 
evaluation  contributed  by  the  selecting  verb  seem will  bear  on  the  predication 
relation  they  contribute.  This  boils  down  to  evaluating  whether  the  property 
expressed by the small clause predicate holds of the subject. 
In the next sub-section, we will show how the noted restrictions can be derived from 
the  interaction  of  the  epistemic  meaning  component  with  the  different  types  of 
complements; now we will focus on the epistemic content of seem.
The felicitous use of seem requires uncertainty with respect to the evaluation of 
the proposition or property in its complement. Take the following example:
(81) The squire seems (to be) sick. 
In  either  of  its  two versions,  this  sentence  can  only be  uttered  felicitously  in  a  
context  where  the  speaker  has  indirect  evidence:  upon  noticing  that  the  squire 
suddenly looks very pale (after eating), or hearing certain noises from the next room 
etc. But it cannot be uttered if one directly witnesses the squire throwing up, or the 
doctor  giving  a  diagnostic.  Therefore,  seem  exhibits  a  dependency  on  the 
information that is available in the context and which can be used as a basis (i.e. as  
107 Interestingly, some English grammars note that  to be deletion in the complements of verbs such as 
seem, consider, think, imagine etc. is only possible with adjectives and nouns that make a judgment. Seem 
is used "when the Arbiter is not fully certain whether the adjectival description is appropriate, or whether 
the statement of the complement clause [e.g.  like/ as if  clauses] is correct – perhaps when there is not 
enough evidence. Appear has the same syntactic possibilities and a very similar meaning, but may imply 
'can be observed by me' in contrast to seem 'can be inferred by me'." (Dixon 1991/2002:202) The intuition 
expressed here is similar to the one underlying our attempt to find an alternative account. 
108 Hence, the experiencer of seem is not just an experiencer, but also the epistemic agent: the one who 
observes / perceives the evidence, and also evaluates it and makes an epistemic judgment based on it. 
109 Heycock  (1994) proposes that the small clauses selected by  seem  (also by  consider) involve even 
more minimal structures, namely that they are simply the projection of a lexical predicate (an adjective or 
a noun) (see also Stowell 1991, Guéron and Hoekstra 1995). 
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evidence)  for  making  an  inference  that  a  property  or  a  situation  holds.  This  is 
parallel  to the behaviour of epistemic modals. Von Fintel  and Gillies (2007) a.o.  
observe that in a context in which we see people coming into the building carrying 
umbrellas, it would be perfectly acceptable to say It must be raining. But if we look 
out of the window and see the pouring rain, it would be very strange to utter such a 
sentence. What one should say in the latter scenario is the non-modalized sentence It  
is raining.  They suggest that the dependency of epistemically modalized sentences 
on the information available in the contexts in which they occur can be understood if 
epistemic modals are taken to include an evidential component in their meaning, in 
the sense that they signal the presence of an indirect inference or deduction rather 
than of a direct observation. In more recent work (von Fintel and Gillies 2010), they 
reformulate  this  by  saying  that  the  kernel  (or  privileged  information  –  which 
corresponds,  more  or  less,  to  the  modal  base  in  Kratzer  1977,  1981)  "does  not 
directly settle whether  p". They  treat this evidential  signal that  epistemic modals 
contain as a presupposition, and impose its satisfaction as a definedness constraint 
on the assignment of truth values in a context at a world. We propose that von Fintel 
and  Gillies'  account  of epistemic  modals  as  containing an evidential  signal  also 
applies to seem. With sentential  seem, the evidential meaning component is related 
to general indirect inference or hearsay. The small clause  seem  is also evidential/ 
epistemic in this sense; it appears to involve inference based mainly on evidence that 
is available through perception, but not exclusively so: there are also cases like (79) 
above, which do not involve perception in the literal sense. More about what can 
count as evidence (and why) will be said in the next sub-section.
The  relation  between  seem  and  its  complement may  be  understood  as  in 
Rooryck's  (2000)  'comparative'  account  of  sentential  seem. In  the  case  of  small 
clause complements, what is involved is  uncertainty in assessing (in view of some 
evidence)  the  resemblance  of  a  particular  instance  (i.e.  the  state  holding  of  the 
subject)  to the type of property expressed by the predicate in the complement of 
seem, i.e. whether the instance referred to is of the type denoted by the AP or NP. 
When  seem  takes  an  IP/  CP  complement,  the  relation  is  established  at  the 
propositional  level  –  comparing (complex)  situations.  What  is  involved  in  these 
cases,  is  uncertainty in evaluating the resemblance of  a  given situation (the one 
referred to via the "demonstrative components" of the sentence – e.g. the tense on 
seem,  the raised  subject  DP)  to  a  typical  situation of  the  type  described  by the  
complement CP (cf. Rooryck 2000).
3.3.2.2 Evaluation of properties vs. (complex) situations
In the preceding paragraphs,  we have discussed the common core of all  uses of 
seem, i.e. both with sentential and with small clause complements. But there is also a 
fundamental difference between the two, which is reflected in the noted difference 
with  respect  to  selectional  restrictions  imposed  on  what  can  appear  in  its 
complement: when it applies to propositions (situations) there are no restrictions, but 
when it applies to properties there are.
 Note, in this context, that  such behaviour is in fact not unique to  seem. On the 
one hand,  the same modal  or  evidential  expression may differ  in the selectional 
restrictions  it  imposes  on  different  types  of  complements.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
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modal  expression or  an  evidential  marker may occupy different  positions in  the 
syntactic structure, and, depending on the level at which they occur, the resulting 
interpretation may differ. For example, in Dutch modals which can take not only 
infinitival, but also AP or PP complements. In the latter case, however, they can only 
get a deontic interpretation.  In the evidential domain,  Blain and Déchaine (2006) 
propose that evidential markers can be introduced in a number of different positions 
in the clause,  namely in the CP, IP, AspP, and vP domains; and they  analyse the 
nonvolitional force of nonvisual evidentials in the first person as an instance of vP-
external evidentials.
We would like to suggest  that  the difference found between the cases  where 
seem  takes  a  sentential  complement  and  those  where  it  takes  a  small  clause 
complement is  due  to  a  difference  with  respect  to  how  complex  situations/ 
propositions (sentential complements) vs.  predications  (small clause complements) 
are evaluated, and what counts as evidence in doing so. There is a difference in the 
range  as  well  as  in  the  nature  of  the  knowledge  based  on  which  the  felicitous 
epistemic use depends (i.e. on which uncertainty can be assessed). 
With  propositional  complements,  one  is  quite  free  to  use  any  type  of 
circumstantial indications, hearsay etc. as evidence in a context based on which to 
make an inference 'that p', expressible by seem. The fundamental uncertainty that is 
required  for  a  felicitous  epistemic  interpretation  depends  on  what  the  speaker 
broadly knows contextually; a context is needed that spells out the knowledge of the 
speaker with respect to the prejacent, e.g. [the squire to be sick].
When  seem takes a small clause complement whereby the predication is being 
evaluated, i.e. whether the property expressed by the small clause predicate holds of 
the subject, one is restricted to properties which are observed to be manifested in the 
subject  itself  and  which  are  somehow  associated  with  P and may  be  used  as 
indications  that  P  holds  of  that  subject.  Other,  subject-external,  circumstances 
cannot be used as evidence that  P holds of  the subject. This is why, for example, 
(78)a can be uttered upon perception of the subject's condition by the experiencer,  
but not upon entering a room and seeing Kleenexes and medicine bottles covering 
the floor. In a sense, then, evidence for properties is less flexible than evidence for 
(complex) situations. What counts as P, or what is a "sign" of P, is largely part of 
speakers' encyclopedic knowledge (rather than being strictly linguistic). Therefore, 
unlike  with  sentential  complements,  here  the  uncertainty  that  is  required  for  a 
felicitous  use  depends  much  more  strictly  on  what  the  speaker  knows 
encyclopedically. This requirement of uncertainty accounts for the impossibility of 
certain AP and DP predicates in the small  clause complement of  seem:  if it  is a 
predicate  that  must  be  interpreted  out  of  context  in  terms  of  definitive,  purely  
objective  criteria  (as  discussed  in  §3.3.1),  the  sentence  will  be  semantically 
infelicitous.  Unless,  as  the  discussion  in  §3.3.1 has  shown,  the  right  context  is 
obtained where even "strict" concepts may be "relativized" (recall the influence of 
focus, temporal modification etc.) which would create room for uncertainty as to 
whether the P applies in a particular case, as required by seem.
In other words,  what seems to be needed is an expression which comes with 
associated  manifestations  or  properties,  which  form  vague  sets  of  vague, 
"subjective" criteria  for  application  of  P.  On  the  one  hand,  these  should  be 
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observable properties.110 On the other hand, they may apply only part(ial)ly and they 
are  not  exclusive  "symptoms"  of  just  one  particular  P.111 Thus,  they  allow  for 
uncertainty in evaluating whether the predicate holds or not. This is quite easy to see 
with adjectives like sick and dead vs. alive (as discussed in previous sub-sections). 
Or take the nouns discussed in  §3.3.1.2. The fact that some involve vague criteria 
(e.g. Christian, artist, friend etc.) may have to do with the fact that, in addition to the 
definitional core, e.g. the actual occupation or religion, they involve a whole series 
of  associated  attitudes,  manifestations,  properties  based  on  which  it  can  be 
ascertained whether X is N. In other words these may count as evidence compatible 
with the property holding of the subject, and still allow for uncertainty. Others (e.g. 
doctor)  only  have definitive  criteria,  that  are  at  once  necessary  and  sufficient 
conditions (e.g. the relevant diploma), based on which it can be decided whether an 
individual belongs to the class of Ns or not. One cannot conceive of any associated, 
"signalling" properties which may be manifested by an individual and which may be 
used as evidence indicating that this P holds of an individual. Hence, such nouns are  
not compatible with seem in a small clause structure. Recall, however, that a contrast 
was noticed between the unmodified and the modified use of such nouns in the small 
clause complement of seem, as illustrated below:
(82) a. *Eric seems a doctor.
b. Eric seems a good doctor. 
Modification  by  an  adjective  (especially  an  adjective  like  good) ensures  an 
interpretation  in  terms  of  less  objective,  more  vague  or  subjective criteria.  This 
allows for a lot of space for uncertainty of assessment, and the DP can occur in the 
complement  of  seem.  However,  as  one  may  recall  from  §3.2.1-3.2.2,  and  as 
illustrated again below, simply adding a gradable adjective does not automatically 
license the use of a noun like doctor in the small clause complement of seem. 
(83) *He seems a {tall/ handsome} doctor.
The adjective introduces some fuzziness, in virtue of it being gradable, hence vague,  
but this is not relative to and does not carry over to the concept of 'doctor', which 
heads the phrase located in the small clause complement of  seem. So the NP as a 
whole  still  does  not  make  a  good  complement  for  seem.  Note also  that  the 
110 It should be noted that  seem  is not confined to strictly perceptual, concrete evidence, but accepts 
more general(ly observable) sorts of evidence. In this it differs from the verb look, for example, which is 
strictly  specified for direct visual perception. In evaluating  He looks tired  only information based on 
direct visual perception of the subject's state will count, while in evaluating He seems tired the inference 
that he may be tired can be based on information derived not only from physically visually perceptible 
features, but also from more general behaviour that may be related to tiredness (e.g. he cannot find the 
right  words  etc.).  If  the  evidential  component  is  made  part  of  the  lexical  meaning  of  the  verb  (as  
suggested above), and if this type of approach is also extended to verbs like appear, look, sound etc., this 
would allow us to capture the differences among these verbs (i.e. with respect to the specification of 
evidence).
111 Take, for instance, the relation between  being pale  and  being sick, where the former may serve as 
evidence based on which it may be inferred that the latter may hold (and which would make a sentence  
with seem felicitous). The idea would be that one does not necessarily and exclusively imply the other; in 
other words this is a relation that holds in some possible worlds, not in all possible worlds. 
90 CHAPTER 2
corresponding sentence with the copula to be (He {seems to be/ is} a tall doctor.) is 
also very odd, especially when uttered out of the blue.  Tall doctor  becomes better 
when more context  is  provided:  this  can be seen  in  (84)a,  where  what  is  being 
evaluated is whether the subject belongs to a rather vague category that is being 
proposed ("those tall country doctors that all the village women fall in love with"). 
The difference in the possibility of establishing a category, that  may have vague 
criteria of application, is probably also what makes (84)b better than (83): handsome 
men vs. handsome doctors. Note, incidentally, that, again, the more general term is 
better suited for such uses than the more specific one.112
(84) a. He {is/ seems} one of those {tall/ handsome} country doctors that all the 
village women fall in love with.
b. ?He seems a handsome man. 
This also shows, once again, that gradability tends to make an expression well 
suited for use in the small clause complement of  seem, in virtue of the vagueness 
associated with gradable expressions, but that gradability as such (and the type of 
vagueness  it  introduces)  is  not  sufficient,  in  addition  to  not  being  necessary,  as 
shown throughout this section. To illustrate again the latter point, take the adjective 
pregnant (cf. (68)b). Adjectives like pregnant or dead have very precise (scientific, 
medical)  definitions  and  are  typical  examples  of  non-vague,  or  "all-or-nothing" 
adjectives: they are not contextually variable; someone is definitely either pregnant/ 
dead or not pregnant/ dead, there is normally no in-between, grey area; and it does 
not give rise to the Sorites paradox.113 The vagueness which is relevant for seem is 
related to the (un)certainty of assessing whether the property holds, and arises from 
the point of view of an epistemic agent trying to gather evidence and evaluate a state 
of affairs based on it. The states denoted by adjectives like pregnant or dead involve 
a series of accompanying manifestations, symptoms etc. that may be observed, and 
these may be used as evidence for assessing whether the respective state holds of 
someone, and this assessment may open to uncertainty. This is what makes such 
expressions compatible with seem.
In fact, this set of manifestations of properties somehow associated with P may 
be  all  that  is  needed,  and  may  even  be  completely  stripped  from  the  basic, 
definitional core of the N. This is what happens in the case of nouns used under a 
112 Note also:
(i) He seems like a doctor.
Like  relativizes,  by introducing  a class  based on resemblance  to  doctors  and it  can be  under  debate 
whether or how much of it applies.
113 Sentences involving gradable predicates,  in particular those associated with relative standards (cf. 
Kennedy and McNally 2005, Kennedy 2007a), are characterized by three main features that point to their 
vague nature. First, they display contextual variability in truth conditions. Second, they are characterized 
by the existence of borderline cases: for any context, in addition to the sets of objects that the predicate is  
clearly true of and clearly false of, there is typically a third set of objects for which it  is difficult or 
impossible to make these judgments. And finally, sentences containing vague predicates give rise to the 
Sorites paradox. This due to the uncertainty about the boundaries of a vague predicate's extension, about 
the cut-off point between P and non-P. (cf. Klein 1980, Kennedy 2007a, van Rooij to appear a.o.) 
Note that, in fact, a noun like heap which is typically used to illustrate the Sorites paradox does not 
make a good small clause complement to seem: ??That seems a heap.
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figurative  interpretation,  where  x is  actually  not  an  N,  but  (only)  has  properties 
stereotypically associated with Ns:
(85) a. This house seems a palace after the shelters where we have passed our 
nights for the last couple of weeks.
b. The boy seems a scholar.
c. This child seems a clown (at times).
The  interpretation  of  these  examples  involves  the  observation  of  some  sort  of 
behaviour or some properties that are in some way associated with being N; based 
on this, it may be said that X resembles N.114
These  semantico-pragmatic  differences  between  "complex  situations",  as 
expressed by  IP  or CP complements,  and  predications,  as  expressed  by  small 
clauses,  are  correlated  with  a  difference  in  syntactic  complexity.  For  example, 
sentential  complements  (even  infinitivals)  contain  a  series  of  clausal  and  verbal 
functional projections, which small clause complements lack. This follows from the 
analysis of small clauses as bare predications which we have adopted following Den 
Dikken (2006, 2008) and it is a  hallmark of small clauses (especially small clause 
complements of verbs like  seem  and  consider)  and a fact widely accepted in the 
literature: small clauses lack clausal and typically verbal functional projections. In 
particular they lack aspect and tense, which has been invoked in the literature to 
explain  their  dependence  on  a  higher verbal projection.  Guéron  and  Hoekstra 
(1995), for example, argue that small clauses are clauses that, due to their smallness,  
cannot survive by themselves and must be licensed by a temporal or aspectual head 
in the structure that dominates them. A small clause can be licensed only by having 
its functional head incorporated into the T-chain of the verb. In Den Dikken's theory 
this  amounts  to  incorporation  of  the  RELATOR into  the  verb  (this  is  in  fact  a 
reformulation of "small clause restructuring" initially proposed by Stowell (1991) in 
order to explain facts such as the scope of small clause subjects, something which, 
however, goes beyond the scope of our investigation here).115 What is relevant for us 
here  is  that that  small  clauses  do  not  contain projections hosting independent 
temporal  or aspectual  information,  let alone modal or evidential.  Therefore,  while 
the content of the sentential complement can constitute a full, independent situation, 
the small clause complement is dependent on (the parameters set in) the main clause. 
Thus,  if  situations  are  conceived  of  as  world-time  pairs,  then  the  small  clause 
predicate is interpreted with respect to the same world and time as the main-clause 
predicate.116 If this is on the right track and the small clause predicate and main-
114 Again,  world knowledge influences the availability of the relevant sort of interpretation. For more 
discussion of stereotypical interpretations, see chapter 3.
115 See also Sportische (2005), who, in a discussion of reconstruction facts, argues that small clauses are 
functionally too small and simply lack the functional structure that introduces quantification. He suggests 
that this assumption is supported by the fact that, under normal intonation, high adverbs in the sense of 
Cinque’s adverbial hierarchy (e.g. probably, perhaps) are disallowed in such clauses. 
116 This may be another instance of the Intersective Predicate Generalization proposed by Keshet (2010), 
which states that two predicates interpreted intersectively (i.e. via Predicate Modification) may not be  
evaluated at different times or worlds from one another.  (Keshet's 2010 generalization, which  covers 
noun-intersective modifier combinations, existential  there-constructions and depictives, is based on and 
extends Musan's 1997 work.)
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clause predicate (i.e.  seem, which is an epistemic verb, with an evidential meaning 
component) make up one situation, then this may be what underlies the restrictions 
on the possible evidence that can be used to evaluate the predication. Predications 
can only be evaluated encyclopedically, that is, on the basis of what is known about 
the  property  expressed  in  their  predicate.  This  can  consists  of  either  subjective 
criteria (i.e. necessary but not sufficient conditions for application of P) or objective 
criteria (i.e. both necessary and sufficient). Only the former type are compatible with 
the epistemic verb seem. In addition, the discussion above concerning the syntactic 
properties of small clauses can now help to further understand the restrictions on the 
type of evidence that can be used: it is evidence that can be gathered from the same 
situation of which the evaluated property is a part (namely to observed properties or  
behaviour manifested by the subject). 
We  think  this  is  a  promising  direction,  but  have  to  leave  a  more  detailed 
investigation of and account for the correlations between the semantic and syntactic 
properties of these constructions to future research. 
3.4 Concluding remarks
This section has shown that the requirement placed on the small clause complement 
of  seem is not that it  be gradable or that it project a DegP in the syntax.  Hence, 
occurrence in this environment cannot be used as a test for gradability.
Instead,  seem always contains  an epistemic/ evidential meaning component. As 
such,  it  involves  uncertainty in  assessing whether  the property expressed by the 
small  clause  complement,  or  the  complex  situation  denoted  by  the  sentential 
complement, holds.
The  noted  restrictions  on  the  small  clause  complement  of  seem  can  then  be 
viewed as  reflecting a need for  compatibility  of this complement  with the basic 
meaning of seem, namely the requirement of uncertainty it places on the evaluation 
of the property. This will rule out AP and DP predicates that are interpreted in terms 
of or verified by definitive, purely objective, unequivocal criteria, which allow no 
room for uncertainty of assessment. Gradable predicates are particularly suitable as 
small clause complements to  seem due to their inherent vagueness; however, they 
are not the only ones and they are not all so either.
A difference  has  also  been  revealed  concerning  the  evaluation  of complex 
situations (sentential complements) vs. predications (small clause complements), in 
the sort  and range of evidence that  can be used as  a  basis.  The former allow a 
broader knowledge base to assess uncertainty contextually, while the latter are more 
restricted, and depend on encyclopedic information.
Although more work is needed in order to provide a more precise account of the 
intuitions expressed here rather informally, we think that the direction suggested in 
this section is promising as it  seems to capture the facts more accurately than a 
simple gradability approach or the syntactic degree account.
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4 Conclusions
In this chapter we have studied two environments that had been claimed to involve 
gradability – and where gradability would be relevant for the well-formedness of 
more complex structures containing the nouns, namely N of an N constructions and 
the  small-complement  of  seem.  It  has  been  argued  here,  however,  that  the 
distribution of nouns in these contexts is not determined by gradability – whether at  
the lexical or syntactic level – but by other factors. 
In  the case of  N of an N  constructions,  it  was shown that  the necessary and 
sufficient  condition for  a noun to be able to occur in the first  slot  is  that  it  can 
express a value judgment. It was shown that the two categories, i.e. gradability and 
value  judgment,  though  they  may  overlap  to  some  extent,  can  and  must  be 
distinguished. Once this is done, the confusion that was seen to exist in some of the  
literature can be removed and the underlying factor can be clearly identified, and 
that is the expression of a value judgment.
In the case of  seem,  it  was argued that  what underlies the restrictions on the 
distribution of expressions in its small clause complement is of an epistemic and 
evidential  nature.  Seem  is  an epistemic verb that  contains an evidential  meaning 
component, and the expressions in its small clause complement must be compatible 
with the uncertainty of assessment involved. Gradable expressions are particularly 
suitable, as they introduce vagueness, but they are not the only ones, and it is also 
not the case that all gradable expressions make good complements to  seem. Here 
again,  therefore,  the  category of  expressions that  may occur in  the small  clause 
complement of seem overlaps, partially but, crucially, not entirely, with the class of 
gradable expressions. It was also shown that that there is a difference in the way one 
evaluates whether a predication vs. a complex situation holds, which determines the 
differences  in  restrictions  on  the  small  clause  complement  and  the  sentential 
complement of seem.
Consequently,  these  two  environments  have  been  excluded  as  tests  for 
gradability. The distribution of nouns in these contexts cannot be used evidence in 
favour of positing a gradable structure in their semantics or of a degree projection in 
their syntax. The two case studies addressed in this chapter have also shown how 
various factors may conspire so as to make believe that gradability and degree are 
involved. In the coming chapters this will turn out to be a recurring theme.

Chapter 3 DEGREES AND KINDS
1 Introduction
As indicated in chapter 1 (§2.1.2), it has been claimed in the literature that the use of 
such as an exclamative and with result clauses is restricted to the class of gradable 
nouns (cf. Bolinger 1972,  Matushansky 2002b). Consequently, co-occurrence with 
this so-called "degree", or "intensifying", such has been used as a test for gradability. 
This view is supported by facts such as those illustrated in (1) and (2): 
(1)  a. *He is such a person!
b. *He is such a person that I cannot trust him.
(2)  a. He is such an idiot!
a'. He has such courage!
b. He is such an idiot that no one will hire him.
b'. He showed such courage in battle that he was awarded the highest 
distinction.
The examples in  (1) show that  such  cannot be used exclamatively or with a result 
clause  when  the  noun  is  an  ordinary,  non-gradable  one.  Such  structures  are 
grammatical when a gradable noun is used, as in (2). These examples are claimed to 
get an interpretation in terms of the high degree to which the property denoted by the 
noun (idiot, courage) holds. At first sight, therefore, such looks like a typical degree 
operator.
In addition nouns like  idiot, genius, (jazz) enthusiast,  nonsense, courage  etc., 
which are typically considered to be gradable, such-exclamatives and result clauses 
are also allowed with nouns receiving stereotypical interpretations, which are often, 
but not always, figurative (cf. discussion in §2.1.2 in chapter 1). This is illustrated in 
(3):
(3)  a. He is such a linguist! (he'd ask for grammaticality judgments even while 
the plane he's on is being hijacked!)
b. Their new place is such a palace!
c. Those '50s Cadillacs were such boats! (you couldn't ride in them for a 
few minutes without getting sick!)
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Application of the various gradability tests discussed in chapter 1 to the classes  
of nouns illustrated above yields different results. Nouns like the ones illustrated in 
(2) have been shown to come out as gradable according to the other tests reviewed 
too, while nouns like those in (3) give rise to diverging results. Take modification by 
degree  adjectives,  for  instance.  The  examples  in  (4) show  that  nouns  which 
categorize  individuals  via  a  (gradable)  property,  such  as  idiot,  genius,  (jazz)  
enthusiast etc.,  and  abstract  mass  nouns  naming  (gradable)  properties,  such  as 
courage, generosity etc., can be modified by adjectives like big in a degree sense:
(4)  a. He's a big idiot.
b. He has great courage. 
The interpretation of these examples seems to be in terms of the high degree to 
which  the  property  denoted  by the  noun holds  of  the  individual,  parallel  to  the 
interpretation  obtained  when  a  degree  modifier  is  used  with  a  corresponding 
adjective, as in very idiotic or very courageous.
In contrast, nouns like linguist  and palace cannot be so modified: the resulting 
interpretation of (5) is fundamentally different:
(5)  a. a big linguist
b. a big palace
c. a big boat
In  (5), the adjective  big  can only be interpreted in a literal sense, referring to size 
(either  concretely,  or,  more abstractly,  to importance),  not  in a  degree sense that 
would parallel the interpretation in  (4) above. The type of interpretation the nouns 
linguist, palace, boat receive in (3) in the context of such is not available when they 
are modified by adjectives. The same results with respect to modification by degree 
adjectives are obtained with ordinary, non-gradable nouns like person:
(6)  a big person
In sum, there are nouns that come out as gradable according to both tests (e.g. 
nouns like idiot and courage etc.) and nouns that fail both tests and hence come out 
as non-gradable (e.g. person etc.). There is, however, also a class of nouns, namely 
those illustrated in  (3), which qualify as gradable according to the  such test, but 
which pattern with non-gradable nouns with respect to the modification by degree 
adjectives  such as  big.  The question then arises  where this contrast  between the 
results of the two tests stems from. There are two possible sources. It could be that  
one of these tests is too lax and takes in too many nouns, or it could be that the other  
test is too strict and filters out nouns that it should not. In other words, one of the  
two is not a fully reliable test for gradability.
In addition to the "degree" such, illustrated in (2)-(3) above, there is also another 
instance of  such which  can be used anaphorically or deictically and  gives rise to 
neutral type-interpretations paraphrasable as 'of this type/ kind'. This is the "kind" 
such, which can be used with all types of nouns: both non-gradable nouns (for which 
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it  is  in  fact  the  only  one  available)  and  gradable  nouns,  as  in  (7)a  and  (7)b, 
respectively.
(7)  a. Such a person will always fail to do the job properly.
b. Such an idiot will always fail to do the job properly. 
An example like  (7)b is said to be ambiguous between the two interpretations, i.e. 
'someone who is idiotic to a high degree' or 'an idiot of this kind' (cf. Bolinger 1972).
In this chapter, we will show that the distribution of "degree" such is not limited 
to  gradable  nouns,  or  nouns  that  can  be  modified  by  other  (potential)  degree 
modifiers, and that the interpretation is also not in terms of degree.  We will argue 
that all instances of such, including the so-called "degree" such, are in fact cases of 
kind-reference. What accounts for the differences in distribution (and interpretation) 
between (1), on the one hand, and (2)-(3), on the other, is that such here comes with 
particular  semantic  requirements  concerning  the  construal  of  (sub-)kinds  it  can 
select,  and these are only satisfied by certain types of nouns.  This approach will 
enable us to solve the problematic aspects that arise from an analysis of  such as a 
degree  operator  in  contexts  like  those  illustrated  in  (2)-(3) above,  such  as  the 
contradictory results obtained if such is used as a test for gradability as compared to 
other tests, as well as other issues that will be discussed in the coming sub-sections. 
A major consequence is that co-occurrence with such in exclamatives or with result 
clauses is not a test for gradability. This means, more generally, that the distribution 
and interpretation of such cannot be used as evidence in favour of the existence of 
gradable structures in the semantics and/or syntax. It does not exclude the possibility 
that some nouns may be gradable, given that, at least intuitively, it seems to interact 
in  particular ways  or  with  particular  effects with  nouns  that  seem  to  encode  a 
gradable property in their meaning. However, to verify the linguistic reality of such 
gradable structures, even in a subset of the cases, additional, independent tests will  
be needed.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 2 we will offer some background 
information concerning the "classical" approach to the two  such's,  reviewing and 
shedding  doubt  on  some  of  the  arguments  that  have  been  used  in  favour  of 
postulating two fundamentally different lexical items, such as the distribution of as-
clauses and result clauses. We will also present the semantics of the kind-referring 
such which has been proposed in the literature, and which we will use as a basis for 
our analysis.  The proposal  will  be  given in  section 3,  and  in  section 4 we will  
discuss  some  consequences  of  this  approach.  Section  5  briefly  examines  other 
constructions in the light of the proposal made for  such, namely  wh-exclamatives 
and  quite-structures, which have often been analysed on a par with "degree"  such. 
Section 6 concludes. 
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2 Background
2.1 The two such's in literature
In the literature on  such, a distinction is generally assumed between two different 
lexical items: the "kind" such and the "degree" such (Bresnan 1973, Carlson 1977, 
Siegel 1994, Landman 2006 etc.), which differ in interpretation as indicated above, 
as well as in chapter 1. In this sub-section, we will briefly review the observations 
which  have  motivated  the  split  between  the  two,  as  well  as  introducing  some 
arguments in favour of a unified analysis, which we will be pursuing.
Firstly, differences are argued to exist with respect to the types of nominals they 
may modify: "degree" such is claimed to only be available with gradable nominals 
(e.g. mess, mistake, loudmouth etc.), while kind such is not subject to this restriction 
(Siegel 1994, Landman 2006 etc.). In addition, "degree" such is assumed to be able 
to also modify (attributive) adjectives. That is, for the cases of NPs that contain 
adjectives, as in  such strange theories, the dominant view is that  such  is in fact a 
degree operator that  modifies the adjective,  though subsequent raising to the DP 
periphery  obscures  the  syntactic  relation  between  such  and  the  adjective  (cf. 
Matushansky 2002a, Meier 2003 etc.).
Secondly, a difference is claimed to exist with respect to the types of subordinate  
clauses they may correlate with: when such occurs with a result that-clause, only its 
degree reading is available, while when it occurs with an  as-clause, only its kind 
reading is available (Bolinger 1972, Landman 2006 etc.):117
(8)  a. He is such a fool that I cannot trust him!
b. Such women as we met yesterday are a credit to society.
Thirdly,  there  are  differences  in  the  restrictions  on  their  co-occurrence  with 
determiners and quantifiers (Bresnan 1973, Carlson 1977, Siegel 1994, Wood 2002, 
Landman 2006). Thus, only kind such may occur between a determiner or quantifier 
(e.g. cardinals,  few, most, many etc.) and a noun, or between an adjective and the 
noun, as illustrated in (9)a and (9)b respectively. Degree such cannot occur in these 
positions, as illustrated in (10). But both may occur with bare plural NPs and with 
the singular indefinite, as illustrated in (11), and neither can co-occur with a definite 
determiner (including possessives), as illustrated in (12).
(9) a. some/ few/ all such dogs [kind]
b. two new such problems
(10) a. *some such idiots [intended: degree]
b. *two friendly such idiots
(11) a. such mistakes [kind, degree]
117 Example (8)a is from Bolinger (1972), and example (8)b is from Carlson (1977).
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b. such a scholar
(12) a. *the such scholar [kind, degree] 
b. *such the scholar
c. *my such mistakes
Finally, the two such's have been claimed to be pronounced differently (Carlson 
1977, Landman 2006):  "degree"  such  always bears a pitch accent or a particular 
stress contour, while kind such may, but need not.
As it turns out, however, the distinction between the two such's is not as clear-cut 
as it might look at first sight. It will be shown in the coming sub-sections that the 
above arguments do not constitute solid reasons to postulate a radical split, and that 
the facts may be explained in an alternative way. In addition, there are some clear 
arguments in favour of pursuing a (more) unified analysis.
It has already been indicated that the view that one  such  is a degree operator, 
which can thus be used to test for the gradability of the expressions it can modify, 
faces problems once one compares the results yielded by this diagnostic with the 
results obtained by applying other gradability tests.
A more indicative fact is that, in language after language, the kind-reading and 
the degree-reading are both associated with the same lexical item: French tel, Italian 
tale, Romanian asemenea, Polish taki, German solch- etc. Here are a few examples:
(13) a. un tel homme [French]
a such man
'such a man'
a'. un tel idiot (que…)
a such idiot (that…)
'such an idiot (that…)'
b. un asemenea om [Romanian]
a such person
'such a person'
b'. un asemenea idiot (că…)
a such idiot (that…)
'such an idiot (that…)'
c. ein solcher Mann [German]
a such man
'such a man'
c'. ein solcher Idiot (dass…)
a such idiot (that…)
'such an idiot (that…)'
This suggests that the two are closely related, certainly in a more direct way than  
one is led to believe by most of the analyses put forth in the literature; we indeed 
take this as an indication that a common semantic core should be sought.
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There have been few attempts in the literature to provide a unified account for all  
the instances of such items, which focus either on the pro-form behaviour of such 
expressions, or on the sorts of entities they refer to (i.e. kinds).
Cross-linguistically,  equivalent  items  can  be  seen  to  get  a  high  degree 
interpretation, under which they can take result clauses and be used as exclamatives, 
as well  as  exhibiting demonstrative-like behaviour,  which seems to cross-cut the 
distinction between kind and degree and includes deictic, anaphoric, and cataphoric 
uses. This is the type of observation that prompts Umbach (2007) and Umbach and 
Ebert (2009) to argue that German so is uniformly a demonstrative modifier. While 
this is an interesting proposal and goes a long way towards a unified analysis, it is  
not unproblematic and distinctions still remain. Most importantly, so still refers to a 
property in some cases, and to a degree in others.
Some tentative suggestions taking a different perspective, which in fact comes 
close to the view that we will adopt, can be found in Landman and Morzycki (2003)  
and  Landman  (2006).  The  basic  observation  here  is  that,  cross-linguistically,  in 
addition to  the usual  kind interpretations they get  in  the nominal  domain,  items 
equivalent to English such/ so (e.g. German so, Polish taki etc.) can receive either 
manner  interpretations  or  degree  interpretations  when  used  in  the  verbal  and 
adjectival domains. They suggest that all these uses might plausibly be unified under 
the kind umbrella. They argue that, similarly to how kinds of individuals are made 
use of in the nominal domain, in the verbal domain, manners are construed as kinds 
of events, and suggest that, in a parallel way, one could try to map degrees as kinds  
of  states.  So  what  will  differ  is  the  sort  of  kinds  referred  to,  namely  kinds  of 
individuals,  kinds of events  and, possibly,  kinds of states.  However,  they do not  
attempt an explicit analysis in this direction, and they do not directly address the 
degree interpretations of such in the nominal domain.
 In this  chapter, we will argue that the so-called "degree"  such  is in fact not a 
degree operator, and that all the uses of such share a common semantic core which 
consists  of  kind-reference.  Before  making  a  more  explicit  proposal,  we  need  to 
better understand the semantics of kind-reference associated with such and to show 
that a fundamental distinction between two unrelated  such  lexical items cannot be 
maintained. This is what the next two sub-sections aim to do. In §2.2, we will briefly 
look at how kind such has been approached in the literature; this discussion is meant 
to provide us with some basic tools we can make use of in the remainder of the 
section.  In  §2.3 we  will  question  one  of  the  major  arguments  in  favour  of  the 
proposed distinction, namely the distribution of result clauses and as-clauses.
2.2 The semantics of kind such
In this sub-section we will present the main views in the literature on kind such. We 
cannot fully evaluate all the existing approaches here, or cover all the issues related  
to the semantics of  such. The aim is mainly to introduce some tools that will help 
make the discussion in the next sub-sections more concrete.
Kind such has been analysed in the literature either as an anaphor to kinds or as 
an anaphor to properties. The former view is most notably expressed by Carlson 
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(1977), followed by Wilkinson (1995), Landman and Morzycki (2003),  Landman 
(2006) etc., while the latter view is upheld by Siegel (1994).118
Carlson analyses kind such as a kind anaphor: such means 'of kind k', where k is 
some contextually salient kind. Thus, one such dog, for example, means 'one dog of 
that kind'. His main argument in favour of this analysis comes from the observation 
that the antecedents of such must be [or rather: contain] "modifiers that delineate a 
KIND of the nominal modified" (Carlson 1977:233); expressions which cannot denote 
kinds do not make good antecedents. This is illustrated by the contrasts between (14) 
and (15) below, where italics indicate co-reference following Carlson (1977):
(14) a. Cats without tails… such cats 
b. People who eat fish… such people
(15) a. People in the next room… ??such people
b. Elephants that are standing there… ??such elephants
In fact, such does not just refer back to the modifier, but rather to the whole NP. This 
is most clearly shown by examples like the following, where the noun contained in 
the antecedent and the noun modified by such are different, but this is taken to be the 
case in general.119
(16) "Honest money lenders? There are no such people."
Carlson also points out that the NP referred to must be a sub-kind of the kind that  
corresponds to the noun that  such  modifies,  as shown by the following contrasts 
(italics are used here again to indicate co-reference):
(17) a. mammals… such animals
a'. *animals… such mammals
b. vicious dachshunds… such dogs
b'. *vicious dogs… such dachshunds
Carlson analyses kind such as being syntactically a CN-external AP. An AP is, in his 
analysis,  a  phrase  consisting  of  an  adjective  and  what  he  calls  an  adjectival 
determiner, i.e. a degree word, such as fat enough or more beautiful. Semantically, 
such  is translated as an expression of category CN'/CN containing a free variable 
that ranges over kinds, with the qualification that the free kind variable has to be 
interpreted as a kind subordinate to the one that corresponds to the CN that  such 
modifies. The context of use (the assignment of values to variables) will assign any 
possible denotation to the free variable. (Carlson 1977:234) The translation of such 
proposed by Carlson is given in (18), where Q is the variable which will receive the 
value  of  the  CN that  such  modifies,  xk is  the  free  kind  variable,  and  R'  is  the 
118 For more syntactically-oriented work on such, see Bresnan (1973), Wood (2002), Wood and Vikner 
(2011). 
119 The example in (16) is from Carlson (1977).
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realization relation that holds between object-level individuals (those superscripted 
o) and the kinds they instantiate (the elements superscripted k):
(18) λQ  λxo [[∀z0⎕[R'(zo,xk)  →  ⋁Q(zo)]  &  R'(xo,xk)  &  ∼⎕∼∃yo[⋁Q(yo)  & 
∼R'(yo,xk)]]
This denotes the set of properties that  hold of a set  of objects that  realize some 
contextually-specified kind, represented by xk, with the condition that all objects that 
realize  xk must be a subset of whatever value is assigned to Q. But while Q must 
hold of all object-level realizations of  xk, not all objects that Q holds of must be 
realizations of xk. 
In (19) we give the translation of such dog(s) as an illustration of a CN derived 
by applying such to a CN, here dog (omitting the final conjunct, which ensures the 
kind is subordinate):
(19) λxo [∀zo⎕[R'(zo,xk) → dog(zo)] & R'(xo,xk)
This is the set of objects that realize whatever kind is assigned to xk, such that for all 
objects it is true that at all points of reference if that object realizes that kind then it 
is a dog, which is the value assigned to Q in this case (so xk must be some kind of 
dog(s)).  The value  assigned  to  xk might  be Afghan hounds,  shepherd  dogs,  bull 
terriers, Chihuahuas, guardian dogs, companion dogs, longhaired dogs etc. Any of 
these can be referred to with the phrase  such dogs.  What  could not possibly be 
assigned as a value of xk is any kind that does not have all of its realizations as dogs,  
for example toy dogs.
In sum, although such itself is of a higher type, the variable it contains is a kind 
variable and it is of type <e> since kinds are modelled as a special type of individual 
in D.120
Differently from Carlson, Siegel (1994) argues that kind  such  is simply a pro-
form for an adjective, i.e. it is a simple variable ranging over one-place predicates, 
formally  vn,  <<s,e>t>.  On her  account,  such  is  syntactically  a  simple  adjective  and 
semantically it is bound by the translations of (complex or simple) common noun 
phrases, not by those of adjectives or Carlson's kinds. Her main argument comes 
from the type of antecedent she claims  such  can have. While she agrees that it is 
much easier  to imagine using  such  to refer  back to  expressions which represent 
kinds of things than it is using it to refer back to those which do not, she points out  
that "this preference of such for kind modifiers seems to have more to do with how 
such  is  usually  used  than with its  structure;  the preference  is  not  in  fact  strong 
enough to encode in the grammar by making the free variable in the translation of 
such  a  kind  variable.  We  CAN get  good sentences  in  which  such  is  bound  by 
120 Note that there are also mechanisms to construe kinds as individuals out of (sets of) properties – cf.  
Chierchia (1998).
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modifiers  that  definitely  do  not  delineate  kinds."  (p.  488)121 She  provides  the 
following examples to support this claim:
(20) a. The elephants that are standing there are useless; I can't get an exciting 
picture with such animals.
b. Ned is sound asleep; I'm not going to call on such a student.
c. Hallie is two rooms away; I can't carry on a conversation with such a 
person.
Based on these examples, where such does not have a kind-referring expression as 
an antecedent,  Siegel  concludes that  such  is  an anaphor to properties/  one-place 
predicates, not to kinds. However, we would like to suggest that the kind analysis 
can be maintained even in view of the above examples.
It can be argued that, at the point where such is interpreted in these examples, a 
contextually salient kind is construed which it can refer to. That is, the such DPs in 
(20) are also interpreted as 'animals of this kind',  'a student of this kind',  and 'a  
person of this kind', respectively. What is different is that here the kind referred to is  
not  explicitly  specified,  but  has  to  be "reconstructed"  from the preceding  clause 
based on information provided by the subject DP in combination with the predicate, 
and  possibly  some  extra-linguistic  knowledge  as  well.  Namely,  it  is  the  kind 
instantiated  by  the  individual  (referent  of  the  subject  DP)  as  described  by  the 
predicate in that clause. So what is obtained would be something like 'the kind of  
elephants that just stand uselessly/ uninterestingly', 'the kind of students who are/ 
tend to be sound asleep (probably at inappropriate times)', 'people/ colleagues who 
are too far away (to have a conversation with)'. This is in fact similar to certain cases 
121 Siegel (1994) also argues that her analysis of  such as bound by the translation of a CN provides a 
natural explanation for the special proviso in Carlson's translation of such "that all objects that realize xk 
are a subset of whatever value is assigned to Q" (Carlson 1977:234), which is meant to account for the 
contrast in (i) (the examples are from Siegel 1994):
(i) a. Small mammals are afraid that people like to eat such animals.
b. *Small animals are afraid that people like to eat such mammals.
She argues that (ia) is fine because 'small mammal animals' makes sense, and the sentence means that  
small mammals are afraid that people like to eat small mammals, not just any small animals. (ib) is odd  
because a 'small animal mammal is redundant'. Thus, Siegel argues that the limitation of the kind variable  
to subsets of the objects picked out by the head noun of the such nominal which is required on Carlson's 
account,  and which she regards as arbitrary, follows naturally from normal pragmatic rules if  such  is 
translated by CN meanings. It may be that this limitation is indeed pragmatic in nature, and may even be 
overruled under certain circumstances. Landman (2006) in fact provides the following counterexample 
(which prompts her to drop this condition altogether):
(ii) Longhaired dogs can be difficult to brush. Such cats are even worse.
Cats cannot be a sub-kind of dogs, but the example is nevertheless grammatical according to Landman.
However, it seems that focus-related/ contrastive stress also plays a role in the acceptability of certain 
examples. For instance, stress seems to be needed on cats in (ii), where two co-hyponyms are used (dogs, 
cats)  instead  of  the  more  usual,  and  most  easily  interpretable,  subordinate-superordinate  relation 
(mammals,  animals). And examples like (ib) above, where this relation is reversed, may in fact also be 
improved by stressing the N modified by such (i.e. mammals). Similar cases exist which do not involve 
such, like (iii) below, where we have used capitals to indicate stress:
(iii) Small animals are afraid that people like to eat small MAMMALS.
Contrastive focus therefore seems to be able to influence the relation between such DPs and possible 
antecedents. This is an aspect which deserves further research.
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already discussed by Carlson, such as (21) below, where the kind referred to by such 
is understood to be the kind instantiated by the elements the subject NP refers to: 
(21) a. with politicians, journalists and other such important personages… 
b. Though the wheel and the lever were known to the ancient Babylonians, 
such devices were unknown to the inhabitants of the North American 
continent. 
c. I met an old-style structural linguist the other day. Such people become 
rarer in academic fields as well, I'm told.
Carlson  provides  these  examples  to  show  that  such need  not  have  specifiable 
linguistic antecedents but that it can even have a denotation which cannot be related 
directly to another expression of English. In spite of this, the examples are perfectly  
interpretable, and speakers understand, for instance, that the such DP in (21)a refers 
to other persons that are of the same kind of important person as journalists and 
politicians (though there is no exact specification of this particular kind), and that in 
(21)c  such  refers  to  the  kind  of  person  that  an  old-style  structural  linguist  is 
(whatever that may be exactly). 
Therefore,  while  in  the  examples  in  (14) there  is  an  explicit  kind-referring 
expression that functions as a straightforward antecedent, in (20), just as in (21), the 
kind that is to be picked up by such has to be construed based on the content of the 
preceding clause (and, possibly, also assigned on the basis of speakers' knowledge of 
the world – cf. Carlson 1977).122 In conclusion, the kind analysis of such proposed 
by  Carlson  can  be  maintained,  and  can  also  account  for  the  apparent 
counterexamples provided by Siegel. 
The mechanism at work in examples like (20)-(21), where a contextually salient 
kind is constructed from an individual that instantiates (or exemplifies) it, is in fact 
similar to that involved in the interpretation of  as-clauses, or phrases, which  such 
may co-occur  with,  and  which  represent  yet  another  way  the  kind  variable  can 
receive a value:123
(22) a. Such women as we met yesterday are a credit to society.
b. Such women as Frieda should be paid more handsomely.
Carlson (1977) takes the function of these clauses/phrases to be one of exemplifying 
the kind, where a specific individual or set of individuals can be picked out and 
pointed to. On his account, the semantic rule associated with the presence of an as-
clause in the structure creates a predicate out of the as-clause which has as argument 
122 This type of accommodation is also found elsewhere: for instance, in the interpretive mechanisms 
involved in certain types of pronominal anaphora, such as E-type pronouns, pronouns of laziness, plural  
pronouns with split antecedents etc. Some examples are given below:
(i) a. John owns some sheep and Harry vaccinates them in the spring. (Evans 1980)
b. The only man who ever stole a book from Snead made a lot of money by selling it. (Geach 
1964) [where it = the book that he stole from Snead]
c. Mary met Sue around noon yesterday; they had lunch together. 
d. You take two wings, put them together on a broom-stick, and it will never fly. (Parsons, in 
Carlson 1977)
123 The examples in (22) are from Carlson (1977).
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the free variable in the matrix occurrence of such, and finally gives a derived phrase 
of type <eo,t>. That is, a phrase like  such women as we met yesterday  is a set of 
properties of objects, namely the property set associated with any object that is a  
realization of a kind, represented by the free variable  xk, which is  woman, in this 
example.  But  there  is  an  additional  restriction  here  on  the  interpretation  of  xk 
stemming from the presence of the as-clause: it can only be assigned a value from 
the domain of kinds such that it is not only some kind of woman, but also a kind of 
woman that we saw yesterday. For cases like (22)b, where as is only followed by a 
DP, he adopts a more straightforward treatment. Namely, phrases like such women 
as Frieda are interpreted as 'women that are of the same KIND as Frieda'. This is the 
set of properties associated with all objects that are realizations of xk, xk being some 
kind of woman, and Frieda being a realization of that  kind. There are additional 
issues that we cannot go into here, such as the (internal) syntax of as-clauses and as-
phrases (including the question whether the latter are just reduced versions of clausal 
structures, a question that also applies to comparatives), and the question whether 
as-clauses/phrases  help  identify  the  kind  associated  with  such,  by  providing  a 
restriction on its kind variable, or whether they directly supply such with the value 
of its kind variable, in which case they would be construed as definite descriptions 
of  a  kind,  analogous  to  some  analyses  of  than-clauses/phrases  in  comparative 
constructions – see Carlson (1977) and Landman (2006) for relevant discussion.
 This  concludes the  discussion of  the semantics  of  kind  such as  it  has  been 
treated in the literature. We will retain that  it  picks up on kind descriptions and its 
semantics can be defined in terms of a kind variable, which can receive a value by 
co-reference with an antecedent when used anaphorically, from the (extralinguistic) 
context when used deictically, or in correlation with an as-clause/phrase. With these 
notions in place, we will now turn to a consideration of an issue that is of particular 
relevance for the fundamental division between the two  such  lexical items that is 
usually made, an issue that has been partially touched on in this sub-section too.  
Namely, the distribution of as-clauses/phrases and result clauses.
2.3 As-clauses and result clauses
As already noted, a major difference observed between kind such and "degree" such 
refers to the type of clauses they can correlate with:  as-clauses and result clauses, 
respectively. The following examples illustrate the claimed restriction of as-clauses 
to the kind reading of such, and that of result that-clauses to its degree reading:124
(23) a. Such women as we met yesterday are a credit to society.
b. He is such a fool that I cannot trust him!
This generally accepted correlation has accordingly guided the analyses of these 
types of clauses. Thus, as-clauses have been analysed in the context of accounts of 
kind  such, as was  shown in the previous sub-section. They can be taken either to 
directly supply the kind associated with  such, or to help identify it by providing a 
124 Example (23)a is from Carlson (1977) and (23)b from Bolinger (1972).
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restriction on the kind variable associated with  such (cf. Carlson 1977, Landman 
2006). Result clauses, on the other hand, have been analysed as arguments of the 
degree operator, in a parallel way to the infinitival clause correlated with enough or 
to  other  degree  constructions  involving  correlate  subordinate  clauses  (cf.  Meier 
2003).
In this sub-section, however, we show that, in fact, the distribution of as-clauses 
and result clauses is not a solid argument in favour of postulating two fundamentally 
different lexical items that would each be specified as selecting one or the other. 
There are two (empirical) arguments supporting this claim: on the one hand, we may 
find as-clauses with high degree readings of such; on the other hand, result clauses 
seem  to  be  possible  with  neutral,  kind  interpretations  of  such.  The  following 
examples illustrate the former point:125,126
(24) a. It is really a joke to try to reason with such an idiot as you!127
b. How can you expect such an idiot as I am to say anything but idiotic 
things?128
c. It was such a quantity as you would hesitate to accept.
In (24)a and (24)b, such an idiot can be interpreted as 'so (very) idiotic' and, at the 
same time, a comparison is made: 'as idiotic as you/ me'. In connection with (24)c, 
Bolinger  (1972)  points  out  that  the  example  can  get  either  a  kind  or  a  degree 
interpretation.  In fact, it is hard in these examples to distinguish between a degree 
reading and a kind reading. 
Conversely, result clauses seem to be possible with neutral, kind interpretations 
of such, both in its usual attributive use, as in (25), and in predicative position, as in 
(26):
(25) a. The statute defining this offence imposes punishment on any person who 
wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of sixteen 
years to be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of the child is 
endangered…129
125 Note that there is also a different type of as-clause, infinitivals, illustrated in (i). These as to-clauses 
should be distinguished from regular as-clauses and are in fact more similar to result clauses. It should be 
noted, however, that in the proposal we will make in section 3, result clauses will be in fact analysed as  
identifying a particular sort of sub-kind too.
(i) a. Next time I won't be such an idiot as to put the wrong barring password in three times.
b. "What!" says Jack's mother, "have you been such a fool, such a dolt, such an idiot, as to 
give away my Milky-white, the best milker in the parish, and prime beef to boot, for a set of 
paltry beans?!" (Jack and the beanstalk)
c. They got out £600 from a card with my name on it; but who would be such an idiot as to let 
them use it?
d. She was not such an idiot as to believe what he was saying.
They are also similar to the infinitival complements which certain nouns or adjectives can take and which 
are used to give a reason for passing a judgment: 
(ii) You are a fool to believe such a thing!
126 Example (24)c is from Bolinger (1972).
127 Source: http://www.wallstreetsurvivor.com/CS/forums/t/39082.aspx
128 Source: W. M. Thackeray – The Virginians 
129 Source: http://www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part6/6.11-1.htm 
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b. It's ridiculous that our footballers should be put in such a situation that 
there is a possibility of serious injuries.130
c. …the act must be of such character and done in such a situation that the 
actor should reasonably have anticipated that some injury to another 
would probably result.131
d. To organise society in such a way that every member of it can develop 
and use all his capabilities and powers in complete freedom and without 
thereby infringing the basic conditions of this society.132
e. Live in such a way that you would not be ashamed to sell your parrot to 
the town gossip.133
f. I found myself surrounded by such circumstances and such people that I 
knew not whom to trust.134
(26) a. The employment situation of Singapore in the 1960s was such that 
workers found themselves in a position where they could not be choosy.135
b. The disease was such that no treatment was possible...136
c. … the hat that lay by him on the floor (he was the only one uncovered) 
was such that if one had considered it as an article of mere personal 
adornment he would have missed its meaning.137
d. Public opinion in Finland during the spring 1941 was such that it would 
have been extremely difficult for any government to explain…138
e. The design of the portable tank was such that the bottom of the valve 
structure, vent fittings and shell insulation all sat below the line…139
These facts indicate that the distribution of as-clauses and result clauses is wider 
than usually claimed and cross-cuts the distinction between the neutral, kind and 
(high) degree interpretations of  such. This may be taken to suggest that the noted 
distinction may simply  be  a  matter  of  preference.  That  is,  it  may be  that  result 
clauses  are  particularly  (but  not  exclusively)  felicitous  when  the  main  clause 
expresses a situation which may be easily conceived of as entailing some sort of 
consequence;  this  is  the  case,  for  example,  when there  is  an expression of  high 
degree, especially one implying excess. Looking at the facts in this way might help 
us begin to understand the privileged relationship between the expression of (high) 
degree and result clauses, as it is manifested cross-linguistically (i.e. result clauses 
are more often than not associated with expressions of [high] degree), in spite of the 
fact  that  consequence  is  not  necessarily,  logically  speaking,  dependent  on  an 
expression of (high) degree.
130 Source: http://education.theage.com.au/cmspage.php?intid=135&intversion=31 
131 Source: http://www.4lawschool.com/torts/williams.htm 
132 Source: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/cw/volume06/footnote.htm#69 
133 Source: Will Rogers, US humorist and showman (1879 – 1935) (at http://www.quotationspage.com/)
134 Adapted from http://www.state.il.us/HPA/facsimiles.htm 
135 Source: stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/tmp/ygce19810811s.pdf 
136 Source: http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/plague.htm 
137 Source: A. Bierce – Can such things be? (http://bierce.thefreelibrary.com/Can-Such-Things-Be/22-1) 
138 Source: http://www.kevos4.com/Part13 Was the Continuation War Unavoidable.htm 
139 Source: www.unece.org/trans/doc/2008/ac10c3/ST-SG-AC10-C3-2008-47e.doc 
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We  can  conclude  at  this  point  that  the  distribution  of  as-clauses  and  result 
clauses cannot be used as an argument in favour of a split between two different  
lexical items, a kind-referring expression and a degree operator: their distribution 
does  not  coincide  with  this  interpretation-based  distinction.140 The  exemplifying 
function  of  as-clauses  and  the  consequential  meaning  of  result  clauses  do  not 
correlate with or depend on one or the other interpretation of use of such. However, 
it is still the case that e.g. result clauses are not generally available with such (e.g. 
*He's such a person that I  cannot trust him.).  Understanding the contribution of 
result  clauses  will  be  instrumental  to  providing  a  comprehensive  account  of  the 
semantics of  such, as will become clear when we present our proposal in the next 
section.
3 The proposal
In this section we aim to show that the kind analysis of such discussed in §2.2 can be 
extended,  with  some  adjustments,  to  the  cases  which  have  been  claimed  to  be 
instantiations of the "degree"  such,  i.e.  those cases  where  such  can take a result 
clause or be used in an exclamative. We will argue that such is not a degree operator 
in these cases, but that it makes reference to salient inherent sub-types which are 
identified by natural consequences. 
In §3.1 we will present the main ingredients of the analysis and introduce the 
basic notions we will  be employing, namely that  of  salient  sub-type and natural 
consequence, which will be used in accounting for the distribution and interpretation 
of such in conjunction with the contribution of result clauses, which we take to be 
key to a full understanding of these cases. Sub-sections 3.2-3.4 will offer the details 
of the analysis as applied to the various classes of nouns that are compatible with 
this use of such and result clauses. In §3.5, we will examine an additional meaning 
aspect, having to do with the expression of 'unexpectedness', on the basis of some 
preliminary data concerning the intonation of these DPs.
140 There are two other differences which have been claimed to exist between "kind" such and "degree" 
such. One concerns register: while "degree" such is common in both informal and formal speech, "kind" 
such  is  of  a  formal  register  (Bolinger  1972,  Landman  2006).  This  probably  has  to  do  with  the 
(non-)existence of alternative structures that compete with as-clauses and result clauses. For such + as-
clause structures there are at least two alternatives. One is to use the noun kind and a relative clause (e.g. 
the kind of women who...), the other is to use like-structures (e.g.  women like this/ those), and these are 
strongly preferred in the informal register. There is, however, no possible way to replace the such + result 
clause structure. The second difference, which has been mentioned in §2.1 and which we will come back 
to in more detail in §3.5.2, concerns intonation: it has been claimed that "degree"  such  always bears a 
pitch accent or a particular stress contour, while kind such may, but need not (Carlson 1977, Landman 
2006). As it turns out, however, the special intonation is not obligatory and is only found in a subset of  
cases – namely, in exclamative uses, where a result clause is not overtly present. It seems, therefore, that 
both these differences are related to the difference between structures with as-clauses vs. result clauses, 
rather than to a difference between kind and degree per se.
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3.1 Salient sub-types with natural consequences
In this section we introduce the basic ingredients of our proposal.  We analyse the 
cases  where  such  can  take  a  result  clause  or  be  used  in  an  exclamative  not  as 
involving a degree operator  such,  but as  also involving reference to (sub-)kinds, 
though this is  achieved somewhat  differently.  The details  of the analysis will  be  
made more specific based on the three case studies in §3.2-3.4. An additional aspect 
will be discussed in §3.5.
We argue that the licensing of  such (+ result clause) structures is subject to a 
double  condition:  (i)  they  must  contain  a  noun  that  makes  salient  sub-types 
inherently available and (ii) these must be sub-types that can be identified by natural 
consequences (which can be expressed by result clauses).
While in the ordinary anaphoric or deictic cases such picks up a sub-type by co-
reference with an explicit or implicit antecedent, here such needs to pick out a sub-
type internally to the DP in which it occurs (but see a refinement of this in  §3.3). 
Therefore, in the former case, a property which is external to the meaning of the 
noun is  added in order  to  perform (more  specific)  divisions within the  domain, 
resulting e.g. in subsets of individuals that have the respective property vs. those that 
do  not.  In  this  way,  (different)  sub-kinds  can  be  delineated.  Such  externally 
determined sub-types are generally available with any noun. In the latter case, this 
operation is effected internally to the such DP, and such picks out a salient sub-type 
which is delineated not by an external criterion, but only by what the nominal itself 
expresses, in correlation with the result clause (where one occurs). Therefore, the 
meaning of the noun needs to be such that it allows discriminating among potentially 
different sub-types of N, without resorting to extrinsic properties. That is,  it must 
contain a salient criterion for inherently distinguishing among possible sub-types so 
as to make salient sub-types easily accessible;  in addition, these must be sub-types 
that can be associated with natural consequences . We will refer to the instances of 
such present in this type of structures, i.e. with result clauses and in exclamatives, as 
"internal  such", to distinguish it from the ordinary anaphoric or deictic kind  such, 
henceforth "external such".141 This difference with respect to how sub-kinds can be 
delineated and accessed determines the differences in distribution between external 
and internal  such. The latter will only be possible with nominals which contain an 
intrinsic  structuring  principle,  so that  their  domain is  inherently differentiated in 
such a way that  they make salient sub-types accessible that  can be identified by 
natural consequences. This second part of the condition reflects on the possibility of 
using a result clause, which we argue correlates with the possibility of forming a set 
of possible natural consequences of belonging to a certain kind, which correspond 
141 The terminology used here is inspired by that used in works on same, which seems to have similar 
behaviour: it has a deictic or anaphoric use, where it has a contextual antecedent or is accompanied by an  
as-clause,  as  illustrated  in  (i),  and  a  sentence-internal  reading  which  is  dependent  on  a  plural  or  a  
universal DP (i.e. must be licensed), as illustrated in (ii) taken from Matushansky (2008) (cf. also Carlson 
1987, Moltmann 1992, Dotlačil 2010):
(i) Alice bought the same book as Beth.
(ii) Alice and Beth bought the same book.
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to,  and as  such identify, salient  sub-types of that  kind,  that  are inherently made 
available, as defined above.
Note that sub-kinds made available by taxonomic hierarchies, even though they 
may be quite salient cognitively  (as in the case of nouns like  animal,  lion,  whale, 
bread etc.), do not make good sub-types for internal  such to pick.  Although in the 
case of tigers one may easily think of a Bengali tiger or some other kind of tiger, the 
example below is not grammatical:
(27) *The local zoo now has such a tiger that all the other animals are afraid.
This is presumably because this sort of sub-kinds,  based on natural classes, cannot 
be associated with and defined by natural consequences they would give rise to in a 
given situation.
To illustrate the gist of our proposal, consider the following pair of examples: 
(28) a. *He is such a person that no one will hire him.
b. He is such an idiot that no one will hire him. 
In  these  examples,  such  needs  to  pick  out a  sub-type  of  person  and  idiot, 
respectively, which is the operation it normally performs. However, it needs to do 
this relying solely on the lexical meaning of the noun in correlation with the result 
clause. In the case of  person, there is nothing inherent to the meaning of the noun 
that can make salient sub-types available a priori. One always needs to make use of 
additional, extrinsic properties in order to delineate distinct sub-kinds of people. The 
noun idiot, on the other hand, which categorizes individuals in terms of a gradable 
property,  easily prompts  types of  individuals  that  can be distinguished from one 
another in terms of their degree of idiocy. A 'high degree type' (i.e. a very idiotic or  
an extremely idiotic person) is a very salient sub-type of idiot, one naturally made 
available by the noun. In addition, being a sub-type of idiot, as defined by having a  
high  degree  of  idiocy,  can  naturally  determine  one's  chances  of  being  hired. 
Therefore, this is a salient sub-type that can be identified by a natural consequence, 
and  the  [internal  such  + result  clause]  structure  is  licensed.  There  is,  however, 
nothing inherent to being a person that can have as a natural consequence their being 
hired or not. Or at least it is rather unclear, or very vague, what kind of properties  
people have that would lead to the consequence that no one wants to hire them. So 
the consequence  expressed  by  the  result  clause  cannot  be  associated  with  being 
some  salient,  natural  sub-type  of  person.  Since  a  salient  sub-type  that  can  be 
identified by a natural consequence is not available, the example in (28)a fails (both 
aspects  of) the  condition  on  the  licensing  of  the  [internal  such  + result  clause] 
structure.
In general,  then, a result clause will  be felicitous if  it  can express a possible 
natural consequence that corresponds to and identifies the salient inherent sub-types 
that  internal  such  can  pick  out. The  contribution  of  the  result  clause  may  be 
paraphrased by using an implication expressed by a conditional, as in  (29), which 
will be made more precise in the coming sections:
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(29) 'he is some (salient) type of idiot such that if someone is that type of idiot he  
cannot be hired'
In the account we are proposing, the contribution of the result clause is essential,  
due to the role natural consequences (which we take result clauses to express) have 
in identifying the salient sub-types that internal  such  can pick. It should be noted, 
however, that a result clause is not always overtly present. We take it that when a  
consequence is not explicitly expressed, it is still implicitly present and recoverable 
from the context  of  utterance.  This is  what  happens in exclamatives,  where this 
specification (i.e. the consequence) is suspended,  or, in some sense, left hanging. 
Here the situation of utterance plays a major role, and non-verbal elements such as 
facial expressions, tone of voice, gestures etc. may give an indication as to what sub-
type, defined by what consequence, the speaker might have in mind. This correlates 
with other differences that the exclamative use of internal  such exhibits – see §3.5 
for more discussion. Interestingly, however, the consequence may not always be left 
implicit, presumably because  in certain cases the sub-type supplied by the noun is 
not specific enough without it. This is the case of situation-type nouns that will be 
discussed in §3.3. 
We argue that such salient, inherent sub-types which can are identified by natural 
consequences are made available by several classes of nouns, namely (i) gradable 
nouns such as  idiot,  courage  etc., (ii) nouns such as  situation,  way etc., and (iii) 
nouns  that  receive  stereotypical  interpretations.  Our  analysis,  therefore,  brings 
together these different types of nouns, which otherwise would rather puzzlingly 
pattern  together  with  respect  to  distribution  in  internal  such  +  result  clause 
structures. Note also that nouns that are typically considered to be gradable, such as 
idiot or  courage,  which are the ones usually looked at  when considering the so-
called "degree"  such, constitute only one of the relevant classes. In what follows, 
each of the three types of nouns will be discussed in more detail in §3.2-3.4. At the 
same time, the discussion in these sub-sections, especially in §3.2 and §3.3, will also 
shed more light on the contribution of result clauses and the related notion of natural  
consequence.  Gradable  nouns  can  most  easily  illustrate  the  approach  we  are 
adopting, which is why we will start spelling out the analysis on the basis of these 
cases in §3.2. However, they are also the ones that can be most easily accounted for 
under a degree analysis of  such. It is rather when one comes to consider the other 
two classes of nouns that the advantages of our proposal become most evident. With 
situation-type nouns, especially, it is clearest that gradability plays no role. As such, 
they are most problematic under a degree approach to  such  (and result clauses). A 
similar argument in fact also applies to stereotypical nouns, which will be shown not 
to involve gradable meanings. 
3.2 Case I: gradable nouns
One class of nouns that make available salient sub-types consists of nouns that are, 
at least conceptually, gradable. These are nouns which contain a (gradable) property 
in their lexical meaning, either in virtue of naming it, as in the case of abstract mass  
112 CHAPTER 3
nouns  like  courage,  wisdom,  patience etc.,  or  by  denoting  individuals  that  are 
characterized by such a property, whether these are human individuals (as in the case 
of  idiot,  genius,  blunderer,  liar etc.)  or  non-human  objects,  either  concrete or 
abstract (e.g.  bargain,  effort,  mistake,  failure,  success,  blunder,  masterpiece,  stink, 
fragrance,  boon,  gyp, disaster,  chaos,  mess, modicum,  smidgen etc.). These nouns 
make certain sub-types salient and easily accessible to internal such – these are the 
sub-types including objects in the domain that have the defining property to a high 
degree. As already noted in the previous sub-section, a noun like idiot, for example, 
which categorizes individuals based on a gradable property, namely  idiocy, easily 
prompts types of individuals that can be distinguished from the others in terms of 
their high degree of idiocy. Very idiotic people, i.e. "big idiots", constitute a salient 
sub-type of idiots that is naturally made available by the noun.142 These salient sub-
types inherently made available by gradable nouns may entail natural consequences 
that can identify them. In (30), belonging to, or manifesting, a sub-type defined by 
the high degree of  idiocy  and courage  can  naturally  determine one's  chances of 
being hired, or being awarded a distinction, respectively. So result clauses can be 
used to express consequences which naturally follow from a given individual being, 
or  having,  an  instance  of  some  salient  sub-type  of  the  kind  idiot  and  courage, 
respectively.
(30) a. He is such an idiot that no one will hire him.
b. He showed such courage in battle that he was awarded the highest 
distinction.
These possible natural consequences which correspond to natural sub-types specify 
the sub-types in question. As already indicated, the contribution of the result clause 
may be paraphrased by using an implication:
(31) a. 'he is some type of idiot such that if someone is that type of idiot he 
cannot be hired'
b. 'he showed some type of courage such that if someone shows that type of 
courage he must be awarded the highest distinction'
This  way  of  understanding  the  contribution  of  result  clauses  is  very  similar  to 
Meier's (2003) analysis, which is, however, set in a degree-based framework. Meier 
analyses  result  clauses  as denoting an incomplete conditional  which is implicitly 
modalized  by  a  modal  with  universal  force  (unless  a  different  type  of  modal  is 
overtly expressed) as if it were the consequent of a complete conditional. On her  
account, result clauses are arguments of the degree words so/ such which she treats 
142 Such sub-kinds can in fact also be explicitly delineated by degree adjectives like big in big idiots, for 
example, and then they may be available as antecedents to kind anaphors. Consider, in this context, the  
following example where such is used in its ordinary kind anaphor guise, but it just happens to pick up 
from the context a sub-kind of idiots delineated by the high degree of the property (in other words, one 
containing individuals that are ordered high with respect to their degree of idiocy, i.e. 'big idiots'):
(i) I didn't expect the tax office to employ big idiots. But John is such an idiot, and he's been 
working there for a couple of years already.
For an analysis of modificational structures of the type big idiot, see chapter 4 (section 2). 
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on a par with enough, in the sense that they both introduce a comparison relation (of 
the equative type: 'greater than or equal') between two degrees. Here is an example 
(where e stands for 'extent', which is how she defines degrees, as opposed to viewing 
them as points): 
(32) a. The apartment had such a beautiful view that we rented it.
b. 'The (max.) e such that the apartment has a e-beautiful view ≥ the 
minimal e* such that, if the apartment has a  e*  -beautiful view, we  have  
t o  r ent it  .'
Instead of relating result clauses to degrees/ degree operators, however, we take 
them  to  identify  the  salient  sub-type  that  such  picks out,  by  expressing  a 
consequence that follows from the very nature (i.e. sub-type) of a given individual, 
relative  to  the  situation in  which it  is  a  participant.  So the result  clause overtly 
contributes information specifying the sub-type. In the absence of a result clause the 
consequence that identifies the sub-type is left implicit;  this is what happens, for 
example, in exclamative uses. The close relation which exists between the natural 
consequence expressed by the result clause and the sub-type to which it corresponds 
will become clearer when we consider situation-type nouns in the next sub-section. 
In  order  to  represent  the  contribution  of  the  result  clause,  we  make  use  of  an 
equivalence relation between sets. The interpretation will finally amount to matching 
the salient sub-type that is made available by the noun and that is to be selected by  
such with the sub-type defined by the  natural consequence expressed by the result 
clause:143
(33) some sub-type of idiot  xk such that he is an  xk-idiot = a sub-type of idiot  yk 
such that, if someone is that type of idiot, no one will hire him
This way of understanding internal  such + result clauses also enables us to capture 
the intuition that if the individual in question turned out to be even more idiotic, he 
would still not be hired. This is due to the entailments that hold. If John is a bigger  
idiot than Peter, then John is also a big idiot, i.e. he is also included in the set of big 
idiots (or: is an instantiation of the type of big idiots too). And if being a big idiot 
entails that no one will hire you, then a bigger idiot will be characterized by that 
consequence too.
From our discussion so far,  it  would seem that  the meaning  of  the  NP itself 
should be enough to make salient sub-types available, which can be associated with 
a natural consequence. And with a noun like idiot in (28)b this seems to be the case: 
143 Recall  that  we  started  out  by  represent  the  contribution  of  the  result  clause  by  means  of  an 
implication: A→B. The implication relation can be given a set interpretation in terms of an inclusion 
relation  between  two sets:  {x|A(x)  is  true}⊆{x|B(x)  is  true}.  Given  the  ordering  (hence,  inclusion) 
relations that are assumed to exist in the domain of a gradable noun, it is not essential whether we define  
the relation between the two sets in  (33) as "=" or as the less restrictive inclusion/ subset relation "⊆" 
(which would also more directly translate the "greater than or equal to" relation used in Meier's analysis ); 
the two will give rise to the same result. However, the choice of the =-relation will turn out to be justified 
when taking into account situation-type nouns in the next sub-section. It will become apparent then that 
the natural consequence expressed by the result clause does not merely (further) specify the sub-type, but 
actually defines it.
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simply being a sub-type of idiot (as delineated by a high degree of idiocy) is enough 
to give rise to a potential natural consequence and thus make the use of a result  
clause possible when the nominal is used in predicate position. But take an example 
where such a DP would occur in object position – e.g.  They hired such an idiot...  
The consequence that the result clause will (at least preferably) express will bear not 
simply on him being some type of idiot, but rather on him being that type of idiot  
relative to the situation (i.e. him being hired). So the continuation would much rather 
be something like …that the company went bankrupt within a month than …that he 
couldn't even tie his shoes properly. The latter, however, would be ok in correlation 
with a predicative use: He's such an idiot that he can't even tie his shoes properly. 
This  suggests  that  the  consequence  that  defines  the  relevant  sub-type  is  not 
completely established at the NP or DP-level, but is rather related to the situation as  
a  whole,  in  which  it  is  a  participant  –  hence the definition we presented in  the 
preceding paragraph. This may be obscured, however, when the nouns are used in 
predicative  position,  in  which  case  there  is  no  major  difference  between 
interpretation at just the DP-level and at the Pred (or higher) level. The requirement 
to be related to the situation rather than simply to the  such  DP will emerge more 
clearly  in  our  examination  of  situation-type  nouns.  We  therefore  postpone  a 
discussion  of  the  mechanisms  by  which  [such  + result  clause]  can  achieve  the 
required scope to the next sub-section. 
So far,  the  analysis  we have  proposed  is  not  very  different  in  coverage  and 
predictions from a degree analysis, given that the salient sub-type being made use of  
is related to degree of a property (idiocy, courage etc.). In the domain of gradable 
nouns, the sub-type delineated by a high degree of the property seems to be the most 
salient and easiest to single out. However, degree becomes relevant rather indirectly, 
by making available a salient sub-type.144 And it is a sub-type that internal  such is 
looking for, not a degree (or an ordering determined by degree) as such. In the next 
sub-section, where we discuss situation-type nouns, it will in fact become clear that 
such cannot be analysed as a degree operator, whether on a degree-based or on a 
degree-less approach to gradability (cf. the discussion of the different approaches to 
gradability in chapter 1, §1.1). It will be in connection with that class of nouns that 
the advantage of adopting a non-degree approach to such and result clauses will be 
most  obvious.  While gradable nouns can be dealt  with on either  approach,  with 
situation-type nouns gradability plays no role. As such, a degree approach to result 
clause structures cannot account for these cases.
144 The role degree seems to play here as a salient criterion for inherently discriminating among potential 
sub-types within the domains of gradable nouns recalls the proposal made, in a different context, by 
Tovena  (2001)  in  connection  with abstract  mass  nouns  naming  qualities  (e.g.  courage etc.).  Tovena 
proposes that it is the differing degrees of the property that allow distinguishing between different sub-
types of the property: "a high degree and any other given degree of courage are different types of courage.  
It is the ordering that allows us to talk about sub-types, because we cannot distinguish them in any other  
way. […] The domain of [abstract mass nouns] is [weakly] discretised into degrees that are a sort of  
ordered species. […] Degrees identify types…" (Tovena 2001:575). This view is suggested by data which 
indicate that the default interpretation of such nouns is in terms of (sub-kinds distinguished by) the degree 
of the property when non-specific expressions (such as wh-words, or elements like English  a certain, 
such and French  un certain,  tel) are used in the absence of any overt modification or any (explicit or  
implicit) antecedents in the discourse (see Van de Velde 1996, Tovena 2001 for relevant discussion).
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3.3 Case II: nouns like situation, way etc.
In this sub-section we will examine a rather different class of nouns, which can only 
be seen as exceptional in other approaches, and show that the view of internal such 
proposed above can be extended to them. It was noted in §2.3 that, contrary to the 
usual claims found in the literature, result clauses are sometimes possible  in contexts 
where the interpretation of  such  is not  and cannot be (claimed to be) in terms of 
(high)  degree,  but  it  is  rather  a  neutral,  kind  interpretation.  Interestingly,  such 
examples  generally  contain  nouns  like  situation,  way,  circumstance.  These  are 
clearly  non-gradable  nouns.  Consequently,  a  degree  approach  to  result  clause 
constructions will not be able to cover these cases. Under our approach, however,  
these nouns can be accounted for. They also illustrate, more clearly than gradable  
nouns, a mechanism that lies at the core of the interpretation of result clauses, which 
can be extended to the other cases,  namely, that result clauses need to have scope 
over the entire situation. It will also become clearer that the consequence expressed 
by the result clause defines (instead of simply making more specific) the sub-type in 
question, and thus result clauses come to have a definitional role.
To begin with, consider the following examples:
(34) a. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 must be placed in the depicted 
triangle, in such a way that the sums of the numbers on each side are 
equal.145
b. Live in such a way that you would not be ashamed to sell your parrot to 
the town gossip.146
c. Read on to find out how to design your program in such a way that it 
keeps its memory usage in check... 147
All these examples contain the noun way used with  such  and a result clause.  Way 
itself is  a rather general,  or underspecified, term; its reference needs to be made 
more specific in context. In (34)a, for example, it is contextually restricted to 'ways 
of arranging numbers in a triangle'. The ways in which numbers can be arranged in a 
triangle can then naturally be classified by means of the possible operations on those 
numbers function of their distribution with respect to the sides of the triangle. One 
salient sub-type may then be identified by its having as a natural consequence the 
particular mathematical relations described, namely 'that the sums of the numbers on 
each side must be equal'. 
Next, consider the following examples containing the noun situation: 
(35) a. It's ridiculous that our footballers should be put in such a situation that 
there is a possibility of serious injuries.148
145 Adapted from: http://www.freewebs.com/mathareenaboppis/riddles.htm 
146 Source: Will Rogers, US humorist and showman (1879-1935) (at http://www.quotationspage.com)
147 Source:  http://delphi.about.com/od/windowsshellapi/ss/setprocessworkingsetsize-delphi-program-
memory-optimize.htm 
148 Source: http://education.theage.com.au/cmspage.php?intid=135&intversion=31 
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b. …the act must be of such character and done in such a situation that the 
actor should reasonably have anticipated that some injury to another 
would probably result.149
c. If you find yourself in such a situation that you cannot keep your calm 
and know you will only continue to have difficulty with that patient, you 
need to ask your supervisor to change your assignment.150
d. The statute defining this offence imposes punishment on any person who 
wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of sixteen 
years to be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of the child is 
endangered…151
Situations are typically associated with consequences they may have. Consequences 
come to be a default  criterion available for  defining (and distinguishing among) 
possible sub-types of situations. Take (35)a, for instance. Again the actual content of 
the noun is specified by the context:  here it is a situation in which footballers are 
placed. This is still not very specific. Sub-types of situations of the kind given by the 
main  clause  in  (35)a  can  be  identified  in  terms  of  e.g.  how the  footballers  are 
affected  by  the  circumstances  in  which  they  are  placed.  One  such  natural 
consequence is possible injury. This will identify the sub-type of situation in referred 
to by such in the main clause.
Finally, consider some examples containing the noun circumstance:
(36) a. If the information has been acquired in such circumstances that it would 
be a breach of confidence to disclose it to another, then courts of equity 
will restrain the recipient from communicating it to another.152
b. … the injury was received in the course of duties performed in such 
circumstances that it would be inequitable if an award were not payable in 
respect of the officer...153
c. … if the letter or document which contains the acceptance shows that it 
has been sent in such circumstances that if its transmission had been 
normal it would have been communicated in due time...154
Circumstance is very similar to way, though more general as a term. It too needs to 
have its reference made specific in context. In (36)a, for example, it is restricted to 
circumstances in which information has been acquired. Sub-types of circumstances 
149 Source: http://www.4lawschool.com/torts/williams.htm 
150 Source: http://nursinglink.monster.com/topics/10247-every-nurse-should-always-be-polite-no-matter-
what-the-situation/posts 
151 Source: http://www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part6/6.11-1.htm 
152 Source: Trusts Law. Text and materials – G. Moffat (at http://books.google.com/books)
Interestingly, if one looks at the larger context in which this sentence occurs, it becomes completely 
clear that it is indeed about identifying the circumstances and that the role of (the consequence expressed 
by) the result clause is to identify the sub-type at stake. Here is the extract: 
(i) The true test is to determine in what circumstances the information has been acquired. If it has 
been acquired in such circumstances that it would be a breach of confidence to disclose it to 
another then courts of equity will restrain the recipient from communicating it to another
153 Source: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/about-us/home-office-circulars/circulars-2010/001-20101/ 
154 Source: http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/unidroit.ulf.convention.1964/doc.html 
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in which information is  acquired can naturally  be distinguished e.g.  in  terms of 
agreements concerning the conditions for obtaining information. One such natural 
sub-type can then be identified by the fact that it naturally entails that disclosing it to 
another would be a breach of confidence, which is the consequence expressed by the 
result clause.
In sum, all these nouns refer to abstract entities, namely situations or states of 
affairs. The noun situation designates this sort of entity explicitly; in a sense, it is a 
name-holder for an eventuality or situation. The nouns way, manner or circumstance 
are always connected to an event and are used as typical event modifiers (inside a 
PP). If manners can be modelled as kinds of events, as proposed e.g. by Landman 
and Morzycki (2003), then these expressions could be taken to refer to this sort of 
entities  (i.e.  kinds of  events,  or  situations).  In  the more philosophically  oriented 
literature  there  have  in  fact  been  suggestions  that  the  expression  way  induces 
reference  either  to  an  instance  (or  trope)  of  an  event  or  to  kinds  of  events 
(Armstrong 1989, 1997, Moltmann 2003, 2004a). The compatibility of these nouns 
with internal such and result clauses is presumably due to the fact that they denote 
precisely the sorts of entities which can make available potential sub-types that are 
naturally defined and distinguished in terms of the consequences they have. As these 
nouns are general, abstract terms, their reference needs to be made more specific in 
context, and the whole situation or eventuality expressed by the main clause is taken 
into account in this process. These contextually restricted (composite) sub-kinds are 
associated  with  consequences  that  necessarily  follow  from  operations  naturally 
involving  the  elements  that  make  them  up  (recall  e.g.  (34)a).  These  natural 
consequences  can,  in  turn,  be  used  not  simply  to  specify,  but  in  fact  to  define 
(distinct) sub-types. The result clause construction then becomes definition-like.155 
This justifies representing the contribution of the result clause by means of the "="-
relation (cf. also fn. 143 above). The examples (34)a and (35)a discussed above can 
then be paraphrased as follows (omitting, in the first part, some of the information 
contributed by the main clause):
(37) a. … some (type of) way of arranging numbers in a triangle xk = a (type of) 
way of arranging numbers in a triangle yk, such that if the numbers are 
arranged in that way, the sums of the numbers on each side will be equal
b. some type of situation xk in which footballers are placed = a type of 
situation yk such that, if footballers are put in that type of situation, there 
will be a possibility of serious injury
In  a  certain  sense,  these  nouns could  be  regarded  as  a  sort  of  place-holders 
formally providing internal such with the right type of argument. The result clause is 
essential to identifying the actual sub-type. Without it the  such  DP would be too 
unspecified to be informative in any significant way. We conjecture that this can also 
explain why these nouns are harder to use with  such  in exclamatives.  There the 
consequence is not explicitly mentioned, but is left implicit. As a result, the sub-type 
seems to remain (too) unspecified. If exclamatives involve the speaker's emotional 
155 Possibly indicative in this sense are also the types of discourse in which these occur most frequently: 
administrative, legal, technical, mathematical, religious.
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attitude towards the salient sub-type picked by internal such, then this would be hard 
to express in relation to a highly abstract, unspecified sub-type. (see §3.5 for more 
on the exclamative use of internal such structures)
In triggering sub-types that are primarily defined (and distinguished) by their 
consequences, situations differ from regular individuals. Individuals can be divided 
into sub-kinds based on a variety of possible criteria, but these are always properties  
that individuals may exhibit. Individuals do not have consequences per se, hence 
consequences  are  not  available  to  distinguish  between  different  sub-kinds,  and 
ordinary (individual-denoting) nouns are normally incompatible with result clauses, 
as  illustrated  again  in  (38)a.  This  difference  in  sub-types  of  situations  being 
identified, even defined, by their consequences vs. individuals being identified and 
distinguished  by  properties  that  characterize  them  possibly  correlates  with  a 
difference  in  the  tendency  to  use  result  clauses  vs.  relative  clauses  (or  other 
modifiers) to qualify situations and individuals respectively.156
(38) a. *He is such a person that I cannot trust him.
b. He is {such a/ the kind of} person that would make anyone trust him as 
soon as they meet him.
Interestingly,  there  are  cases  where  the  participation  of  a  certain  type  of 
individual in a certain situation may have consequences. This can license the use of 
ordinary nouns like person/people with result clauses.
(39) a. I found myself surrounded by such circumstances and such people that I 
knew not whom to trust.157
b. The current president is surrounded by such people that we have lost faith 
in him.
Not knowing what to do in  (39)a, and the loss of faith in the current president in 
(39)b are not consequences of the individuals in question simply being (some sub-
type of) people. Rather it is the situation as a whole, that of being surrounded by 
people  of  a  certain  type,  that  entails  that  consequence.  It  is  in  virtue  of  being 
participants in a situation (hence, one of the parameters that make up the situation) 
that  individuals  may  be  related  to  consequences,  which  can  then  (indirectly) 
distinguish between different sub-kinds of individuals. The interpretation of these 
such  DPs could  then  be  understood as: 'a  sub-type  of  N  such  that  if  the  event 
contains instantiations of that sub-type as participants then [result clause]'. In (47b),  
for example, it is that sub-kind of people that, when/if a president is surrounded by 
them, will cause the public to lose faith in that president. It is in this way that the use 
156 As noted in §2.3, the noun kind (or similar nouns, like sort etc.) may also be used in correlation with 
relative clauses, as illustrated in (i). The noun kind is then responsible for introducing the kind reading; 
note also that these are the usual (sub-)kinds, that can be obtained with any noun; they are not salient sub-
types that need to be identified by natural consequences.
(i) a. He is the sort of person that I just cannot trust.
b. They were the kind of women who were not easily forgotten. 
For an analysis of kind see Carlson (1977), Wilkinson (1995), Zamparelli (1998).
157 Adapted from http://www.state.il.us/HPA/facsimiles.htm 
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of result clauses with ordinary nouns becomes possible,  with the situation/ event 
playing an essential role.
Still, in (39) such modifies the ordinary, individual-denoting noun people, while 
normally  it  cannot  be  used  with  this  type  of  nouns  because  they  fail  to  make 
available  potentially  distinct  inherent  sub-types.  In  addition,  if  the  result  clause 
expresses a consequence of the whole situation as discussed above, then such seems 
to  be  located,  in  surface  structure,  at  a  lower  level  than  the  one  at  which  the 
consequence-entailing entity is computed, i.e. the eventuality. Semantically, this can 
be defined by using a neo-Davidsonian notion of event in a broad sense (cf. e.g. de 
Swart 1991), and, in syntactic terms, it would roughly correspond to the vP, or even 
the whole proposition which contains the such DP (e.g. de Swart 1991 takes sets of 
eventualities to correspond to the denotation of a proposition). In order to be related 
to the eventuality, [such + result clause] would need to have scope over this larger 
constituent containing the DP. This means that such (or the whole DP) would need to 
raise  and  adjoin  to  the  top  node  of  this  constituent.  In  the  literature  on  degree 
phrases, which is the context in which result clauses have been investigated, it is in 
fact  widely assumed that  elements  like  so,  too etc.  are operators  which undergo 
Quantifier Raising (QR) at LF (Rouveret 1978, Guéron and May 1984, Heim 2000, 
Meier 2003, Bhatt and Pancheva 2004 etc.). The result clause will also be located 
there, either following movement or by being generated in that position, depending 
on the approach one takes (for the former view, cf. Rouveret 1978, Guéron and May 
1984, Meier 2003 etc.; and for the latter: Bhatt and Pacheva 2004)158.  In addition, 
such  + result clauses have been shown to be possibly attached higher than the CP 
containing the degree phrase: they can scope out of complement clauses of bridge 
verbs (cf. Rouveret 1978, Guéron and May 1984, Meier 2003 a.o.). For example, a 
sentence such as (40) is supposed to be ambiguous between two readings: one where 
the fact that Bertha is going to get the job is a result of her having claimed she has 
influential friends, and a second one where Bertha says that she is going to get the 
job because she has influential friends.159
(40) Bertha said that she has such influential friends that she is going to get the 
job.
The two readings are accounted for by assuming that such + result clause can move 
into two different scope positions: in one case it will be adjoined all the way to the 
matrix CP above the verb said, and in the other it will only move up to the level of 
the embedded CP, hence below the verb said. Such long movement seems not to be 
possible in non-bridge contexts160.  (41), for example, is unambiguous and only has 
the narrow scope reading:
(41) Bertha whispered that she has such influential friends that she is going to get 
the job.
158 See Rijkhoek (1998) for a different type of account, namely in terms of conjunction.
159 The example in is from Meier (2003) who adapts it from Rouveret (1978).
160 Although result clauses seem to be able to violate (certain) island constraints as discussed in the 
extraposition analyses of result clauses (cf. Guéron and May 1984)
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Meier (2003) concludes that LF-movement of such patterns with wh-LF movement 
and quantifier movement (though Rouveret 1978 discusses differences between the 
contexts that allow extraction of wh-elements vs. of so-result clause). 
We will also assume that some raising mechanism is involved, whereby such can 
achieve the necessary scope. Such raises at least to vP level, and possibly higher, as 
suggested by the wider scope possibilities illustrated above. As for the result clause,  
we  adopt  the  late-merge  analysis  proposed  by  Bhatt  and  Pancheva  (2004);  this 
seems to be supported by the facts discussed here since the result clause would seem 
not to be interpretable at a lower level, e.g. within the such DP. On such an account, 
the subordinate clause is merged late, by countercyclic merger, in the position where 
such has been QR-ed covertly; it can, therefore, end up at different heights in the 
tree, depending on the scopal position of  such. The lowest position where  [such + 
result clause] can be interpreted is vP, as  it is at that level that a salient sub-type 
defined by a natural consequence that its participation in a situation can have may be 
constructed.
We have seen that (such +) result clause needs to have scope over the eventuality 
since  consequences  have  to  follow  from  situations.  Therefore,  a  mechanism  of 
raising such + result clause seems to be necessary. However, this mechanism is not 
sufficient. If raising could be enough to satisfy the requirements of  such  + result 
clause,  then they would be expected to be possible whenever the right syntactic 
conditions for such movement are met. Therefore,  they would be expected to be 
much more generally available than they are in fact (i.e. also in the ungrammatical 
examples above which, with the exception of the nominal content, are syntactically 
identical  to  the  grammatical  examples).  This  is  where  the  particular  semantic 
requirements we have proposed internal such + result clause place come in, namely 
the requirements in terms of the sub-type that can be selected (which makes the type 
of nominal used essential) and at which level of the structure. Therefore, it is at the 
latest at the level of the situation that a salient, inherent sub-type must be available,  
which can be defined by the consequence that follows from their participation in a 
situation.
Result  clauses  seem  to  be  looser  from  but,  at  the  same  time,  also  more 
intrinsically tied to the matrix (DP) they are associated with. From a syntactic point  
of view, they are more independent (see e.g. discussion in Guéron and May 1984, 
Rijkhoek 1998 etc.). Unlike comparatives,  as-clauses and relative clauses (at least 
on some accounts of the latter) which contain gaps corresponding to elements in the  
matrix CP so that e.g. the head noun participates in construing the denotation of the 
clause, result clauses contain no gaps to be related to elements in the matrix clause 
which would thus take part in the interpretation of the result clause itself. From a  
purely  interpretive  point  of  view,  however,  there  is  a  tight  logical  connection 
between  result  clauses  and  their  matrix:  they  express  natural  consequences,  i.e. 
consequences which necessarily follow from the very nature of the individual as a 
participant in a given situation, and by that come to intrinsically define the sub-type 
of individual.  As-clauses, on the other hand, may be used to identify sub-kinds by 
comparison, i.e. similarity, to other realizations of the kind. They supply restrictions 
by 'exemplification' of the same kind. Recall from §2.2 that Carlson (1977) takes the 
function of these clauses to be that of exemplifying the kind. A phrase like  such 
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women as we saw yesterday (cf. example  (22)a) is the set of properties associated 
with any object that is a realization of a kind (represented by the free variable xk), 
which is  woman in this particular example; in addition, the interpretation of  xk is 
further restricted by the presence of the  as-clause:  xk can only be assigned a value 
from the domain of kinds such that it is not only some kind of woman, but also a 
kind of woman that we saw yesterday (for more details see Carlson 1977; for a 
different analysis see Landman 2006).
Note  also  that  the  mechanism illustrated  above  is  restricted:  simply  being  a 
participant in a situation is generally not enough to (automatically) license use of 
internal such + result clause with ordinary, individual-denoting nouns. In (42) below, 
just like in  (28)a/(38)a above, the NPs do not have readily available, salient sub-
types which could then be associated with consequences:
(42) a. *They {met/ talked to} such people that they didn't know what to do.
b. *The apartment had such windows that we bought it. 
It seems then that, in the absence of a noun that can provide the right sort of 
salient sub-types, there are certain factors which may facilitate this use. One possible 
factor is the choice of the verb, which may give a hint as to what types to expect  
(also possibly related to the actual role the participant plays in the event) and thus 
would  allow  identifying  a  sub-type  by  means  of  a  consequence  related  to  the 
situation in  which the individual  is  a  participant  –  e.g.  being surrounded by  vs. 
meeting or talking to. Another may have to do with the type of statement at stake:  
generalizations seem to make this use more easily possible. One can come across 
(though quite rarely) examples of ordinary nouns with such accompanied by a result 
clause even in predicative position, i.e. in a context where not much is provided in  
terms of a situation in which the referent of the such DP would be a participant, and 
by that could have some bearing on the consequences of the state of affairs:
(43) a. There are such people that to think of a world without them is 
inconceivable. 
b. Among you are such people that if they raise their hands and swear by 
God, He grants them whatever they want... 
Such generic statements seem to facilitate a definitional  use of the result  clause. 
What  the result  clause expresses contributes  in  fact  to delineating a sub-kind of 
individuals, and there is a sense that it is somehow related to, or follows from, some 
intrinsic quality of people.
More work is needed in order to make the conditions under which such uses are 
possible more precise. But we think the direction suggested here is promising. It 
offers a way to capture a class of cases which a degree analysis of such and result 
clauses would not be able to account for. What has also emerged is that the whole 
situation or event expressed by the main clause is relevant and needs to be taken into 
account. In addition, the compatibility of the nouns considered in this sub-section 
with result clauses is related to the definition-like use, and the fact that sub-types can 
be identified, even defined, by consequences ('natural' consequences).
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3.4 Case III: stereotypical nouns
The third class of nouns that are compatible with internal  such  and result clauses 
consists  of  nouns that  receive stereotypical  interpretations.  It  will  be shown that 
these are not gradable meanings and, therefore,  they cannot be account for by a 
degree approach to  such  and result  clauses.  The analysis we have proposed can, 
however, be easily extended to cover these cases as well. Before showing how these 
nouns make available salient sub-types that can be related to natural consequences, 
let us first clarify what type of meaning is involved in these cases.
3.4.1 Background – stereotypical interpretations
Consider the examples in (44) and (45) below (partly repeated from (3) in section 1): 
they  show  that  the  use  of  such  as  an  exclamative  and  with  result  clauses, 
respectively,  is  also  available  with  nouns  which  receive  stereotypical  (often 
figurative) interpretations. These nouns were seen to fail other gradability tests, and, 
as such, raised questions concerning the viability of such as a gradability test, which 
was one of the facts that prompted the investigation carried out in this chapter.
(44) a. He is such a linguist! (he'd ask for grammaticality judgments even while 
the plane he's on is being hijacked!)
b. Johnny is such a boy!
c. Julie is such a boy!
d. Their new place is such a palace!
e. Those '50s Cadillacs were such boats! (you couldn't ride in them for a 
few minutes without getting sick!)
(45) a. But I'm such a linguist that I'd start subconsciously mimicking the sounds 
they'd make.
b. Johnny is such a boy that he can't even stand the sight of his sister's dolls!
c. Julie can't wear nylons or tights. She's such a boy that she rips and snags 
everything!
d. Their new place is such a palace that everyone is envious!
e. Those '50s Cadillacs were such boats that you couldn't ride in them for a 
few minutes without getting sick!
In all of these examples reference is made to properties stereotypically associated 
with a certain property or kind, namely the one normally denoted by the N modified 
by such: properties stereotypically associated with being a linguist, a boy, a palace, 
or a boat. This is what we call the stereotypical interpretation of nouns. 
This interpretation is in fact also available elsewhere. The examples below are 
acceptable  under  a  stereotypical,  figurative  interpretation  of  the  non-modified 
predicate noun:
(46) a. Julie is a boy.
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b. Their new place is a palace.
This is a type of interpretation that has been noted in the literature on bare nouns. It  
has been observed that in certain Romance and Germanic languages (though not in 
English),  certain  classes  of  nouns,  usually  those  denoting  professions  or  other 
functions or roles, can be used as bare predicate nominals, while other nouns (e.g.  
those denoting human sub-kinds, or other sorts of objects) need the indefinite article 
in the singular. This is illustrated below for Dutch161:
(47) a. Henriëtte is (een) manager.
Henriëtte is  a manager
'Henriëtte is a manager.'
b. Henriëtte is *(een) vrouw.
Henriëtte is    a woman
'Henriëtte is a woman.'
When the nouns that  can be used as  bare  predicate  nominals  are used with the 
indefinite article, they may take on a different, figurative, interpretation. Thus, the 
version of  (47)a with the bare noun is interpreted as 'Henriëtte  is  a  manager by 
profession',  while  the  version  with  the  indefinite  article  attributes  to  Henriëtte 
properties  stereotypically  associated  with  being  a  manager,  though  she  is  not 
actually a manager professionally (cf. Beyssade and Dobrovie-Sorin 2005, de Swart, 
Zwarts and Winter 2007, Le Bruyn 2010 a.o.).
Thus, in these languages, for this class of nouns, the difference in interpretation, 
i.e. literal, profession vs. figurative, stereotypical interpretation, correlates with the 
absence vs. presence of the indefinite article in the predicative use of the nouns. For  
other  nouns,  and  for  all  nouns  in  English,  the  different  interpretations  are  not 
grammatically  distinguished  in  this  way.  It  seems  that  sometimes,  however,  a 
particular intonation and/or stress on the noun will be preferred, as it may facilitate 
the  figurative,  stereotypical  interpretation,  or  disambiguate  the  interpretation, 
especially if there may be ambiguity, or with nouns which are less usually employed 
with this type of interpretations (or if this meaning is not lexicalized, as one might  
claim for cases like clown or baby, for instance – cf. also discussion in chapter 4).
All this shows that this interpretation is found independently of  such. In other 
words, this is not a meaning that results from the application of  such  as  a degree 
operator  as  the usual  degree approach to  such  would have it  –  cf.  Matushansky 
(2002b) who treats these as cases of scalarity coercion, or Bolinger (1972, 1980) 
who  treats  them  as  gradable  (uses  of)  nouns.  In  fact,  these  are  not  gradable 
meanings. Consider  (46) above.  Julie and the place are said to have a (relatively 
large)  number  of  properties  stereotypically  associated  with  boys  and  palaces, 
respectively.  For  example,  in  the  case  of  'stereotypical  boys'  these  could  be  an 
observed preference for certain games or toys, negative attitude against others (e.g. 
toy-cars vs. dolls), lack of delicacy in behaviour or movements, lack of attention to 
detail in outfit, wearing pants vs. skirts, and so on and so forth. But on the basis of 
these properties it is not  really possible to say to what degree Julie is a boy or to 
161 Example (47)a is from de Swart, Zwarts and Winter (2007).
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what degree the place is  a  palace.  The sort  of ordering we know from gradable 
adjectives cannot be established on the domain of these nouns (on the stereotypical 
interpretation).162 First of all, the number of properties necessary for an individual to 
qualify as a stereotypical-N may vary. For an individual to belong to the set, it must  
have  one  or  more  such  stereotypical  properties  –  usually  it  is  a  relatively  large 
number, but in some cases one, very salient, property may be enough (e.g. climbing 
trees). Secondly, for those properties that are gradable, which is not necessarily the 
case, the degree to which they hold may vary. Moreover, the domain of these nouns 
is  defined  as  a  set  of  stereotypical  properties  that  may  be  partly  overlapping/ 
intersecting, i.e. not ordered among themselves e.g. by a part-whole relation, that 
would allow us to keep track of the relative positions of individuals in the domain 
either. Finally, the weight of the properties in deciding whether a given individual is, 
figuratively speaking, 'a boy' or 'a palace' may also vary (e.g. wearing pants might 
not be as important nowadays any longer). As a result, it is not clear how to establish 
an ordering on these domains.
Besides the fact that the stereotypical, figurative, interpretation described above 
can obtain independently of  such, it should also be noted that such interpretations 
seem to be easier to obtain with some nouns (e.g. clown, boy, palace, ballroom etc.) 
than with others (e.g.  president, professor,  building,  room etc.). This is presumably 
because  certain  objects  or properties are  not,  or  less,  readily  associated  with 
stereotypical properties; most people would have no opinion about such objects  or 
properties in terms of their stereotypical character. This is the case of titles such as 
president, professor etc., for example, which have rigid criteria for inclusion (hence: 
*He's  such a professor of  French Linguistics at  Leiden University.).  An extreme 
case,  where  such  stereotypical  properties  seem  to  be  completely  absent,  is,  for 
instance, that of general concepts like person, or concrete objects with very specific 
purposes like  chair,  table, room etc., which have few salient characteristics. As a 
consequence,  such nouns will  not  readily give rise to  the intended interpretation 
when used predicatively (i.e. (48) below can only have the literal interpretation), and 
will also not be grammatical with such as exclamatives or with result clauses:
(48) a. This (man) is a person.
b. This (object) is a table.
(49) a. *This man is such a person!
b. *This is such a table!
(50) a. *This man is such a person that I cannot trust him.
b. *This object is such a table that we have no use for it in the bathroom. 
Or take linguist, for example (cf. (44)a and (45)a above): it would probably be easily 
used in this way only by someone belonging to or very familiar with the linguistics 
community, outside of which it is rather hard to have stereotypical images associated 
162 If one was to assume an ordering on the basis of typicality (in the sense of Sassoon 2007a, and as also 
suggested by the paraphrases used by Matushansky 2002b), then these nouns would not differ from e.g.  
bird or boy in their literal meaning, contrary to fact – see more discussion on this point in §3.4.2.
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with being a linguist (which is not a profession as well-known or recognizable as 
that of lawyer or clown for instance). In addition, some concepts will naturally be 
associated with more, and others with fewer, stereotypical properties. Compare, for 
instance, boy and boat illustrated in (44)b,c,e and (45)b,c,e: for the former one can 
think up a plethora of such associated properties, as seen above, while for the latter 
the number is rather low (probably only size/ shape and a particular way of moving).
This also shows that it is stereotypes and not prototypes that play a role in these 
cases. Chairs may well have prototypes, and different objects may be evaluated with 
respect to their similarity to such prototypes (cf. Kamp and Partee 1995, Sassoon 
2007a a.o.), but they still do not license the uses discussed here. 
If stereotypicality is what is involved, the kind of variation described above is 
expected. As briefly pointed out in chapter 1, world knowledge plays a role, and 
may influence the availability of the relevant type of interpretations for different 
nouns. As discussed in a different connection by McCready and Ogata (2007), the 
availability of such interpretations depends on "the speaker's notion about how a 
particular  property  is  normally,  or  at  least  how it  should  normally  be,  realized 
according to the speaker or his cultural context". Individual and cultural variation is 
to be found, expectedly, since the exact set of properties that an individual takes to  
be typical of a given class is not necessarily the same as what other people believe to 
be typical of that class.
Finally, recall another point made in chapter 1 in comparing examples  (44)a,b 
and (45)a,b, where the individual is also an actual N, with the other examples in (44) 
and  (45),  where  the  subject  DP is  not  an  actual N and the  sentence  contains  a 
predicate used figuratively that attributes stereotypical, non-essential properties of N 
to that  individual.  This shows that  while a  figurative use implies  a  stereotypical 
interpretation,  the  reverse  does  not  hold:  a  stereotypical  interpretation  does  not 
necessarily imply a figurative use. Nothing excludes that in the domain covered by 
the stereotypical interpretation of a noun N there will also be individuals that are 
actual  Ns,  as  long  as  they  exhibit  the  required  type  of  properties  too,  i.e. 
stereotypical properties associated with the kind.
3.4.2 The  interpretation  of  stereotypical  nouns  with  internal 
such and result clauses
So far we have established what  the stereotypical  interpretation is,  and that  it  is 
available independently of  such. Now let us see how exactly this type of meaning 
interacts with internal such and result clauses so as to make their use possible, as in 
(44) and (45) above.
On the stereotypical interpretation, the N denotes a set of (individuals that have)  
properties which are stereotypically associated with being N. Gradable nouns were 
shown to be compatible with internal  such because they easily prompt salient sub-
types delineated by a high degree of the property included in their meaning, and 
these sub-types can be defined by natural consequences that they entail. In the case 
of stereotypical  nouns, it  is the different stereotypical properties contained in the 
meaning of these nouns (i.e. those properties that qualify individuals as stereotypical 
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Ns) that will be used to inherently define and differentiate sub-types in their domain, 
and thus make available salient sub-types that can be defined by consequences that 
they  naturally  entail.  This  will  be  the  default  criterion  based  on  which,  in  the 
absence of any other explicit criteria, sub-types can naturally be distinguished within 
the respective kind. For example, in the case of 'stereotypical boys' there could be 
individuals who strongly prefer playing with toy-cars, or individuals who are not 
very delicate in behaviour or movements etc. These various stereotypical properties 
delineate possibly different sub-types of 'stereotypical boys'.163
Note that these natural sub-types are distinct or potentially distinguishable from 
one another but they are not (necessarily) disjoint. This is because, as discussed in 
§3.4.1, the domain of these nouns consists of clusters/ sets of possibly intersecting 
properties (or sets of individuals).  If  each of these potentially partly overlapping 
properties  may delineate 'natural  sub-types'  that  internal  such  picks out,  then the 
respective sub-types will also be potentially partly overlapping. In this respect, these 
sub-types differ from the sub-kinds that are usually discussed in the literature on 
kinds, since there it is assumed that all sub-kinds of a kind must be disjoint (Carlson  
1977 and much subsequent work): no object may belong to two different sub-kinds 
of the same kind. 
The  requirement  to  make  potentially  distinct  salient sub-types  available  also 
explains the exclusion of core, definitional properties of N as possible criteria for 
defining sub-types that  would be  selected  by internal  such.  These  are  properties 
which all individuals satisfying N must have (e.g. 'male up to the age of 14' for boy, 
or  'having feathers,  being able to  fly  etc.'  for  bird  etc.). Consequently,  they will 
always fail  to discriminate among sub-types of  N.  In addition, it  is  not  just  any 
(cognitively) salient sub-kind that will do, as already pointed out in §3.1; it must be 
one that is identifiable by a natural consequence.  This is why internal  such  is not 
grammatical with 'ordinary' nouns on their basic, literal interpretation: they  fail to 
make  available  inherently  distinct  salient  sub-types  that  can  be  associated  with 
natural consequences which internal such could single out within the domain of the 
N. This relates to the already noted lack of prototypical interpretations with internal 
such:
(51) a. *This robin is such a bird!
b. *This is such a {table/ chair}!
Reconsider in this context, examples  (44)a,b and  (45)a,b. In chapter 1 we already 
argued against assigning such examples a prototypical interpretation, as sometimes 
claimed in the literature (cf. Bolinger 1972, Matushansky 2002b) and pointed out 
that if one allowed for such an interpretation, it would be hard to explain why not  
just  any  noun  that  denotes  (a  set  of)  objects  which  come  with  prototypes  or 
prototypical examples, but which lack stereotypical associations, (e.g. bird etc.), can 
be  used  with  internal  such (e.g.  (51)).  The  apparent  difference  in  interpretation 
163 This shows that such figurative interpretations are relevant to the compositional semantics – internal  
such would not be able to apply to the literal meaning of these nouns. This means that (at least certain  
types of) metaphor need to be computed in the grammar, at the sub-propositional level, as they participate  
in  truth  conditions  and  well-formedness  conditions,  and  cannot  be  accounted  for  in  a  (neo-)gricean 
approach to metaphor.
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between examples  like  (44)a,b  and  (45)a,b,  on  the  one  hand,  and  (44)c,d,e  and 
(45)c,d,e, on the other hand, stems from an independent difference concerning the 
individuals they are predicated of. In the former, the individual referred to by the 
subject DP is already an actual N (i.e. has the core, definitional properties of N, such 
as the respective job in the case of linguist) and, in addition, such an N attributes this 
individual stereotypical, non-essential properties usually associated with being an N. 
This  conspiracy  of  factors  makes  the  respective  individual  look  like  the  perfect 
exemplar  of  the  category  denoted  by  the  N,  leading  to  a  prototypical-like 
interpretation. In the latter, the nouns are used figuratively; the individual denoted by 
the subject DP is not actually an N, and the sentence will only contain a predicate 
that attributes stereotypical, non-essential properties of N to that individual.
The salient sub-types in the domain of a stereotypical N can be associated with  
natural  consequences,  which,  in  turn,  can  be  used  to  identify  the  sub-types  in 
question. Consider for example the sentences in  (45), some of which are repeated 
below for convenience:
(45) b. Johnny is such a boy that he can't even stand the sight of his sister's dolls!
c. Julie can't wear nylons or tights. She's such a boy that she rips and snags 
everything!
d. Their new place is such a palace that everyone is envious!
A building having stereotypical properties of a palace may naturally be associated 
with certain emotional reactions it generally gives rise to, such as admiration or envy 
etc. Similarly for (45)c, where one of the properties stereotypically associated with 
being a boy is clumsiness or carelessness with respect to outfit  etc. Hence, one's 
being a stereotypical boy of this sub-type can have as a natural consequence ripping 
and  snagging  things.  In  sum,  in  all  of  the  examples  in  (45),  result  clauses  are 
possible  due  to  the  availability  of  a  set  of  possible  natural  consequences 
corresponding to some natural sub-type of the kind of stereotypical-N individuals. 
This accounts for the difference in acceptability between examples like (45)b,c and 
an example like the following:
(52) *He's such a boy that he wakes up at 8 every morning.
Waking up at 8 cannot be a natural consequence of someone simply being a (sub-
type of)  boy;  there  is  nothing inherent  to  being  a boy that  can  determine  one's 
waking up at 8. Given our world knowledge, waking up at 8 also cannot be naturally 
linked to any properties stereotypically associated with being a boy which it could a 
natural consequence of. Waking up at 8 every morning can, however, conceivably be 
a property that some, but not all, boys have. As such, it could in principle be used to 
distinguish between different types of boys. But in order for such a property, which 
is extraneous to the nature of being a boy (whether in the actual or stereotypical 
sense), to be possibly used to pick out a subset of the set denoted by the N, it must  
be added, and introduced into the structure at a level where it can intersect with the  
denotation of the NP, i.e. as a modifier – e.g. as a relative clause:
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(53) He's (such) a boy that wakes up at 8 every morning. 
Note  that  stereotypicality  is  also  the  source  of  the  apparent  (high)  degree 
interpretation  such  DPs containing stereotypical nouns have been claimed to have. 
On the one hand, if the stereotypical properties happen to be gradable, then they are 
usually to a high degree as these will be most salient or make individuals stand out  
in the domain. On the other hand, stereotypical status is based on (conventionalized) 
generalizations  about  properties  that  are  viewed  as  characteristically  and 
prominently associated with a certain kind, so that they distinguish it  from other 
kinds, even though they do not define the essence of the kind the way core, essential  
properties do. In addition, the use of such DPs is generally triggered by the presence 
in a context of particularly salient, discriminatory properties which, in the speaker's 
opinion, identify or justify identifying the individual in question as a sub-type of the 
respective  kind,and  this  may  come  as  an  emotionally  charged  qualification,  as 
possibly indicated by intonation – cf. discussion in §3.5. As noted in the discussion 
of  gradable  nouns  too,  the  content  of  the  result  clause  can  also  contextually 
influence the interpretation, and make it look like high degree. Take examples like 
(45)b,c,d  where  the  result  clauses  themselves  contain  universal  quantifiers  or 
adverbs that give a sense of intensification (e.g.  everyone, everything,  even  etc.). 
Such "extraordinary" consequences are likely to be interpreted as resulting from an 
"extraordinary"  situation  or  property,  which  may be  mistaken  for  a  high  degree 
interpretation. In sum, several factors may manipulate the interpretation in such a 
way as to make it at first sight describable in terms of (high) degree, while, in fact,  
degree plays no role here, and the meaning of the stereotypical N itself, on which 
such  operates, is not gradable. The individuals in its domain, or the stereotypical  
properties for that matter, are not inherently ordered by possibly differing degrees of 
a property, as is the case with gradable expressions.
3.4.3 Stereotypicality and gradable nouns
Before going on to a discussion of some additional aspects of the interpretation of  
internal  such,  we  would  like  to  add  a  note  concerning  the  relevance  of 
stereotypicality for gradable nouns. Stereotypical properties can be associated with 
being an idiot, a genius, or a jazz-enthusiast. And even in the case of an abstract  
mass  noun  like  courage,  one  could  imagine  stereotypical  acts  of  courage,  or 
stereotypical images associated with being courageous  or with courageous people. 
This means that gradable nouns can also receive a stereotypical interpretation of the 
type just described. Consequently, when internal such is used with gradable nouns, 
two interpretations are in principle possible:  such  can pick out a salient sub-type 
inherently distinguished either by the high degree of the property intrinsic to the  
lexical meaning of the noun, or by some stereotypical property/ies that define the 
domain of the noun on the stereotypical interpretation. 
One might object that there seems to be a difference between these cases and the 
ones  discussed  previously  (i.e.  the  ones  illustrated  in  (44)-(45))  in  that  when 
predicating an N like idiot etc. of an individual, one will not merely attribute to that 
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individual  properties  stereotypically  associated  with  being  an  idiot.  They will 
generally say  that  the  individual  is  actually  an  idiot,  in  the  sense  of having the 
defining property of the category, idiocy. In other words, it seems that such nouns 
cannot be used purely figuratively. However, as already pointed out, a stereotypical 
interpretation does not necessarily imply a figurative use. In addition, there may be a 
difference in what comes to be considered to be stereotypical of e.g. boys or boats 
vs.  idiots,  or rather in the relation between stereotypical properties and the basic  
meaning of the nouns. In the case of boys, stereotypical images will refer to certain 
types of behaviour that boys (are generally thought to) display (such as playing with 
cars and disliking dolls etc.). Such images are based on generalizations of (observed) 
behaviour which individuals that belong to the kind boy happen to exhibit. But they 
may also be displayed by individuals that do not, by definition, belong to the actual 
kind boys. (Similarly for boats: any stereotypical properties one may think of are 
related to characteristics that the objects belonging to this kind normally display, 
such as  a  particular  way of  moving,  or,  possibly,  a  certain shape  or  size.)  Such 
stereotypical properties are, then, in a sense, properties that are accidental to the kind 
they are associated with. In the case of idiot, or, similarly, genius or jazz enthusiast, 
however,  any  properties  one  may  stereotypically  associate  with  the  kind  are 
necessary consequences of being an idiot, i.e. of the property that in fact defines this 
kind (as a sub-kind of human beings). As such, they cannot exist independently of 
this property,  in the sense that  their presence necessarily implies (or evokes) the 
existence of the basic property (e.g. idiocy). Examples like He's such an idiot will be 
uttered when someone shows behaviour stereotypically associated with idiots; but it 
is not likely that  this sentence may be used without implying anything about  the 
person's  intelligence  (e.g.  'he's  a  type  of  idiot/  person  that  cannot  tie  his  shoes 
properly' but still 'not actually characterized by idiocy').164
3.5 Speaker opinion and the exclamative use 
3.5.1 Speaker opinion in the absence of overt result
So far we have been focusing on cases of internal such + result clause. However, as 
already noted at various points, the result clause need not be overtly present. The 
consequence may be left implicit. This is what happens in the exclamative use of 
internal  such  structures. It is to an examination of these uses that we turn in this 
section. We will show that the fact that the consequence which identifies the sub-
type is absent and needs to be somehow recovered and added from the context of 
utterance results in an evidential  flavour,  whose linguistic relevance can be seen 
from  the  interaction  of  internal-such  DPs  with  epistemic  and/or  evidential 
expressions that occur in the same sentence.
Sentences  containing  internal  such  DPs  +  result  clauses  can  be  embedded, 
reported, and are even compatible with inference. The examples below illustrate the 
last point, i.e. the possibility to embed them under the epistemic verb seem and the 
epistemic modal may (very well). 
164 Nouns like genius etc. can be used ironically, of course, but that is still a different type of use. 
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(54) a. It seems he's such an idiot that he can't get any job done properly.
b. He may (very well) be such an idiot that we cannot hire him.
 
Internal  such  DPs used in the absence of an overt result clause interact differently 
with epistemic and/or evidential expressions that occur in the same sentence, as will 
be shown below.
Internal-such  DPs  without  overt  result  clauses  are  best  when  used  in  direct 
assertions, where the speaker is the attitude/opinion-holder. But clauses containing 
such  DPs may also be embedded under reporting verbs, under the factive verb  to  
know, under attitude verbs, as well as under some verbs expressing certain mental  
processes  like  to  conclude, as  illustrated  in  (55).  They are  also compatible with 
perspective markers and with hearsay expressions used parenthetically, as illustrated 
in (56).165 
(55) a. I've heard the new manager is such a jerk.
b. Everybody knows he's such a clown!
c. I think he's such a pedant!
d. I find he's such an idiot. 
(56) a. In my opinion, he's such an idiot!
b. He's such an idiot, {(or so) they say/ I've heard/ I hear}.
The examples in (55)c,d with the attitude verbs to think and to find are equally 
acceptable, as both verbs are interpreted as introducing an opinion. However, when 
the verbs are used parenthetically, there is a contrast in acceptability:
(57) He's such an idiot, {I find/ ?I think}.
This is because find is simply interpreted as expressing an opinion (based on more or 
less direct experience of what is evaluated), while in the parenthetical use of think 
the inferential meaning of the verb is most prominent (i.e. 'probably, but not sure').166 
This contrast is sharper in Dutch, where the corresponding verbs vinden and denken 
are more clearly specialized and differentiated in meaning:167,168
165 For  some  speakers  there  is  some  clash  in  register  between  expressions  like  in  my  opinion,  or 
according to X, and the sentence containing a such DP as they feel that the former are of a more formal 
register than the latter. Otherwise, the examples are completely acceptable.
Some speakers report that even examples like (55), where the such DP is part of a report (where the 
origo of the evaluation is not the speaker) or where an attitude or thinking verb like to think or to find is 
used (which have a weaker assertive force), are somewhat marked. This suggests that, for these speakers, 
such DPs very strongly convey a direct evaluation by the speaker.
166 Note that contrastive focus on I  makes the example more acceptable, presumably because it brings 
again to the fore the attitude meaning of the verb, and the sentence is interpreted as expressing the opinion 
of the speaker as contrasted with potentially different opinions.
167 A similar contrast exists in French between the verbs trouver and penser.
168 We use capital letters for zo'n in the Dutch examples to indicate stress, which excludes the possible 
'you know what type/ one of those Ns'-reading (on which the examples improve significantly).
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(58) Jan is ZO'N idioot, {vind ik/ ??denk ik}.
Jan is such.an idiot   find I/    think I
'Jan is such an idiot, I find/ ?I think .'
Finally,  when using  a  modal  like  may (very  well), an  epistemic  adverb  (e.g. 
probably), the epistemic verb seem (especially when used parenthetically),169 or the 
verb suppose,170 the examples are clearly more degraded. Similar, even clearer, facts 
obtain in Dutch when the exclusively inferential modal expression consisting of the 
modal  zullen  'shall'  and  the  particle  wel,  is  used,  as  illustrated  in  (60).171 This 
contrasts with the facts illustrated in (54) above where the such DP is accompanied 
by an overt result clause.
(59) a. ?It seems that the new director is such a jerk.
b. ?He's such an idiot, it seems.
c. ??He may very well be such an idiot!
d. ??I suppose Mary's new boyfriend is such an idiot! (her boyfriends always 
are) 
(60) *Jan zal wel ZO'N idioot zijn.
  Jan shall PRT such.an idiot be
  'Jan would be such an idiot.'
These facts suggest  that  for  the exclamative use of internal-such  DPs (in the 
absence of an overt result clause) to be felicitous, an agent has to be present as the 
source of the opinion conveyed by means of the qualification expressed by these 
DPs. This relation between the speaker-oriented, evidential meaning component and 
the exclamative use of these structures (which correlates with the lack of an overt 
result clause) may be understood as follows. Result clauses have been argued here to 
express natural consequences that identify, even define, the salient sub-type picked 
by such. They provide, therefore, the basis that justifies qualifying the individual in 
question as an instantiation of some (salient) sub-type of N.  In the presence of the 
result clause, the description is complete and not linked to or dependent on the actual 
context of utterance. Consequently, the clause can be embedded, reported, or even 
compatible  with  inference  to  some  extent.  If  the  consequence  is  not  explicitly 
expressed by means of a result clause, it is still implied, but needs to be recovered 
from the context  and added to the interpretation, which results  in the noted  and 
context-dependence and evidential flavour. On the one hand, the lack of an explicit 
169 However, the judgments here are not as clear-cut as one might wish because seem is not exclusively 
inferential,  but  may  also  be  interpreted  as  introducing  a  claim  based  on  hearsay  evidence.  On this  
interpretation of seem, the examples become acceptable since, as already shown, such DPs are compatible 
with hearsay.
170 Even when context is provided that makes reference to some sort of precedent for the expressed  
opinion. 
171 The examples in (59)-(60) would be fine if such was used anaphorically. (59)c, for instance, could be 
used as a reply to a question like the one in (i) below: 
(i) Q: Could he be such an idiot that he forgot his own birthday?
A: Well, yes, he may very well be such an idiot.
This is, however, not the kind of use we are interested in here.
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specification is responsible for the intuition that these internal-such DPs express the 
speaker's opinion, or some sort of direct, subjective evaluation. They tend to be used 
when there is a particularly salient property in the context of utterance which, in the 
speaker's opinion, qualifies (or justifies qualifying) the individual in question as a 
sub-type of the kind denoted by N. In other words, the interpretation is assigned with 
respect to the speaker's beliefs about certain properties which s/he takes as evidence 
qualifying an individual as instantiating a sub-type of N. On the other hand, this 
"suspension"  of  the  specification  makes  exclamatives  more  dependent  on,  or 
connected to, the speech situation, as it is the context that supplies (or helps one 
recover) the properties that justify the qualification or identify a given individual as  
an instance of  the sub-type picked by  such  in the speaker's  opinion. Non-verbal 
elements such as facial expressions, tone of voice, gestures etc. also play a role in  
identifying  the  speaker's  attitude  and  inferring  what  sub-type,  defined  by  what 
consequence, s/he might have in mind. As already noted, the result clause may not 
always  be  omitted,  as  in the  case  of  situation-type  nouns.  This  is  presumably 
because the sub-types supplied by these nouns are too abstract, unspecified without 
the consequence, which, as discussed in §3.4, defines them. On the one hand, this 
makes it harder for a speaker to have an attitude with respect to such sub-types (see  
also  discussion  in  next  sub-section);  on  the  other  hand,  too  much  specific 
information would need to be recovered. We conjecture this is why these nouns are 
not very good in exclamative uses of  internal  such, where an overt result clause is 
not present . 
To conclude, exclamative uses of internal  such DPs,  which lack an overt result 
clause, are more truly direct evaluations made by the speaker, which restricts their  
embedding possibilities, as well as their compatibility with expressions that mark the 
assertoric force of an utterance.172 The best possible option is when the speaker is the 
origo (as shown by their compatibility with e.g. direct experience), but cases where 
there is a reported speaker are also acceptable.  However, as soon as the claim is 
mediated  by inference,  the  examples  become degraded. In  sum, these  structures 
interact with evidentiality markers, and other expressions that bear on the status, i.e. 
force, of the assertion, in a way which suggests that they involve speaker (or rather: 
agent)  opinion  or beliefs  that  should be captured in  a  way akin to  epistemicity- 
and/or  evidentiality-related  meanings.173 We  will  not  attempt  to  offer  a  formal 
account  along  these  lines  here,  but  suggest  that  it  might  be  worth  pursuing  an 
account  such  as  that  put  forth  by  Marandin  (2008),  who  analyses  [French] 
exclamatives, including those containing [the French counterpart of] such, in terms 
of  direct  evidentiality.  The exclamative  uses  of  internal  such  DPs without  overt 
result clauses are also associated with a particular intonation. It is on this aspect that 
we will focus in the next sub-section.
172 Exclamatives are in general subject to restrictions when it comes to being embedded; however, the 
restrictions that are usually discussed concern factivity (Grimshaw 1979, Zanuttini and Portner 2003,  
Castroviejo-Miró 2006 a.o.)
173 Or in some other way that could capture/ incorporate agent beliefs (e.g. by indexation to the speaker). 
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3.5.2 Unexpectedness and prosodic realization
As mentioned in §2.1, it has been claimed in the literature that there is a difference 
in  stress  (stress  contour)  between  the  two  such's:  "degree"  (our  'internal')  such 
always bears a pitch accent, while kind (external) such may, but need not (Carlson 
1977, Landman 2006). This has been taken as yet another argument in favour of 
distinguishing between the two lexical items. However, the data we have collected 
seem to contradict this conclusion. More structured research is needed on this issue; 
experiments should be designed and carried out in order to find out whether the 
interpretation we have analysed as pertaining to internal such always correlates with 
a certain stress contour or prosodic pattern that is different from the one found with 
external  such, or whether, in case internal  such  only sometimes bears a particular 
type of stress, this correlates with any additional difference in interpretation. Still, 
the data we have so far do seem to suggest a certain pattern, which is worth further 
investigating. In this sub-section we will present some preliminary observations in 
this respect, and suggest an account. 
First of all, contrary to the claims generally made in the literature, our informants 
report no difference between examples containing internal such and those containing 
external  such: like external  such, internal  such  need not bear any particular stress/ 
pitch, though it may. In addition, the noun modified by internal  such  may also be 
stressed. It seems that this is the case especially (i) when dealing with stereotypical 
interpretations  of  nouns  which  are  not  very  well-established  and  the  intonation 
facilitates the desired interpretation,174 or (ii) when  such  itself already bears stress 
(and this spreads over to the noun). Finally, the rising contour typically associated 
with exclamative utterances in general also affects the intonation of internal-such 
DPs contained within such sentences.  As for the cases where  such  is stressed as 
compared to when it is not, speakers report this has an emphatic effect, or adds a 
sense of surprise.
We take  this  to  indicate  that  such  may be  associated  with  an  expression  of 
unexpectedness,  though this is  not  necessarily always present  with internal  such 
structures.175 This  may  be  analysed  in  terms  of  an  (additional  and  optional) 
"unexpectedness" marker.  In  proposing  this  unexpectedness  marker  (henceforth 
UNEXP), we build on a parallel that can be drawn with  wh-exclamatives and other 
expressions of surprise, unexpectedness, or markedness.176 This view is inspired by 
Nouwen's (2005, 2011a) approach to adverbs like  surprisingly,  unusually  etc. and 
174 Recall that a similar effect was noted in connection with the simple predicative use of stereotypical 
nouns.
175 The  question  arises  whether  this  can  in  fact  be  reduced  to  the  meaning  component  previously  
discussed, i.e. speaker opinion. Marandin (2008), in fact, takes such an approach, trying to capture all  
these effects by postulating a direct evidential operator, while Castroviejo-Miró (2010) includes various 
shades of emotion in the operator she proposes to account for wh-exclamatives.
176 Zanuttini and Portner (2003) argue that clauses with  so  and  such  are in fact declaratives, not true 
exclamatives (like wh-exclamatives, for instance). This is because (i) they may be embedded under non-
factive predicates such as think, hence they fail the factivity test; (ii) when embedded under amazing, this 
predicate can be negated and questioned, which indicates that the sentence lacks the scalar implicature of 
exclamatives; and (iii) they may serve as answers. Based on different criteria, however, other authors 
claim that such clauses are, in fact, true exclamatives (cf. Elliott 1974, Michaelis and Lambrecht 1996,  
Nelson 1997). 
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Castroviejo-Miró's (2010) and Rett's (2008a,b) accounts of wh-exclamatives. These 
are  constructions  which  "express  some  sort  of  markedness",  i.e.  that  pick  out 
elements that, "in some respect, stand out in their domain" (Nouwen 2005, 2011a).177 
In terms of its realization, UNEXP is similar to the operator proposed by Castroviejo-
Miró (2010) for wh-exclamatives, in the sense that its PF realization is a particular 
intonation, not an actual morpheme. However, it is different from it in two other 
respects.  First,  we  do  not  take  it  to  operate  at  the  propositional  level  (i.e.  on 
propositions or sets thereof), but to attach to  such  and have its same scope (recall 
that, as discussed in  §3.3, there are independent reasons for which  such  needs to 
raise, which results in a wider scope that just DP-level). Secondly, we do not define 
it as requiring by definition an ordered set (of propositions) to operate on, though it 
is compatible with one.178 So let us see how UNEXP interacts with the interpretation of 
internal  such  DPs. As noted in §3.1, §3.3 and §3.5.1,  situation-type nouns do not 
occur  in  exclamatives;  therefore,  we only have  the other  two types of  nouns to 
address here, namely gradable nouns and stereotypical nouns. 
As discussed in §3.2,  when  internal such co-occurs with gradable nouns, the 
salient  type that  it picks out  is  one delineated by a high degree of  the property 
included in the meaning of the noun (and one that can be identified by a natural  
consequence, which is, however,  in this use left  implicit), e.g. the  big idiot-type. 
What  UNEXP adds is that it was not expected that  x  be an instantiation of that sub-
type. If x is a big idiot and that is surprising, and given that if he turned out to be a 
bigger idiot he would still be included in the set of big idiots, then if he turned out to 
be a bigger idiot, that would still be surprising. Inferences to a high(er) degree thus 
stem from the inclusion relations that hold among such sets.
When co-occurring with stereotypical  nouns,  UNEXP +  such will  single out an 
unexpected stereotypical property which makes the individual in question stand out, 
or rather it will say that a given individual is an instantiation of a salient sub-type 
delineated by a stereotypical property that was not expected to hold of the individual 
(in a certain context). No inferential patterns (based on inclusion relations between 
sets) of the type we have encountered with gradable nouns occur here, given the 
different structure of the domains associated with these nouns and the way sub-types 
are made available. They simply consist of clusters of possibly intersecting sets of 
stereotypical properties, which are not ordered within or among themselves (cf. §3.4 
for more discussion). Consider the following example repeated from above:
177 Note that the accounts referred to above analyse these as degree constructions. We only retain the 
unexpectedness/ markedness aspect and dissociate it from degree. We take the unexpectedness marker to  
attache to such, which is also not a degree operator in our account.
178 Nouwen (2005, 2011a), followed by Castroviejo-Miró (2010), shows, within a degree-based account, 
that unexpectedness is a downward monotonic (or upward scalar) function, which reverses the entailment 
patterns normally associated with expressions that are upward monotonic (or downward scalar). So while 
with a gradable adjective like tall, being tall to a certain degree entails being tall to all lower degrees too,  
when an adverb like unusually or surprisingly is added, the inferences are reversed and become, instead, 
upwards directed: John is amazingly tall entails that, if John had been taller, he would still be amazingly 
tall. In our proposal, monotonicity results from the type of sub-kind that is selected. If certain entailment 
patterns hold and lead to certain types of interpretations, they seem to be present independently of the  
contribution of this operator. For example, the inferences related to the big idiot-type, which also show up 
in  the  cases  with  result  clauses,  that  is,  in  the  absence  of  unexpectedness  (cf.  discussion  in  §3.2). 
Conversely, as will be shown below, stereotypical nouns do not give rise to this type of inferences.
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(61) Julie is such a boy!
This could be uttered if  Julie  displays some behaviour stereotypically  associated 
with being a boy – e.g. if she is seen playing with cars or climbing trees while the 
other girls are playing with dolls, or if she is clumsy or careless about her outfit 
(recall e.g.  (45)c) etc. – as long as the speaker  wants to insist on the unexpected 
character of  that  behaviour.  It  is not necessary that  it  be unexpected for Julie to 
behave  like  a  boy;  it  may  be  simply  that  she  just  did  (yet)  another  thing 
stereotypically associated with boy-behaviour which was not expected. For (44)c to 
be felicitous, Julie need not outrank other individuals in terms of the degree to which 
she is a stereotypical-boy. Nothing like that is implied. All that it takes for such an  
example to be felicitous is for her to display a stereotypical-boy property that was 
not  expected  to  hold  of  her.179 If  another  individual  were  to  display  the  same 
property  in  the  same  way,  it  would  not  automatically  mean  that  they  are 
stereotypical boys to the same degree. Therefore, what underlies the felicitous use of 
such examples is the (un)expectedness of a given individual to belong to a certain 
sub-kind, namely one delineated by the observed stereotypical property, rather than 
an established ordering of individuals in the domain of the stereotypical-N.180
Alternatively, it may be the case that, in a given context, an ordering may be 
imposed on stereotypical properties in relation to given individuals – an ordering 
with  respect  to  (un)expectedness  as  to  whether  some  properties  would  hold,  or 
which properties would hold, of individuals in certain contexts. This intuition could 
be captured if the unexpectedness marker itself were to introduce a scale, namely an 
unexpectedness scale. UNEXP would then be parallel to e.g. even-elements, which, at 
least on some accounts (Giannakidou 2007), are taken to induce an ordering along a 
likelihood scale, and to associate with the highest or lowest element on that scale. 
On this account, even-elements induce an ordering of individuals on the domain of a 
predicate P according to a likelihood scale and the even phrase will pick out the least 
or most likely individual(s) from the given set of alternatives, e.g. likelihood (P(x))  
>/< likelihood (P(y)). In a parallel way, UNEXP would force an ordering on the set of 
stereotypical properties relative to given individuals along an unexpectedness scale, 
i.e. according to the speaker's expectations.181 But note that simply introducing an 
ordering along a scale of unexpectedness is not enough, so the operator will also 
179 Also  irrespectively  of  whether  or  not  other  stereotypical  properties  [are  known to]  hold  of  that 
individual – hence, it cannot be the case either that individuals are (inherently) ordered by the number of  
stereotypical  properties  that  hold of them (in contrast,  such an interpretation may be  arrived at with  
expressions like more of an N – see §5.3.).
180 As discussed in §3.4.3, gradable nouns may also be associated with stereotypical interpretations. In 
that  case,  the  interaction  with  UNEXP would  be  along  the  lines  described  in  these  paragraphs  for 
stereotypical nouns.
181 So, differently from even-elements, which induce an ordering along a scale of likelihood with respect 
to the predicate of the clause, our operator will order the individuals with respect to a salient property P. 
Two types of ordering seem possible in the case of stereotypical nouns:
(i) different individuals will be ordered with respect to the same stereotypical property --- that is, the 
speaker is surprised that x has property P, but may find it not, or less, surprising if y had that property:
Unexpectedness Scale: {… P(z), P(y), P(x)...}
(ii) different possible properties are ordered as applying to the same individual --- i.e. the speaker is  
surprised that x has property P but would not be surprised if x displayed property Q:
Unexpectedness Scale: {… R(x), Q(x), P(x)...} 
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have  to  be  associated  with  the  higher  part  of  this  scale.  Consequently,  the 
unexpectedness marker, just like  even, would be a scalar item in the sense that it  
introduces a scale itself: it creates an ordering on an otherwise unordered set. But,  
importantly, this does not make it (or internal  such, to which it attaches) a degree 
operator since it does not depend on an inherent ordering of the individuals in a set.  
In other words, it does not (need to) operate on gradable expressions. 
3.6 Extension: [such A N] structures
In view of the proposal that  such  is not a degree operator, a question immediately 
arises. What does such modify when it occurs in DPs containing a gradable adjective 
(e.g. such strange theories): the whole NP or just the adjective? If the former view 
could be maintained, it would enable us to have a simpler and more uniform syntax 
and semantics for all cases. But this is not the view commonly taken. In this sub-
section, however, we will show that on the approach proposed here it becomes easy 
to analyse  such as modifying the whole NP in a way parallel to the simple noun 
cases discussed in §3.2.
The dominant view (in the literature on degree) with respect to the use of  such 
with NPs that contain adjectives, as in (62), is that such is a degree modifier of the 
adjective  (Bresnan  1973,  Matushansky  2002a,b,  Meier  2003  etc.)  but,  for  some 
reason, it needs to raise to the DP periphery, which obscures the syntactic relation 
between  such  and  the  adjective  (cf.  Bresnan  1973,  and  especially  Matushansky 
2002a a.o. for discussion of the movement involved).
(62) a. suchd [d-strange] theories
b. suchd a [d-strange] theory
The  semantic  relationship  between  such  as  a  degree  modifier  and  a  gradable 
adjective  can  be  easily  captured  –  and  it  has  been  in  the  context  of  works  on 
gradable adjectives and degree expressions that such proposals have been put forth. 
However, such an approach is not without problems. First of all,  such is only used 
with NPs, it cannot modify an adjective appearing on its own, e.g. in predicative 
position, without a noun (but see Bresnan 1973, Matushansky 2002a for suggestions 
as to how to approach this problem).182
(63) a. such an intelligent man 
182 Both accounts rely on the stipulation of specific syntactic or spell-out rules that are basically meant to 
change so into such. Bresnan proposes a syntactic transformation, Adj Shift, to derive such an A N from 
so A an N: so → such/__NP; this is accompanied by a shift that triggers the particular word order that we 
find with such. Matushansky (2002a) proposes that degree expressions like such/ so need to raise to the 
DP-periphery for reasons that have to do with type mismatches. The difference between the two items lies 
in the absence vs. presence of pied-piping: if pied-piping takes place, the element will be spelled out as 
so,  while  if  there  is  no  pied-piping,  it  will  be  spelled  out  as  such.  Leaving  aside  a  discussion  of 
problematic issues that arise on an analysis such as proposed by Bresnan, we will just mention that such  
accounts do not generalize to the cases where the DP does not contain an adjective, unless one wants to  
assume the presence of covert adjectives in the structure. This also poses problems as will be shown 
shortly.
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b. *such intelligent 
c. so intelligent
Secondly,  if  such  in  such  an  intelligent  man modifies  the  adjective,  but  it 
modifies  the  (gradable)  noun in  such  an  idiot,  then  we  need  to  make  a  further 
distinction between two degree  such's, at least from a syntactic point of view: one 
that  is  an ad-adjectival  modifier  and another  that  is  an adnominal modifier. The 
analysis can be unified by postulating some covert/ phonologically empty adjective 
in all cases where the so-called degree such co-occurs with a gradable noun: such an 
ADJ idiot.  However, at least two problems arise on this view. First, stereotypical 
nouns  are  generally  not  compatible  with  adjectives  on  this  interpretation,  as 
illustrated in (64)a. Secondly, if covert adjectives were generally available, then why 
would  they  not  be  able  to  rescue  internal-such  DPs  containing  ordinary,  non-
gradable and non-stereotypical nouns, as illustrated in (64)b?
(64) a. #Their new place is (such) a {beautiful/ amazing} palace. 
b. *He is such a __ person that I cannot trust him. 
As  will  be  discussed  in  section  5,  such  proposals  have  in  fact  been  put  forth, 
especially to account for wh-exclamatives and quite-structures (see Rett 2008b,c for 
a most recent proposal of this type); it will be shown that (similar) problems arise 
for those cases as well.
The alternative offered by the approach suggested here can avoid these problems 
by analysing  such  as modifying the NP, i.e. the [A N] combination as a whole. In 
fact,  suggestions  in  this  direction  are  found  in  e.g.  Bolinger  (1972),  Landman 
(2006).  These authors  note that  once we add a gradable adjective to  a  noun we 
obtain a gradable nominal; for them, "a gradable nominal is one that either contains 
a  gradable  adjective  […]  or  a  gradable  noun"  (Landman  2006).  They  do  not, 
however, offer an explicit analysis, and, given most current assumptions about the 
syntax-semantics  of  NPs,  adjectival  modification  and  degree  modifiers,  it  is  not 
immediately obvious how to capture this intuition. In the standard, degree-based, 
approach  to  gradability,  degree  expressions  operate  on  degree  arguments,  and 
gradable expressions (e.g.  gradable adjectives) are those expressions that  include 
just such a degree variable in their argument structure, i.e. they are of type <d,<e,t>> 
(on the classical approach, but see chapter 1 for more discussion). The <d> argument 
must be bound first, before the adjective can combine with the noun, type <e,t>. In 
the  absence  of  an  overt  degree  expression,  this  is  generally  assumed  to  be 
accomplished by a phonologically null degree operator pos. Consequently, once the 
adjective  and  the  noun  have  combined,  at  the  NP-level,  there  will  be  no  <d> 
argument left. For such to be able to modify the whole NP as a degree modifier, the 
degree argument of the adjective modifying the noun would need to percolate up to 
the NP-level so that it can be targeted by such. What would be needed would be an 
operation that could "pass up" the degree argument of the adjective so that it would 
still be available at the NP-level for a potential degree operator to pick up. We do not 
see  how  this  could  be  made  to  work  unless  one  is  ready  to  give  up  on 
compositionality.  However, for an approach that does not treat internal  such  as a 
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degree modifier, but as a (special) case of a kind-referring expression (and which is,  
more generally, couched in a degree-less approach to gradability), degree arguments 
become irrelevant. Consequently, these difficulties do not arise.
This  approach  allows us  to  maintain  a  simpler,  more  uniform semantics  and 
syntax for such NPs, since such will be doing the same job in such an idiot and such 
an intelligent man. Syntactically, it modifies an NP in both cases. Semantically, the 
(gradable) property contributed in syntax by the adjective plays the same role as the 
(gradable) property which is encoded in the lexical meaning of a gradable noun like 
idiot. Due to this added property, the 'complex' NP (A ∩ N) will prompt a salient 
sub-type delineated by a high degree of intelligence, which can be identified by a 
natural consequence (that can be expressed by a result clause – e.g.  He is such an  
intelligent  man  that  every  company  wants  to  hire  him.).183 In  other  words,  the 
interpretation of  such an intelligent man  will  be completely parallel  to the cases 
where such combines with a gradable noun like idiot – see the discussion in §3.2.
Interestingly,  in  these  'complex'  NPs,  the  salient  differentiating  criterion  for 
making sub-types accessible to internal such is the one introduced by the expression 
which is the highest one in the syntactic structure. Otherwise such cannot 'reach' it. 
The effects that are found here are reminiscent of intervention effects. Consider the 
following example:
(65) such a friendly idiot
The NP in  (65) contains both a gradable adjective (friendly) and a gradable noun 
(idiot). Therefore, there are in principle two criteria based on which sub-types could 
be made available. However, the only one that counts for the interpretation of such is 
the property contributed by the adjective. Such cannot target the gradable noun idiot, 
and simply pick out a salient sub-type of idiot. It looks like the noun is too deeply 
embedded to be reached by such. In other words, the adjective acts as an intervener 
in the path of  such to the noun. It seems then that as soon as a modifier is added 
within the NP the (gradable) property it contributes will become the salient criterion. 
Once it  is adjoined, it  performs a division within the kind, and it determines the 
(new)  relevant,  salient  dimension  based  on  which  sub-kinds  can  be  further 
distinguished. It thus overrides the property inherent in the meaning of the noun, 
which would otherwise act  as the default criterion for distinguishing  salient sub-
kinds.184
183 Note that we use the term 'complex' here rather informally, to simply refer to an NP which contains  
more than just the head noun, in the case at hand, the noun plus an adjective / modifier. 
184 This seems to be what generally happens. In the absence of overt modification, nouns like idiot and 
abstract mass nouns like  courage,  beauty  etc. give rise to a default interpretation in terms of sub-kinds 
distinguished by the high degree of the property. But when an explicit modifier is present it will act as the 
criterion for delineating sub-kinds. This can also be seen by comparing (i)a and (i)b below:
(i) a.  such beauty
b.  (such) cold beauty
Conversely, if the modifier which is added does not have the right sort of meaning, that is, a meaning  
which could make salient sub-types identifiable by natural consequences available, it may block the use 
of a noun which would otherwise be compatible with internal such, which also suggests that the meaning 
of the noun itself is no longer directly accessible to such: 
(ii) *It's such a mathematical problem! 
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Finally, this approach can also straightforwardly capture the fact that such is only 
used with NPs and cannot modify an adjective appearing on its own, an issue that  
was problematic for the classical (i.e. degree) approach. This follows naturally given 
the analysis of such as an ad-nominal modifier, with the particular semantics argued 
for above; it  would in fact  be unexpected if  such  could co-occur with adjectives 
alone.
An interesting case which supports  the view proposed here is  offered by the 
German equivalent of  such,  solch, which agrees  with the modified noun, and is 
interpreted as modifying the whole NP in both of the following examples:
(66) a. ein [solcher Idiot ]
aMASC  suchMASC idiotMASC
'such an idiot'
b. ein [solcher [ guter Freund ]]
aMASC  suchMASC goodMASC friendMASC
'such a good friend'
In order to modify just the adjective, either the invariant version solch or so will be 
used, as illustrated below:
(67) a. ein [[solch guter] Freund]
aMASC    so goodMASC friendMASC
'such a good friend'
b. ein [[so guter] Freund]
aMASC    so goodMASC friendMASC
'such a good friend'
The contrast between (66)b and (67)a suggests that modification by solcher  of the 
[A N] complex is a distinct option. 
4 Concluding remarks
It has been argued in this chapter that what had been labelled "degree" such is not a 
degree operator.  Our proposal is centred on the idea that all occurrences of  such 
share  a  common  semantic  core  which  has  to  do  with  kind-reference,  and  the 
differences lie in what sort of sub-kinds can be accessed and how. Unlike external 
such, which can pick up an externally determined sub-type, by co-reference, internal 
such picks out salient sub-types that can be identified by natural consequences. For 
this, it has to rely, on the meaning of the noun itself in the context of the situation  
This example is also interesting because the modifier that is used is a relational adjective, and these  
adjectives have been analysed as properties of kinds or as mapping kinds to sub-kinds (cf. Bosque and 
Picallo 1996, McNally and Boleda 2004 a.o.), so one might expect them to be compatible with internal  
such. Again, however, we see that the taxonomic sub-kinds they may provide are not the sort that internal 
such requires (see also the discussion in §3.1). 
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expressed in the clause in correlation with the content of the result clause (where one 
is overtly present, otherwise, recoverable from the context).
We have seen that only certain nouns can make available the needed sort of sub-
types, and that gradable nouns such as  idiot,  courage etc. are only a subset of this 
class; the others include nouns such as  situation,  way etc., and nouns that receive 
stereotypical interpretations. In the first case, the nouns easily prompt salient sub-
types delineated by a high degree to which the property contained in the meaning of 
the noun holds (e.g. "big idiots"). In the second case, the nouns provide sub-types of 
situations or events, which are naturally defined by their consequences. In the third 
case,  the  domain  of  the  noun  is  defined  by  stereotypical  properties  which  can 
naturally discriminate among possible sub-types of N (i.e. salient sub-types can be 
delineated by the various stereotypical properties that may hold of the individuals).  
It was also shown that consequences need to be "calculated" higher in the clause 
structure – e.g. at the vP-level (rather than just DP-internally). 
In  our account,  the contribution of  result  clauses  is  an essential  piece of the 
puzzle. We have argued that the possibility of using a result clause correlates with 
the possibility of forming a set of possible natural consequences of belonging to a 
certain kind, which correspond to and identify salient,  inherent sub-types of that 
kind. For the cases where a result clause is not overtly present, as in the exclamative 
use, we have assumed that the consequence is still implied and inferable from the 
context.  These uses  have been seen to have  specific  properties  in  terms of their 
interpretation, their interaction with evidentiality and their prosody.
This proposal can better account for the distribution and interpretation of nouns 
with internal such than the analyses assuming it is a degree operator. Gradable nouns 
can be dealt with on either approach, but the approach we have proposed here also 
offers a straightforward way to analyse [A N] combinations in a completely parallel 
fashion, with no additional adjustments or stipulations. 
The other two classes of nouns cannot be accounted for by a degree analysis of 
such. In §3.4 it was shown that the meaning of stereotypical nouns is not gradable, 
either inherently or due to some sort of coercion, and the interpretations that obtain 
are not in terms of degree.185 When internal such is used, a salient sub-type is picked 
that may be delineated by any of the stereotypical properties that define the domain, 
as long as the sub-type can be associated with a natural consequence. No ranking is 
implied to hold between the individuals in the domain in terms of the degree to 
which a property holds of them. If an apparent high degree interpretation may be 
thought to be present, that stems either from stereotypicality itself – a reflex of the  
sort of properties stereotypical attributes are, or it is a contextual effect, arising from 
the content  of  the  result  clause,  or  may be  due  to  an  ordering  that  is  imposed, 
contextually, when the additional unexpectedness operator is used, at least on one 
185 A degree  analysis,  especially  if  set  within a degree-based approach to gradability,  normally also 
comes with specific assumptions about the syntax of the respective expressions, such as the projection of  
a dedicated functional phrase, DegP, that would host the degree operator. In this chapter we have not  
discussed  the  syntactic  implications  of  a  degree  analysis  of  such and  the  possible  undesirable 
complications this might introduce into the system, as we started out by arguing that such is in fact not a 
degree operator and by proposing an alternative account. However, a discussion of these issues (i.e. the  
evidence for and the consequences of assuming a DegP for nouns) will be elaborated in the next chapter  
as well as in the concluding chapter of this dissertation. 
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possible  account  of  it,  but  then  it  is  an  ordering along a  superimposed  scale of 
unexpectedness (cf. §3.5.2).
The  clearest  advantage  of  the  approach  proposed  here  emerges  once  one 
considers situation-nouns. These are the most problematic under a degree approach 
to such (and result clauses), since the interpretation has nothing to do with degree in 
these cases. On our analysis, where internal  such in correlation with result clauses 
picks out sub-types defined by their possible natural consequences, as explained in 
§3.3, these cases now fall into a natural class and the otherwise puzzling parallels 
with e.g. gradable nouns are predicted by the analysis. 
These cases are also relevant in showing that the distribution of result clauses is  
not dependent on an expression of degree, which is the generally assumed view in 
the literature (Meier 2003, Rijkhoek 1998 a.o.). Our account, which does not rely on 
degree relations, but instead associates natural consequences with salient sub-types 
they can identify, is therefore better suited to deal with these cases.
Further  support  for  a  more  unified  approach  to  such,  which  argues  that  all 
occurrences  of  such  share  a  common  semantic  core  having  to  do  with  kind-
reference,  comes  from  the  existence  of  other  expressions  which  make  explicit 
reference to kinds and which, in certain contexts, can also get a reading which has 
been described in terms of degree, or intensification.186 We refer here to expressions 
such as kind of187, illustrated below: 
(68) a. that kind of animal 
a'. what kind of a guy
b. that kind of idiot
b'. that kind of an idiot
Bolinger (1972) discusses the difference in interpretation as the result of a semantic 
shift from identifier to intensifier which he claims expressions like such, that/what  
kind of, some have undergone. He claims that the 'suchness' of something is likely to 
be  an  intensifiable  characteristic  due  to  the  closeness  of  identification  by  some 
noteworthy  characteristic  to  intensification  of  that  characteristic;  then  the  act  of 
pointing easily turns into an act of 'pointing up' (p. 91-92). The approach we have 
suggested can capture Bolinger's intuition. Note, first, that the examples involving 
what has been labelled a degree interpretation in fact do not involve (intensification 
of) an added characteristic; it is rather something within the meaning of the noun 
itself  that  is  targeted:  namely,  a  salient  sub-type  the  noun  inherently  provides, 
precisely as proposed  above for internal  such.  We find here,  therefore,  the same 
difference  with  respect  to  how sub-kinds  are  made available:  either  by  external  
criteria, or inherently to the meaning of certain types of nouns. Therefore, adopting 
an  approach  such  as  the  one  we  have  suggested  here  allows  the  (otherwise 
accidental) parallel behaviour of various expressions to be captured in a uniform, 
systematic way.
186 Note that, interestingly, that/what kind of can be used to intensify a gradable property, as in (68)b, but 
also a quantity, as in (i) which contains mass nouns:
(i) I don't have that kind of money and I don't have that kind of time. (Bolinger 1972)
187 For an analysis of kind, see Carlson (1977), Wilkinson (1995), Zamparelli (1998).
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In  sum,  internal  such  is  not  a  degree  operator.  A gradable  meaning  is  not 
required, nor created. Consequently, co-occurrence with internal  such  (with result 
clauses,  or in exclamatives) cannot be used as test for gradability. However,  this 
does not exclude the possibility that some nouns may have a gradable structure. This 
seems to be implied, even if only indirectly, in the case of nouns like idiot, courage 
etc.  which seem  to  make  salient  sub-types  delineated  by  a  high  degree  of  the 
property encoded in their meaning, e.g.  "big idiots". In the next chapter we will 
examine  certain  types  of  adjectival  modification  that  seem  to  lead  to  a  similar 
interpretation, in the sense that they seem to denote sets of individuals that have the  
property to a high degree – e.g.  a big idiot, among others – and will show that the 
relevant  interpretation is  in  fact  arrived  at  without  the manipulation of  gradable 
structures. Before concluding this chapter, however, we need to (briefly) discuss, in 
the light of the proposal made here, other constructions which have been analysed as 
degree constructions, on a par with "degree"  such, namely wh-exclamatives,  quite-
structures and predicative partitive structures (e.g. more of an idiot).
5 Related cases
In the preceding sections of this chapter we have shown that occurrence with the so-
called "degree"  such, our "internal such" is not determined by gradability, contrary 
to what is generally assumed in the literature. We have argued that internal such is 
not  a  degree  operator,  but  a  kind-referring  expression,  which  places  particular 
requirements, in terms of the sub-kinds that it can select. Gradable nouns are only a 
subset of the nouns that satisfy the requirements imposed by internal  such, and  a 
gradable meaning as such is neither required to be present nor created as a result of 
using such. In view of this conclusion, questions arise concerning the status of other 
structures which have been treated in the literature in a similar way to such, namely 
wh-exclamatives,  quite  and predicative partitive structures (e.g.  more of an idiot). 
These  have  been  generally  analysed  as  degree  constructions  involving  an 
interpretation and distribution quite similar to  such. In this section, we will  briefly 
re-examine these constructions;  the question we will  ask is whether  they indeed 
involve  operations  on  gradable  structures  and  need  to  be  analysed  as  degree 
constructions. We cannot offer an account of these constructions here but will only 
sketch an answer to this question.
We  will  suggest  that  wh-exclamatives  do  not  provide  a  reliable  basis  for 
distinguishing  (lexically)  gradable  from  non-gradable  nouns,  and  that  quite-
structures need not be analysed as degree constructions. In the case of predicative 
partitive structures,  gradability seems to be involved, but it  comes into play at  a 
higher level, not at the lexical nominal level, and seems to make use of an ordering 
in terms of typicality (cf. Sassoon 2007a) which can be forced upon any noun when 
used as a singular indefinite predicate. In the concluding chapter of this dissertation 
we will  discuss  the  more  general  implications  this has  for the representation of 
gradability in the nominal domain, also in the light of the conclusions that will be 
reached after the investigation of adjectival modification in the next chapter. 
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5.1 Wh-exclamatives
As discussed in chapter 1 (§2.1.1), wh-exclamatives have often been treated on a par 
with the so-called "degree"  such and similarly used as  a  test  for  gradability  (cf. 
Bolinger 1972, Matushansky 2002b a.o.).  We cannot give a full  overview of the 
literature here, and certainly cannot aim to offer a full account of the semantics of 
wh-exclamatives. The questions we would simply like to raise are whether nominal 
gradability is a necessary condition for the well-formedness of these constructions or 
whether they can indeed be used as a test for nominal gradability.  We will suggest 
that the answer is negative.
First of all, let us briefly recall the basic facts concerning the distribution and 
interpretation of wh-exclamatives, as compared to what we have learned about such. 
Internal such (with result clauses or as an exclamative) has been shown to only be 
grammatical  when  it  can  pick  out  a  salient  sub-type  identifiable  by  a  natural 
consequence; the only nouns that can make such sub-types available are gradable 
nouns, stereotypical nouns and situation-type nouns, and to be even more restricted 
in the exclamative use, without an overt result clause. By contrast, wh-exclamatives 
can accommodate any noun. What has been claimed to distinguish between gradable 
and  non-gradable  nouns,  and  thus  to  be  a  diagnostic  for  gradability,  is  the 
interpretation (Bolinger 1972, Matushansky 2002b etc.): external or internal degree 
(cf. chapter 1, §2.1.1). Consider the following examples:
(69) a. What a guy!
b. What a doctor he has become!
These  wh-exclamatives  containing ordinary,  non-gradable  Ns  receive  an  external 
degree interpretation: they identify someone as a particular type of individual (e.g. a 
guy), characterized by some property, external to the fact of being an N. It is this 
quality,  left  implicit,  but  inferable  contextually,  that  is  somehow remarkable,  or 
unexpected, and triggers the use of the exclamative. The intonation may give a cue 
as to whether the evaluation conveyed is positive or negative in a particular context. 
So  (69)a may be understood as 'what a  great/ awful  guy', and  (69)b as 'what an 
excellent/ awful doctor'.
Now compare this to the following examples, which contain gradable nouns:
(70) a. What an idiot they hired!
b. What a genius he was!
These  wh-exclamatives  are  generally  claimed to be  about  the  unexpectedly high 
degree to which the property included in the lexical meaning of the noun holds of 
the referent,  i.e.  they receive an internal  degree interpretation. This may also be  
associated with a negative or positive attitude of the speaker, but, differently from 
the cases in (69), with the nouns in (70) the orientation is directly determined by the 
lexical meaning of the noun (negative in the case of idiocy vs. positive in the case of 
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geniality).188 Such examples can also receive an external interpretation like that of 
(69), in the sense that the exclamation may be about some external property of the 
idiot, e.g. his/her being unexpectedly friendly, nasty etc. (cf. Bolinger 1972) . 
Finally, wh-exclamatives can also combine with stereotypical nouns like palace, 
boy, boat etc., as illustrated in (71), where the given individuals stand out in terms of 
showing  properties  stereotypically  associated  with  being  a  palace,  or  a  clown. 
Therefore, it is with respect to properties included in the meaning of the noun that 
the individuals are evaluated, and in this respect the interpretation is similar to the 
internal interpretation of (70).
(71) a. What a palace their new house is!
b. What a clown their little boy is!
On the one hand, one may wonder whether all these data can be accounted for 
under one analysis, given the two apparently different interpretations (i.e. external 
and internal),  which, incidentally, make  wh-exclamatives look in some sense like 
they collapse the properties that would correspond to external and internal such. On 
the other hand, one would like to know why gradable nouns and stereotypical nouns 
behave in a parallel way in these contexts, given that we have argued before that the 
latter do not have a gradable meaning. Does gradability play a role at all in any of  
these cases?
The assumption generally made in the literature seems to be that it does.  Wh-
exclamatives have been analysed either as explicitly involving degree modification 
(Matushansky 2002b, Castroviejo-Miró 2006, Rett 2008b,c, 2011), or, if they have 
been analysed as operators of a different sort, they are still defined as requiring the  
presence of an ordering to operate on (Castroviejo-Miró 2010, but also Zanuttini and 
Portner 2003 who build an ordering on the domain into their mechanism of domain 
widening).  All  these  accounts,  therefore,  assume gradability  (or  the  presence  of 
ordered sets) in some sense or  another. Assuming that the nouns in  (70) have this 
sort of meaning, as seems intuitively to be the case (see also discussion in §3.2),  
then  all  these  accounts  could  in  principle  easily  cover  these  cases.  Something 
additional would need to be said about the cases in (69) and (71), i.e. about arbitrary 
non-gradable  nouns  which  give  rise  to  an  external  degree  interpretation  and 
stereotypical nouns, which have been argued to be non-gradable (cf. §3.4 and §3.5). 
There are two ways of approaching cases of non-gradable expressions that appear in 
the context of a degree operator or of an operator that requires the presence of an 
ordering:  either  assuming  that  the  meaning  of  the  non-gradable  expression  is 
coerced so as to make it compatible with the operator, or assuming the presence of a  
covert element that provides the required ordering. In what follows we will briefly 
(and in a rather simplified form) show how these types of accounts (could) deal with 
the different sets of data and what problems arise. 
The first path is chosen by Matushansky (2002b), who analyses wh-exclamatives 
as degree operators which, in the absence of an adjective, semantically modify the 
noun. This can easily account for the simple gradable cases in  (70), while all the 
other cases have to be treated in terms of scalarity coercion. Matushansky in fact 
188 Though ironical uses are, of course, possible, thereby reversing the sense of the evaluation. 
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proposes that the 'excellent' interpretation noted for examples like (69)b above is the 
result of "an attempt to apply a degree operator to a [non-gradable] noun". However, 
it  is hard to maintain that the interpretation that the nouns  guy  and  doctor get in 
examples like (69) is a coerced gradable meaning, or in any way different from their 
basic meaning. As for the nouns in (71), it was already argued in §3.4 that they do 
not involve gradable meanings,  either inherently or as the result  of coercion. An 
analysis in terms of (generalized) scalarity coercion is, therefore, confronted with 
problems.189 
The other  way of  approaching  data  like  (69) has  been  to  assume the  covert 
presence of a contextually given gradable property P which is said to hold to an  
unexpectedly high degree (most recently: Rett 2008b,c, but see also Milner 1978, 
Gutiérrez-Rexach 1996, Villalba 2003, Castroviejo-Miró 2006, 2010). The resulting 
structure for the examples in (69) is given in (72), where ADJ could stand for great, 
exotic,  crazy, awful,  excellent  etc.190 This  seems  to  correctly  capture  the 
interpretation. 
(72) a. What an ADJ guy he is.
b. What an ADJ doctor he has become!
Once a covert evaluative gradable adjective is assumed to be present in the structure, 
the  wh-element  can  be  easily  analysed  as  a  degree  operator  which  semantically 
modifies this adjective.191 Alternatively,  it  may be analysed as an operator which 
operates in some other way on the ordering provided by this covert adjective – cf. 
Castroviejo-Miró (2010), who proposes that wh-exclamatives involve an expressive 
speech  act  operator,  which  expresses  the  speaker's  surprise,  or  emotion  more 
generally, and is defined as necessarily taking an ordered set of propositions as its 
argument (which is the denotation of the  wh-clause). The fact that the speaker is 
surprised  at  the  high  degree,  not  just  any  degree,  is  accounted  for  through  the 
monotonicity properties of this operator.
This type of account could in fact be extended to examples with gradable nouns,  
like  (70). It  could be assumed that such examples also involve the presence of a 
covert adjective, for example big (cf. What a big idiot!); this is indicated in (73):
(73) a. What an ADJ idiot!  
b. What an ADJ genius he was!
189 This  raises  a possible  theory-internal  problem: if  the  wh-exclamatives involve  a  degree  operator 
which can so easily trigger scalarity coercion thus making the combination with any noun possible, then 
why would this coercion not always be possible with all other items that have been argued to be degree 
operators on such approaches, e.g. such?
190 The surface syntactic position which the wh-element occupies on top of the indefinite DP containing 
the covert adjective, is derived through movement, just like in the cases where an overt adjective occurs  
in the structure – see Matushansky 2002a,b a.o. for discussion of movement in degree constructions.
191 Rett's (2008b,c) analysis involves an illocutionary operator which takes as its argument a degree  
property D (type <d,<s,t>>) (which is how she analyses the content of the wh-exclamative), whose degree 
and world arguments it binds, and returns a proposition λw.D(d)(w) with respect to which the speaker can 
express his/her surprise. The utterance of an exclamative is expressively correct if its content is a degree  
property D which is salient in the discourse, the speaker is surprised that a specific degree holds of that  
degree property, and that degree exceeds a contextually provided standard s.
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This type of analysis, which postulates covert adjectives in the structure, faces 
problems, however, once one considers the nouns with stereotypical interpretations 
given  that  such  noun  interpretations  are  not  available  in  the  context  of  overt 
evaluative  adjectives  (even  evaluative,  speaker-oriented  ones  like  amazing  or 
surprising), as illustrated in (74)a, which is unacceptable on the intended reading.192 
So the fact that nouns with stereotypical interpretations are perfectly acceptable in 
wh-exclamatives, as illustrated in (74), remains unaccounted.
(74) a. #Their new house is an {amazing/ beautiful/ luxurious/ big} palace. 
b. #What an ADJ palace their new house is!
What the surprise in examples like  (71)a, on the stereotypical interpretation of 
the noun, is related to is a stereotypical property associated with palaces that holds  
of the place, not just any property that the place (which is just incidentally said to be 
a 'stereotypical palace') happens to have. It may be that it is very spacious, or very 
luxurious, that it  has particularly fancy, expensive curtains or floors or bathroom 
appliances a.s.o;  but it  cannot be that  it  is  painted red, or that  there is  a fir-tree 
growing outside the gate.  So what  seems to happen in the  case  of  stereotypical 
nouns  is  that  one  of  the  stereotypical  properties  associated  with  palaces  can  be 
singled out and "extracted" out of the set denoted by the N. Therefore, rather than 
assuming the presence of an actual empty adjective with these nouns, it might be 
more appropriate to simply define the interpretation of  wh-exclamatives relative to 
some contextually salient property (cf. Schwager's 2009 proposal for amazing-type 
adjectives).  In  the case of  stereotypical  nouns, the nouns provide the relevant  P 
themselves.
We therefore obtain the following picture. Wh-exclamatives involve an operator 
that  needs  to  apply  to  a  gradable  property.  This  gradable  property  can  be  a 
contextually salient property, which may either correspond to a property that is part 
of the denotation of the noun itself, as with stereotypical nouns, or be a completely 
external, contextually salient property, as with arbitrary, non-gradable nouns. There 
are also differences among non-gradable nouns, in the sense that some have salient 
aspects that are more prone to evaluation. For example, with professions nouns, like 
(69)b,  the  most  salient  interpretation  is  in  terms  of  the  quality  with  which  one 
performs the respective job. We have seen that this strategy is also available to what 
we might want to call gradable nouns, where the gradable property that the operator 
applies to could correspond to an adjective like big. Given that the same mechanism 
(whereby a gradable property  can be so easily filled in  contextually)  derives all 
cases,  wh-exclamatives do not provide a basis for  distinguishing between gradable 
and  non-gradable  nouns.  The  existence  of  this  strategy  also  distinguishes wh-
exclamatives from structures with internal such. Such can only pick out salient sub-
types which are identified by natural consequences and which are delineated based 
on the meaning of the noun itself in the context of the situation expressed by the 
clause, in correlation with the content of the result clause; a property cannot simply 
192 With respect to the availability of modification by [possibly covert] adjectives, therefore, gradable 
nouns and non-gradable nouns pattern together, to the exclusion of stereotypical nouns.
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be picked from the context and used in order to license the use of internal such with 
just any noun.
5.2 Quite 
In this section we turn to the distribution and interpretation of structures containing 
quite.  Although  quite has  been  assumed to  be  very  similar  to  internal  such  (cf. 
Matushansky 2002b a.o.), there are in fact significant differences between the two 
which indicate that a different account is needed. This also means that ruling out a 
degree analysis of internal such does not automatically entail adopting the same for 
quite. Therefore, we would like to know whether gradability is independently proved 
to be relevant for the distribution and interpretation of quite. We will suggest that it 
is not, and that quite-structures need not be analysed as degree constructions.
Let us start by briefly reviewing the distribution and interpretation of  quite. As 
discussed in chapter 1  (§2.1.3),  quite  can modify both gradable and non-gradable 
nouns;  but its interpretation has been argued to differ with the two types of nouns. 
When quite modifies a gradable noun, as in (75), it has been argued to indicate that 
the  property  denoted  by  the  noun  holds  to  a  high  degree  (cf.  Bolinger  1972, 
Matushansky 2002b, Birner and Kaplan 2004).193
(75) a. Adam is quite a genius.
b. John is quite a fool.
When it  modifies  non-gradable nouns,  as in  (76),  the interpretation has been 
argued to be different (cf. Matushansky 2002b, Birner and Kaplan 2004). In chapter 
1, we concluded that in such examples the interpretation is in terms of the respective 
individual being 'a remarkable/ impressive N', or rather 'remarkable/ impressive as 
an N': the individuals in question stand out in their domain due to some remarkable 
features they have as doctors, linguists, shirts or cars.194
(76) a. William is quite a doctor – last time he performed a surgery, he operated 
on four patients at once!
b. Martin is quite a linguist.
c. That's quite a shirt.
d. That's quite a car!
Finally, it it should be noted that stereotypical, figurative nouns seem to be less 
acceptable with  quite  than with internal  such or  in  wh-exclamatives. For example 
193 However the particular intonation and context may influence the exact interpretation of quite. Thus, 
in examples like (i), it may be interpreted, depending on intonation, either as indicating high degree or 
low degree (i.e. attenuating the intensity of a gradable property).
(i) He is quite {an idiot/ a genius}. 
And an example like (ii) [see (76)d in the main text] may be used to convey either a positive or a negative 
attitude of the speaker:
(ii) That's quite a car you've got there.
194 Example (76)a is from Matushansky (2002b) and (76)c from Birner and Kaplan (2004).
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(76)b  above  cannot  generally  mean  that  Martin  shows  a  lot  of  properties 
(stereo)typically associated with linguists. So continuing the sentence by "all he can 
talk  about  is  critical  acquisition  periods  and  universal  grammar"  would  be 
infelicitous, while a continuation like "he's published in LI, NLLT,  and Science!" 
would be felicitous. However, this sort of interpretation is not completely excluded 
either, not for all speakers, and not for all examples. This is shown by the variable  
judgments associated with the following examples:195
(77) a. ?(?)Julie is quite a boy.
b. ?That old Cadillac my grandpa owned was quite a boat!
c. (?)Their new place is quite a palace.
d. The company is in the process of developing a lavish new headquarters 
building in New York City… That's quite a palace for a company whose 
shares are down 40-some percent in the last year, and whose assets are 
deployed mostly in declining businesses…196
In sum,  quite  can modify both gradable and non-gradable nouns – the range of 
distribution  is  different  from  internal  such,  as  well  as  from  wh-exclamatives. 
Similarly to  wh-exclamatives,  the interpretation has  been claimed to be different 
depending on the type of  noun (cf.  Bolinger 1972,  Matushansky 2002b).  So the 
question arises  whether  quite  can be analysed in  the same way in all  cases  and 
whether gradability should play a significant role.
Quite is generally assumed to be a moderately high degree modifier (cf. Bolinger 
1972, Matushansky 2002b, Birner and Kaplan 2004).  On the assumption that the 
nouns  in  (75) are  gradable,  such  an  analysis  can  apply  to  these examples 
straightforwardly: quite can be interpreted with respect to the scale identified in the 
meaning of gradable nouns.  This could be implemented either in a degree-based 
approach  or  a  degree-less  approach  to  gradability  (cf.  chapter  1,  §1.1,  for 
discussion). On the former type of approach, gradable nouns would be defined in 
terms of degrees, e.g. as of type <d,<e,t>> and quite could be defined as a degree 
operator (type <<d,<e,t><e,t>>) that boosts the standard somewhat. This seems to be 
the type of analysis that Matushansky (2002b) envisages, though she does not spell 
it  out.197 On a degree-less  approach,  gradable  nouns would be  defined as  vague 
predicates and quite would be analysed as a degree function, which operates on the 
ordering introduced by the noun;  when applied to N it results in a subset  of the 
individuals in the domain.198 When modifying non-gradable nouns, as in (76), quite  
195 Recall  that  in  §3.3.4. we noted the variation in the availability  of stereotypical interpretations in 
general, also in simple, non-modified predicate position. Therefore, such variation does not come as a  
surprise in itself; however, it is interesting to note the differences that arise in this respect between such 
and quite. 
196 Source: http://www.americanthinker.com/2006/04/pinch_gets_punched.html
197 This is a possibility considered by finally rejected by Nouwen (2011b); the possible lexical entry for 
quite on such an analysis is given in (i):
(i) [[quite]] = λP<d,<e,t>>.λx.∃d[P(x,d) & d>>s]
where d>>s expresses that the degree exceeds the standard to some considerable degree 
198 Note that Klein (1980), who analyses degree modifiers of adjectives as degree functions that have the  
role of determining how the domain is to be partitioned, proposes that quite in fact moves the partition 
'downward' as as to absorb the extension gap of the adjective. He takes x is tall to entail x is quite tall, and 
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has  been  taken  either  to  coerce  the  meaning  of  the  noun itself  into  a  gradable 
meaning that can be degree-modified (Matushansky 2002b) or to be interpreted with 
respect  to  an  external,  contextually  salient  scale  (Birner  and  Kaplan  2004,  Rett 
2008b,c).  In what follows, we will  consider each of these views and  show their 
problematic aspects.
The first type of approach is suggested by Matushansky (2002b).  Referring to 
examples  like  those  in  (76),  which  contain  non-gradable  nouns,  Matushansky 
proposes  that  quite is  interpreted  "as  if  there  is  a  covert  adjective"  similar  in 
meaning  to  excellent, outstanding  or  nontypical.  Subsequently,  however,  she 
suggests  that  this  sort  of  interpretation  is  due  to  "an  attempt  to  apply  a  degree 
operator  to  a  [non-gradable  expression]",  just  as  she  argues  for  such  and  wh-
exclamatives. If quite is analysed as an adnominal degree operator, then all the cases 
of  basically  non-gradable  nouns  will  have  to  be  analysed  as  involving  scalarity 
coercion. As also pointed out in relation to wh-exclamatives, such a view is hard to 
maintain in connection with examples like (76), where the nouns retain their basic, 
literal meaning, as well as for the examples in (77) (to the extent to which they are 
acceptable) which contain stereotypical interpretations of nouns which have already 
been argued in §3.4 not to be gradable, either inherently or as the result of coercion. 
In addition, a theory-internal problem seems to arise on this account. While she 
analyses all these items (i.e.  quite,  such,  wh-exclamatives) similarly, she describes 
the interpretation differently. For quite, the interpretation is paraphrased in terms of 
non-typicality, while structures with  such  are argued to be interpreted as 'a typical 
N'.  This  difference  between  such  and  quite (typical  vs.  non-typical),  and  the 
interpretation  assigned  to  quite  in  particular,  is  rather  unexpected  within 
Matushansky's account. She analyses both  such  and  quite  as degree operators that 
indicate a high value on a scale and treats the examples where they co-occur with 
non-gradable nouns as cases of scalarity coercion, which  brings about a meaning 
shift  that corresponds to "having many of the typical  properties associated with" 
being N (or A), and she claims that the notion of a prototype or a stereotype comes  
into play. Therefore, the fact that  quite an N  would end up being interpreted as 'a 
non-typical N' is rather contrary to expectations. 
If, however, we accept that the interpretation of quite-structures is in terms of the 
referent standing out among Ns, as we suggest, then the 'non-typical' interpretation 
may just arise as a side effect: if something is somehow remarkable and stands out in 
its domain, then it is not just another N, and it is non-typical, rather than typical. 
The second type of approach mentioned above is put forth by Birner and Kaplan 
(2004).  Birner and Kaplan propose that, in combination with non-gradable nouns, 
quite  is  interpreted  with  respect  to  an  external,  contextually  salient  scale.  For 
instance, quite a shirt might be one that is particularly ornate, expensive, tacky, old 
etc.  This  understanding  of  the  interpretation  of  quite  is  also  reflected  in  Rett's 
(2008b,c)  proposal  that,  similarly  to  wh-exclamatives,  quite  structures  like  (78) 
possibly involve the presence of a covert gradable predicate  P which receives its 
value from context (e.g. good, large, crazy, etc.):199
not the other way round.
199 In order to derive the surface word order, raising of quite to the left periphery of the DP is assumed – 
see e.g. Matushansky 2002a,b a.o. This is supported by the fact that in structures where the DP contains 
an overt adjective, quite may occupy a position below the indefinite article. Thus, next to the structure in 
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(78) That's quite an ADJ turkey you have there!
This type of approach was already discussed in the preceding section in relation to 
wh-exclamatives,  and  the  same  comments  apply  here:  the  corresponding  overt 
modification structures with stereotypical nouns are not acceptable on the intended 
interpretation. And although such nouns do not always easily occur with quite, they 
are also not completely excluded. An analysis postulating actual covert adjectives in 
the structure fails to capture these cases. 
Such an account might be rescued in the way suggested in the preceding section 
for wh-exclamatives. This would mean that, just like wh-exclamatives,  quite would 
not provide a basis for identifying nominal gradability in any reliable way. However, 
adopting this sort of analysis for quite does not seem appropriate. One reason is that 
the choice of  contextual  property  is  not  completely free,  unlike what  Rett's  and 
Birner and Kaplan's account would predict, and unlike  wh-exclamatives. Take, for 
instance,  nouns  denoting  professions  (cf.  (76)a-b  above);  such  examples  are 
interpreted in relation to the professional quality. In fact, a sentence like (76)b would 
not be felicitous if Martin were remarkable in some respect totally unrelated to being 
a linguist, for example if he were a very eccentric person (i.e.  'a linguist and an  
eccentric person').200 (see also Nouwen 2011b for more arguments that the account 
based on the free insertion of gradable properties over-generates)
This also confirms our suggestion that  quite-structures involve an interpretation 
in terms of the referent 'being remarkable as an N' (cf. also Nouwen 2011b for a  
similar  suggestion,  namely  that  quite  contributes  an  interpretation  in  terms  of 
[reasonable] noteworthiness).  We would now like to suggest  that  quite-structures 
always involve this interpretation. In what follows we will sketch this view of quite, 
which seems better cover the data than the degree accounts discussed above.
It is important to recognize that if something or someone is remarkable, they are 
so for a reason;  an  individual will stand out  in its domain due to something they 
have done or to some property they manifest. This is what will provide a basis for 
passing a "remarkability" judgment. It is also important to point out that we assume 
that such  properties  do  not enter  the  composition  (e.g.  in  the  shape  of  covert 
adjectives  as in  the  account  of  wh-exclamatives  discussed in  the preceding sub-
section, or  in  Rett's  and Birner's  accounts of  quite),  but  they simply provide the 
justification for the qualification. Given that the remarkability expressed by  quite-
(ia), the structure in (ib) is also possible:
(i) a. quite an unusual person
b. a quite unusual person
It should be noted, however, that these structures are not completely interchangeable (the examples below 
are from Bolinger 1972 and L. McNally p.c.): 
(ii) a. quite an odd man/ quite a long time
b. *a quite odd man/ ??a quite long time
It is not completely clear to us at this point what underlies these differences, but it seems to suggest at  
least that not all  quite an (A) N  structures can be reduced to a corresponding  a quite A N  structure in 
which  quite  would be a modifier of the adjective (but see also Bolinger 1972 for the suggestion that 
phonological factors might play a role in the acceptability of these structures).
200 Moreover, if such, wh-exclamatives and quite are similarly analysed as degree modifiers/ operators, 
as generally done in these accounts, then it is also hard to explain the differences in distribution among 
them (which may be interpreted as differences in their ability to (i) license covert adjectives, or (ii) to  
coerce the meaning of the noun, depending on the approach).
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structures is relativized to the noun, the properties that can justify the qualification 
must be related to the type of lexical meaning the noun has. For nouns denoting 
professions (cf.  (76)a-b above) they will have to bear on the professional quality. 
With nouns like idiot, they will have to be acts or features motivating the property 
that  characterizes  an  individual  as  e.g.  an  idiot.  With  stereotypical  nouns (when 
accepted),  the  qualification  will  be  motivated  by  the  individual  in  question 
displaying a stereotypical property associated with N. With arbitrary, non-gradable 
nouns, which fail to make any particular dimensions salient, the basis will be more 
unspecified; there is a wide range of extraneous, less specific, properties which can 
make a shirt, a car etc. stand out among shirts or cars.  Interestingly,  the example 
below shows that the qualities  that  justify the qualification expressed by the quite-
structure may be explicitly mentioned in the linguistic context:
(79) I  relate  to  little  Finn Garrett.  He's  quite  a  boy:  great  imagination,  logical 
thought processes, and is quite resourceful.201
Finally,  as illustrated in  (77) above, quite an N  structures do not easily accept 
nouns  on  a  stereotypical,  figurative  interpretation,  where  the  referent  would  be 
allowed not to be an actual N but only have properties (stereo)typically associated 
with being an N.202 In this, they differ both from wh-exclamatives and from internal 
such. We would like to suggest that a possible explanation for this lies in the original 
use of  quite  as a marker of truth value – cf.  Bolinger 1972 who argues that  quite  
developed  from  an  identifier  of  truth  value  of  a  predication,  i.e.  an  adverb 
commenting on full truth vs. partial truth, meaning something like 'identifying x as Y 
is  fully  justified'.  This  use  of  quite  seems  to  survive  especially  (though  not 
exclusively) in negative contexts:203
201 Source: http://www.amazon.com/Last-Invisible-Boy-Evan-Kuhlman/dp/1416957979
202 The stereotypical, figurative interpretation of nouns, is, however, available when quite combines with 
a definite DP. Some examples of the quite the N structure are provided below (the examples in (iv) are 
from Bolinger 1972): 
(i)  Johnny is quite the boy. 
(ii) a. Julie is quite the boy. [cf. (77)a]
b.. That old Cadillac my grandpa owned was quite the boat! [cf. (77)b]
c. Their new place is quite the palace. [cf. (77)c]
(iii) He is quite the fool. 
(iv) a. He is quite the lawyer. 
b. She was quite the belle of the ball. 
c. He is quite the gentleman / man about town / soldier of fortune. 
d. It is at once rich, tasty, and quite the thing.
As can be seen from these examples, any noun seems to be able to occur in this type of structure, and the 
interpretation seems to involve reference to generic types which the individuals in question approximate 
(cf. Bolinger 1972, Birner and Kaplan 2004). Note however that the "generic types" need to be defined in 
such  a  way  as  to  also  include  stereotypical  properties  associated  with  N  given  the  availability  of  
stereotypical, figurative interpretations of nouns in this structure.
203 According to Bolinger (1972) this is also the way in which quite  is used when it combines with a 
definite NP, as well as with superlatives, where the property has already been boosted to the maximum:
(i) a. He is quite the fine gentleman.
b. She is quite the nicest person I know.
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(80) a. I was often questioning my own gender. I was not sure what I was. I 
generally accepted that I was not quite a boy and really wanted to be a 
girl.204
b. No longer quite a boy, but still a boyish charm lingers...205
c. … an adventure of his own when he was catching wild horses in Texas 
with his adventurous cousin, at a time when he must have been quite a 
boy.206
This initial use of  quite  as an identifier of truth value may explain the absence of 
stereotypical, figurative readings for some speakers. It may be conjectured that for 
these speakers  quite has retained an element of its original  meaning, requiring that 
the individual be an actual N, while for others it  has lost  the entailment that the 
argument of the predicate be an actual N, and  can be  used to mean that a given 
individual is remarkable as an N, in any sense of N, whether actual or stereotypical. 
This variation in the use of  quite by different speakers is somewhat parallel to the 
difference between the adjectives  real  and  true:  real can be used with nouns that 
receive figurative interpretations, while the entity described by true must belong to 
the category named by the noun (Bolinger 1972). For example, it is only in  (81)a 
that he may be just a student behaving like a lawyer or in a way stereotypically 
associated with lawyers, while in (81)b he must be a lawyer by profession.207
(81) a. He is a real lawyer, the way he goes about proving his case.
b. He is a true lawyer, a credit to his profession.
 In sum, on the view suggested here, quite  would express that  the individual 
under  consideration  deserves  to  be  identified  as  an  N  and  this  qualification  is 
justified by the individual manifesting some remarkable property. On such a view, 
quite would be more similar to the adjectives real and true mentioned above, which 
will be argued in chapter 4 (section 4) to make an epistemic/ evidential contribution 
to the interpretation, something like 'the speaker has good reasons to identify x as an 
N' or 'x undoubtedly qualifies as an N [in the speaker's view]'. A full formal account, 
must be left to further research however.
To conclude, this section has shown that  quite an N constructions are  different 
from internal such in terms of distribution and interpretation. They also differ from 
wh-exclamatives, in the sense that they are more restricted in terms of the range of 
noun  interpretations  allowed.  It  has  been  suggested  that  quite  is  not  a  degree 
operator, but that it involves an interpretation of the individual being remarkable as 
an N. 
204 Source: http://conundrum131.tripod.com/childhood.htm 
205 Source: www.fanfiction.net›Anime/Manga›Naruto
206 Source: http://www.bartleby.com/310/6/1.html 
207 The examples in (81) are from Bolinger (1972).
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5.3 Much/ more of an N 
In  chapter  1  (§2.1.4)  we  briefly  discussed  the  distribution  and  interpretation  of 
predicative partitive structures (e.g.  more of an idiot),  which enable the use of a 
degree quantifier to modify nouns on an interpretation that looks more like a degree 
interpretation  than  the  usual  quantity  interpretation  such  expressions  get  in  the 
nominal domain. That is, these structures seem to quantify over properties rather 
than measuring the size of sets of entities in terms of quantity. This makes them 
more similar  to degree modifiers  as  we know them from the adjectival  domain,  
therefore, and raises the question whether this is indeed how they should be treated. 
This  is  the  hypothesis  we  will  investigate  in  this  section.  We  will  show  that, 
although they do seem to involve operations on scales (namely typicality scales),  
these are not provided by the lexical noun, but are introduced by indefinite nominal  
predicates.  In  addition,  these  scales  can  be  brought  about  with  any  noun. 
Consequently, occurrence in the predicative partitive structure cannot be used as a 
test for (lexical) nominal gradability.
It  should be noted,  first  of  all,  that  predicative partitive  structures  are  rather 
specific to English, where they can be used with a variety of nouns. Other Germanic 
languages (e.g. Dutch), and Romance languages make use of a different syntactic 
structure: in Dutch and French the degree modifier (e.g. meer, teveel etc., plus etc.) 
directly combines with the DP, without the mediation of a preposition..208,209
208 A degree expression may also modify a DP predicate without the mediation of the preposition of, as 
in (i).  In this case, the restriction to singular indefinites disappears.  The DP can also be definite, for 
example (similarly to quite), as in (ii) (all examples are from Neeleman, van de Koot and Doetjes 2004; 
see also Sassoon 2007a).
(i) a. He is too much a scientist to care about such problems.
b. This is less a typical Italian opera than most of Puccini's.
(ii) I wonder how much the village idiot he is generally considered. 
209 In Romance another option is available, namely a degree operator may combine with a bare noun in 
predicative position; this is illustrated below for Romanian and Spanish, but similar facts obtain in French 
and Italian:
(i) a. E mai copil decât credeam. [Romanian]
is COMP child than thought.1SG
'He is more childish than I thought.'
b. Es muy niño. [Spanish]
is very child
'He is very childish/ young.'
The nouns  seems to be recategorized as  adjectives  here  (cf. also Le Bruyn 2010 for  the  suggestion, 
following Van Peteghem 1993, that these languages allow for an adjectival reanalysis of nouns): they  
accept degree words that exclusively select for adjectives, and they may also occur in other environments 
normally exclusively reserved to adjectives, such as modification of a noun or nominal pro-form:
(ii) a. unul mai copil ca mine
one.the COMP child than me
'one (who is) more child-like than me
b. una niña muy niña
a child.FEM very child.FEM 
'a girl (who is) very child-like'
More work is needed to understand exactly what is happening in these cases – not in the least on the side  
of  the  interpretation.  In  (i)a,  '(mai)  copil'  seems  to  mean  something  like  'having  (more)  properties 
typically  associated  with  children'  and  is  typically  used  when  someone  shows  naïve or  immature/ 
irresponsible behaviour. In (i)b 'muy niño' may also be used in this sense, but it may also simply refer to  
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As far as their distribution in terms of syntactic positions is concerned, these 
constructions are most frequently used in predicate position, i.e. after the copula be, 
or  other  copular  verbs  or  verbs  taking  the  noun  as  a  secondary  predicate  (e.g. 
become,  make someone X etc.), as well as with the verb have. The non-predicative 
use is not completely excluded, but it displays a lot more variation depending on the  
noun used, as well as on the verb used. The examples below illustrate some contrasts 
between  the  predicative  and  non-predicative  use;  according  to  Bolinger  (1972) 
gradable  nouns  and  semantically  rich  nouns  can  be  used  more  easily  in  non-
predicative positions (e.g. (83)a vs. (83)b).210
(82) a. It is less of a telescope than I had hoped. 
b. *I bought less of a telescope that time.
(83) a. I received less of a surprise than I expected.
b. *I received less of a letter than I expected.
There is also a difference with respect to the type of verb used. Bolinger (1972) 
observes  that,  unlike  non-personal  (i.e.  [-human])  gradable  nouns,  personal  (i.e. 
[+human]) ones are acceptable in what he calls "indefinite" contexts, but not always 
in  "definite"  ones.  By "indefinite"  (vs.  "definite")  contexts  he  seems to refer  to  
intensional contexts (i.e. with verbs like seek, need etc.), or more generally contexts 
that  do  not  presuppose  the  existence  of  the  individual  (e.g.  contexts  where  one 
wonders about a given qualification). The contrast is illustrated below.
(84) a. I need more of an expert for that job. [+human]
b. *I found more of an expert for that job.
(85) a. He told enough of a lie to convince them. [-human]
b. He committed too much of a nuisance to be forgiven. 
Our searches of the Corpus of Contemporary American English seem to confirm 
Bolinger's  data.  Nouns denoting [+human] individuals (e.g.  more of  a man/ boy/  
woman/ expert/ artist  etc.) seem to be restricted to occurring in predicate position 
within such structures. Inanimate nouns tend to occur in  modalised contexts (e.g. 
might be seeing), as arguments of intensional verbs and attitude verbs (e.g.  want, 
hope for) or within non-argumental prepositional phrases (e.g. working under even 
more  of  a  microscope  than  before,  forced  me  into  more  of  a  diplomatic  role, 
someone with less of a past and more of a future etc.) 211 Bolinger (1972) suggests 
childhood age, so 'very young' (cf. also desde muy niño 'from early childhood'). It is not completely clear 
at this point exactly how the interpretation of these "adjectivized" nouns relates to the noun interpretations 
we discuss in this dissertation,  in particular the stereotypical interpretation of nouns (cf. §3.4) and the 
interpretation of  more of an N structures discussed in this section.  But it  seems to pattern more with 
adjectives in the view of nouns and adjectives that we suggest in chapter 5 (see also chapter 4, section 2, 
for relevant discussion).
210 The examples in (82)-(85) are from Bolinger (1972).
211 For  example, searches including verbs like  find,  talk  to,  meet,  hire followed by  more of  a have 
returned no hits (http://corpus2.byu.edu/coca/ consulted on 17.10.2011). A noticeable tendency is for the 
nouns occurring within predicative  partitive  constructions  in  non-predicative  positions  to  be  general, 
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that what determines this difference in distribution is very possibly the readiness 
with which the noun, whether gradable or non-gradable, admits of being interpreted 
in terms of an underlying predication. According to him, this is easier with gradable 
nouns than with non-gradable nouns – e.g. He told enough of a lie to convince them 
can be interpreted as 'what he told was enough of a lie to convince them'. But an 
example like  *He wrote enough of  a novel  to earn the necessary money.  is  not 
acceptable precisely because it is not likely to be interpreted as 'what he wrote was  
enough of a novel…'. We do not see at this point how to make his suggestion more 
precise, especially since the paraphrase in fact corresponds to an acceptable use of 
the noun with a predicative partitive construction in predicate position. Hence, it is 
not immediately clear what would exclude an interpretation that would correspond 
to an example like 'what he wrote was enough of a novel...'. At this point we will  
only conclude by restating the observation that the non-predicative use is easier in 
contexts where the existence of a particular individual is not presupposed,  and we 
will return to this after considering the interpretation of these constructions.
In  sum,  the  distribution  of  predicative  partitive  structures  is  rather  restricted 
cross-linguistically, and, within English too, it displays a number of idiosyncrasies, 
which we will put aside in what follows.212 The predominance of the predicative use, 
however, is significant, and should play a role in the analysis of these structures.
As  for  the  interpretation  of  predicative  partitive  structures,  it  was  shown in 
chapter 1  (§2.1.4)  that they may be used with a variety of nouns, both with nouns 
typically taken to be gradable, as in (86), and with arbitrary, non-gradable nouns, as 
in  (87),  and  may quantify over all  and  any  properties  associated  with N.  These 
include stereotypical  properties,  as  in  (88),  as  well  as  prototypical  properties,  as 
illustrated in (89). In this last respect these structures differ from all the other types 
of modification examined so far (i.e. internal  such,  wh-exclamatives,  quite) which 
were seen not to allow prototypical interpretations.
(86) a. He's more of a fool than I thought. 
b. It was so much of a failure that he decided never to try again.
(87) a. The BMW is more of a car than the Smart.
b. Martin is more of a linguist than anyone I know.
(88) a. Julie is too much of a boy to wear nylons or tights.
b. The old Cadillac that my grandpa owned was more of a boat than my 
dad's old Lincoln Continental.
(89) The robin is more of a bird than the penguin.
abstract terms such as role, approach, future etc. (e.g. taking more of a policy role, might be seeing more  
of a collective system,  beginning to see more of a team approach,  [they] see more  of a  future in crime 
etc.).
212 Predicative partitive structures also display certain idiosyncrasies with respect to the acceptability of 
various degree modifiers. The most frequent and most readily accepted structures are comparatives. When 
other degree words are used one finds more variation in acceptability. For example, so, too, that etc. are 
less  easily  accepted,  but  there  is  a  lot  of  variation  among them,  and among the  nouns that  may be  
embedded in the respective structures (see Bolinger 1972 for more discussion).
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The  interpretation  seems  to  be  in  terms  of  the  appropriateness  of  calling  the 
individual  in  question  an  N,  in  virtue  of  it  exhibiting  the  attributes  typically 
associated with N. This makes the interpretation of these structures very similar to  
metalinguistic comparison, where what  is  compared is not the extent  to which a 
certain property holds of e.g. two individuals, but the appropriateness of applying 
one or the other description to an individual. Interestingly, with predicative partitive 
structures this sort of interpretation seems to be the one that is always available, i.e.  
also when two individuals are compared with respect to the same predicate, as in 
some  of  the  examples  above,  not  only  when  comparing  the  appropriateness  of 
applying  one  or  another  description  to  the  same  individual  as  illustrated  below 
(which is, incidentally, the majority of examples found):213
(90) a. My problems are more financial than legal.
b. He's more of a literary critic than a writer. 
To sum up so far, partitive predicative structures are different from the structures 
with internal such in terms of interpretation, as well as range of distribution:214 they 
can combine with any nominal, and seem to take in the set of all and any properties 
associated with the indefinite predicate nominal. 
These  may  be  understood  as  typicality  dimensions  in  the  sense  of  Sassoon 
(2007a).  Sassoon  proposes  that  nouns  are  inherently  multi-dimensional;  the 
dimensions need not obey any specific constraint: some may turn out to be common 
in  the  category,  others  may  be  based  on  cultural  conventions  or  scientific 
observations; some properties are a relatively steady part of the linguistic definition 
(they are part of speakers' world knowledge), while other dimensions are completely 
episodic restrictions on relevant predicates  in a particular context.  This seems to 
cover the variety of properties that predicative partitive structures can take in. What 
predicative partitive structures seem to do is to measure and compare the typicality 
of entities in their respective categories. In other words, they seem to operate on a 
typicality scale. If this is the meaning that these structures manipulate, then we can 
also understand their  metalinguistic  flavour:  the more typical  of  the category an 
entity is, the more appropriate will it be to call it an N.215
Interestingly,  however,  this  interpretation  in  terms  of  a  typicality  scale  only 
becomes accessible out of a singular indefinite nominal predicate – it does not seem 
to be available at the lexical level of N as Sassoon 2007a argues. This is indicated by 
the impossibility of using a degree modifier like  more,  inside the DP, to directly 
modify the lexical noun (cf. also chapter 1, §1.2):216
213 Sassoon  (2007a)  also  notes  that  nouns  can  occur  in  what  she  calls  "in  between  predicate  
comparison", where the degrees in two different predicates are compared, but she focuses on comparison 
structures where the degree quantifier applies directly to the nominal predicate, without the preposition of, 
as illustrated below:
(i) Bling Bling says "tweet" (I'm convinced he's more a bird than a cat).
214 They  also  differ  from  structures  with  quite  which  do  not  always  easily  allow  stereotypical 
interpretations. 
215 Nouns like  idiot denote individuals  characterized by one  very salient  property (idiocy), and this 
property will always weigh most in calculating the typicality of individuals. This, we suggest, results in 
the apparent degree interpretation that had been associated with such examples (e.g. by Bolinger 1972).
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(91) *{a/ the} more {idiot/ bird} (than I thought)
 Predicative partitive structures,  which make the use of a degree modifier like 
more possible, seem therefore to involve an operation which coerces the meaning of 
the indefinite nominal predicate in such a way that it can be measured and compared 
(i.e. it can be the input to a degree modifier). In other words, an ordering is brought 
into existence which did not exist, or was not grammatically accessible, at the lexical 
level.217 We may still  understand it  in terms of  a  typicality ordering, in the way 
proposed by Sassoon (2007a), but with this important difference that the ordering is 
not made available lexically, but as the result of a coercion operation applying to the 
indefinite  nominal  predicate.  This  operation presumably  turns  it into  a  set  of 
properties  associated  with  N  that  would  correspond  to  the  set  of  typicality 
dimensions in Sassoon's theory.
We would like to suggest that this coercion is also responsible for the restrictions 
on the syntactic distribution of predicative partitive structures noted above. It may be 
conjectured  that  its  output  is  a  property  denotation,  which  is,  therefore  not 
compatible with an argumental, referential use of the noun phrase, on which it would 
(have to) introduce discourse referents into the discourse  model.218 This is  is why 
these  phrases  are restricted  to  the  predicative  use  or  to  contexts  which  allow a 
property interpretation of the nominal phrase, and do not require or presuppose the 
existence of an individual, namely intensional, non-referential.219
To conclude,  in  this  sub-section we have  suggested  that  predicative  partitive 
structures,  whose  distribution  and  interpretation  differs  from  that  of  the  other 
structures examined in this chapter (especially internal  such), may be analysed as 
operating on a typicality scale (where typicality would be understood in the sense of 
Sassoon 2007a).  This involves a coercion operation which, however, applies not to 
the lexical noun, but to a singular indefinite nominal predicate. Thereby, though we 
are  not  dealing  with  a  plain  degree  modifier/  operator  that  would  select  for  a  
gradable expression, the nominals are coerced into a meaning that can be operated 
on by a degree quantifier. This coercion seems to be relatively easily performed with 
all types of nouns. As such, occurrence in this environment is not a reliable test for 
gradability.
216 Examples may be found where the degree modifier combines with a bare noun in predicate position. 
These are, however, rather infrequent and occur in what seem to be stereotyped combinations of things  
that come in pairs (of opposing elements). Our search of the Corpus of Contemporary American English 
has  returned  a  few  such  combinations:  more  fiction  than  fact,  more  symbol  than  substance,  more  
adversary than ally,  more boy than man,  more insult than injury.  We take these cases to be  similar to 
other uses of bare nouns in English that are restricted to such mostly idiomatic combinations, such as bare 
coordination:  husband and wife,  mother and daughter, bow and arrow(s),  knife and fork,  needle and 
thread (cf. de Swart and Zwarts 2009, Heycock and Zamparelli 2003, Lambrecht1984).
217 If  this coercion seems to be easier with some nouns than with others, this may be because certain  
classes of nouns already make certain properties salient, which can be made use of in creating a typicality 
scale the partitive can apply to (e.g. gradable nouns, "semantically rich" nouns, stereotypical nouns).
218 This characterisation was inspired by McNally's (2009) adaptation of Doherty's (1993) generalization 
concerning the distribution of subject relative clauses without  that (e.g.  I have an idea might work – 
McNally  2009):  "subject contact clauses are licensed only in nominals that do not introduce persistent 
discourse referents into the discourse model" (p. 175). 
219 For property analyses of (certain types of) arguments of (certain types of) verbs, see Dobrovie-Sorin 
and Laca 2003, Dobrovie-Sorin and Beyssade 2004, van Geenhoven and McNally 2005 a.o.
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5.4 Concluding remarks
In  this  section  we  have  examined  wh-exclamatives,  structures  with  quite and 
predicative partitive structures, i.e. constructions which had been generally treated 
on a par with the so-called "degree" such. Given the analysis we proposed in section 
3 for  such, which was argued not to be a degree operator, the question arose how 
these other constructions should be analysed. It has been shown that they differ from 
internal  such, as well as from one another, both with respect to the range of nouns 
they  may  modify  and  to  the  interpretation.  On  the  one  hand,  this  confirms  the 
analysis we have proposed for internal  such. On the other hand, it means that, in 
principle, having excluded a degree analysis for internal  such would not entail the 
same for these constructions. Indeed, for wh-exclamatives we have suggested that an 
analysis in  terms of  a  degree operator  may be maintained.  On such an account, 
however, the way the operator is supplied with the necessary gradable meaning on 
which it can operate,  namely by the insertion of a contextually salient property, a 
mechanism which is easily and generally available, makes the lexical gradability of 
the noun irrelevant, as well as harder to detect. As for quite-structures, we suggested 
that they need not be analysed as degree constructions, but rather as conveying that 
the individual  in  question stands out  in  its  domain.  Finally,  predicative  partitive 
structures have been argued to indeed involve some sort of coercion, whereby the 
degree  quantifier  can  apply  to  a  typicality  scale.  This,  however,  is  not  lexically 
available  with (a  particular  class  of)  nouns,  but  is  obtained  out  of an  indefinite 
nominal  predicate  with virtually  any  noun.  As  such,  occurrence  in  this  structure 
cannot be used as a test for (lexical) gradability. 
6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have examined the case of  such. A fundamental distinction had 
been proposed in the literature between a "kind" such and a "degree" such. We have 
argued against this view and showed that an analysis as a degree operator cannot be 
maintained. We have proposed that "internal"  such  (thus labelled here in order to 
distinguish  it  from  the  usual  anaphoric  and  deictic  uses  of  the  "kind"  such,  or 
"external" such) is also a kind-referring expression. Internal and external such differ 
in the way the sub-kinds are identified. In the case of internal such, the requirement 
is for  salient  sub-types  that  are  identified  by  natural  consequences  (which  are 
expressible by means of result clauses). The nouns one might want to call gradable 
turn out to be only a subset of the nouns that make available the required sort of sub-
types. In the last part of the chapter we briefly examined  wh-exclamatives,  quite-
structures  and  predicative  partitive  structures  (more  of  an  N).  The  range  of 
distribution,  the mechanisms by which  gradability  may come into play,  in  those 
cases where it seems to be indeed involved, or the structural level where a gradable 
meaning becomes available do not allow us to make a distinction between lexically 
gradable and non-gradable nouns. It  turns out, therefore, that occurrence in these 
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environments cannot be used as a reliable test for (lexical) nominal gradability, or as 
evidence in favour of the existence of gradable structures in the semantics and/or 
syntax of nouns that would be similar to what is found with gradable adjectives. 
Similarly to what we saw in the previous chapter, however, gradability may interact 
with  other  phenomena,  such  as  the  identification  of  sub-kinds  or  'remarkability' 
judgments. 

Chapter 4   "DEGREE ADJECTIVES"
1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on a phenomenon that is central to the topic of gradability in 
the nominal domain, namely modification by degree adjectives. From the discussion 
of gradability tests in chapter 1, the availability of modification by degree adjectives 
emerged  as  the  seemingly  most  restricted  environment  sensitive  to  nominal 
gradability. The central question that this chapter addresses, especially in view of the 
negative conclusions of previous chapters in connection with other potential test for 
gradability, is whether degree adjectives are, indeed, a reliable test for gradability in 
the nominal system.
To recall  the  basic  observation,  consider  examples  (1) and  (2).  The  relevant 
interpretation of the adjectives considered is the one they receive in the examples 
given in (1). It seems that when they modify nouns that encode a gradable property 
in their lexical meaning they indicate that this property holds to a high degree. When 
they  modify  ordinary,  non-gradable  nouns,  as  illustrated  in  (2),  these  adjectives 
receive a different interpretation,  namely their basic, literal interpretation:  concrete 
physical size in the case of big, negative qualitative evaluation in the case of terrible  
or completeness in the case of complete. 
(1)  a. a big {idiot/ eater} 
b. a terrible {coward/ bore}
c. a complete idiot
(2)  a. a big {lad/ house}
b. a terrible {doctor/ idea}
c. a complete description
The interpretation of the adjective-noun combinations in (1) seems to parallel that of 
the  corresponding  adverb-adjective  combinations  illustrated  in  (3) below,  in  the 
sense that in all of these examples, the modifier contributes an indication of the high 
degree to which the property denoted by the modified expression holds. 




In other words, the relation between the adjective and the noun it modifies seems to 
parallel the relation between a degree modifier and a gradable adjective. Therefore, 
the question that arises when faced with such examples is whether the adjectives in 
(1) indeed function as degree modifiers or operators in the nominal domain similarly 
to  how the expressions  in  (3) are  generally  argued to function  in  the  adjectival 
domain, and whether their distribution and interpretation can be taken as evidence in 
favour of the presence of a semantic gradable structure and of a DegP in the syntax  
of certain nouns. This is the question we will try to answer in this chapter. 
As already noted in chapter 1, degree adjectives make up a rather heterogeneous 
class and  their  use  is  often  collocational  in  nature,  or,  at  least,  they  have  a 
distribution that is marked by many lexical irregularities within English, as well as  
across  English  and  Romance  among  otherwise  similar  adjectives.  These 
idiosyncrasies  must  be  acknowledged.  However,  if  one  puts  them aside,  certain 
patterns  emerge  quite  clearly.  In  principle,  there  are  three  potential  classes  of 
candidates  to  the  status  of  a  degree  adjective  in  the  sense  relevant  here,  which 
exhibit different properties. These are classes that were already illustrated in chapter 
1,  namely adjectives which in their basic,  non-degree use refer  to size (e.g.  big, 
huge,  enormous etc.), evaluative adjectives (e.g.  terrible,  amazing,  incredible etc.), 
and the so-called adjectives of purity and veracity (e.g.  real,  true,  perfect  etc.). In 
this chapter, we will re-examine in more detail the distribution of these adjectives  
with respect to different types of nouns, as well as with respect to syntactic position 
(i.e.  attributive  vs. predicative uses).  This investigation will  result in  a  necessary 
reconsideration of the status of the alleged degree adjectives included in chapter 1. 
For example,  real  and size adjectives  will  be argued not to be degree operators, 
while for other adjectives it will also be shown that different analyses are possible. 
The behaviour of each class will be examined in turn. 
Section 2 focuses on size adjectives. We will examine the distributional patterns 
of these adjectives and their consequences for possible analyses of the adjectives, as 
well for the use of such modification as a test for gradability. As it turns out, the 
facts  here  do  not  conclusively  support  a  degree  analysis,  but  rather  favour  an 
alternative  account  in  terms  of  abstract  size,  on  which  the  adjectives  do  not 
manipulate  gradable  structures  that  nouns  would  be  assumed to have.  Section  3 
focuses  on  evaluative  degree  adjectives,  a  class  which  exhibits  an  even  larger 
amount of lexical variation in terms of collocational restrictions. We will examine 
their distribution, and the differences they exhibit as compared to size adjectives, 
and  conclude  that,  although  at  first  sight they  may  be  a  better  indication  of 
gradability, they also show differences as compared to their adverbial counterparts 
that function as degree modifiers in the adjectival domain (e.g.  terribly  etc.).  We 
therefore  suggest  an  alternative  way  of  deriving  the  degree-like  interpretation. 
Section 4 re-examines the distribution and interpretation of real-type adjectives and 
argues for a different account of these adjectives: not as degree adjectives, but as 
adjectives  whose  semantic  contribution  is  rather  to  be  understood  in  terms  of 
epistemicity/ evidentiality. Subsequently, we briefly consider totality adjectives such 
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as  complete,  absolute  etc., which seem to be compatible both with an analysis as 
degree  expressions,  and  with  an  analysis  similar  to  that  proposed  for  real-type 
adjectives. The main conclusion of this chapter will be that there is no clear evidence 
for the existence of adnominal degree operators/ modifiers in a parallel way to what 
is generally assumed for the adjectival domain. 
2 Size adjectives
In  this  section  we  examine the  first  case  of  expressions  that  look  like  degree 
modifiers in the nominal domain, namely size adjectives, and show that the facts do 
not  necessarily  support  an  analysis  of  these  adjectives  as  degree  expressions, 
whether  on  a  degree-based  or  a  degree-less  approach  to  gradability.  In  order  to 
account for their syntactic and semantic behaviour it is not necessary to assume that  
they  directly  manipulate  gradable  structures  (whether  represented  in  terms  of 
degrees or orderings). We will propose that an alternative analysis, which takes size 
adjectives to always be predicates of (abstract) size, can be extended to all cases and 
the sometimes peculiar combinatorics with the noun can be put down to mechanisms 
that  are independently needed in order  to  account  for  non-intersective adjectives 
more  generally.  Modification  by  size  adjectives  turns  out  to  differ  from  degree 
modification in the adjectival  domain; even though the resulting interpretation is 
very similar, the mechanism by which it is brought about is different. This will also 
have consequences for our understanding of gradable nouns. 
2.1 Distribution and interpretation
In this section we examine the distribution of size adjectives with respect to types of 
nouns, as well as the interpretation obtained in these contexts. Putting aside some 
distributional idiosyncrasies that  will be briefly discussed towards the end of the 
section, it seems that adjectives like big can be used quite generally as modifiers of 
nouns that encode a gradable property in their lexical meaning.
In their  basic,  literal  use,  adjectives  like  big,  enormous,  huge etc.  receive an 
interpretation in terms of concrete, physical size, as in (4). When they modify nouns 
which encode a gradable property in their lexical meaning, the adjectives seem to 
measure this property and, thus, contribute a (high) degree interpretation. This is 
illustrated in (5), where the adjectives are shown to modify gradable nouns, whether 
[+human] or [-human], count or mass.220 For example,  a big idiot is  'a very idiotic 
person'. In other words, the relation between the adjective and the noun it modifies 
seems to parallel the relation between a degree modifier (e.g.  very) and a gradable 
adjective (e.g. idiotic, foolish etc.). 
220 Note, however, that with abstract mass nouns the adjective great is used in English, not big, while in 
the Romance languages there is no such difference: French grand, Romanian mare etc. will be used both 
with count and with mass nouns. 
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(4)  a big {lad/ house}
(5)  a. a {big/ huge} {idiot/ beer-drinker/ football fan}
b. great courage/ immense pleasure 
c. a huge blunder/ a gargantuan appetite/ a big mistake
As shown in chapter 1, nouns under figurative stereotypical interpretations (of 
the type found with internal  such, for example – cf. chapter 3,  §3.4) cannot be so 
modified by degree adjectives.  The resulting interpretation of such adjective-noun 
combinations  is  fundamentally  different: only  the  basic,  literal  meanings  of  the 
adjective  and  noun  are  available.  Thus,  in  the  examples  in  (6) below,  the 
interpretation is in terms of concrete size, age or importance of actual boys, lawyers  
and palaces. These adjective-noun combinations cannot be used to describe someone 
who is very boyish, someone who is very lawyer-like or litigious, or a place which is 
very palace-like, in a way parallel to (5) above. 
(6)  a. a big boy
b. a big lawyer
c. a big palace
The facts are not always as clear-cut. A possible counterexample is given in (7), 
where it seems that  baby can be used in its figurative meaning and intensified by 
big:
(7) He is just a big baby.
However,  this example may be understood as a  conjunction: something like 'big 
(~grown-up) and a baby'. Alternatively, it might be that this meaning of  baby  has 
become lexicalized, i.e. it has become so conventionalized that it has developed into 
a separate lexical entry/item of the type idiot or fool. This seems to be confirmed by 
the fact that baby on this interpretation can also be modified by evaluative adjectives 
like  terrible,  which  also  otherwise  fail  to  be  compatible  with  nouns  interpreted 
figuratively (see §3.1):
(8) I am a terrible baby when it comes to pain.
This conclusion is also suggested by the fact that certain conventionalized epithets 
may also accept such modification, while epithetic uses relying more strongly on 
metaphorical interpretations resist it. The contrast is illustrated below:
(9)  a. He's a big {bully/ jerk}.
b. #She's a big angel. 
This seems to suggest that there is indeed a distinction among what may be called 
figurative, stereotypical interpretations of nouns. Some, like boy, denote (unordered 
and variable) sets of properties and for an individual to qualify as such they must 
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have one or more such stereotypical properties; in chapter 3 it was argued that these 
are not gradable meanings. Others, like baby, seem to have lexicalized as gradable 
nouns similar to idiot, in the sense that they denote a set of individuals characterized 
by one salient property, e.g. their immaturity for baby just like idiocy in the case of 
idiots. The latter type may be modified by size adjectives on the relevant reading. 
(see §2.4.1 for more discussion)
Having seen the types of nouns that can be modified by size adjectives on the 
relevant reading, a few remarks are in order concerning the adjectives themselves, 
and  the  variation found among them.  First  of  all, while  big  is  a  rather  'neutral' 
adjective,  adjectives  like  huge,  enormous,  colossal  etc.  encode  a  notion  of 
extremeness in their lexical  meaning and they have been treated as  examples  of 
'extreme' adjectives in the literature (cf. Cruse 1986, Paradis 2001, Morzycki 2010). 
Most  of  the  adjectives  in  the  class  that  will  be  discussed  in  section  3,  namely 
evaluative adjectives, are also 'extreme' adjectives in this sense (e.g. terrible); others 
seem to correspond to 'extreme degree modifiers' (cf. Morzycki 2010), i.e. degree 
modifiers that seem to occur only with expressions that are in some sense 'extreme' 
(e.g.  absolute  – absolutely).  In  other  words,  the  distinction between neutral  and 
extreme adjectives cross-cuts the classification of degree adjectives based on their 
basic  meaning  component  –  e.g.  size,  qualitative  evaluation  etc.  However,  the 
distribution of degree adjectives (with respect to types of nouns and to syntactic 
position, as well as their interpretation in these contexts) is differentiated along the 
lines of the latter, rather than the former, aspect of their meaning, as will become 
clearer once the other classes of degree adjectives are also considered in the coming 
sections. We will, therefore, continue to classify the adjectives based on their literal 
meaning, namely size vs. qualitative evaluation,  and treat each of these classes in 
turn.
In addition to the general size adjectives considered so far, there are also some 
other  dimensional  adjectives  which  may  be  used  to  give  rise  to  degree 
interpretations, such as high and deep. These, however, display a more idiosyncratic 
behaviour and seem to exhibit collocational restrictions in terms of an item-to-class 
selectivity.  For example,  high  can be used with abstractions relating to  anything 
scaled  up,  whether  literally  (e.g. probability,  visibility,  pressure,  intelligence),  or 
figuratively  (e.g. fury,  indignation,  temper,  admiration,  ambition,  influence) 
(Bolinger 1972).221




Other idiosyncrasies are found among size adjectives. In English, for example,  
great and not  big  is used with abstract mass nouns (e.g. great courage, not:  *big 
221 See Bolinger (1972) for more discussion of the factors influencing the availability of modification by 
high.
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courage).222 In addition, unlike big, the rather similar adjective large cannot be used 
with a degree interpretation:
(11) ≠a large idiot
Morzycki (2009) suggests this is because  large  is not a size adjective in the same 
way big is; while general size adjectives like big are indeterminate in the sense that 
they can measure along a number of different types of scales (e.g. area, population, 
'pure' size) among which also the abstract scale of degree size, the adjective large is 
lexically specified as only measuring physical size and does not have degrees in its  
domain. If this sounds more like restating the problem in different terms, it is in fact  
not easy to find a more explanatory account – it does seem to be a matter of lexical  
restriction.  One  might  be  tempted  to  think  that  the  availability  of  'degree 
measurement' is dependent on a general size-related meaning, such as the one  big 
has, while large might be understood rather in more specific size-related terms, such 
as spaciousness  or volume.  This cannot be completely correct,  however.  A more 
specific meaning  does  not  necessarily  exclude  the  availability  of  a  degree 
interpretation:  in French, for example,  the adjective  gros meaning 'fat'  or, in any 
case,  making  reference  to  volume,  can  give  rise  to  degree  interpretations,  as 
illustrated below:
(12) a. un gros con
a fat idiot
'a big idiot'
b. un gros mangeur
a fat eater
'a big eater'
222 Note  also the  rather  collocational  combinations of  the  adjective  heavy  with  nouns in  English,  a 
collocation which persists across categories (see also van der Wouden 1994, 2011 for some remarks on 
collocations of this type.):
(i) a. heavy {smoker/ drinker} 
a'. heavy reliance
b. to {smoke/ drink} heavily
b'. to rely heavily on something
(ii) a. *heavy eater
a'. ??heavy patience
b. *to eat heavily
b'. *to be heavily patient
While  big  smoker, big drinker and  great  reliance  are not  ruled out,  they are clearly dispreferred as 
compared to  the  collocational  combinations heavy  smoker  and  heavy  drinker: a simple  search in the 
Corpus of Contemporary American English returns 2, 8 and 6 examples, respectively, of the former and 
46, 64 and 146, respectively, of the latter (http://corpus2.byu.edu/coca/ consulted on 15.10.2011). In other 
cases,  the  differences  are  not  as  significant,  but  some  preference  still exists  in  favour  of  the  more 
collocational combination as compared to the use of the more general adjective big – e.g. heavy losses vs. 
big losses.  Note that the adjective  heavy  also enters collocations with other types of nouns that do not 
follow the same patterns as the types of nouns considered in this chapter – e.g. heavy {rain/ snow/ traffic} 
(also:  to {rain/ snow} heavily). More corpus research might have very interesting insights  to offer as to 
the possible patterns of distribution and interpretation, but we have to leave such investigation to future  
research and will rely from now on on data that is less collocational and idiosyncratic in nature.
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We will,  therefore,  retain these as  lexical  idiosyncratic  restrictions and put  them 
aside in what follows. In spite of these idiosyncrasies, some patterns emerge quite 
clearly and it is on these that we will focus in the remainder of this chapter. 
There are two relevant properties of size adjectives which need to be examined 
as they play a role in deciding what the most suitable account of size adjectives is. 
One is  their  syntactic  distribution and  associated interpretation,  i.e.  "the position 
generalization" (cf. Morzycki 2009). This will be discussed in the next section. The 
other one is the lack of low degree interpretations obtained by means of (small) size 
adjectives,  or  "the  bigness  generalization"  (cf.  Morzycki  2009),  which will  be 
discussed in §2.3. 
2.2 Syntactic distributional patterns and their implications
This section examines the syntactic distribution of size adjectives on their degree 
reading and discusses its implications for possible approaches to these adjectives, in 
particular  for  their  possible  status  as  degree  operators  or  modifiers.  The  initial 
observation that the relevant reading of size adjectives is restricted to the prenominal 
position  has  prompted  Morzycki  (2009)  to  analyse  them  specifically  as  degree 
modifiers.  However,  it  will  be shown in this section that,  on the one hand,  this  
restriction has  relevant  exceptions and that,  on the other  hand,  the distributional 
pattern displayed by size adjectives is more generally found with non-intersective 
adjectives, and is mostly independent of gradability. Thus, analysing these adjectives 
as degree modifiers (either in terms of applying to a degree argument, or as degree 
functions that apply to an inherent ordering) amounts to a very specific analysis of a 
sub-class of non-intersective adjectives. It will be shown that the alternative analysis 
of the predicative cases,  namely on  in terms of predicates of abstract size  (cf.  the 
suggestion  made  by Morzycki  2009  for  a  subset  of  the  cases),  can  in  fact  be 
extended  to  all  cases,  once  we  admit  the  existence  of  mechanisms  that  are 
independently needed. As such, the position generalization cannot be taken as an 
argument to maintain a degree analysis for any of the cases. 
2.2.1 The position generalization and the degree analysis
The  degree  reading  of  size  adjectives  is  normally  restricted  to  the  prenominal 
attributive position; this is impossible in predicative position or in the postnominal 
attributive  position (cf.  Siegel  1976,  Bouchard  1998,  2002,  Demonte  2008, 
Morzycki 2009 a.o.).  This is shown by  the following examples (taken or  adapted 
from Morzycki 2009):
(13) a. a big idiot
b. That idiot is big.
c. an idiot bigger than anyone I know
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In (13)a the adjective is used in the attributive prenominal position and receives the 
relevant degree interpretation. In (13)b-c, where the adjective is used predicatively 
and postnominally, the intended degree reading is not available. The adjective  can 
only be interpreted in its literal meaning in terms of concrete size in these positions. 
The examples in (13)b-c are not about individuals who are idiotic to a high degree, 
but can only be about individuals who are literally, i.e. physically, big.
This restriction on the syntactic position also correlates with the fact that such [A 
N] combinations entail that 'X is N', but not that 'X is A'. In addition, the fact that the 
two possible interpretations of these adjectives are distinct is indicated by the fact  
that one can be affirmed while the other is negated, without a contradiction ensuing 
(Morzycki 2009):
(14) She's a big eater, though she's not (very) big.
Morzycki (2009) takes this restriction on syntactic position, which he labels the 
"position generalization", as an argument in favour of the idea that these are degree 
modifiers.  Given  the  degree  reading  that  these  adjectives  give  rise  to  and  its 
restriction to the prenominal attributive position, an analysis of size adjectives as 
degree  modifiers  seems justified.  In  principle,  such  a  view can  be  implemented 
either in a degree-based approach or in a degree-less one. In what follows we will 
sketch both types of approaches and their predictions, which turn out to be very 
similar. 
Morzycki  (2009) proposes  an analysis  of  gradable  nouns and their  modifiers 
which is framed within a degree-based approach to gradability, which, in a parallel 
fashion  to  the  corresponding  analyses  put  forth  in  the  adjectival  domain,  makes 
explicit use of degrees. Morzycki argues that gradable nouns like idiot are lexically 
associated with scales  and should be semantically defined in terms of degrees (see 
also  Matushansky  2002b,  Matushansky  and  Spector  2005,  who  make  similar 
assumptions  though  on  different  grounds).  Morzycki  adopts  a  Kennedy-style 
analysis of gradability, in the sense that he assumes both gradable adjectives and 
gradable nouns to denote measure functions from individuals to degrees, i.e. type 
<e,d> (cf. Kennedy 1999a,b, 2007a). This semantic understanding of gradability is 
also associated with a particular syntax. Just like gradable adjectives, gradable nouns 
are assumed to project  a  dedicated functional  projection,  DegNP, as  part  of their 
extended nominal projection. This hosts degree morphemes that turn the measure 
function into a regular predicate (type <e,t>) as needed. In the absence of an overt 
degree  expression,  a  phonologically  null  operator  pos  is  postulated,  in  full 
parallelism  to  what  has  been  proposed  for  the  adjectival  domain.  As  for  size 
adjectives like big, on their degree use, he analyses them as degree modifiers, which 
is motivated by the fact that they can take their own degree modifiers, as illustrated 
below; this indicates that they are phrasal rather than being degree heads themselves 
(as he proposes for other degree adjectives).223
223 Similar facts obtain in other languages too, for example in French (contra Knittel 2005):
(i) a. un {très/ si/ plus} gros con 
a {very/ so/ more} big idiot
b. un {très/ si} grand voyageur 
a {very/ so} big traveller
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(15) a. George is a really big idiot.
b. George is a bigger idiot than Dick is.
Semantically, he analyses them similarly to ad-adjectival measure phrases, namely 
as  predicates  of  degrees  (following  Schwarzschild's  2005  proposal  for  measure 
phrases), i.e. type <d,t>. In this use, size adjectives measure along a scale of degree 
size, just as in other cases they measure along scales of area, population, 'pure' size 
etc. In other words, size adjectives are indeterminate, and have degrees themselves 
in their domain. He therefore makes use of an abstract scale of degree size, onto 
which any degree can be mapped (cf. Bale 2006, 2008). In order to reflect the fact 
that big can measure both individuals and degrees, he ultimately adopts an ontology 
with a type o, which includes objects of both types (e and d). Hence the denotation 
of  big  is of type <o,d>, and the type of its extended projection is of type <o,t>. 
Syntactically, he proposes that size adjectives are located in the specifier of DegNP, 
whose head is occupied by a null operator,  which is  a version of the  Meas-head 
proposed by Svenonius and Kennedy (2006) to account for AP-modifying measure 
phrases. The syntactic structure proposed by Morzycki (2009) is given in (16): 
(16)                      DegNP <e,t>
DegP <o,t> DegN'<ot,et>
Deg<od,ot> AP<o,d>    DegN <ed,<ot,et>>   NP<e,d>
POS big MEASN idiot
This  account  predicts  the  impossibility  of  size  adjectives  on their  degree  use  in 
predicate position for two reasons, syntactic and semantic. First, they are connected 
with  a  particular  functional  projection  which  is  part  of  the  extended  nominal 
structure,  hence  unavailable  outside  of  the  DP.  Secondly,  they  are  predicates  of 
degrees and an argument of the right sort is no longer available to the adjective used  
predicatively. This is because the measure  function, which is the denotation of the 
noun, must be first turned into an ordinary predicate before the noun can interact 
with other modifiers or functional elements within its extended nominal projection. 
So once the subject  DP is fully built,  there is  nothing of the right type (namely 
defined in terms of d-arguments) that the degree adjective can be predicated of. 
Alternatively, the same intuition could be implemented in a degree-less approach 
to gradability, such as that proposed by e.g. Doetjes, Constantinescu and Součková 
(2011) and Doetjes (2009) (see chapter 1, §1.1.2.2 for more detailed discussion). On 
such an approach, gradability is not a matter of degrees but a matter of the presence  
of a (salient) ordering, and relations between degrees are not made use of in the  
semantics.  Instead,  degree structures  are represented as relations between degree 
functions. Adopting such a view for the analysis of the facts discussed here would 
amount to analysing adjectives such as big as degree functions, similarly to degree 
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expressions like  very  in the adjectival domain. Accordingly, when  big  applies to a 
gradable noun like idiot it will result in a subset that includes individuals which are 
ordered relatively high in the domain of the noun. Just as degree expressions such as 
quite,  very  and  extremely  correspond  to  degree  functions  that  are  intrinsically 
ordered with respect to one another, an ordering that is independent of the specific 
adjective to which they apply, it  may be conjectured that  adjectives like  big  and 
huge, for instance, correspond to degree functions that are similarly ordered. That is, 
huge  will  always result  in  a  more restrictive set  than  big.  In  other  words,  huge 
corresponds to a degree function that is more restrictive, or informative, than  big: 
δhuge ⊂ δbig. Such an approach, which analyses these adjectives as degree functions, 
also  predicts  that  the  non-intersective  reading  should  not  be  available  when the 
adjective is used predicatively, and, hence, is applied to something of type <e>: the 
adjective needs to be adjacent to the noun which lexically provides the ordering on 
which the degree adjective operates,  and to which it  applies as  a  function to its 
argument.224,225
The two approaches, therefore, make very similar predictions with respect to the 
syntactic behaviour of size adjectives on their degree use, and both account for the 
position generalization.
2.2.2 Exceptions and an alternative account
As already noted  by  Morzycki  (2009),  there  are  a  number  of  exceptions  to  the 
position generalization, as the examples below show:226
224 Note also that analysing size adjectives as degree functions amounts to a very specific version of the 
analysis of non-intersective/ intensional adjectives as predicate modifiers as proposed by Siegel (1976).  
As such, they would be expected to be barred from the predicate position just as an adjective like former 
is:
(i) a. the former president
b. *the president is former
See §2.2.3 and §2.4.2 for more discussion.
225 Note that in the discussion of the predictions made by the two approaches we have been assuming 
that the subject DP is never of type <d>, which would allow the adjectives to occur predicatively on the 
relevant reading. This assumption will be made explicit when we propose the alternative account in the  
coming sub-sections. We take instead DPs such as John's stupidity to denote instances of properties (or 
tropes), and we take these to be abstract objects of type <e> (cf. Moltmann 2003, 2004a,b, 2007, 2009, 
2011). The same view may be extended to even more abstract objects such as those possibly denoted by 
nouns like degree (e.g. The degree of responsibility was huge.).
226 Similar cases are found in French (cf.also  Grossmann and Tutin 2005, Marengo 2005):
(i) a. Le problème a été énorme les premières années.
the problem has been enormous the first years
'The problem was huge during the first years.'
b. L'échec a été si grand que... 
the.failure has been so big that...
'The failure was so big that...'
(ii) a. Ma joie/ Son indifférence/ Sa générosité/ Sa gentillesse} était grande.
my joy/ his indifference/ his generosity/ his kindness was big
'{My joy/ His indifference/ His generosity/ His kindness} was great.'
b. Son chagrin est immense.
his sorrow is immense
'His sorrow is immense.'
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(17) a. Harvey realized that the mistake was pretty big.227
b. When I lived there over 5 years ago, the [stray and feral cat] problem was 
huge.228
c. For Peter, that failure was big, maybe too big to overcome.229
d. The success was huge.230
e. The mess left behind was huge.231
(18) a. His sorrow was enormous.
b. Her generosity was great.
In these examples, the interpretation of the adjectives does not seem to be distinct 
from that  of their corresponding prenominal uses – e.g.  big problem,  huge mess, 
enormous generosity etc. The availability of the predicative use of degree adjectives 
seems to depend on the type of noun used as a subject. The cases considered before  
(cf. examples (13)), where the degree interpretation was seen to be restricted to the 
attributive prenominal position, were examples of [+human] nouns. The examples in 
(17)-(18) above,  where  the  adjectives  can  occur  predicatively,  contain  [-human] 
nouns, whether they are count nouns (e.g.  problem,  mistake  etc.)  or  mass nouns 
denoting states, emotions or feelings, qualities (e.g.  sorrow,  generosity etc.).232 The 
question then arises as to how these two types of patterns should be interpreted (and 
reconciled). 
Morzycki (2009),  for whom the position generalization is a necessary feature 
identifying degree adjectives as such, adopts the following position with respect to 
these facts. First, he argues that these are not instances of the 'degree use' of size  
adjectives;  they are ordinary predicative adjectives  whose interpretation is not in 
terms of degree, but in terms of size, though in a metaphorical or abstract sense, and  
only has a degree flavour because of the type of noun used. Secondly, he argues that  
not only are these not instances of the degree use of the adjective found in big idiot, 
but  also  that  these  nouns  are  not  gradable,  which,  in  the  framework  he  adopts, 
translates as saying that they are not to be represented as being of the same semantic  
type as gradable adjectives (namely type <e,d>), while nouns like idiot are.
His  first  conclusion is  correct,  and it  is,  in  fact,  a  necessary consequence of 
analysing  these  adjectives  as  degree  expressions,  as  shown in  the  previous sub-
section. On any type of approach to gradability, a degree operator or modifier would 
need to be adjacent to the noun which provides the gradable structure on which it  
227 Source: http://community.foxsports.com/papaclinchsaint/blog/2010/04/17
228 Source: http://www.wnep.com/news/countybycounty
229 Source: http://andyatfaith.blogspot.com/2010/04/one-of-most-amazing-things-about-god-is.html 
230 Source: http://apps4ottawa.ca/en/ideas/107 
231 Source: www.fanfiction.net/s/3513784/1/ninja_sleepaway_camp 
232 Note that the degree readings arise with abstract mass nouns when they refer to instances, not kinds, 
of properties. Thus, the relevant reading is only available in (i)a, while in (i)b, a generic sentence, this 
reading is not available, and only the regular qualitative reading of the adjectives  great and  amazing 
obtains, while the size adjective huge is odd. 
(i) a. John’s patience is {great/ amazing/ huge}.
b. Patience is {great/ amazing/ ??huge}.
This also confirms our analysis that such adjectives are predicated of instances of properties (see §2.4 for 
more discussion).
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operates and in whose extended functional projection the DegP that hosts them is 
located. In other words, adnominal degree operators or modifiers can only appear in 
a  prenominal  configuration,  and  will  be  banned  from  the  predicative  position. 
Consequently, any predicative uses that appear to exist will need to be excluded as 
cases of degree modification and accounted for in a different way. Morzycki points 
out that some ordinary size readings of size adjectives have a roughly degree-like 
flavour because of the nature of the modified NP. He argues that these are not true 
degree readings but rather size readings that make reference to size along a possibly  
abstract dimension, one that may correlate with some intuitive sense of extremeness 
or severity. In his view, these uses, unlike true degree readings, seem to be in some 
important sense genuinely metaphorical. His main argument that such cases pattern 
with ordinary size readings rather than with degree readings is precisely that they 
fail  to  accord  with  the  position  generalization  as  they  can  occur  in  predicative 
position.
This seems indeed a plausible approach to the data in (17). When the subject is a 
[+human] individual-denoting nouns like idiot the predicative adjective attributes a 
property  to  the  individual  referred  to  by  the  subject  DP.  The  only  available 
interpretation then is in terms of physical size of the individual. When the subject is 
a [-human] noun which describes an (abstract) object via a property (e.g.  failure, 
mess,  problem  etc.)  or  names  a property (e.g.  sorrow,  generosity  etc.),  using an 
adjective  like  big predicatively  results  in  an  interpretation  that  seems 
indistinguishable from the degree reading obtained when it is used attributively (as 
in big idiot). The degree interpretation here is, however, only apparent and it is due 
to the way size adjectives are understood in the context of the particular types of 
nouns used, namely nouns which denote abstract objects, or instances of properties 
(cf.  Nicolas  2004,  2010,  Moltmann  2004a,b  for  such  proposals  concerning  the 
semantics of abstract mass nouns). In sum, in some cases, due to the type of noun, 
size adjectives receive an interpretation which is very similar to the degree-reading, 
without the actual manipulation of degrees. The adjectives are not (and cannot be) 
degree modifiers, but regular descriptive adjectives that get an abstract size reading, 
which only mimics the degree interpretation. 
However,  objections  may  be  raised  in  connection  with  Morzycki's  second 
conclusion. Analysing the predicative uses as abstract size predicates, as suggested 
above,  does  not  automatically  entail  that  these  adjectives  can  never  function  as 
degree modifiers when used attributively with these nouns. So these nouns could 
still in principle be gradable.233 Nothing excludes the possibility that, when used as 
an attributive modifier of such nouns, a size adjective like big is ambiguous between 
an  abstract  size  adjective  (which  can  also  be  used  predicatively)  and  a  degree 
233 There is some unclarity about his position with respect to cases like (i) below, where the subjects are 
abstract  mass nouns.  He suggests  these  are "expressions that  seem to involve  what  might  be  called  
'nominalized' degrees" and big (but also small – the importance of which will become clearer in §2.3) can 
measure their size (i.e. the size of degrees themselves) "though the results often have the stilted quality of 
circumlocutions".
(i) {George's idiocy/ Clyde's enthusiasm for goat cheese/ Herman's dorkiness} is {big/ enormous/ 
substantial/ small/ tiny}.
But measuring the size of the degree is precisely what he claims such adjectives do when they are used 
attributively with nouns like idiot, where he argues they are degree modifiers (which are, by definition, 
restricted to occurring within the DP), which he analyses as predicates of degrees.
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modifier  within  DegNP (which  is  restricted  to  the  attributive  use).  When  used 
attributively  with  these  nouns  (e.g.  enormous  mistake,  huge  blunder, enormous 
generosity etc.) it would be, however, almost impossible to distinguish between the 
two readings. The potential degree reading obtained in the attributive use and the 
abstract size reading, which is the only one available in the predicative use, would 
be  indistinguishable.  This  would  also  explain  the  contradiction  pointed  out  by 
Morzycki  and  illustrated  in  (19),  and  the  contrast  with  (20),  which  contains  a 
[+human] individual denoting noun and  where the degree reading available in the 
attributive position is clearly distinct from the concrete size interpretation available 
in predicate position:234,235
(19) a. #That mistake wasn't enormous, but it was an enormous mistake.
b. #That problem wasn't huge, but it was a huge problem.
(20) a. Gladys isn't very big, but she is a very big beer-drinker.
b. Harry isn't enormous, but he is an enormous idiot.
Unlike with [+human] individual-denoting nouns, the two interpretations would be 
virtually indistinguishable with nouns denoting abstract objects characterized by a 
property or directly referring to such abstract properties, without actually ruling out 
the  possibility  that  an  actual  degree  modification  use  is  possible  for  enormous 
mistake. In other words, what seems to make the difference between nouns like idiot  
and nouns like mistake,  blunder,  generosity (and to underlie the contrast illustrated 
above) is that the former have concrete size while the latter have abstract size. But is  
this  enough  to  warrant  that  these  classes  of  nouns  should  be  assigned  different 
semantic types (i.e. <e,d> vs. <e,t>)?
Given the similarity between the abstract-size reading and the degree reading, the 
question arises whether the analysis proposed for the predicative cases discussed 
above  could  be  extended  to  all  cases.  Or  is  there  really  evidence  in  favour  of 
analysing size adjectives as degree modifiers in any of the cases (e.g. in examples 
like big idiot)? 
We will argue that in fact there is no conclusive evidence to support an analysis  
of size adjectives as degree modifiers in any of the cases considered so far.  In the 
next sub-section, we will  show that  the position generalization is  not enough to 
analyse these adjectives as degree modifiers. This distributional pattern is generally 
found with non-intersective adjectives, independently of degree and gradability. This 
suggests that size adjectives should be considered within the broader context of non-
intersective  modification,  and  that  an  alternative  account which  makes  use  of 
mechanisms that are independently needed should be taken more seriously. This will 
be discussed in §2.4 after a discussion and rejection of another possible argument in 
234 The examples in (19)-(20)are from Morzycki (2009).
235 Note also that  if the examples in  (19) are made more  parallel to  (20), by choosing as a subject a 
different noun, which does not support the same sort of abstract size interpretation of the adjective, the  
same result as in (20) is obtained (i.e. no contradiction):
(i) Their intervention was {not big/ small}, but it was / turned out to be a huge mistake!
The war was small(-scale)/ short… but it was a huge/ terrible mistake.
(ii) John is {not big/ small}, but he's a big idiot.
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favour of a degree analysis of size adjectives, namely the "bigness generalization", 
in §2.3.
2.2.3 The broader picture: non-intersective adjectives
The position generalization is not enough to assume that these modifiers depend on 
the presence of gradable structures in the semantics and of a DegNP in the syntax. 
The restriction to the prenominal position is a property exhibited by a large number 
of adjectives which do not give rise to degree readings. 
It  has  often been shown in the literature that  certain adjectives (namely non-
intersective ones) are either restricted to the prenominal attributive position, or if  
apparently the same adjective can appear in both positions (i.e. both prenominal, and 
postnominal  and  predicative)  then  the  different  positions  correlate  with  distinct 
meanings.  The  first  class  is  illustrated  in  (21) below  by  the  English  temporal 
intensional  adjective  former.  The  second  type  is  instantiated  by  adjectives  like 
ancien  in French: in the prenominal use illustrated in  (22)a, it  is intensional and 
corresponds to the English adjective  former, while when used in the postnominal 
and  predicative  positions,  as  in  (22)b,c,  it  receives  an  intersective  interpretation 
('old, aged').
(21) a. the former prime-minister
b. *this prime-minister is former
(22) a. une ancienne église
an old church
'a former church'
b. une église ancienne
a church old
'an old church'
c. Cette église est ancienne.
this church is old
'This church is old.'
A similar case is represented by the class of subsective adjectives, such as those in  
(23), which give rise to the well-known intersective / non-intersective ambiguity. 
That is to say, when an adjective like beautiful is used prenominally, as in (23)a, the 
example  can be  interpreted  either  as  'Olga is  a  dancer and she  is  beautiful',  i.e. 
intersectively, or as 'Olga is beautiful as a dancer' or 'Olga dances beautifully', which 
is  a  non-intersective  interpretation.  Such  adjectives  have  been  called  subsective 
precisely because on their non-intersective interpretation, they license the inference 
that anything that  is [A N] is an N, but not that it  is A. Thus,  (23)a on its non-
intersective reading entails that Olga is a dancer (who dances beautifully) but not 
that she is a physically beautiful individual. Similarly, (23)b can have either a non-
intersective interpretation, which is in fact the most salient one, on which it is about 
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someone who has been a friend for a long time, or an intersective interpretation, in  
which case it is about a friend who is aged.
(23) a. Olga is a beautiful dancer.
b. Peter is an old friend.  
When used predicatively, the adjectives have been argued to no longer give rise to 
such an ambiguity; they only have an intersective interpretation. 
(24) a. That dancer is beautiful.
b. That friend is old.       (Larson 1998: only intersective interpretation) 
Degree  adjectives  do  in  fact  feature  among the  examples  of  non-intersective 
adjectives discussed in the literature (e.g. Siegel 1976, Larson 1988, Bouchard 1998, 
2002,  Demonte  2008  a.o.).  In  Siegel  (1976),  for  example,  examples  of  degree 
adjectives  are found both among the exclusively non-intersective adjectives  (e.g. 
blithering,  utter,  inveterate etc.),  and  among  adjectives  which  have  both  an 
intersective and a non-intersective interpretation (e.g. big, heavy, true, absolute etc.); 
in the latter case, the degree use we are interested in here corresponds to the non-
intersective use of the adjective.
The pattern  presented  above is  not  without  exception.  Some non-intersective 
adjectives  can  occur  in  predicate  position  under  certain  circumstances,  namely 
depending on the type of noun that is used as a subject, or if the relevant 'dimension'  
for interpretation is made salient enough in the context.
For example,  notorious intensional  adjectives  such  as  alleged in  English  and 
supposé  in  French,  which  are  normally  ungrammatical  in  predicative  position, 
become grammatical in the predicative position when the subject is an abstract mass 
noun  like  communism,  as  pointed  out  by  Higginbotham  (1985)  and  Bouchard 
(2002). What Higginbotham and Bouchard suggest is wrong with (25)a and (26)a is 
that it is a category mistake. With an appropriate argument, we obtain a legitimate 
predication, as in (25)b and (26)b.
(25) a. *That Communist is alleged.
b. His Communism was alleged.
(26) a. *Ce communiste est supposé.
  this communist is supposed
b. Son communisme est  supposé.
his communism is supposed
Similar facts have been noted in connection with the distribution of relational  
adjectives by Demonte (1999), Picallo (2002), McNally and Boleda (2004). Such 
adjectives do not generally make good predicates, as shown in  (27)b. However, if 
the right noun is used as a subject, then the predicative use of the adjective becomes 
grammatical,  as  shown in  (28)b.  The  particular  type  of  noun  required  by  these 
adjectives is different (McNally and Boleda argue that relational adjectives denote 
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properties of kinds, where kinds are modelled as entities, following Carlson 1977), 
but the mechanism seems to be the same: as soon as the right type of argument is 
provided, the predicative use of the adjective becomes possible.236
(27) a. El Martí és arquitecte tècnic. [Catalan]
the Marti is architect technical
'Marti is a technical architect.'
b. #El Martí és tècnic.
  the Marti is technical
(28) a. una malaltia pulmonar [Catalan]
a disease pulmonary
'a pulmonary disease'
b. La tuberculosi pot ser pulmonar.
the tuberculosis can be pulmonary
In  sum,  the  pattern  discussed  here  is  similar  to  the  pattern  we  have  seen 
displayed by size adjectives on the relevant reading, in that there is a large class of 
adjectives which are exclusively prenominal with certain types of nouns, while some 
types  of  nouns  allow their  predicative  use  as  well.  Given  the  generality  of  this 
pattern and its general independence from  degree or gradability, we conclude that 
the position generalization is not an argument in favour of analysing nouns such as 
idiot on a par with gradable adjectives and size adjectives as degree modifiers; it 
cannot be taken as (conclusive) evidence in favour of  the existence of  a  DegNP. 
Instead, it should rather be seen as an instantiation of a pattern more generally found 
with non-intersective adjectives and taken to suggest  that there are more general 
mechanisms at work which should be considered in an account of size adjectives 
too. We would like to propose, therefore, that the analysis in terms of abstract size 
suggested for case like  the mess was huge  can be extended to cases like  big idiot  
once one takes into account the independent existence of particular mechanisms of 
semantically and syntactically combining (non-intersective) adjectives and nouns. 
Before discussing this in more detail, we should, however, point out that Morzycki 
(2009) provides another argument in favour of a distinction between the degree use 
of size adjectives and their abstract size reading, and of a degree(-based) account of 
the former, namely the "bigness generalization". It is to a discussion of these facts 
that we turn in the next section. 
2.3 The bigness generalization 
There  is  a  second  set  of  facts  that  has  been  used  as  evidence  in  favour  of  a 
distinction between the degree use of size adjectives and their abstract size reading, 
in addition to the position generalization, namely what Morzycki (2009) labels the 
"bigness generalization". This refers to the general impossibility of using small size 
adjectives to modify nouns and give rise to a low degree interpretation, that would 
236 The examples in (27)-(28) are from McNally and Boleda (2004).
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be the counterpart of the high degree interpretation obtained with size adjectives that 
predicate 'bigness'. Consider the examples below from Morzycki (2009):
(29) a. George is a {big/ enormous/ huge/ colossal/ mammoth/ gargantuan} idiot.
b. George is a {*small/ *tiny/ *minuscule/ *microscopic/ *diminutive/ 
*minute} idiot.
The [A N] combinations in (29)b cannot be interpreted in terms of 'being idiotic to a 
low degree', in a parallel way to (29)a, which is interpreted as 'being idiotic to a high 
degree'.  If  they  are  acceptable,  then  they  can  only  receive  the  concrete  size 
interpretation, not the degree interpretation, i.e. he is both small and an idiot. 237 In 
sum, while adjectives that predicate bigness (i.e. upward monotonic size adjectives) 
systematically and productively license degree readings,  adjectives  that  predicate 
smallness generally do not.
Morzycki takes the  bigness generalization to only apply to degree readings of 
size  adjectives.  Therefore,  examples  like  the  following,  where  the  adjectives 
predicating small size receive an interpretation that  parallels the interpretation of 
their 'big' counterparts, in the sense that they seem to express low degree, are not 
treated as counterexamples:238
(30) a. a {small/ tiny/ minuscule/ microscopic/ diminutive/ minute} mistake
b. a small lie
This  is  because,  on  his  account,  these  are  not  gradable  nouns,  and  when  size 
adjectives modify them they are not instances of the degree use of these adjectives, 
but regular size predicates that simply get an abstract interpretation due to the type 
of nouns. His other argument in favour of this position was that, unlike nouns like 
idiot, nouns like mistake fail to conform to the position generalization (cf. discussion 
in §2.2.2).
237 Note that small size adjectives may be used with a different interpretation, namely to express positive  
or negative evaluation, similarly to an expressive expletive like damned (cf. also Bolinger 1972):
(i) a. a little rascal
b. such a little fool 
This use of little is also similar to diminutives which are used to suggest cuteness with favourable nouns – 
e.g. She’s a little angel, she is!, depreciation with unfavourable ones – e.g. you little rascal/ he’s a dirty  
little coward (examples from Bolinger 1972).
Note also the following contrasts in French provided by Johan Rooryck (p.c.):
(ii) a. un gros menteur [degree]
a fat liar
'a big liar'
b. un petit menteur [depreciation/negative evaluation]
a little liar
'a little liar'
(iii) a. Il est un gros menteur, vraiment le roi des menteurs.
he is a fat liar indeed the king of.the liars
'He's a big liar, the king of liars really!'
b. #Il est un petit menteur, vraiment le roi des menteurs.
  he is a little liar indeed the king of.the liars
238 The examples in (30)a are from Morzycki (2009).
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In  what  follows  we  will  show  how  Morzycki  accounts  for  the  bigness 
generalization  within  a  degree-based  analysis  and  what  the  predictions  and 
problematic  aspects  of  this  approach  are.  Importantly,  the  predicted  correlation 
between the position generalization and the bigness generalization will be shown not 
to hold; hence such facts cannot be taken to directly support the particular account 
proposed by Morzycki. We will suggest an alternative way of approaching the facts  
which  takes  the  bigness  generalization  to  be  an  instantiation  of  a  more  general  
property of the nouns for which it holds, namely the lack of meaning neutralization.
Morzycki (2009) takes the bigness generalization to define the degree use of size 
adjectives, in an absolute way, along with the position generalization discussed in 
§2.2.1, and to support his particular degree-based analysis of gradable nouns and 
size  adjectives.  On his  account  the  restrictions  on the  available  types  of  degree 
modification by means of size adjectives are brought about in part by the underlying 
syntax that is proposed and in part by how the scale structure of the size adjective 
interacts with the semantics of degree measurement. Only big-type adjectives will be 
able to  occur in  the particular  configuration in  which they can modify  gradable 
nouns as only they will make a difference to the positive unmodified noun (where 
pos is used). Let us see how this comes about.
Recall from the discussion in §2.2.1 that on Morzycki's account gradable nouns 
like  idiot  are taken to be of  semantic type <e,d> and to project  a DegNP in the 
syntax.  Syntactically,  size  adjectives  are  analysed  as  specifiers of  DegNP. 
Semantically, they are analysed roughly on a par with ad-adjectival measure phrases 
because "both measure phrases and size adjectives predicate of a degree that it has a 
certain minimum size". Pursuing the parallel with the adjectival domain, he proposes 
that they are introduced by a nominal counterpart  of the  Meas-head assumed by 
Svenonius  and  Kennedy  (2006)  for  AP-modifying  measure  phrases.  Some 
complications arise here, however: while AP-modifying measure phrases do not give 
rise to an entailment to the positive form of the adjective, i.e. they receive a neutral  
interpretation, as  shown in  (31), size adjective do imply that 'x is N', i.e. the non-
neutral or standard-related interpretation is preserved, as shown in (32).
(31) a. He's 1.50m tall.
b. He's tall.
(32) a. He's a big idiot. →
b. He's an idiot.
This leads him to assume that the nominal  Meas-head responsible for introducing 
size adjectives not only introduces the minimum requirement, but also the standard, 
just like pos. Thus, MeasN requires that the individual satisfy the gradable predicate 
(noun) to a degree that (i) is at least as great as the smallest degree that satisfies the 
size adjective, or rather the DegP projected by the size adjective, and (ii) is at least  
as great as the standard for the gradable noun. The denotation of MeasN is given in 
(33) and the corresponding syntactic structure is repeated in (34): 
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(33) [[MeasN]] = λGλMλx [MIN{d : d ∈ SCALE(G) ∧ M(d)} ≤ G(x) ∧ sG ≤ G(x)]
(where M is a measure phrase consisting of a size adjective, SCALE(G) is the 
scale (ordered set of degrees) associated with a particular gradable noun G, 
and MIN picks out the smallest degree on that scale that satisfies M)
(34)               DegNP <e,t>
DegP <o,t> DegN'<ot,et>
Deg<od,ot> AP<o,d>    DegN <ed,<ot,et>>   NP<e,d>
POS big MEASN idiot
Let us now see how he excludes small-type adjectives. If small is used instead of 
big, this will amount to requiring that (i) the degree of that individual's idiocy be at 
least  as  great  as  the  smallest  that  meets  the  smallness  standard and  that  (ii)  the 
individual meet the standard for idiocy. It is in computing the minimum (i.e. the first 
requirement) that a problem arises. Morzycki states the problem as follows. There is 
a minimum degree on the idiocy scale: d0, corresponding to 'not idiotic at all'. There 
can be no smaller degree than this,  so this will be the  maximum on the smallness 
scale. Thus, irrespective of what the standard for smallness is, it will always be the 
case that d0 is small enough to meet it. Therefore, the minimum computed for small 
idiot will always be the same: d0.239 But to say that the individual's idiocy must meet 
or exceed  d0 is to say nothing at all. Since  d0 is the minimum of the idiocy scale, 
every degree of idiocy meets or exceeds it. That means that the requirement will  
always be trivially satisfied.240 And all that remains of the denotation is its second 
part, namely that the individual must meet the standard for idiocy. But this is the  
same denotation that would have been arrived at without the adjective, with [pos N]. 
So  modification  by  small-size  adjectives  on  a  degree  interpretation  will  be 
blocked.241
239 Morzycki's  (2009)  treatment  of  d0  as being the  maximum on the  smallness  scale  and,  therefore, 
always meeting the standard for smallness wherever it may be fixed, is not unproblematic. The adjective 
small, just  like  other  negative  dimensional  adjectives such as  short,  shallow  etc., normally requires/ 
presupposes that the objects measured have some of the respective property or dimension, for example a 
general physical extension, or some, non-zero height or length in the case of short, or some depth in the 
case of  shallow  (cf. Bierwisch 1989, Kennedy and McNally 2005). Such adjectives will  not apply to  
objects that have no (i.e. zero) physical extension, no height/ length or no depth. Similarly, a size of zero  
means not having a size, so it cannot be included on any linguistic scale that measures size. They may  
have a lower-closed scale conceptually, but they cannot reach the zero point due to this presupposition. In 
a parallel way, then, we would not expect the standard of smallness to be met by d0. In addition, even if 
we accept the relevance of d0 (and even try to accommodate that it represents a value that is not an actual 
zero), it is not quite clear that this degree, which is the maximum on the scale of smallness, will be the 
minimum degree that satisfies the standard for smallness.
240 At this point his choice to treat size adjectives as measure phrases introduced by a dedicated Meas-
Deg-head which introduces this minimum requirement becomes crucial. 
241 See  de Vries (2010) for a different analysis, also framed in a degree-based approach, but defining 
gradable nouns as being of type <d,<e,t>> and deriving the impossibility of using small size adjectives 
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On this account, therefore, the explanation of the bigness generalization rests on 
rather  particular  and  not  unproblematic  assumptions  about  the  semantic  and 
syntactic make-up postulated for the [A N] combination. But even putting aside such 
considerations, the analysis cannot be sustained:  the predicted correlation between 
the bigness generalization and the position generalization, which are supposed to 
define the degree use of size adjectives and distinguish it from their abstract size 
reading, is empirically contradicted.
On the one hand, there are cases for which the position generalization does not 
hold, as illustrated again in (36), and which would be excluded from the domain of 
gradability by Morzycki, but which also show resistance to modification by small  
size adjectives, as illustrated in (35):242
(35) a. un {grand/ *petit} courage [French]
a  big/    small courage
b. a {huge/ *small} mess [English]
(36) a. Son courage était grand. [French]
his courage was big
b. The mess they left behind was huge. [English]
On  the  other  hand,  there  are  also  cases  which  conform  to  the  position 
generalization,  as shown by the unavailability of the relevant reading in  (38),  and 
which are taken by Morzycki to be gradable nouns and to allow the degree use of 
size adjectives, but for which the bigness generalization does not seem to hold:243,244
(37) a. un {grand/ petit} mangeur [French]
a   big/ small eater
b. a {big/ small} stamp-collector [English]
(38) a. Ce mangeur est {grand/ petit}. [French]
this eater is   big/ small
b. That stamp-collector is {big/ small}. [English]
from  the  monotonicity  properties  of  positive  vs.  negative  adjectives  and  their  interaction  with  the 
gradable structure of the nouns. 
242 cf.  Van den Velde  (1996)  for  this  observation  in  connection  with abstract  mass  nouns  denoting 
properties. 
243 In addition, as  Morzycki (2005) notes,  adjectives predicating small  size seem to be better  in  the 
comparative and superlative, i.e. the contrasts seem less clear, though he points out that the effect does not 
go away completely:
(i) a. Floyd is a {bigger/ ?smaller} idiot than Clyde is.
b. Floyd is the {biggest/ ?smallest} idiot I know.
244 Here are some attested French and English examples:
(i) a. Les différenciations individuelles vont apparaître à travers les comportements alimentaires 
(certaines personnes mangent plus ou moins vite), les prises alimentaires (gros mangeurs, 
petits mangeurs) et la perception des odeurs et des saveurs. 
(http://www.inpes.sante.fr/OIES/alimentation_atoutprix/pdf/05manger.pdf) 
'Individual differences will show up in eating behaviour (certain people eat more or less 
quickly), the intake of food (big eaters, small eaters) and the perception of smells and tastes.'
b. "She didn't eat very much supper, he said. I don't think she did." […] "Oh, she ate enough. 
She's just a small eater." (Corpus of Contemporary American English)
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This shows that the bigness generalization does not characterize in an absolute 
way those cases that Morzycki would take to be instances of the degree use of the  
adjective and of gradable nouns, while also holding for nouns and adjectives that he 
excludes  from  the  realm  of  gradability.  In  other  words,  there  is  no  complete 
correlation between the bigness generalization and the position generalization. As 
such, these facts cannot be taken as evidence in favour of distinguishing between the 
degree use of size adjectives and their abstract size reading and as support for the  
particular degree-based analysis he proposes. In addition, these facts also correlate 
with another observation, namely that the nouns which resist modification be small  
can never really be neutralized. 
Nouns  that  obey  the  bigness  generalization,  do  so  systematically:  neutral 
readings do not occur in any context. For example, when the noun is used inside 
comparative or interrogative constructions like He is a bigger idiot than his brother 
or How much of an idiot is he?, it still entails that He is an idiot. In other words, it 
seems  that  this  high  degree,  or standard-related,  meaning  is  always  part  of  the 
meaning of the noun and cannot be removed. This suggests that it should be made 
part of the lexical meaning of these nouns, rather than being 'detached' and placed in 
the syntax, as in Morzycki's (2009) degree-based account, where it is taken to be a 
fact about the internal semantics of the extended nominal projection (as it is made 
part of a particular type of operator,  Meas, that occupies the head of DegNP). We 
suggest instead that this should be taken to be a fact about the lexical semantics of  
the nouns. As a general principle, if a meaning is entailed in all the uses of an item, 
then it is part of its lexical meaning (cf. Rappaport-Hovav 2008, Rappaport-Hovav 
and Levin 2010).
Thus,  idiots  are  individuals  characterized  by  a  high  degree  of  idiocy,  i.e. 
individuals whose idiocy is big245. Individuals whose idiocy is small will not qualify 
as idiots. Translating it in terms of scales, this means that, even though in theory an 
idiocy  scale  may  be  conceived  of  that  starts  at  an  absolute  0,  i.e.  at  the  point 
corresponding to 'not idiotic at all'  or 'no idiocy at all', it does not seem that this is 
also  the  linguistically  relevant  scale  for  idiot  (contrary  to  what  Morzycki  2009 
assumes): the domain of the noun idiot seems to include only individuals that have 
some idiocy to start with. It should  also  be noted that not all nouns are alike. For 
example, while nouns  which categorize [+human] individuals based on a gradable 
property like idiot seem to presuppose that the individuals have quite a high degree 
of the property, other nouns, especially those derived from activity verbs, are more 
neutral.246 Among abstract  mass nouns there is also variation. Nouns referring to 
physical dimensions (e.g. length, height) are neutral. But there are also others which 
are derived from adjectives and seem to be based on the non-neutral,  or standard-
related, meaning of the adjective (e.g. tallness). These, however, do not seem to be 
245 As will become clearer in §2.4, we understand "idiocy" here as referring to an instance of a property 
or  trope  (cf.  Moltmann 2004a,b, Nicolas  2004,  2010).  Tropes are a sort  of individuals,  but  they are 
dependent  individuals (cf.  Mary's idiocy,  John's  happiness etc.)  (see Moltmann 2003, 2004a,b, 2007, 
2009,  2011 for  properties  of  tropes).  As compared to  concrete  objects  like  chairs  or  boys that  have  
concrete physical size, tropes have abstract size. The use of the term 'degree' in our description of the  
meaning of nouns in this paragraph should, therefore, not be taken literally, i.e. in the sense it is generally 
understood in the literature assuming a degree-based approach to gradable adjectives, which is also the 
sense in which it is understood in Morzycki (2009) (cf. also chapter 1 for more discussion).
246 These results will be confirmed by the data discussed in section 4. 
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gradable (e.g. ??big[ger] tallness, and even: ??more tallness). Among 'evaluative' 
abstract mass nouns there is also some variation – cp.  courage in  (35) to  comfort, 
which may be modified by small  (e.g.  It was small comfort to know that we were  
being backed by that group. – Bolinger 1972). There is also variation among nouns 
denoting  abstract  objects  characterized  by  a  property  –  cp.  mess,  blunder and 
mistake, problem.247 
This  variation  in  encoding  what  might  be  called  a  standard-related 
interpretation,248 and the persistence of this sort of interpretation throughout the uses 
of certain nouns, is most easily relegated to the lexicon. It is not clear how a  pos-
based approach, which 'externalizes' the standard and places it in the syntax, could 
capture these facts  straightforwardly.  On the one hand, it seems to replicate in the 
syntax information which is already lexically encoded. On the other hand, it would 
require further  complicating  the  semantics  of  all  potential  adnominal  degree 
expressions in a way that would lose the parallel with degree modification in the 
adjectival  domain  (cf.  the  case  of  Meas  above).249 Placing  this  aspect  of  the 
interpretation of gradable nouns in their lexical  semantics,  the way a degree-less 
approach would, seems to capture the facts better and to offer a simpler account. 
To conclude, the bigness generalization cannot be taken as an argument in favour 
of distinguishing between the degree use of size adjectives and their abstract size 
reading or as evidence in favour of adopting a degree-based account which treats 
nouns like idiot, but not blunder, semantically on a par with gradable adjectives, and 
assumes the existence of a DegNP. This means that the suggestion made in §2.2.2-
2.2.3 that the analysis in terms of abstract size could be extended to all cases (i.e. to 
big idiot as well) can be maintained. This view will be detailed in the next section.
2.4 Size adjectives are always size adjectives 
The facts  discussed  so  far  concerning  the  distribution  and  interpretation  of  size 
adjectives  do  not  support  an  analysis  as  degree  expressions.  It  was  shown  (cf. 
§2.2.3) that size adjectives pattern with non-intersective adjectives more generally. 
247 (Certain) gradable nouns seem to be somewhat similar to partial adjectives in that they require some 
minimal amount of the property (as compared to dimensional abstract nouns which start applying from an 
absolute zero), but they may differ in the size of this interval/ amount: for some it may need to be very  
high – e.g. idiot, mess. 
248 If  we were  to  think  in  terms  of  (types  of)  scales  and standards  (cf.  Rotstein  and  Winter  2004, 
Kennedy and McNally 2005), we could say that with nouns the "standard" may not only coincide with the 
maximum or minimum of a scale or be calculated with respect to a norm, but there seems to be a lot more  
variation. 
See Kennedy (2007a) for a proposal of how to relate the type of standard and the type of scale (which 
accounts  for the differences between relative and absolute adjectives),  and McNally (2011) for some 
criticism,  and a  different  proposal  which relies  on the  types  of  properties  adjectives  denote  and the  
strategies for calculating whether they apply or not; the latter seems better suited to account for example 
for those cases where adjectives have absolute standards which do not coincide with the maximum or  
minimum of the scale. 
We will, however, not pursue a description of gradable nouns in these terms here. 
249 But see Bierwisch (1989) for a type of degree-based approach designed specifically to account for the 
differences between dimensional and evaluative adjectives,  including the difference concerning the way 
in which they relate to a standard. 
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The alternative account we have suggested is to take size adjectives as simply being 
size adjectives and to re-analyse all cases of the so-called 'degree' use as instances of 
an abstract  size  interpretation.  Their  sometimes peculiar  way of  combining with 
nouns can be understood as making use of mechanisms generally available to non-
intersective modification. In §2.4.1 we will present the alternative approach to size 
adjectives. In order to account for the exclusively attributive uses, we need a more 
general theory of non-intersective adjectives. This is why in §2.4.2 we will provide 
some  background  on  possible  approaches  to  non-intersective  adjectival 
modification, which will serve to suggest possible directions one could take in order 
to account for size adjectives too, though the choice of the exact mechanism to will 
be mostly left open for future research to settle.
2.4.1 Abstract size 
On  the  view  we  would  like  to  put  forth,  the  apparent  degree  reading  of  size 
adjectives is always simply an abstract size reading  (cf. discussion in  §2.2.2). In 
these uses, the adjective still measures size, but in this case it is the size of instances 
of properties rather than that of objects that have concrete spatial dimensions; hence,  
the abstract nature of the measuring involved. Let us first consider the predicative 
uses  which  have  been  the  first  ones  to  be  dealt  with  in  this  way.  In  predicate 
position, the relevant interpretation will arise when the subject is an object of the 
right sort, for example an abstract mass noun like patience, generosity etc. We take 
such nouns to denote instances of properties (cf. Moltmann 2004a,b, Nicolas 2004, 
2010).250 When  an  expression  is  used  whereby their  size  or  volume  is  to  be 
measured, that will be understood in terms of the degree to which the property holds. 
Similar effects are also found with other adjectives too, as illustrated below:251
(39) a. His patience is sufficient for this job. 
b. The safety of the roads in the Czech Republic is satisfactory. 
c. The length of this board is {satisfactory/ sufficient}.
Nicolas (2010) discusses such effects on the interpretation of abstract mass nouns 
while maintaining that they still basically denote instances of properties. Consider 
the following example from Nicolas (2010):
(40) Julie's love for Tom was greater than her love for Fred.
Nicolas argues  that  sentences  like  (40) compare  two instances  of  love  using  an 
ordering relation associated with the adjective  great. Given the vague meaning of 
250 The view of abstract mass nouns that we are adopting here is also compatible with Chierchia's (1984) 
theory.  He  analyses  nominalizations  like  goodness (e.g.  Goodness  is  good) as  entity  correlates  of 
properties, a sort within type <e>, similar to Carlson's (1977) kinds. As has already been pointed out, 
however, the relevant readings of size adjectives occur in the context where the nominal does not have a 
kind reading, but refers to an instance of a property, i.e. a particular of an entity correlate of a property 
(just as an "ordinary" individual/ object is a particular of the kind) – recall the contrast illustrated earlier:  
#Generosity is enormous vs. Mary's generosity was enormous.
251 The examples in (39) are from Constantinescu and Součková (2007).
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great, this may then be understood as comparing the two instances of love using an  
ordering  relation associated with the noun  love and  the  verb  to  love.  Hence  the 
possibility of a paraphrase in terms of degree: 'the degree to which Julie loved Tom 
was greater than the degree to which she loved Fred'. (p. 16) In other words, the 
basic denotation of these nouns need not be, and is not, actually defined in terms of  
degrees (contra Tovena 2001, for example). What the paraphrase in terms of degree 
reflects is just one among several possible ways of understanding the application of 
certain modifiers or predicates to instances of properties.252
This sort of interpretation will not, however, be available when the DP subject of 
the  adjectival  predicate denotes  a  [+human] individual  (e.g.  that  idiot).  In  such 
cases,  the  interpretation  will  be  in  terms  of  physical  size  –  this  is  the  only 
interpretation that makes sense when applying a size adjective to an individual. This 
accounts for  the unacceptable examples  in  (13)a-b,  which contrast  with those in 
(17)-(18), as well as for the non-contradictory examples in (20), which contrast with 
(19).253
When used prenominally with these nouns, the adjectives can be interpreted in a 
similar way to the cases where they modify property-denoting nouns. The difference 
is that here the  property with respect to  which they are interpreted is part of the 
internal semantic make-up of the noun (e.g. idiocy in the case of idiot). As far as we 
can tell,  with property-denoting nouns, the adjective could apply in either of two 
ways, without that having a visible effect on the interpretation. Note again that with 
such nouns the interpretation obtained in the attributive and predicative uses of the 
adjective will not be distinguishable, hence the contradictory statements in (19). 
The generalization of this account in terms of abstract size is also best supported 
by the distribution of size adjectives – in particular by the facts related to figurative 
meanings that were pointed out in §2.1. It was shown that size adjectives cannot 
generally be used to modify nouns used with figurative interpretations, though there 
also seem to be some counterexamples. Two relevant examples are repeated below 
for convenience. 
(41) a. #Julie is a big boy.
b. He is just a big baby.
It was suggested there that the relevant interpretation of baby may have lexicalized 
into a gradable noun of the  idiot-type. Here is how we may  now understand the 
difference between nouns like boy and nouns like baby. On the one hand, as argued 
in chapter 3, on their stereotypical, figurative interpretation, nouns like boy denote 
sets of various properties that are stereotypically associated with boys. (Some of) 
these may intersect, and they make up an unordered set. In order to qualify as Ns, in  
this sense of N, individuals must have one or more such stereotypical properties. In 
general, they have a relatively large number of them. But sometimes having just one 
252 See also section  3 where a different  type of interpretation of  abstract mass nouns will  show up 
(namely as facts). 
253 This type of interpretation will also be available when the adjective is used attributively with these 
nouns (i.e. idiot), which leads to an ambiguity in these cases, an ambiguity which does not arise with e.g.  
property-denoting nouns.
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such property, if it is a very salient one, may be sufficient.254 This is not unexpected 
given that  the stereotypicality of the properties may vary in the sense that they are 
more  or  less  important  in  deciding  whether  a  given  individual  is,  figuratively 
speaking, an N or not. On the other hand, we would like to suggest that nouns like 
baby,  have  lexicalized  as  nouns  of  the  idiot-type,  in  the  following  sense.  They 
probably originally had a figurative interpretation of the type discussed above, but 
subsequently the set of stereotypical properties has been 'collapsed' and has come to 
be lexically encoded as one property, though a possibly complex, multi-dimensional 
one, such as 'immaturity'. In other words, baby has undergone a lexical change and 
is not represented as a set  of individuals that  all  have a number of stereotypical 
properties  of  babies,  but  rather  as  a  set  of  individuals  characterized  by  their  
immaturity,  similarly  to  a  noun  like  idiot,  which  denotes  a  set  of  individuals 
characterized by their idiocy. This makes it possible to use a size adjective, as it can 
now apply to this one characterizing property inside the meaning of the noun.
We would like to point out again that talking about the degree of a property in 
these cases is just a convenient paraphrase. This is understandable given that the 
meaning introduced by size adjectives in these contexts is very similar to meanings 
obtained by degree modification in the adjectival domain. However, the mechanism 
by which these meanings are obtained is different. We have argued that in all the  
relevant cases the size adjective applies to an instance of a property or trope. These 
are objects (i.e. we take them to be of type <e>) of a particular sort.  Among the 
properties that distinguish tropes from other sorts of objects, we mention here the 
fact that they are dependent (i.e. they depend on another individual in which they are 
located – e.g. Mary's happiness, cf. Van de Velde 1996, Moltmann 2004 a,b, 2011) 
and  that they have abstract size (for more details on tropes, see Moltmann 2003, 
2004a,b, 2007, 2009, 2011). Gradable nouns,  therefore, are those nouns that either 
denote  sets  of  such  abstract objects,  which  have  an  abstract  size  (e.g.  idiocy, 
courage etc., i.e. nouns that  denote properties, whose instances have abstract size), 
or that denote sets of [+/-human] individuals defined in terms of such an object (e.g. 
idiot, a noun that denotes a set of individuals characterized by their idiocy). It should 
be noted, however, that size is not an inherent ordering criterion for nouns: abstract  
size is  not  one for  the gradable nouns discussed  here  (e.g.  idiocy,  courage etc., 
blunder,  problem  etc.,  idiot,  smoker  etc.), just as concrete size is not for concrete 
nouns like  boy  or  house. It may come to be a possible ordering criterion, once an 
explicit modifier is added (e.g. big idiot, huge problem, great courage etc.. just like 
tall boy, big house etc.). This makes an ordering, hence comparison, possible – as in 
example (40) from Nicolas (2010) discussed earlier. 
The mechanism by which, in their attributive use, size adjectives can access a 
property inside the lexical meaning of nouns like idiot, is one that is independently 
needed in the construal of other non-intersective adjectives, as discussed in §2.2.3., 
and may be formally implemented in several ways. This is something that requires 
an  independent,  generalized  account.  However,  offering  a  theory  of  non-
intersectivity would go well beyond the scope of this thesis. In the next sub-section,  
254 It is, probably, this possibility of singling out just one property of the set (which was seen happening 
in the context of internal such with result clauses or in exclamatives) that places these nouns somewhere 
in between ordinary, non-gradable nouns and nouns like idiot, which encode one salient proeprty in their 
meaning (and which are generally considered to be gradable). 
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we will only briefly suggest some possible directions given the existing proposals in 
the literature on non-intersective adjectives that will be reviewed in the first part of  
the sub-section.
2.4.2 Non-intersective uses of abstract size adjectives
In this section we will consider some possible ways of approaching the exclusively 
attributive uses  of  size adjectives  (e.g.  a big idiot)  where they target  a property 
inside the meaning of the noun. In order to do this, we will first review some of the 
main existing accounts of non-intersective adjectives, and the differences between 
intersective and non-intersective adjectives.
There are several types of approaches in the literature. Some assign two different 
semantic (and syntactic) types to intersective and non-intersective adjectives (such 
as Siegel 1976). Others argue that the different behaviour is actually due to there 
being  different  semantic  types  of  nouns  and,  accordingly,  extend  the  argument 
structure of the noun in order to account for the different types of interpretations 
adjectives give rise to in combination with (certain types of) nouns (Larson 1998). 
Finally,  there  are  accounts  which  posit  richer  lexical  structures  for  nouns 
(Pustejovsky 1995, McNally 2006, as well as Bouchard 1998, 2002). 
Probably the best known analysis of the intersective/ non-intersective ambiguity 
illustrated in (23) above and repeated below for ease of reference, is Siegel's (1976) 
doublet analysis of adjectives. 
(42) a. Olga is a beautiful dancer.
b. Peter is an old friend.
Siegel  proposes that  the ambiguity reflects a fundamental semantic and syntactic 
dichotomy holding among adjectives. One class is that of non-intersective adjectives 
(or  non-intersectively  interpreted  adjectives).  These  are  analysed  as  underlyingly 
nominal  modifiers,  which  combine  with  common  nouns  to  form  new  common 
nouns.  Semantically,  they  are  properties  of  properties,  rather  than  properties  of 
individuals (i.e. predicate modifiers), so they are of type <<e,t>,<e,t>>, and combine 
with  the  noun  as  function  to  argument.  This  means  that  they  combine  with 
characteristic functions of sets to form new characteristic functions; in other words, 
they combine with a property to form a new, modified property (hence, they are 
reference-modifying  in  Bolinger's  1967 terminology).  In  the  usual  Montagovian 
way, they invoke intensions (hence the term 'intensional  adjectives').  The second 
class is that of intersective adjectives. Semantically, intersective adjectives are of 
type  <e,t> (i.e.  simply  characteristic  functions)  and  are  extensional  (or  referent-
modifying  in  Bolinger's  1967 terms).255 When  they  combine  with  a  noun,  the 
semantic  result  is  predicate  conjunction,  which  can  be  expressed  through  λ-
abstraction. Their attributive use is accounted for through a mechanism of relative 
clause reduction (for details, see Siegel 1976).
255 More  precisely,  taking  into  account  intensions,  non-intersective  adjectives  are  of  type 
<<s,<<s,e>,t>>,<<s,e>,t>>, and intersective ones of type <<s,e>,t>.
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While some adjectives are assigned exclusively to one of these two classes (e.g. 
aged is only intersective, former – always intensional), a large number of items are 
assumed to belong to both, which is the source of the intersective / non-intersective 
ambiguity. For Siegel this is a case of homophony between two semantically distinct 
elements. Thus, a single phonetic form like old or beautiful actually corresponds to a 
"doublet" old1/ old2 or beautiful1/ beautiful2, respectively, and this yields ambiguity. 
Adjectives like  big  are also such cases: they are treated as ambiguous between a 
non-intersective  use  (i.e.  the  degree  use)  and  an  intersective  one  (i.e.  the 
interpretation descriptive of size). The degree-less approach to size adjectives  (cf. 
discussion in §2.2.1), which amounts to proposing a distinction between the degree 
adjective big, which is analysed as a degree function (hence, a predicate modifier),  
and the predicative size adjective big, is, therefore, directly comparable to Siegel's 
analysis of adjectives.
Although this type of analysis can account, for example, for the entailment facts 
(i.e. that on the non-intersective interpretation [A N] fails to entail that 'NP is A'), it  
also  faces  certain  problems.  First,  as  Larson  (1998)  points  out,  this  approach 
postulates an ambiguity for a lot of adjectives, which is difficult to justify. Secondly, 
as McNally and Boleda (2004)  and  Partee (2010, in press) observe, the predicate 
modifier analysis also makes it hard to explain why the putatively non-intersective 
reading is sometimes available even when the adjective is used predicatively, and, 
hence, is applied to something of type  <e>. Such behaviour is even exhibited by 
privative adjectives like  fake (as in  That gun is fake), as well as other intensional 
adjectives like alleged (recall the examples in (25)-(26) in §2.2.3).
Differently from Siegel  (1976),  Larson  (1998)  proposes  that  the  intersective/ 
non-intersective ambiguity should not be blamed on the adjective, but on the noun. 
He suggests that the ambiguity involves what the adjective is modifying (e.g. the 
individual  or  the  dancing)  rather  than  something in  the  lexical  semantics  of  the 
adjective  itself.  Thus,  he  argues  for  treating  adjectives,  including  the  subsective 
ones, uniformly as type <e,t>, and proposes that some nouns have an event argument 
e which  can  be  modified  directly  by  the  adjective,  just  as  its  standard  entity 
argument usually is.256 The two readings of an adjective like beautiful in a beautiful  
dancer in (23)/(42) above are thus correlated with whether the adjective modifies the 
noun's entity or event argument. In addition, he proposes that the event argument can 
be bound by a (generic) quantifier by the end of the derivation (see Larson 1998 for 
details).  In  the  same  vein,  McNally  and  Boleda  (2004)  propose  re-analysing 
relational adjectives intersectively, as properties of kinds: they posit that all common 
nouns  have  an  implicit kind  argument,  which  is  related  to  the  individual-sort 
argument typically associated with nouns via the Carlsonian realization relation R 
(cf. Carlson 1977). The effect of modification by a relational adjective is to restrict 
the kind described by the modified noun to one of its sub-kinds. Subsequently, the 
kind  argument  gets  saturated  by  a  contextually-determined  kind.  Thus,  a  noun 
phrase like arquitecte tècnic 'technical architect' in (27) ends up denoting a property 
of individuals which can then be applied to an argument like Martí. 
256 Larson (1998) takes the nominal dancer to apply to pairs of individuals <x,e> such that x is the agent 
of e, where e is a dancing event. 
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Such approaches predict the difficulty of using these adjectives predicatively (on 
the relevant interpretation, where the adjective has more than one) and present it as a 
matter of sortal mismatch, i.e. if the subject of the copular sentence does not denote  
an object of the right sort, the adjective cannot be used predicatively. However, if the 
argument  of  the  adjective  is  of  the  right  sort  (e.g.  if  the  subject  of  a  relational 
adjective does plausibly denote a kind), then the predication will be acceptable, as in 
(28)b.  Therefore,  this  type  of  approach  seems  better  suited  to  also  capture  the 
possible predicative uses of such adjectives.
However, this sort of approach, which moves to an intersective semantics for at 
least some of the non-intersective adjectives, entails providing a much more fine-
grained semantics for nouns. As McNally and Boleda (2004) note, such analyses 
result  in  a  very  extended  argument  structure  for  nouns.  This  proliferation  of 
arguments also brings about a consequent proliferation of covert operations that are 
required to properly bind those arguments in the absence of overt expressions that 
have this function, such as the covert generic operator postulated by Larson (1998) 
to bind a noun's  event  argument.257,258 McNally and Boleda (2004) and McNally 
(2006) suggest  that  once argument lists  get  too long, an alternative,  more highly 
structured representation, such as that proposed by Pustejovsky (1995),259 starts to 
look  more  appealing  as  it  allows  us  to  distinguish  those  variables  which  have 
syntactic consequences from those which do not (i.e. those which license discourse 
referents from those which generally do not).
An alternative approach is proposed by Bouchard (1998, 2002). Bouchard argues 
that the semantic part of the entry of a common N (e.g.  mammal) is a network of 
interacting elements (or functions): (i) a characteristic function f which provides the 
property that interprets the N;260 (ii) a specification for a time interval i, which tells 
us at what moment f holds; (iii) an indication of the possible world w which allows 
us to know whether f holds in the "actual" world or in some other imagined world in 
which  f  is  not  necessarily  false;  and  (iv)  a  variable  assignment  function  g,  that 
allows  us  to  determine  the  truth  value  of  the  final  formula  by  associating  each 
variable with a particular entity in the model. On this account, the combination of an 
adjective  and  an  N actually  always  results  in  an  intersective  interpretation.  The 
difference between the traditional intersective and non-intersective (interpretations 
257 McNally (2010) also points out that it is not clear what kind of event the event-argument of nouns in  
Larson’s analysis stands for – e.g. dancer vs. cup, recipe etc. As for McNally and Boleda’s analysis, she 
notes that  it  uses  an ad hoc composition rule,  but one  that  could be generalized to  diverse cases of  
modification.
258 Note that the same criticism can be extended to degree-based approaches to nominal gradability, i.e.  
approaches which postulate  explicit degree arguments in  the semantics of gradable nouns (which are 
defined either as of type <d,<e,t>> as in Matushansky 2002b, or of type <e,d> as in Morzycki 2009) and 
which, consequently, have to postulate a covert operator,  pos, that will bind the degree argument of a 
gradable noun, or to turn the measure function into a predicate, in the absence of overt degree expressions  
in order to. This a possibly undesirable consequence.
259 We  will  not  discuss  Pustejovsky's  (1995) Generative  Lexicon  theory  here,  as  it  would  require 
entering a completely different framework that we will not make use of in the rest of this chapter. We 
refer the interested reader to Pustejovsky (1995 and subsequent work), as well as to McNally (2006), 
Saint-Dizier (2001) etc. for more discussion on criticisms of GL and possible ways of countering them, 
and Asher (2007) for an alternative theory.
260 Bouchard defines this, following Kamp and Partee (1995), as "a measure of the degree to which an  
object falls in the extension of a given concept". 
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of) adjectives is recast in the following terms. In some cases, the meaning of the 
adjective intersects with the whole network of the meaning components of the N; 
this  is  the traditional  intersective  interpretation.  In  other,  specifically  determined 
cases, the adjective intersects with only one of these components in particular; this is 
the  case  of  the  traditional  non-intersective  adjectives.261 In  French  (and  other 
Romance languages) this correlates with the prenominal use of the adjective; when 
in postnominal or predicative position, the adjective cannot access  these internal  
subparts of N, but can only modify the N as a whole. What modification relation can 
be defined crucially  depends  on the  meaning of  the  adjective  (i.e.  what  kind of 
feature it can modify), and the meaning of the N (i.e. what features it has).262 For 
example,  a  temporal  adjective like  future  or  former (e.g.  the future  president  or 
former  senator)  is  compatible  with  the  interval  of  time  i  (and results  in  the 
interpretation 'someone characterized as a president/ senator at an interval of time in 
the future/ past); false (e.g. a false eyelash) is compatible with the possible world w; 
alleged (e.g.  an alleged  communist)  with the value assignment  function,  and an 
adjective like  perfect (e.g.  a perfect scoundrel) with the characteristic function  f. 
When a noun phrase built from the same adjective and the same N can receive more 
than one interpretation, it is because the adjective is in a position to combine with  
different components of N.
This approach seems to offer an elegant and quite straightforward way to capture 
non-intersective (uses  of)  adjectives.  However,  it  is  not  completely clear  how to 
formally represent these meaning components and their interaction with modifiers, 
nor is it always obvious which meaning component is modified by a given adjective.
To conclude, the theories on non-intersective adjectives discussed in this section 
have in common  the search for ways to capture the intuition that non-intersective 
adjectives  modify  something  inside  the  meaning  of  the  noun.  They  differ 
significantly in the chosen formalization of the mechanisms whereby the adjective 
can target such a meaning component, though, even in this respect, we have seen 
that two main directions exist: either to treat non-intersective adjectives differently 
from intersective ones and take them to act as functions on the nouns they combine 
with, or to treat adjectives uniformly and enrich the structure of the noun, elements  
of  which  non-intersective  adjectives  can  be  predicated  of.  With  this  much 
background information, we may now consider some possible directions to take in 
order to account for the behaviour of size adjectives.
Our understanding of size adjectives probably resonates most obviously with the 
type of approach proposed by Bouchard (1998, 2002) to account for non-intersective 
adjectives. On this approach the prenominal adjective is in a position to target an 
internal element  in the semantic  make-up of a noun. A size adjective on its degree 
reading would target the characteristic function  f which provides the property that 
261 His theory allows an adjective to modify only a subpart of N, but, differently from e.g. Pustejovsky 
1995, he does not allow modification of elements internal to the characteristic function  f  providing the 
property that interpretes N, but only modification of N itself, as well as i, w, g. "These are not context-
dependent notions like qualia, but general, nondefeasible subparts that all nouns have". In this way, he  
"avoids  the  problem of  multiple  polysemy  created  by  the  defeasibility  of  the  qualia  structures  and 
sublexical semantic features" (Bouchard 2002). 
262 There is some unclarity on this point. While at first Bouchard argues that the four components are  
present in the lexical semantics of all nouns, he later on suggests that nouns may actually differ in their 
actual semantic make-up.
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interprets the N – e.g.  idiocy  in the case of  idiot.  This is  in fact  how  Bouchard 
himself analyses examples such as a big eater, as illustrated in (43) for French:
(43) a. un {mangeur/ fumeur/ buveur} gros 
a  eater/ smoker/ drinker fat
'a fat eater/ smoker/ drinker'
b. un gros {mangeur/ fumeur/ buveur}
a fat  eater/  smoker/ drinker
'a {big/ heavy} {eater/ smoker/ drinker}'
According to Bouchard, the basic meaning of gros is 'surpasses the norm in volume'. 
In (43)a, the adjective modifies the whole network of the N, and indicates that the 
individuals denoted surpass the norm in volume, size being the most salient feature 
of volume. By contrast, in (43)b the adjective only intersects with the characteristic 
function of the N, and, therefore, says that the norm in volume is surpassed qua 
eater, smoker or drinker. By inference, then, it is interpreted with respect to food, 
smoking and drinking, respectively.
The view of size adjectives we have proposed here may also be implemented in a 
Larsonian  type  of  semantics,  whereby  the  adjective  would  be  predicated  of  an 
(implicit) argument of the noun.263 This argument would be an instance of a property 
that defines an individual as N – e.g. idiocy in the case of idiot. When applied to it, 
the size adjective would give rise to the same interpretation as in examples like huge 
stupidity/ his stupidity was huge.  This sort of argument would then be somewhat 
similar to the content of the characteristic function f from Bouchard's theory as well 
as to that of the 'attribute' given by the N in Higginbotham (1985).
It is important to point out (again) that, although the meaning introduced by size 
adjectives  in  these  contexts  is  very  similar  to  meanings  obtained  by  degree 
modification in the adjectival domain, the mechanism by which these meanings are 
obtained is different. In those approaches to gradability that make use of degrees, the 
semantics of adjectives is basically defined in terms of a comparison of degrees. 
Take,  for  example,  the  pos-operator  that  is  generally  postulated for  the  positive, 
unmodified form of adjectives and which is responsible for introducing the non-
neutral interpretation. The positive form of an adjective like tall will be interpreted 
263 Larson (1998) in  fact  raises  the  question whether  the same type of analysis  that  he proposes to 
account for event-modifying adjectives (e.g.  beautiful dancer  or  former president) could be applied to 
account for adjectives such as  utter or  complete  (as in  an utter/ complete fool) etc. He notes that these 
adjectives are also behaving "adverbially", but the semantics is not event modification, but rather degree  
modification, as the relation between the adjective and the noun parallels that between a degree modifier  
and an adjective. He leaves open the question of how precisely to accommodate these forms, simply 
speculating that "just as we must posit a hidden event parameter in  dancer to accommodate  beautiful  
dancer, we may ultimately be forced to posit a hidden degree parameter in  fool to accommodate  utter  
fool." (Larson 1998:10). The way he talks about it suggests that this argument would indeed be similar to  
the sort of degree argument defined in degree-based approaches to gradable adjectives. In a sense, then,  
this anticipates the extension of degree-based approaches to gradable nouns, as proposed by Matushansky 
(2002b), Matushansky and Spector (2005), and, most explicitly, Morzycki (2009). These analyses propose 
to define gradable nouns in terms of explicit degree arguments, i.e. either of type <d,<e,t>> or of type 
<e,d>.  However,  as  discussed  throughout  this  section,  such  an  account  cannot  be  applied  to  size 
adjectives, which involve something different from degree modification as we know it from the adjectival 
domain. As for adjectives like complete, we will examine them in §4.5.2. 
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roughly as being 'tall to a degree  d which is greater than or equal to the standard 
degree' (see also chapter 1, §1.1). Nothing like this (i.e. comparison of degrees) is 
involved in the case of modification by size adjectives. In all the relevant cases the 
size adjective is predicated of an instance of a property or trope, i.e. an object of type 
<e>, which is part of the meaning of the noun, and results in a size reading, as usual 
–  it  is  just  abstract  due  to  the  particular  nature  of  the  object  involved.  This  is 
completely parallel to how a non-intersective adjective like  old  in  an old friend  is 
interpreted as applying to the property defining the N, namely the 'friendship', and 
measuring the length of the friendship in time. Once an explicit modifier like big or 
old is introduced, this makes an ordering, hence comparison (of idiots and friends, 
respectively), also possible (recall also example (40) from Nicolas (2010) discussed 
in the preceding sub-section).
More work is needed to decide on the best analysis of the non-intersective uses, 
but this is an issue for a more general theory of non-intersective adjectives. Be that  
as it may, it seems that this type of approach, which capitalizes on differences among 
nouns while treating size adjectives in the same way in all cases, offers a simpler 
account, as well as making use of mechanisms that would be independently needed.
2.5 Concluding remarks
The facts examined in this section concerning the distribution and interpretation of 
size adjectives do not seem to support an analysis as degree modifiers, semantically 
or syntactically. Instead, they seem to favour an analysis which treats them as size 
adjectives across the board and attributes the apparent degree reading to an abstract 
size interpretation which arises when the adjective meaning applies to a particular 
type  of  object,  namely  an  instance  of  a  property.  Although  the  resulting 
interpretation is very similar to meanings obtained by degree modification in the 
adjectival  domain, the mechanism by which it  is  brought about is  different.  The 
relevant reading obtains with nouns that denote abstract properties whose instances 
have  abstract  size  (e.g.  idiocy,  courage  etc.),  or  with  nouns  that  denote  sets  of 
individuals (concrete or abstract, human or non-human) that are characterized by 
such a property (e.g.  idiot,  blunder etc.). This is, therefore, the picture of gradable 
nouns that emerges from the discussion in this section.
This means that, so far, we have no good evidence in favour of the existence of 
adnominal degree modifiers or of an explicit gradable structure in the semantics or 
syntax of these nouns that would be completely parallel to that of adjectives. As for 
the more general implications this has for using the distribution of these adjectives 
as a test for gradability, again, we are left with inconclusive evidence, although we 
may still maintain that the observed meaning effects arise with a limited class of 
nouns – namely those which encode a gradable property in their lexical meaning, 
and this may still be used as an indication of the gradable status of these nouns.
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3 Evaluative adjectives
In this section we examine a class of adjectives which is generally taken to include 
both  adjectives  which  in  their  basic  use  express  qualitative  evaluation,  such  as 
terrible,  awful,  dreadful etc.,  and  adjectives  which  express  amazement,  such  as 
incredible,  amazing,  extraordinary  etc.  (cf.  Paradis  2000,  Nouwen  2005,  2011a, 
Morzycki  2008b,  Schwager  2009,  de  Vries  2010).  As  briefly  illustrated  in  the 
introduction to this chapter, as well as in chapter 1 (§2.2), these adjectives can be 
used to modify gradable nouns (e.g. a terrible fool, an unbelievable weirdo etc.) and 
seem to  give  rise  to  high  degree  readings,  parallel  to  the  use  of  their  adverbial 
counterparts in the adjectival domain (e.g. terribly foolish, unbelievably weird etc.). 
The nouns they can be used to modify in the relevant degree sense are generally a 
subset of the nouns that can be modified by size adjectives. For reasons of space, in 
what follows we will restrict our attention to terrible-type adjectives. (For remarks 
on  amazing-type adjectives,  see Nouwen 2005, 2011a, de Vries 2010;264 see also 
Katz 2005, Nouwen 2005, 2011a, Morzycki 2008b for analyses of the corresponding 
adverbs). The adjectives in this class seem to display more lexical idiosyncrasies as 
compared to the class of size adjectives examined in section  2, as well as to their 
adverbial counterparts. However, a number of clear patterns seem to hold, both in 
terms  of  their  distribution  with  respect  to  types  of  nouns  and  in  terms  of  their  
distribution with respect to syntactic position. Some of the restrictions that can be 
observed in their distribution also turn out to be quite systematic, and may therefore 
play a role  in  the  analysis  these adjectives  should be given.  At  first  sight,  their 
distribution and interpretation makes these adjectives likely candidates for the status 
of adnominal degree modifiers. But it will be shown in this section that the facts  
may also support  an alternative analysis of these adjectives which capitalizes  on 
their evaluative interpretation,  which we take to be an expressive  sort of meaning, 
and does not involve the manipulation of gradable structures. 
3.1 Distribution, interpretation and the degree analysis
In  this  sub-section  we  will  examine  the  basic  facts  about  the  distribution  and 
interpretation  of  evaluative  adjectives,  which  seem to  suggest  that  they  may  be 
analysed as degree modifiers, similarly to their adverbial counterparts, which have 
been analysed as degree modifiers in the adjectival domain (cf. Doetjes 1997, Katz 
2005, Nouwen 2005, 2011a, Morzycki 2008b etc.). 
To start with, the following series of examples illustrate the basic, literal use of 
the adjective, which describes the objects denoted by the modified nouns in terms of 
negative quality, whether that is a [+human] individual as in  (44)a, or a [-human], 
mass or count, concrete or abstract object, as in (44)b-c.
264 The interested reader may also consult Schwager and Castroviejo-Miró 2008 and Schwager 2009 for  
an analysis of amazing (though not in the context of gradable nouns, but only in its use as main clause 
predicate of nominal exclamatives – e.g. It's amazing the people that come here!).
"DEGREE ADJECTIVES" 193
(44) a. a terrible {guy/ doctor}
b. terrible {news/ behaviour}
c. a terrible {place/ story/ idea}
Now consider the following series of examples, which contain gradable nouns of 
various types:
(45) a. a terrible {braggart/ fool/ bore}
b. terrible {nonsense/ negligence}
c. a terrible {shame/ mess}
In these examples, the adjective seems to contribute a high degree interpretation. For 
example,  a terrible  fool is  understood to  be  'a  terribly  foolish  person'.  In  other 
words, the relation between the adjective and the noun it modifies seems to parallel  
the relation between a degree modifier (e.g.  terribly) and a gradable adjective (e.g. 
foolish).  The question we would like to answer in this section is whether this is  
indeed how evaluative adjectives function.
All the adjectives in this class encode a notion of extremeness in their lexical 
meaning, i.e. they are 'extreme' adjectives (cf. Cruse 1986, Paradis 2001, Morzycki 
2010). Such adjectives have been argued either to indicate the ultimate point of the 
scale in terms of which they are conceptualised (Paradis 2000, 2001), or to involve 
degrees which exceed the contextually provided set of salient degrees, or which go 
"off-the-scale", so to say (Morzycki 2010). What seems to underlie the degree use of 
these adjectives, similarly to their adverbial counterparts, is a loss of lexical meaning 
in favour of retaining only the high degree component (cf. Doetjes 1997, Paradis 
2000).265 And even in that component there has been some change, or reduction: the 
adjectives have lost their inherent superlativity or relation to the extreme, end-point 
of a scale, and have simply come to indicate high degree (cf. Paradis 2001).
Returning  to  the  distribution  of  evaluative  adjectives,  similarly  to  big-type 
adjectives, they cannot generally be used to modify in a degree sense nouns used 
figuratively. The examples below, which contain nouns that in other contexts were 
shown to  receive  figurative,  stereotypical  interpretations,  cannot  be  modified  by 
terrible on the intended reading:
(46) a terrible {lawyer/ clown/ boy}
The nouns in  (46) can only be interpreted in their basic, literal meaning and the 
adjective terrible receives its basic, qualificational interpretation: the examples say 
something about the negative quality of the individuals – either in terms of general 
personal quality, or qua the role expressed by the N (as with lawyer or clown). The 
nouns  cannot  receive  figurative  interpretations  so  that  the  examples  would  be 
interpreted  as  being  about  individuals  who  are  terribly  litigious,  or  manifesting 
clown-like behaviour, or behaving in a very childish way, without being an actual 
265 In fact, the original meanings of awful,  dreadful,  horrible,  terrible were 'awe/ dread/ horror/ terror-
causing'. This seems to have been weakened to 'something very bad' (cf. Paradis 2000), or, rather, to have 
become less specific. 
194 CHAPTER 4
lawyer, clown or child. However, as also discussed in the previous sub-section, some 
nouns, such as  baby,  can be used in their  figurative meaning and intensified by 
terrible, as illustrated in (47). Given that such modification is generally not possible, 
this seems to confirm the suggestion made in §2.1 and §2.4.1 (cf. examples (7), (9)a 
and (41)b), namely that this meaning of baby has become lexicalized, and the noun 
is thus similar now to nouns of the type idiot.
(47) a. I am a terrible baby when it comes to pain.
b. He is being a terrible baby about it. 
So  far,  based  on  their  distribution  and  interpretation,  it  would  seem  that 
evaluative adjectives are good candidates to the status of degree expressions that 
would fulfil in the nominal domain the same function as their corresponding adverbs 
in  the  adjectival  domain.  The  distribution  of  these  adjectives  with  respect  to 
syntactic position seems to offer further support to such a view. 
The  examples  in  (48) suggest  that  the  degree(-like)  interpretation  of  these 
adjectives is restricted to the prenominal attributive position.
(48) a. a terrible idiot
b. That idiot {is/ seems} terrible. 
In  (48)b, where the adjective is  used predicatively, the intended reading found in 
(48)a is not available. The adjective can only receive its basic, literal interpretation, 
whereby the individual in question (who is an idiot) is attributed a general negative 
qualitative evaluation.
In fact,  these adjectives seem to be more strictly restricted to the prenominal  
attributive position on the degree reading than size adjectives, and to resist more 
stubbornly  the  predicative  use  under  the  relevant  interpretation.  Although  the 
distinctions are not always very clear-cut, the degree(-like) interpretation does not 
seem to be present in predicate position even when the subject is one of the nouns 
that allowed the predicative use of size adjectives on an interpretation that was not 
distinguishable  from the  one  obtained  in  the  attributive  prenominal  position  (cf. 
§2.2). Consider the following examples:
(49) a. They left behind a {terrible/ awful} mess. 
b. The mess they left behind was {terrible/ awful}.
There is a contrast here between the prenominal and predicative uses, even though it  
may be somewhat less clear than in  (48),  at least at  first sight. While  (49)a can 
clearly (and easily) be interpreted in a way parallel to 'terribly messy', where the 
messiness  is  emphasized  or  intensified,  (49)b  is  perceived  to  be  more  neutrally 
descriptive of the situation as being qualitatively negative – either because of the 
way it is or because of its consequences etc. Perhaps surprisingly, the contrast is  
even clearer with abstract mass nouns:
(50) a. his {terrible/ awful} {negligence/ ignorance} 
b. His {negligence/ ignorance} was {terrible/ awful}
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While the degree interpretation is  available in  (50)a where the adjective is  used 
attributively,  (50)b is interpreted as 'the fact that he was {negligent/ ignorant} was 
terrible'  or  'the  way  in  which  his  {negligence/  ignorance}  was  manifested  was 
terrible' (probably due to the consequences etc.). This is not surprising. As has been 
noted in the literature, abstract mass nouns denoting properties can be interpreted as 
facts  in addition to being interpreted  as concrete manifestations of properties, i.e. 
instances of properties (cf. Van de Velde 1996, Moltmann 2004a,b, Nicolas 2002, 
2004,  2010 a.o.).  However,  an  interpretation  in  terms  of  the  high  degree  of  the 
property (i.e. 'he was {terribly/ very} {negligent/ ignorant}') does not seem to be 
accessible.  This  may  be  a  surprising  result  given  that  a  prominent  property  of 
abstract mass nouns has been argued to be their giving rise to an interpretation in  
terms of degrees, as the unmarked option, in a variety of contexts (cf. Van de Velde 
1996, Tovena 2001) – this is also what was seen in section 2 in the context of size  
adjectives. This is important as it may tell us something not only about the meaning 
of the adjective, but also about the meaning of this type of nouns more generally. 
The absence of the degree interpretation in this context might be taken to suggest 
that this is not the basic denotation of such nouns and that, in those contexts where a 
paraphrase in terms of degrees is available, it arises either as the result of some sort 
of  coercion,  or  as  an alternative way of  understanding the application of certain 
modifiers or predicates to instances of properties (cf. also discussion in Nicolas 2010 
and in §2.4). This confirms the conclusions reached in §2.4, where the latter view is 
taken in the analysis of size adjectives. The possible paraphrase of (50)b in terms of 
a fact may reflect a similar process. If an instance of a property is terrible, that may 
be because of the particular way in which it is manifested and the consequences it  
has,  or  because  of  the  mere  fact  of  its  existence,  the  latter  resulting  in  a  fact 
interpretation.  This means that we can maintain an unambiguous semantics for the 
nouns, as denoting instances of properties, and view the other possible or apparently 
different interpretations as ways of understanding particular modifiers or predicates 
in the context of these objects.266
In sum, the distribution of evaluative adjectives on the relevant interpretation 
with respect to types of nouns (i.e. inherently gradable) and to syntactic position 
(namely,  strictly  prenominal)  suggests  that  they  may  be  analysed  as  adnominal 
degree modifiers (cf.  Nouwen 2011a for a suggestion in this sense,  and de Vries 
2010 for an explicit proposal),267 similarly to to their adverbial counterparts, which 
have been analysed as degree modifiers in the adjectival domain (cf. Doetjes 1997, 
Katz  2005,  Nouwen  2005,  2011a,  Morzycki  2008b etc.).268 This  view  could  be 
266 An interpretation in terms of facts may also be an actually distinct interpretation arising as the result 
of coercion; this might be the case when such nouns occur as arguments to verbs like acknowledge, admit 
etc. 
267 Recall that in being strictly prenominal, evaluative adjectives differ from size adjectives, which were 
seen to be able to occur in predicate position on the relevant reading when the subject is a noun of the  
right sort. This also means that an alternative account such as that proposed in §2.4 for size adjectives 
would not be applicable to evaluative adjectives. But see next sub-section for a different proposal. 
268 Note that on Morzycki's (2008b) account degree intensification is not included in the actual lexical 
meaning of these adverbs; they are taken to denote properties of propositions and combine with adjectives 
through the mediation of a phonologically null degree operator [R]. They are interpreted as arguments of  
this invisible degree morpheme and perform a widening of the domain of salient degrees; this is how 
degree intensification comes about. 
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implemented either within a degree-based or a degree-less approach to gradability. 
Both approaches would make similar predictions about the syntactic behaviour of 
these adjectives: if they involve operations on the gradable structure of a noun (and 
are possibly hosted by a dedicated functional projection – cf. Morzycki 2009, de 
Vries  2010),  then  they  can  only  occur  in  this  particular  configuration,  i.e. 
prenominally (see similar discussion in §2.2.1).
Further  examination  of  the  distribution  and  interpretation  of  evaluative 
adjectives, however, brings up some problems for the view that evaluative adjectives 
are degree expressions that would fulfil in the nominal domain the same function as 
their  corresponding  adverbs  in  the  adjectival  domain.  In  particular,  evaluative 
adjectives  are  subject  to  restrictions  that  are  not  found  with  their  adverbial  
counterparts.  In the next  sub-section,  we will  consider  some additional  data and 
suggest an alternative account of evaluative adjectives.
3.2 Some additional facts and an alternative account
Based on the distribution and interpretation  facts considered in the previous sub-
section, it would seem that evaluative adjectives are good candidates for the status of 
adnominal degree expressions, similarly to their adverbial counterparts.  However, 
some additional facts shed some doubt on this view.  It will be shown in this sub-
section  that  evaluative  adjectives  in  fact  differ  from  the  corresponding  adverbs 
insofar as they are subject  to certain (systematic) restrictions that  their  adverbial 
counterparts  lack.  In  addition,  as  also  discussed  in  §2.2,  the  restriction  to  the 
prenominal position is not enough to assume that they are degree modifiers. Based 
on  the  observed  restrictions,  we  will  suggest  an  alternative  account,  which 
capitalizes on their evaluative meaning. 
The most notable feature of the distribution of terrible-type adjectives, and one 
which may play a significant role in  deciding on  their analysis, is probably their 
restriction to negative nouns.269 This is suggested by the following contrast:270
(51) a. an awful mess
b. a terrible bore
(52) a. ??an awful pleasure
b. ??a terrible {genius/ beauty/ joy}
269 It should also be noted that there is quite a large amount of idiosyncratic behaviour (i.e.  cases of 
individual collocational,  even idiomatic, A-N combinations)  among the adjectives in this class on the 
relevant reading, in addition to the (rather systematic) restrictions that have been discussed  above. For 
example, the adjective dreadful can easily be used on the relevant interpretation with nouns like coward 
or bore, but it is somewhat less normal with fool, and even less so with weirdo, and while it is common to 
talk about  a dismal failure,  it  is  less  so to talk about  dismal  mistakes,  though this is  not completely 
excluded either (see Bolinger 1972 for more examples of this sort). (cf. also Nouwen 2005, 2011a and de 
Vries 2010 for similar remarks on amazing-type adjectives – e.g. while an unbelievable weirdo is fine on 
the relevant reading, an unusual/ surprising weirdo cannot receive this interpretation.)
270 Example (52)a is from Paradis (2000). 
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In this respect, they differ from the corresponding adverbs, which are compatible 
with adjectives irrespectively of their polarity, or connotations:
(53) a. awfully kind
b. terribly nice
On the one hand, this may suggest that the adverbs may have undergone a more 
drastic  process  of  semantic  bleaching  and  abstraction  and  are,  thus,  more 
grammaticalised  than  the  corresponding  adjectives,  which  retain  the  negative 
connotation. On the other hand, it shows that the facts are not completely parallel in 
the nominal and adjectival domains. This suggests that it is not the case that, in  a 
terrible N and terribly A, terrible/y is the same lexical item with the same meaning, 
i.e.  a  degree  modifier,  only  differing  in  shape  depending  on  the  syntactic 
environment in which it is inserted (i.e. nominal vs. adjectival or verbal).
This sort of restriction in the distribution of evaluative adjectives may  in fact 
suggest  an  alternative way  of  understanding  (and  analysing)  them.  When  the 
negative  evaluative  adjective  modifies  a  noun  with  a  negative  connotation,  this 
results in "boosting" the negative connotation of the noun. This indirectly results in 
intensifying  the  property  to  which  the  negative  connotation  is  associated.271 For 
example, if someone is said to be both an idiot, which attributes a property which is 
generally evaluated as being negative, and  terrible (as one), i.e. being additionally 
negatively evaluated, results in a reinforcement that ultimately is taken to bear on 
the property attributed to start with (i.e. the idiocy). If he is said to be  a terrible  
idiot,  it  will  be  inferred  that  this  is  because  he  is  very  idiotic,  rather  than  just  
average. In other words, the reported degree interpretation may not be due to the 
actual truth-conditional semantics of the adjectives that would operate on the degree 
structure of  the modified noun.  Instead,  it  may simply arise as  an effect  of  this 
'boosting',  i.e.  as  an implicature,  in the context  of  nouns that  lexically encode a 
property that has a negative connotation and that also happens to be gradable.
This  view,  which  capitalizes  on  the  (negative)  evaluation  contributed  by  the 
adjective,  finds some additional  support.  First  of all,  while not generally able to 
modify nouns used figuratively (recall the examples in (46)), terrible may, at least to 
some extent, co-occur with nouns used with this sort of interpretation in N of an N 
constructions, which were argued in chapter 2 to be environments which require an 
interpretation in terms of a (typically negative) value judgment:
(54) a. (what) a box of a house
b. a terrible box of a house
c. ??That house is a terrible box.
271 We may add here cases of intensification achieved by semantic repetition, such as those illustrated in 
(i) – we talk about semantic repetition here given that all lunatics are crazy, and all mistakes are bad (cf. 
Bolinger 1972):
(i) a. crazy lunatic
b. bad mistake
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Secondly,  other  nouns,  whose  epithetic  use  is  based  on  an  originally  figurative 
interpretation  also  allow  such  modification,  though  judgments  sometimes  vary 
among speakers (unlike with nouns like idiot or fool):
(55) a. I guess they figured if the lights were too strong, the patrons would see 
what a terrible wreck the theater was and not come back.272
b. (?)His house was a terrible pigsty.
One  way  of  approaching  such  data,  would  be  to  think  that,  since terrible  
independently tends to modify nouns with a negative connotation, it is also likely to 
show up when such nouns are used figuratively. However, this would predict a much 
wider  distribution  with  figurative  uses  than  is  actually  found.  Alternatively,  as 
suggested  above for  baby,  it  may be  that  these  uses  have  become conventional 
meanings  for  some  nouns  (e.g.  wreck  and  pigsty  have  come  to  simply  mean 
something like 'mess' or 'messy place'), but not for all, or not for all speakers – hence 
the  variation.  The  latter  hypothesis  seems  to  be  supported  by  the  possible  co-
occurrence of such adjectives with typical, conventional epithet nouns like bastard 
etc.
(56) He's a terrible {bastard/ bully}.
Finally, expressives (e.g. expletives like fucking, damned etc. by which a speaker 
may signal a marked emotional attitude to what is said, and interjections like man,  
boy,  gosh)  have  also  been  shown  to  interact  in  similar  ways  with gradable 
expressions (cf. Nouwen 2005, 2011a, McCready 2005, 2009).
These facts support the alternative view of evaluative adjectives suggested here, 
which capitalizes on their subjective evaluative interpretation. It may be assumed 
that they have an expressive meaning and involve some notion of general qualitative 
evaluation. Expressive meaning has been most prominently analysed in relation to 
expressions like  the jerk  or  fucking,  damn etc., whose main function is to display 
some  kind  of  evaluative  attitude  or  emotion.  Potts  (2005)  takes  them  to  be 
expressions  which  convey  conventionally  implicated  content,  and  he  develops  a 
multidimensional  logic  for  dealing  with  conventional  implicatures  (CIs).  Such 
expressions, therefore, are interpreted in a separate dimension from that  of truth-
conditional  or  at-issue  meaning.  Cruse  (1986),  Aoun,  Choueiri  and  Hornstein 
(2001),  Corazza  (2005),  and  Potts  (2005)  assume  that  expressives  are  always 
speaker-oriented,  regardless  of  syntactic  position.  Our  evaluative  adjectives, 
however, are not exclusively speaker-oriented; shifts in perspective are allowed, as 
suggested by (57), where the opinion can be attributed to the subject of the report 
and not to the speaker. But the adjective need not be speaker-oriented even when it 
is not syntactically embedded, as suggested by  (58), where the evaluation can be 
attributed to the subject. 
(57) a. Lina said that a terrible idiot had given her a hard time at the tax office. 
272 Source: Growing up Latino. Reflections on Life in the United States, H. Augenbraum and I. Stavans 
(eds.), available at http://books.google.com/books. 
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b. Lina didn't know if that terrible mess would bother anyone. 
c. Lina thought that no one would accept that terrible nonsense.
(58) Lina was looking in disbelief at the terrible mess they'd left behind...
The possibility that expressives be non-speaker-oriented has been acknowledged in 
the recent literature (cf. Amaral, Roberts and Smith 2007, Harris and Potts 2009 a.o.) 
and has led to a somewhat different view. Harris and Potts (2009),  for example, 
propose  that  the  source  of  non-speaker-oriented  readings  of  expressives  is  the 
interaction of a variety of pragmatic factors; in general, these interactions favour 
speaker-orientation,  but  other  orientations  are  always  in  principle  available, 
regardless  of  syntactic  configuration. They thus propose  enriching Potts’s  (2005) 
multidimensional view of semantic composition with a theory of perspective taking 
in context such as Giannakidou and Stavrou (2008) and Lasersohn (2005). This way 
of relativizing the evaluation to a judge could also capture the facts illustrated above 
for evaluative adjectives. But there is a quirk. Built into Potts' (2005, 2007) theory 
are  the  following two claims:  (i)  expressive  content  never  applies  to  expressive 
content, and (ii) no lexical item contributes both an at-issue and a CI-meaning. Our 
view of evaluative adjectives seems to go counter to these claims. If we say that 
evaluative adjectives reinforce a negative connotation in  the meaning of the nouns 
they modify,  that  suggests that  the nouns themselves may involve an expressive 
meaning component; that, however, cannot be their only content – they clearly also 
contribute an at-issue meaning. This contradicts claim (ii). Moreover, saying that the 
evaluative  adjectives  modify  this  meaning  of  the  noun  implies  that  expressive 
content should be able to modify expressive content, which contradicts claim (i). It 
should  be  pointed  out,  however,  that  these  two  claims  have  been  challenged. 
Gutzmann (2008) proposes that both expressive modifiers  of expressives (e.g.  that  
fucking bastard Jones) and mixed expressives (e.g. cur 'dog + expressing a negative 
attitude') do in fact exist. He consequently proposes  extending the logic by adding 
new  type  definitions  and  corresponding  composition  rules.  This  extended  logic 
could also deal with our evaluative adjectives. 
Finally,  note  that  this  account  can  also  capture  the  syntactic  distribution  of 
evaluative  adjectives.  In  the  previous  sub-section  it  was  shown  that  evaluative 
adjectives  are  restricted  to  the  attributive,  prenominal  position  on  the  relevant 
reading.  It  was accepted in that  context  that  this restriction may be taken as an 
argument in favour of analysing these elements as degree expressions. However, as 
pointed out in §2.2,  this distributional pattern is  typical  of non-intersective,  non-
predicative adjectives more generally, and is not necessarily connected to gradability 
or degree. In §2.2 we discussed several examples which showed that the prenominal 
attributive  position  seems  to  make  available  a  particular  way  of  combining  the 
adjective and the noun that enables the former to access a component internal to the 
meaning  of  the  latter.  There  is  also  another  class  of  cases  that  exhibit  such  a 
restriction  to  the  prenominal  attributive  position:  subjective,  speaker-oriented  or 
expressive modifiers are strictly prenominal (cf. Laenzlinger 2005, Morzycki 2008a, 
Potts et al. 2009 a.o.). Some examples are given below (if the predicative uses are at 
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all acceptable, they have a completely different meaning). This is precisely the class 
of adjectives to which our evaluative adjectives belong. 
(59) a. this {fucking/ damned} dog [English]
a'. This dog is damneded.
b. ce {sacré/ pauvre} prof [French]
this  bloody/ poor teacher
'this {bloody/ poor} teacher' 
b'. Ce prof est {??sacré/ pauvre}.
this teacher is      holy/ poor
'This teacher is {?holy/ poor}. 
In  sum,  the  additional  facts  considered  in  this  sub-section,  as  well  as  a 
reconsideration  of  facts  introduced  in  the  previous  sub-section,  suggest  that 
evaluative adjectives may be analysed as evaluative, expressive modifiers of nouns. 
On this view, the apparent degree reading comes about indirectly, as an implicature,  
due to the reinforcement of the negative connotation of the noun by the adjective. 
3.3 Concluding remarks
At first sight, their non-intersective behaviour in terms of syntactic distribution and 
the associated interpretation makes evaluative adjectives likely candidates for the 
status of degree expressions, which would fulfil  in the nominal domain the same 
function that  is fulfilled in the adjectival  domain by their adverbial  counterparts. 
However, the particular restrictions on their distribution, which bring out differences 
with  respect  to  their  adverbial  counterparts,  shed  some doubt  on  this  view,  and 
suggest an alternative approach which capitalizes on their evaluative nature. They 
involve an evaluative, expressive meaning. This can also explain their restriction to 
the prenominal attributive position, as  well  as the apparent degree interpretation, 
which is seen as a result of the "repetition" of an evaluative connotation associated 
with the property encoded in the meaning of the modified nouns. In other words, 
evaluative  adjectives  of  the  terrible-type  need  not  be  analysed  as  actual  degree 
modifiers. The apparent degree interpretation may not necessarily be brought about 
by a mechanism in which gradable structures are actually manipulated, but it may 
rather  simply  be  an  implicature  that  arises  due  to  the  interaction  between  the 
negative evaluation contributed by the adjective and the negative connotation of the 
noun. Although the facts are not completely conclusive and do not clearly overrule 
one or the other account (e.g. one may find ways to save the degree account), the  
alternative view may be favoured if one also considers the general lack of evidence 
for the existence of other adnominal degree modifiers/ operators, which will become 
even clearer once we examine adjectives of veracity and totality in the next section. 
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4 Adjectives of veracity 
This section turns to an examination of another category of adjectives which have 
been argued to function as degree adjectives (cf. Bolinger 1972, Morzycki 2009), 
namely adjectives of veracity like  real and  true. We will show that they do not in 
fact  (need  to)  operate  on  gradable  structures,  and  argue  that  their  semantic 
contribution  can  be  best  understood  in  terms  of  epistemicity/  evidentiality. 
Consequently,  they  cannot  be  taken  to  provide  evidence  for  the  existence  of 
adnominal degree morphemes.  We will propose that this view can be extended to 
other adjectives as well, namely adjectives like  sheer,  pure and perfect  (see §4.5), 
and will end this part of the chapter with a suggestion that adjectives which express 
totality (e.g. complete, total, absolute etc.) can be approached in a similar way.
4.1 The distribution and interpretation of real
This  section  focuses  on  the  distribution  and  interpretation  of  the  adjective  real, 
which has been claimed to be a degree adjective (cf. Bolinger 1972, and especially 
Morzycki 2009, who argues that it is an adnominal degree morpheme). However, 
upon closer scrutiny, it turns out that its distribution (and interpretation) is rather 
different  from  that  of  a  degree  expression.  The  discussion  in  this  section  will, 
therefore, set the scene for the alternative proposal which will be put forth in §4.2, 
and which will be subsequently extended to the adjective true in §4.3.
To start with, consider the following sets of examples.
(60) a. That's a real gun.
b. That gun is real. 
(61) a. That guy is a real idiot.
b. #That idiot is real.
These examples  show that  the adjective  real  exhibits  two different distributional 
patterns which correlate with two different interpretations. In (60) real can be used 
both attributively and predicatively with the same interpretation. In both cases real is 
interpreted as antonymous to  fake, a privative adjective which, notoriously, entails 
that the objects are not Ns, as well as of other modifiers, such as toy and 'constitutive 
material'  modifiers,  which  also  entail  that  the  objects  are  not  Ns,  but 
"representations/ models of N" (cf. Partee  2010, in press). So the gun in question 
may be contrasted with a fake gun, or a toy or plastic gun.  The examples in  (61) 
illustrate a different pattern and interpretation. The example in (61)a,  where real is 
again used attributively, is not about a 'non-fake' idiot. Instead the adjective seems to 
emphasize that the property denoted by the noun indeed holds of the individuals in 
question.  The corresponding  predicative use attempted in  (61) is not possible. The 
interpretation real gets in (61)a is not available in predicate position. (It is also not 
very natural to interpret  (61)b as saying that the idiot is not fake,  so the example 
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remains odd even on this interpretation which is in principle available.) While the 
distribution and interpretation of the 'non-fake' use of  real  is quite straightforward, 
the 'other' real, the one illustrated in (61), is more intriguing. This is the real that will 
be the focus of this section. 
Examples like  (61) have been argued to involve a degree use of the adjective 
real (Bolinger 1972, Morzycki 2009).  Mozycki (2009) analyses it as an adnominal 
degree morpheme which occupies the DegN-head position of the DegNP projected by 




Such an account predicts the impossibility of this element to appear in predicate  
position. This is because semantically it needs to operate on a degree argument (or, 
within the particular  theory of gradability adopted by Morzycki, to take a measure 
function as their argument) and because syntactically it is linked to the DegNP, which 
is part of the extended nominal projection of a gradable noun, and hence unavailable 
outside of the DP. As for the interpretation, he proposes that the semantics of this 
expression  may be  understood as  being  similar  to  that  of  very in  the  adjectival 
domain. (Surprisingly, in fact, he does not mention its direct adverbial counterpart 
really.)
However, upon closer consideration of the data, this view is faced with serious 
problems.  Next to uses with 'gradable nouns', such as the ones in  (61) above,  real  
can be used with non-gradable nouns as well. In what follows, we will discuss and 
analyse the data concerning the distribution and interpretation of real. We will show 
that, on the one hand, there is no reason to offer different analyses for the two types  
of cases, and that, on the other hand, the facts do not support an analysis of real as a 
degree expression in any of the cases; its semantics cannot be reduced to degree.
The examples below show that real can modify non-gradable nouns:
(63) a. That's a real sports car.
b. That's a real bird.
273 Morzycki (2009) provides an additional argument in favour of the idea that real and true (as well as 
absolute,  complete,  total) are heads, differently from size adjectives, which, as already discussed in he 
argues  to  be  degree  modifiers.  This  has  to  do with the  fact  that,  unlike  size  adjectives,  these  other  
adjectives do not allow their own degree modification, which is, however, allowed on their literal use, as  
illustrated in (i):
(i) a. #a {very/ quite/ fairly/ rather} {total/ complete/ absolute/ utter} idiot
b. a {very/ quite/ fairly/ rather} complete description
In §4.4 we will propose an alternative explanation.
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These examples can receive the 'non-fake' interpretation  illustrated in  (60), so that 
the individuals in question may be contrasted, for example, with toy cars or plastic 
birds. But they can also be interpreted similarly to the examples in (61), in the sense 
that  it  is  emphasized  that  the  individuals  in  question  have  the  properties 
characteristically associated with cars or birds (in the speaker's view). For example,  
(63)a may be used about a car with a powerful engine (as opposed to a mini smart), 
and (63)b could be used with reference to an eagle (as opposed to a kiwi bird).
Real  can also modify nouns that receive figurative, stereotypical interpretations 
(it "embraces metaphorical extensions", Bolinger 1972), as illustrated below. In this 
respect it differs from other adjectives, e.g. size adjectives or evaluative adjectives, 
which  have  been  seen  not  to  be  able  to  modify  such  nouns  on  the  relevant 
interpretation.274,275
(64) a. He is a real lawyer, the way he goes about proving his case.
b. This boy is a real clown.
c. Their new place is a real palace.
d. This place is a real pigsty.
What these examples say is that the speaker has good reasons to ascribe the objects  
in  question  to  categories  defined  by  properties  stereotypically  associated  with 
lawyers, clowns, palaces or pigsties, although they are not  actual lawyers, clowns, 
palaces or pigsties. These noun interpretations were already discussed in chapter 3 
(§3.4) in the context of internal such as well as in section 2 of this chapter, where it  
was shown that they should not be considered gradable.
Finally,  even  when  it  modifies  gradable  nouns,  it  seems  to  manipulate  the 
meaning in a way that is  not  dependent of gradability. Take nouns derived from 
activity verbs, such as  eater,  smoker etc. Though examples like  a real eater may 
sound a bit odd at first when uttered out of the blue,  they certainly do occur,  as 
shown in (65). 
(65) a. Someone like Orson Welles – a bon viveur and a real eater.276
b. My buddy and dining companion is over 200 pounds and a real eater.277
In these examples,  eater  seems to receive a high-degree interpretation – they are 
about people who 'indeed eat a lot'. But this is presumably just an effect of the fact 
that  real  emphasises that they undoubtedly belong to the category of 'eaters'.  The 
fact  that  what matters  for making modification by  real  possible is  being able to 
establish  a  category  to  which  an  individual  is  said  to  certainly  belong  is  also 
suggested by the facilitating role of contrast illustrated in (66). 
274 Example (64)a is from Bolinger (1972).
275 The  adjectives  veritable and  regular  are  also  compatible  with  metaphorical  interpretations,  the 
former  in  formal,  and  the  latter  in  non-formal  register  (see  Bolinger  1972  and  Lakoff  1973 for 
discussion):
(i) He is a {veritable/ regular} lawyer, the way he goes about proving his case.
276 Source: http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Your+Life[...]a0194167703 
277 Source: http://local.yahoo.com/info-30688478-presto-pizza-italian-restaurant-trattoria-miami-beach 
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(66) "I'm not a salad girl," she said. "I'm a real eater."278
A contrast is expressed here between two classes. The first is that of people who eat 
scarcely  or  only  'light'  food,  and,  in  opposition  to  that,  a  real  eater is  used  to 
describe  someone  who eats  all  sorts  of  food,  and  who  would,  therefore,  in  the 
speaker's opinion, meet the requirements for clearly qualifying as an eater.
To sum up, it has been shown that the adjective real has two uses: one on which 
it  is the antonym of  fake,  and another one where it  seems to emphasize that  the 
property  denoted  by  the  noun  holds  of  an  individual  (including  figurative 
interpretations of nouns). That the two uses are indeed distinct is also indicated by 
the fact that they may be juxtaposed without that leading to a contradiction:279
(67) Their place is not a real palace, but it's a real palace!
It has also been shown that the other real cannot be regarded as a degree adjective as 
it has a much wider distribution and its interpretation does not seem to involve or be 
reducible to degree. In the next sub-section we will propose an alternative analysis, 
in terms of evidentiality, and show that it can account for the data discussed here.280
4.2 Real as an epistemic/ evidential adjective
In this sub-section we will try to make a bit more precise our view of the semantic 
contribution of the 'other'  real, which we propose is to be understood in terms of 
epistemicity  and evidentiality throughout.  We will  henceforth  be referring to  the 
relevant real as 'evidential real'. 
Recall that in the preceding sub-section it was shown that  real  has two distinct 
uses. We would like to first briefly present here a particular analysis of its basic 'non-
fake'  use,  namely  that  proposed  by  Partee  (2010,  in  press),  since  we  will 
subsequently suggest that the interpretation of its evidential counterpart involves a 
mechanism that performs, in some sense, quite the opposite sort of operation. Partee 
proposes that the use of modifiers like real and true triggers the coerced expansion 
of the denotation of the noun to which the adjective is applied. This enables her to 
re-analyse privative adjectives like fake as subsective. She argues that such coercion 
can  be  motivated  by  treating  the constraints  on  possible  adjectives  meanings  as 
presuppositions that must be satisfied by any use of an adjective; the corresponding 
coercion may then be seen as a form of presupposition accommodation. Thus, while 
normally in the absence of a modifier like fake or real all guns are understood to be 
278 Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/28/dining/miss-labelle-s-kitchen-hot-sauce-and-gold-lame
279 Intonation seems to play a role in disambiguating the meaning in each case: the first occurrence of 
real  in  (67) carries heavy stress, while in the second part of the sentence it is  palace  which is stressed 
(real  may be stressed too, but less than in the first case). It was also noted in chapter 3 that intonation  
(stress) may be needed to disambiguate the interpretation of nouns that may be used figuratively.
280 In more recent work Morzycki argues that  real  and  true  do not involve a degree semantics,  but 
involve scales of prototypicality (Morzycki 2011). As will emerge from the discussion in this and the next 
sub-section it  is not prototypicality  that is relevant,  but something different;  this  is  why we will  not  
investigate this proposal in more detail here. 
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real guns, in examples like (68) the denotation of gun and fur is expanded so as to 
include both fake and real guns and fur, respectively.281
(68) a. Is that gun real or fake?
b. I don't care if that fur is fake (fur) or real (fur).
Partee points out that without the coerced expansion of the denotation of the noun,  
not only would fake be privative, but the adjective real would always be redundant 
(a property also noticed in passing by Lakoff 1987 – apud Partee 2010, in press.). 
She  notes  that  since  this  is  always  necessary  with  privative  and  "tautologous" 
modifiers, there might even be something in their lexical semantics that particularly 
indicates  the  need  to  shift  the  head  to  which  they  apply.  At  any  rate,  this  shift 
enables one to interpret the [Adj+N] predicate in such a way that both its positive 
and negative extensions are non-empty (cf. Kamp and Partee's 1995 "Non-Vacuity 
Principle").
We suggest that, on the evidential use of real, the domain is affected in quite the 
opposite sense,  namely it is, in some sense, narrowed down. The speaker seems to 
divide up the domain normally covered by N into those objects that, according to 
him/ her, undoubtedly have the properties associated with N and, hence, fall into the 
positive extension (and are, therefore, real Ns) and those that do not. This may also 
explain the fact that speakers report that the use of this adjective seems to imply a  
contrast, to involve the presence of some assumed alternatives.
It is important to note that the notion of "reality" involved in the interpretation of 
real is not to be understood in terms of "absolute truth" (so that it is not the case that 
the object has in the actual world all the properties it can have in any accessible  
possible world). Rather it is relativized to the speaker's beliefs. That is, x is a real N  
says that 'in the speaker's belief world x is [in the positive extension of] N'. When 
using real, the speaker emphasizes that s/he has good reasons to describe x as an N 
because  x clearly displays the characteristics which typically define N in his/her 
opinion. We have here, then, an evidential component, which provides the basis for 
the epistemic certainty with respect to the categorization performed. Our view of 
real  is  similar to what Paradis (2003) argues for its adverbial  counterpart  really, 
namely that its use is conditioned by the speaker's wish to qualify an expression 
epistemically with a judgement of truth as perceived by the speaker. This speaker-
dependence  is  also  noted  by  Bouchard  (2002)  in  his  analysis  of  the  French 
counterpart  of  real,  réel.  Bouchard  argues  that  prenominal  réel modifies  the 
characteristic  function (i.e.  the property defining the noun – cf.  §2.4.2 for  more 
discussion of this approach). Thus, in  un réel besoin  'a real need' the adjective is 
argued to apply to the characteristic function and to indicate that it applies exactly, 
that all the properties required by it are verifiable, so  un réel besoin is 'something 
which is truly a need'; it also indicates that the authentication is done by the speaker 
(unlike with an adjective like  authentique 'authentic, genuine'). He also points out 
that it is only when used prenominally that the adjective is in a position to modify an  
281 Note that on a subsective reanalysis of these adjectives (on which they are similar to e.g. skilful) it is 
no longer unexpected that they can can appear in predicate position (cf. also  {John/ This violinist} is  
skilful.), while this would be problematic if they were non-intersective non-subsective. 
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internal subpart of the noun meaning in this way. Indeed, as already indicated at the 
beginning of §4.1, unlike its 'non-fake' counterpart, evidential real entirely resists the 
predicative use.282 We take this total  lack of predicative use to indicate that  it  is  
indeed  an  instance  of  an  exclusively  non-intersective  non-predicative  (i.e. 
intensional) adjective in the sense of Siegel (1976). It participates in construing the 
property that the NP will denote – and, in doing so, it brings in an epistemic and 
evidential component, redefining, in a way, based on the speaker's view, what counts 
as an N. 
We are now in a position to also explain the apparent degree interpretation real  
has been claimed to have in the context of gradable nouns. This comes about as a 
result of the interaction between the 'evidential'  real and the gradable nouns, i.e. 
nouns whose domains are saliently defined by a gradable property. When  real  is 
used to modify a noun like idiot, a division of the domain is performed, as indicated 
above, into those individuals  that the speaker has no doubt fall  into the positive 
extension (i.e. 'are  real idiots') and those that do not (i.e. 'are not  real  idiots'). The 
former set, of individuals to which the [gradable] property undoubtedly applies, will 
end up containing the individuals to which the property applies to a high degree, as 
these constitute the clearest cases of idiots.
As for the sort of properties that count for  a real N  to hold, it seems that this 
adjective is rather indifferent to the objective, definitional characteristics that confer 
actual  category  membership,  as  shown  by  the  availability  of  figurative  uses  of 
nouns. The kind of properties that count are rather properties which happen to be 
characteristic of category members though they do not (necessarily) confer category 
membership. In other words, properties that merely normally hold of N in view of  
what  people  believe,  or  expect,  an  individual  of  a  particular  class,  nationality, 
profession etc. to be like (hence: stereotypical properties). This correlates with the 
subjective  character  of  real; the  relevant  "definitions"  are  filtered  through  the 
speaker's expectations and view of the world. In a sense then, we can say that it is by 
using real that the speaker makes 'X is an N' true (under either interpretation of N, 
literal or metaphorical).
This view of real naturally invites a comparison with such, which was shown in 
the previous chapter to also be compatible with nouns under a stereotypical, possibly 
figurative, interpretation. The question then arises whether the two expressions are 
to be treated in the same way. A quick comparison suggests that there are differences 
in distribution (and interpretation) between the two.  Real  seems to have a wider 
distribution:
(69) a. #That's such a car!
b. #That's such a table!
c. #That's such a bird!
(70) a. That's a real car!
282 Note that in this respect it also differs from size adjectives, which were seen to occur predicatively if  
the subject is of the right sort. The nouns in (i), for example, allow the predicative use of size adjectives 
on the relevant reading. However, even with such nouns,  real  can only be understood in its 'non-fake/ 
pretended' use.
(i) His {courage/ sorrow} was real.
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b. Now, that's (what I call) a real table!
c. That's a real bird. 
In chapter 3 (§3.4) it was suggested that simple objects like cars, chairs, tables etc. 
are  not  easily  associated  with  stereotypical  images,  which  would  enable  the 
construal of the type of denotation that internal such would be compatible with. That 
is,  there  are  no  stereotypical  properties  available  that  could  enable  the  inherent 
structuring  of  their  domain  into  distinct  salient sub-types  identifiable  by  natural 
consequences that  internal such could pick out.  Hence the unacceptability of the 
examples in  (69)a,b. It was also shown that internal  such is not compatible with a 
prototypical  interpretation,  since  prototypical  properties  do  not  allow  one  to 
distinguish among different  salient  sub-types  that  can  be associated  with natural 
consequences; this rules out the example in  (69)c.  Real is different from internal 
such.  It does not require the existence of inherent  salient  sub-types  identifiable by 
natural  consequences –  so  one  does  not  need  a  basis  for  construing  and 
discriminating among such sub-types. What real does is to narrow down the domain 
to those objects which clearly fulfil the criteria in the speaker's opinion. Hence, it is 
not necessarily properties that can distinguish among salient sub-types (identifiable 
by natural consequences)  that are needed, but any characteristics that undoubtedly 
qualify the object, in the speaker's view, as a clear case of N – e.g. size or engine  
quality for a car, size and/or material for a table etc.
To conclude, real has been argued to involve an epistemic/ evidential semantics: 
it says that the individuals in question undoubtedly qualify as Ns in the speaker's 
view. In the next sub-section this type of analysis will be extended to the adjective 
true. 
4.3 Extending the analysis: the case of true
Like  real,  true has  been  claimed  to  be  a  degree  adjective  (cf.  Bolinger  1972, 
Morzycky 2009). However, in this section we will show that the distribution and 
interpretation of this adjective does not support such a view either and that, instead, 
an epistemic/ evidential analysis like the one proposed above for real, can account 
for the facts. 
To start with, just like in the case of  real, we should distinguish between two 
uses of true. Consider the following two sets of examples:
(71) a. That is a true statement. 
b. That statement is true. 
(72) a. That professor is a true genius.
b. #That genius is true. 
In  (71) true  can  be  used  both  attributively  and  predicatively  on  the  same 
interpretation: in both examples it is understood as the opposite of incorrect or false. 
The attributive use of true in (72)a receives a different interpretation: the example is 
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not  about  a  genius  that  is  not  false.  Just  like  real  in  (61)a,  true  here  seems to 
emphasize that the property denoted by the noun indeed holds of the individual in 
question:  'the  professor  is  indeed  a  genius'.283 This  sort  of  interpretation  is  not 
available in the predicative use attempted in (72)b.  It is  also  not easy to interpret 
(72)b as saying that the genius is correct (or, perhaps loyal?), so the example is odd. 
Therefore,  true  also exhibits  two different  distributional  patterns  which  correlate 
with two different interpretations.
It is the exclusively prenominal use of true that is of interest to us here. Just like 
evidential  real,  this  true has been argued to be a degree adjective – cf. Bolinger 
1972,  and  especially  Morzycki  2009,  who  analyses  it  as  an  adnominal degree 
morpheme which  occupies  the  DegN-head  position  of  the  DegNP projected  by  a 
gradable noun (see discussion in §4.1 and the representation in (62) above).
However, just like in the case of real, such a view is faced with problems: like 
real,  true  also  has  a  distribution  that  is  not  limited  to  gradable  nouns,  and  its 
interpretation is not in terms of degree. The examples in  (73) show that  true  can 
modify non-gradable nouns like doctor, symphony etc. Differently from real, it does 
not  accept  figurative  interpretations  of  the  type  illustrated  in  (64).  The  entity 
described by true must belong to the actual category that is named by N and is then 
described  as  typical  of  its  essence,  and  in  this  sense  it  seems  to  involve 
prototypicality (cf. Bolinger 1972, Morzycki 2011). Thus, while in (64)a he may be 
just a student, in (73)a he must be a lawyer by profession.284
(73) a. He is a true lawyer, a credit to his profession.
b. A true doctor would not prescribe that kind of treatment.
c. It was a true symphony.
d. I had a true vacation.
e. That's a true generalization.
This shows that the semantics of true cannot be reduced to degree. In addition, 
the  fact  that  true  is  exclusively  prenominal  on  the  relevant  reading  is  also  not 
enough reason to posit that it is a degree morpheme, which operates on a measure 
function and is projected as the head of a nominal DegP,  as argued by Morzycki 
(2009). Instead, just like in the case of  real, we take the lack of predicative use to 
reflect  the  fact  that  the  relevant  true  is  an  exclusively  non-intersective  non-
predicative  (i.e.  intensional)  adjective  in  the  sense  of  Siegel  (1976),  which 
participates  in  construing  the property  that  the  NP will  denote and brings in  an 
epistemic/ evidential meaning component in the process. We propose, therefore, that 
true should be analysed in a similar way to evidential real. In what follows we will 
present our alternative account of true, as well as pointing out the differences with 
respect to real.
As we have just seen, the conditions on its use are, however, somewhat different  
from those applying to real: true requires x to be an actual N to start with (it is not 
283 Note that this interpretation is also available in (71)a, though maybe not very natural or salient: 'that 
is something which is indeed a statement'. But, crucially, it is never available in predicate position – not in 
(72)b, nor (71)b.
284 The examples in (73)a-d are from Bolinger (1972), while (73)e is based on an example from Siegel 
(1976).
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compatible with figurative  interpretations)  and  then  describes  it  as  typical  of  its 
essence (cf. Bolinger 1972). In other words, x is a true N if x does not lack any of 
the essential  components  of  an N.  This  can be  understood as  follows.  First,  the 
requirement that x be an actual N to start with may be seen as a condition that X has  
the characteristics which all  Ns must have (in all  possible worlds),  i.e.  the core, 
definitional properties of Ns (cf. McCready and Ogata 2007 for this definition of 
core  properties).  This  may  be  defined  as  a  presupposition  on  the  use  of  true. 
Secondly, by the use of true it is said (or emphasised) that there is no doubt that X 
has all the essential characteristics of Ns, or that it satisfies all that is objectively 
required of an N. Take the examples in  (73)a,b, for instance. They seem to imply 
that the individual is (not) a good lawyer/  doctor.  This suggests that, with nouns 
denoting  professions,  the  quality  of  the  job  performance,  according  to  scientific 
and/or moral  standards,  plays a  role.  This is  a salient  dimension associated with 
profession nouns,  so much so that  doing one's  job properly becomes one of  the 
essential criteria in evaluating the appropriate application of a true N description.285 
Let us now see how this way of defining true helps us understand its distribution and 
interpretation, as well as the differences with respect to real.
As far as the modification of nouns  that are generally taken to be gradable is 
concerned,  the  mechanism  that  creates  the  impression  of  a  (high)  degree 
interpretation is similar to the interaction of  real  with  these nouns. There is also 
some difference between the two, however, in that examples with  true  seem to be 
more neutral, or objective, than those with real – e.g. a real genius vs. a true genius. 
This probably has to do with the fact that  true  comes with the condition that the 
individual  in  question  is  an  actual  genius,  and  has  to  have  all  the  essential  
characteristics of an N. Hence the intuition that  a true genius seems to simply say 
that x has (reached) 'genius-status'. With real, it is a qualification that simply holds 
in the speaker's belief world (though the speaker also has good reasons to make the 
qualification). Thus, there is an impression of a more objective evaluation with true, 
and of a more subjective one with real.
Furthermore, this way of defining true may also help us make more sense of the 
fact  that  true cannot  modify  just  any  noun,  as  shown  by  (74).  Based  on  the 
difference  in  acceptability  between  examples  like  (73)a,b  above  and  (74)a-b, 
Bolinger (1972) suggests that true is restricted to gradable nouns and "semantically 
rich" non-gradable nouns. According to him, the semantic enrichment of the nouns 
in  the  former  set  of  examples  comes  from  their  social  implications.  Given  the 
definition of  true  proposed above,  a  way to understand these facts  would be in 
relation to the second condition. Namely, certain nouns, such as those in (74), may 
lack a set of (objective) salient, essential characteristics that could offer speakers a 
basis for evaluating whether an X belongs to the positive extension of (true) N.286
(74) a. ?He's a true farmhand.
b. ?That is a true telescope.
c. ??That's a true car.
285 Recall that similar effects have been encountered with profession nouns in other contexts too (e.g. in  
wh-exclamatives, with quite etc.). 
286 Examples (74)a,b are from Bolinger (1972).
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There is here, however, also a puzzling difference concerning the (un)acceptability 
of the same noun with real vs. true. Compare, for example, the unacceptable (74)c 
with the acceptable  (63)a/(70)a above.  We conjecture that  what makes the latter 
acceptable, unlike the former, is that speakers can come up with (sets of) 'subjective', 
possibly non-essential, non-definitional attributes that would make the object qualify 
as  a real  car  in  their  view.  Such characteristics,  however,  do not  count  towards 
qualifying an object as a true car, given the definition above. 
Finally, the presence vs. absence of a subjective, speaker-oriented component in 
real vs. true may also explain the compatibility of the former, but not the latter, with 
epithets:287,288
(75) a {real/ #true} {cry-baby/ pussy/ wanker/ angel}
To sum up, it has been argued in this section that the adjective true, just like real, 
has a semantics that is to be understood in terms of epistemicity/ evidentiality. In the 
next sub-section we will discuss some consequences and add some more evidence 
favouring this analysis over a degree analysis of real and true. 
4.4 Additional evidence and consequences
It has been argued in this section that  real  and true should be given an analysis in 
terms of evidentiality/ epistemicity, rather than a degree analysis. All the evidence 
from the  distribution and interpretation  of these adjectives points in favour of the 
former, rather than the latter analysis. We will now discuss some additional evidence 
in favour of the epistemic/ evidential analysis, as well as some advantages. 
First  of  all,  the  distribution  of  real  and  true,  on the  relevant  reading,  is  not 
limited to the class of gradable nouns, i.e. it is not determined by the existence of a 
gradable structure in the nouns they modify. If one wanted to maintain that real and 
true are degree morphemes, then all the examples in (63)-(64),  (70) which contain 
nouns that are not inherently gradable would have to be treated as cases of scalarity 
coercion. Unlike other  "degree adjectives",  real  would, then, be able to coerce the 
meaning of an otherwise non-gradable noun into a gradable one – a difference not 
easy to explain. However, this view of the meaning of these nouns is not correct:  
whether interpreted figuratively or not, they do not have gradable meanings.
In addition, it has been shown that the essence of the interpretation of real and 
true is not in terms of an object being ranked high in an ordering with respect to the 
287 This view of real resonates with the way Den Dikken (2006) characterizes examples like He’s a real 
schoolmaster!,  namely  as  epithetic  uses.  This  epithetic  use  is  similar  to  the  interpretation  the  noun 
receives in N of N constructions, which he claims are based on an (often metaphorical) comparison that is  
always evaluative – e.g.  that schoolmaster of a man. Here schoolmaster stands for a set of (typically 
negative) properties that schoolmasters are stereotypically thought to have. In fact, many of the nouns that 
were seen to be able to occur in the first slot of the N of N construction in chapter 2 (section 2) accept 
modification by real. 
288 Not all speakers perceive a big difference between the two adjectives in the use illustrated in (75), 
though most do – and the less conventionalized or common the epithet, the less acceptable true is. It may 
be, however, that for some speakers  true  has become more similar to  real, which, given our proposal, 
would mean that it has lost the condition that the individuals be actual Ns. 
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degree  to  which  a  property  holds.  Rather  (it  is  emphasized  that)  the  respective 
properties undoubtedly hold. The only distinction that needs to be made is a two-
way distinction between those objects that (in the speaker's opinion) qualify as N 
and those that do not. In other words, we are dealing here with an inflexible, two-
way partition of the domain. This may still be viewed as a scale, if one wanted to,  
but it would be just a two-valued scale, and nothing would be gained from looking at 
things in this way. The fact that the adjectives impose a non-graded division of the 
domain is reflected in the fact that they are non-gradable, and do not accept degree 
modification on the relevant reading, as illustrated below. So while Morzycki (2009) 
takes their resistance to degree modification as an indication that they are degree 
heads, we take it as a direct reflection of their semantics.
(76) a. #a {very/ quite/ fairly} real {idiot/ palace/ car}
a'. #a {very/ quite/ more} true {genius/ lawyer/ vacation}
b. a {very/ quite} real problem      [not fake/ imaginary]
b'. a {very/ fairly/ absolutely} true statement      [correct/ not false]
It was also shown that the fact that a degree interpretation appears to obtain in  
combination with a noun  which encodes a gradable property in its meaning is an 
effect of the particular interaction between the semantics of the evidential adjective 
and that  of  the noun. It  is  not  a  distinct  interpretation associated with a  distinct 
lexical item  that would manipulate a gradable structure, i.e. an adnominal degree 
morpheme.289 
Moreover, an evidential analysis seems better suited to account for  the type of 
distinction  we  find  between  real  and  true:  they  differ  in  terms  of  the  type  of 
evidence that plays a role in deciding whether an individual qualifies as an N, not in 
terms of scalar information as might be expected on a degree account. 
289 In view of the conclusions reached in this section about the adjectives  real  and  true, it would be 
interesting to (re-)examine their adverbial counterparts too.
The view expressed by Morzycki (2009) for the adjectives  real  reflects the position expressed in 
connection with its adverbial counterpart really by Kennedy and McNally (2005). They suggest that there 
are two distinct uses of really – intensifier and propositional. Their main argument in favour of this view 
is that examples such as (i) below are ungrammatical on the degree modifier use of really and are only ok 
on the 'propositional' adverbial use as in: I really was very surprised.
(i) I was really very surprised.
They conclude that (distinct) degree modifier recursion (of the type: *very quite surprised, *quite really  
surprised, *really very surprised etc.) is not allowed. The only type of degree modifier recursion allowed 
requires identity of degree modifiers (as in  very very surprised, quite quite hungry, really really tall), 
which leads them to believe that this phenomenon involves a type of reduplication at the lexical level, the  
output of which is a degree modifier with a semantic type identical to that of  very.  However, the view 
taken by McNally and Kennedy (2002) on well also suggests an alternative view of really. Kennedy and 
McNally (1999, 2005) treat well as ambiguous between a degree reading and a quality reading. McNally 
and Kennedy (2002) propose instead an unambiguous analysis of well which derives the attested readings 
as a result of  well applying to different variables in the semantic make-up of the participial adjectives 
(their analysis is cast in a GL framework – cf. Pustejovsky 1995). This account opens the path for a 
similar approach to really. 
It would be interesting to  see whether a unified analysis of all the uses of  really  and  truly  can be 
found – one that would be centred around notions of epistemicity/ evidentiality, and that would derive the  
possible differences in interpretation from their semantic interaction with the elements they combine with, 
which seems to correlate with syntactic position.
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There is an additional set of facts that seem to support an evidential rather than a 
degree analysis. This has to do with the possible co-occurrence and relative order of 
"degree" adjectives.  Examples may be found where  real-type adjectives and size 
adjectives  co-occur  and the  former  precede  the  latter: [real  [big  N]].  This  is 
illustrated below with French examples in order to avoid the problem that in English 
real is homonymous between an adjective and an adverb;  on the latter use it could 
then be interpreted  as  a  degree  modifier  of  the  other  adjective  following it, i.e. 
[[real(ly) big] idiot], which is not the structure we are after here.
(77) a. un vrai gros {con/ fumeur}
a real fat   idiot/ smoker
'a real big {idiot/ smoker}'
b. *un gros vrai {con/ fumeur}
  a fat real  idiot/ smoker
Such facts are predicted to be impossible on a degree analysis,  especially in the 
particular implementation proposed by Morzycki (2009). Recall that in this analysis 
real/  vrai is a degree morpheme occupying the DegN-head position of the nominal 
DegNP projected by a gradable noun, as in (78), while big/ gros is a degree modifier 
hosted in the Spec of the DegNP whose head is occupied by a phonologically null 
MeasN operator, as illustrated in (79). 
(78)                 DegNP <e,t>
DegN<ed,et> NP<e,d>
real idiot
(79)          DegNP <e,t>
DegP <o,t> DegN'<ot,et>
Deg<od,ot> AP<o,d>    DegN <ed,<ot,et>> NP<e,d>
POS big MEASN idiot
In such an analysis there is no room for (the) two degree adjectives to co-occur, 
syntactically or semantically, and result in the structure [A [A N]]. Firstly, Morzycki 
argues that real has a semantics similar to very, while size adjectives are treated on a 
par  with  measure  phrases  and  are  licensed  by  a  dedicated  type  of  Deg-head. 
Secondly, they must be related to expressions defined in terms of degree arguments. 
But once one such element has been used,  an expression of the right type  is no 
longer  available.  Even  if  this  semantics  could  be  overruled  and  the  two  were 
somehow made compatible and allowed to co-occur,290 one would expect the degree 
modifier (big) to precede the Deg-head (real), contrary to fact. However, once real is 
analysed as an epistemic/ evidential  adjective, as proposed here,  rather than as a  
degree  adjective,  the  co-occurrence  problem  disappears.  As  for  the  ordering,  it 
290 For a discussion of the (im)possible co-occurrence of degree expressions (especially in the adjectival 
domain), see Neeleman, van de Koot and Doetjes (2004). 
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seems to  be  more  generally  the  case  that  epistemic/  evidential/  speaker-oriented 
expressions are placed high in the structure, to the left of other modifiers (cf. Cinque 
1994, 2010, Scott 1998, 2002, Laenzlinger 2000, 2005 etc. for the order of adjectival 
modifiers within the extended nominal projection, and: Cinque 1999, 2004, Ernst 
2002, 2007 a.o. for the placement of adverbs in the clausal structure).
To conclude, in this section we have studied the adjectives real and true and have 
argued that  they are not degree operators,  but  that  they are epistemic/  evidential 
modifiers. Consequently, they cannot be taken to provide evidence for the existence 
of degree structures in the nominal domain that would be parallel to those in the 
adjectival domain. In the remainder of this section we will examine another set of 
adjectives which we suggest can be approached in a similar way. 
4.5 Similar cases
4.5.1 Sheer, pure, perfect 
In  this  sub-section  we will  briefly  examine a  few more  adjectives  (sheer,  pure, 
perfect), which have been claimed to be degree adjectives. It will be shown that the 
distribution and interpretation of these adjectives does not support such a view, and 
that they should be approached along similar lines as proposed above for  real and 
true. 
Bolinger  (1972)  notes  that  sheer (in  the  relevant  sense)  is  only  used  as  an 
intensifier of gradable nouns.291 The examples below illustrate its compatiblity with 
nouns that are generally considered to be gradable.
(80) a. sheer {terror/ nonsense/ folly/ malice/ stupidity}
b. (the) sheer {delight/ joy/ beauty/ bliss}
c. I think it is sheer genius to invent such a thing.292
However,  the  following  examples  suggest  that  sheer is  in  fact  not  restricted  to 
gradable nouns, but is compatible with a rather wider range of nouns.293,294
(81) a. by sheer {accident/ coincidence/ will}
291 In addition, the unacceptability of the example in (i), in contrast with those in (80)a would seem to 
suggest that sheer, like utter, also prefers nouns which have a negative connotation (cf. Bolinger 1972).  
However, one also finds examples where sheer modifies nouns which in fact have positive connotations, 
as illustrated in (80)b-c.
(i) *sheer acceptance
Sheer can also be used to modify nouns referring to (physical) dimensions, such as size, volume, weight  
(of numbers) etc.:
(ii) We were overwhelmed by the sheer volume of work.
292 Source: http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/ 
293 It was noticeable in our searches of the British National Corpus that a lot of the DPs containing the  
adjective  sheer are definite. In addition, in many of the examples sheer appears within PPs of the type 
illustrated in (81)a,c, which are equivalent in interpretation to the PP (without the adjective) modified by 
the corresponding adverb (or by the adverb purely): {sheerly/ purely} by accident. 
294 Examples (81)b-c are from the British National Corpus. 
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b. sheer {labour/ personality/ quality of performance/ survival}
c. in sheer play and frolic 
d. the sheer task of learning Clifford's speeches...
Pure  has  a  similar  distribution.  It  is  compatible  with  gradable  nouns,  as 
illustrated by (82), but it is not restricted to modifying such nouns, as indicated by 
the acceptability of the examples in (83) which contain non-gradable nouns:
(82) pure {negligence/ bliss/ delight/ genius}
(83) a. pure socialism
b. a pure accident
c. by pure coincidence
It may be concluded from these data that the adjectives  sheer  and pure are not 
degree adjectives.295 Rather they seem to say that the objects satisfy only and all the 
criteria for qualifying as N. They are, indeed, compatible with nouns which encode 
in their meaning properties that are, intuitively, gradable. The interaction of their 
meaning  with  that  of  nouns  that  denote  gradable  properties  results  in  an 
interpretation that may be (mis)taken for a degree one – similarly, in some sense, to 
what happens when the adjective real combines with a gradable noun. 
Finally,  consider  the  adjective  perfect.  In  its  literal  use,  perfect  describes  an 
object  in  terms  of  (aesthetic  or  other)  perfection,  being  accomplished  etc.,  as 
illustrated in (84). By contrast, in (85), the interpretation is different. A perfect idiot, 
for example, is not an individual who is perfect. It is an individual to whom the 
description idiot applies perfectly, an individual in whom all the attributes of the N 
are clearly present (cf. also Bouchard 2002, Demonte 2008).296
(84) a perfect body
(85) a. a perfect idiot
b. perfect {happiness/ idiocy}
The  latter  type  of  interpretation  is  restricted  to  the  prenominal  attributive 
position. In predicate position, this interpretation is not available; only the basic,  
295 The same seems to hold of their adverbial counterparts too: they are  not used as degree modifiers 
(given that they can modify non-gradable adjectives, e.g.  technical). Their meaning is something like 
'only, exclusively, simply'. (Though sheerly seems to be less used than the adverbial counterparts of other 
adjectives considered in this section, examples may be found.)
(i) On a sheerly technical plane, the projections used for the backgrounds were very effective, 
particularly in the third act, where a sunset faded most convincingly. (1988 October 21, 
George Grass, "WagnerVision", Chicago Reader on http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/sheerly)
296 See Sauerland and Stateva (2007) for an analysis of its adverbial counterpart,  perfectly, as a scalar 
approximator (i.e. an expression which resets the granularity parameter for the evaluation of the modifiee, 
in this case to the finest granularity,  similarly to expressions like  completely  and  exactly) which also 
contains an intensional component, in the sense that an expression like perfectly dry makes reference to a 
desired point of reference (in spite of the existence of examples like  perfectly awful  where perfection 
cannot be related to desirability).
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descriptive interpretation is available, which accounts for the oddness of example 
(86).
(86) #This idiot is perfect. 
Importantly, this interpretation of  perfect  is not restricted to gradable nouns, as 
suggested by the examples below:
(87) a. a perfect solution
b. a perfect example of... 
This may be clearer in the Romance languages, where the prenominal position is 
unambiguously  associated  with  the  relevant,  non-intersective  interpretation,  as 
illustrated below with examples from Demonte (2008):
(88) a. una perfecta solución [Spanish]
a perfect solution
'a perfect solution' 
b. la solución perfecta
the solution perfect
'the perfect solution/ the solution which is perfect'
c. La solución es perfecta. 
the solution is perfect
'The solution is perfect'
The example in (88)a denotes something which is perfect as a solution, a solution in 
all respects, while the examples in (88)b-c are about solutions which belong to the 
set of perfect objects or acts (cf. Demonte 2008). 
We conclude from such data that  perfect  is not limited to modifying gradable 
nouns and that it is not, therefore, a degree adjective. In examples like  (85),  (87), 
(88)a,  it  is  simply a non-intersective adjective whose semantic  contribution is to 
indicate that the object in question fulfils all the criteria for N-hood. In Bouchard's 
(2002) terms, it applies to the characteristic function (i.e. the property defining the 
N) and indicates that it is perfectly filled, that it fits perfectly, that all the attributes 
of the N are clearly present. When it modifies a gradable noun, it may indirectly 
result  in  a  high  degree  interpretation,  similarly  to  what  we  have  seen  with  the 
adjectives  true  and  real;  but  such  an  interpretation  is  not  obtained  by  direct 
manipulation  of  the  gradable  structure  in  the  way degree  operators  give  rise  to 
degree readings in the adjectival domain. 
This way of understanding  perfect  immediately raises the question of what the 
status  of  adjectives  like  complete,  total,  absolute  etc.  is,  given  that  all  these 
adjectives and/or their adverbial counterparts have generally been treated on a par. It 
is to a brief examination of these adjectives that we turn in the next sub-section.
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4.5.2 Complete & co. 
In this sub-section we will examine the distribution and interpretation of adjectives 
such as complete, total, absolute. These adjectives and/ or the corresponding adverbs 
have  been  treated  in  the literature  either  as  maximality  modifiers  (Kennedy and 
McNally 2005, Morzycki 2009) or as extreme degree modifiers (Morzycki 2010) or 
both (Rotstein and Winter 2004, both uses are also noted by Kennedy and McNally 
2005).  As  it  turns  out,  however,  the  facts  do  not  require  an  analysis  of  these 
adjectives as degree expressions. An alternative analysis, on which they are in fact 
more similar to  real  and  perfect, as discussed above, may be envisaged; this view 
will be sketched in the second part of the section.
Similarly to the adjectives examined before (e.g. real, perfect etc.), the adjectives 
complete,  total  and absolute seem to have two types of uses. On one use they can 
combine  with  arbitrary  nouns  and  are  descriptive  of  completeness  of  the  object 
(mereological or otherwise). Thus, in (89), complete is used to describe an object as 
having all of its parts, while absolute means something like 'free of imperfection or 
relativity or relation to something else'.
(89) a. a complete {set of publications/ description}
b. an absolute measure
By contrast, in (90), the adjectives seem to say something about the extent to which 
the property denoted by the noun holds of the objects in question, in a parallel way 
to their adverbial counterparts modifying an adjective (e.g. completely idiotic)
(90) a. a complete idiot
b. a total mess
The nouns in  (90) are nouns  which encode gradable properties in their meaning. 
More examples of this type are given in (91). 
(91) a. a {complete/ total/ absolute/ utter} {idiot/ dork/ stranger}
b. (a) {total/ complete/ absolute/ utter} {mess/ chaos/ mayhem/ disgrace/ 
nonsense/ joy/ confidence/ bliss}
The examples in  (92) show that certain gradable nouns (e.g. nouns derived from 
activity verbs like eater,  smoker etc., as well as other gradable nouns, such as  fan, 
enthusiast etc.) resist modification by these adjectives:297
(92) #a {complete/ utter} {cheese eater/ smoker/ jazz enthusiast/ fan of curling}
There are two directions to go in search for an explanation of this difference, 
which  reflect  the  two  types  of  proposals  that  have  been  made  in  the  literature 
analysing these adjectives and/ or their adverbial counterparts as degree expressions. 
One possible view is that they are maximality modifiers, which can only modify 
297 Some of these examples are taken from Morzycki (2009, 2011).
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expressions  associated  with scales  that  are  upper  closed  and  have  a  maximum 
standard (Hay, Kennedy and Levin 1999, Kennedy and McNally 2005). The other 
one is that they express very high degree (Rotstein and Winter 2004, Kennedy and 
McNally 2005) and are only compatible with expressions that encode a notion of 
extremeness in their meaning (Morzycki 2010).  In what follows we will examine 
each option in turn.
A maximality interpretation seems to be at work in examples like (93)-(94), as 
also  indicated  by  the  possibility  of  replacing  these  adjectives  by  maximality 
modifiers like full  and 100%. The unacceptability of some of the examples in (93) 
and those in  (94) would then be due to the impossibility of assigning a maximum 
bound to the respective properties.298
(93) a. {complete/ total/ full} {certainty/ *uncertainty}
b. {complete/ 100%} {purity/ *impurity}
c. complete {visibility/ invisibility}
(94) a. *{full/ complete/ total} {patience/ impatience}
b. *{complete/ 100%} {strength/ weakness}
This is confirmed by the availability of modification by the adverb  almost, as 
illustrated in  (96).  Almost can typically modify expressions associated with upper-
closed  scales  and  an  absolute  maximum  standard  (including  maximality  degree 
modifiers in the adjectival  domain such as  completely),  as illustrated in  (95) (cf. 
Paradis 2001, Rotstein and Winter 2004, Kennedy and McNally 2005).299 The same 
maximality  interpretation is  also indicated by the availability  of  modification by 
exception phrases in (97):300
(95) a. This rod is almost straight. 
b. It was almost completely dark .
298 The nominal data in (93) seems to replicate the pattern found in the adjectival domain. Kennedy and 
McNally (2005) show that maximality  modifiers (100%,  completely,  fully) are acceptable with positive 
adjectives only if they use a scale with a maximal element, and with negative adjectives only if they use a 
scale with a minimal element:
(i) Open scale pattern
a. ??completely {tall/ deep/ expensive} 
b. ??completely {short/ shallow/ inexpensive}
(ii) Lower closed scale pattern
a. ??completely {bent/ wet} 
b. completely {straight/ dry}
(iii) Upper closed scale pattern
a. completely {certain/ safe/ pure} 
b. ??completely {uncertain/ dangerous/ impure}
(iv) Closed scale pattern
a. completely {full/ visible} 
b. completely {empty/ invisible}
299 The same holds of the literal use of the adjectives:
(i) The library is fortunate to have an almost complete set of these publications. 
(http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/complete) 
300 The examples in (97) are from the Corpus of Contemporary American English.
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(96) a. almost complete {certainty/ invisibility} 
b. almost utter {darkness/ futility}
(97) a. Then silence. Utter, complete silence except for the ticking of the mantel 
clock counting down the seconds that were left in her life.
b. Electricity and lights are fed down to the men, who have lived in utter 
darkness, except for occasional use of their helmet lamps. 
Such modification is, however, not acceptable in all the cases where complete is 
used (cf. the examples in (90) above):
(98) ??an almost {complete/ utter} idiot
This would be puzzling on the view that here too complete would mark maximality 
and idiot would be associated with an upper-closed scale. In addition, application of 
other tests that indicate whether an expression is associated with an upper-closed 
scale and has a maximum standard yields negative results with nouns like idiot. For 
example, Kennedy and McNally (2005) show that an assertion of x is A entails that x 
has  a  maximal  amount  of  A-ness,  i.e.  that  nothing  can  be  more  A than  x.  This 
explains the contradictions illustrated in (99). Unlike the sentences in (99), however, 
the one in (100), with the noun idiot, is not contradictory:
(99) a. #The paper is complete. I just have to write the conclusion.
b. #The plant is dead, though one part of it still appears to be alive.
(100) John's an idiot, though he's quite smart when it comes to computers.
Another test consists of entailment patterns in comparatives: the comparative of a 
maximum-standard adjective generates a negative entailment to the unmarked form, 
as illustrated in (101), where the sentence in (a) entails the one in (b). By contrast, 
the  sentence in  (102)a, where  idiot  is used inside of a comparative structure, does 
not entail the one in (102)b.
(101) a. The floor is drier than the countertop. → 
b. The countertop is not dry.
(102) a. John is {more of an idiot/ a bigger idiot} than George.
b. George is not an idiot.
A  final  test,  meant  to  determine  the  type  of absolute  standard (minimum  or 
maximum) is based on the entailment patterns obtained when proportional modifiers 
are used: if the adjective has a maximum standard, these entail  X is not adj, as in 
(103), while if the adjective has a minimum standard, then it is entailed that X is adj, 
as in (104). If this test is applied to a noun like idiot (to the extent to which it accepts 
proportional  modifiers),  it  again  does  not  pattern  with  maximum-standard 
expressions: the sentence in (105)a does not entail the negative sentence in (105)b.
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(103) a. The glass is partially full. →
b. The glass is not full.
(104) a. The door is half open. →
b. The door is open.
(105) a. John is {partially/ somewhat (of)} an idiot.
b. John is not an idiot.
In sum, idiot  does not pattern with expressions associated with upper-closed scales 
that have maximum standards. 
There is, however, an alternative to interpreting the use of complete in examples 
like  (90)-(91),  namely to take it  as  the adjectival  counterpart  of the high degree 
modifier use of  totally  and completely  illustrated in  (106) (cf. Rotstein and Winter 
2004, Kennedy and McNally 2005, Morzycki 2010):301
(106) I'm totally intrigued by bowling.
Kennedy and McNally show that the true maximality use and the high degree use 
(similar to  very  or  extremely)  are distinguished by their entailments. A maximality 
use entails that the end of the scale has been reached, as shown by the fact that  
(107)a is a contradiction, while the non-maximality, high degree use carries no such 
entailment, hence the acceptable continuation of (107)b:
(107) a. #The line is totally straight, though you can make it straighter. 
b. I'm totally intrigued by bowling, and Kim is even more intrigued by it 
than I am.
If this test is applied to the cases of adjectival modification of nouns, the result is  
similar to  (107)b rather than  (107)a: the sentence in  (108) is not contradictory.  In 
other words, modification by complete in these cases patterns with the high degree 
use of its adverbial counterpart, rather than with a maximality use. 
(108) John is a {complete/ total} idiot, {but/ and} Bill is even more of an idiot!
This also means that the difference in acceptability between the examples in (91) 
and (92) cannot be attributed to a difference in scale structure, namely there would 
be no maximum on the scale associated with smoker, but that there would be one on 
the scale of idiot.
In  §2.3 it  was suggested that  nouns which categorize individuals  based on a 
gradable property already encode high degree in their meaning. What the availability 
of modification by adjectives like complete may now be taken to further indicate is 
that nouns like idiot, unlike nouns such as eater or fan, encode very high degree, or 
301 Kennedy and McNally (2005) suggest that this use might have originated in a hyperbole or metaphor  
based on something that was originally literally interpreted along the lines of 'all of me is intrigued by  
bowling', for example. 
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'extremeness',  in their meaning.302,303 They would thus be similar  to  the so-called 
'extreme' adjectives already mentioned in §2.1 and §3.1 (e.g.  fantastic,  wonderful, 
fabulous,  gorgeous,  tremendous,  huge,  gigantic, enormous,  minute,  tiny etc.)  (cf. 
Cruse 1986, Paradis 2001, Morzycki 2010).  Someone would qualify as an idiot if 
s/he shows a very high degree of stupidity, not just a minimal lack of intelligence.  
Interestingly, in fact, Morzycki (2010) includes the corresponding adjective, idiotic, 
in the class of lexically extreme adjectives. One of the characteristics of this class of  
adjectives that has been highlighted in the literature is precisely that they can be 
modified by totality modifiers like absolutely, totally etc. (Cruse 1986, Paradis 2001, 
Morzycki  2010),  as  well  as  by  other  'extreme'  degree  modifiers  like  simply, 
positively,  flat-out,  downright,  outright  etc.  (Morzycki  2010).  It  is  therefore  not 
unexpected  that  nouns  like  idiot  would  be  compatible  with  the  corresponding 
adjectives: these nouns would be 'extreme' gradable nouns and the adjectives would 
be the adnominal counterparts of extreme degree modifiers. Other extreme degree 
modifiers can also modify nouns like idiot, as observed by Morzycki (2010), which 
strengthens the parallel between such nouns and extreme adjectives.
(109) Clyde is a {flat-out/ downright/ full-on/ straight-up} idiot.
In sum, the adjectives complete, total etc. seem to behave in quite a parallel way 
to their adverbial counterparts in terms of the interpretations available and the types  
of expressions they may modify.304 Does this mean that they should be analysed as 
degree expressions? This is the view put forth by  Morzycki (2009) who analyses 
them as degree heads (similarly to how he analyses real – cf. discussion in §4.1 and 
§4.4).305 We  would  like  to  suggest  that  this  is  not  a  necessary  conclusion.  An 
alternative account, more similar in nature to the approach taken in previous sections 
to adjectives like real and perfect, may be available.
In order to get a better understanding of these adjectives, we should also examine 
their  syntactic  distribution  and  compare  their  attributive  and  predicative  uses. 
302 Paradis (2000) also notes that gradable nouns "tend to be hyperbolic".
303 Similar variation is found in the adjectival domain – cf.  Bierwisch (1989) who makes a distinction 
between  dimensional  gradable  adjectives  such  as  tall and  evaluative  adjectives,  of  which  extreme 
adjectives  are  in  fact  a  sub-class.  Evaluative  adjectives,  for  instance,  generally  resists  neutralization 
(unlike dimensional adjectives), but there is, in addition, a lot of variation among different lexical items or 
sub-classes of adjectives.
304 Note also that while Kennedy and McNally (2005) take the two uses of the corresponding adverbs as  
distinct, other works propose unified analyses for the two and derive the differences from the interaction 
with the (scalar) properties of the modified elements (cf. Rotstein and Winter 2004, Morzycki 2010).
305 Morzycki's (2009) analysis is set within a degree-based approach to gradability. But an analysis of  
complete as a degree expression could also be implemented in a degree-less approach. The question that 
would arise on such an approach, if it is accepted that these modifiers are sensitive to scale structure (at  
least on some of their uses), is how to capture the scalar properties of expressions, more precisely the 
absolute ones. This is a criticism that has been raised more generally against degree-less approaches to 
gradability (see e.g. Kennedy 2007a). Suggestions have been made, however, in the literature of how this  
can be captured. Wheeler (1972), for example suggests that for absolute adjectives the comparison class is 
everything. McNally (2011) suggests a characterization of the relative/absolute distinction focusing on the 
nature of the properties that adjectives contribute, the role that adjectives play in classifying individuals  
according to  their  manifestation  of  these  properties,  and the  strategies  for  classification  that  may be 
involved (namely classification by similarity, and classification by rule). Such a view could be made use 
of within a degree-less approach to gradability. 
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Complete-type  adjectives  seem  to  be  restricted  to  the  prenominal  attributive 
position,  on  the  relevant  reading.  In  the  predicate  position,  only  their  basic,  
descriptive meaning is available, if one exists, hence the results are more or less odd 
or plainly ungrammatical (cf. Bouchard 1998, 2002, Demonte 2008, Morzycki 2009 
a.o.):
(110) a. a complete set of publications
b. The set was complete. 
(111) a. a {complete/ absolute/ total/ utter} idiot
b. That idiot {is/ seems} {complete/ #absolute/ #total/ *utter}.
Analysing  them  as  degree  expressions,  whether  on  a  degree-based  or  on  a 
degree-less approach, predicts this type of syntactic behaviour. On a degree-based 
approach, they need to operate on expressions defined in terms of degree arguments, 
and these will not be available when the adjective is used predicatively. In addition, 
they are linked to a particular projection within the DP; therefore they must appear 
in  a  prenominal  configuration (cf.  Morzycki  2009 who analyses  them as  degree 
heads just like  real). Similarly, on a degree-less approach, these elements will be 
treated  as  degree  functions  that  need  to  apply  to  the  noun  and  operate  on  the 
ordering encoded in its  meaning, hence they will  be restricted to the prenominal 
attributive position. But,  as discussed in §2.2.3,  the restriction to the prenominal 
position is more generally characteristic of non-intersective adjectives, and cannot 
be  taken  as  a  solid  argument  in  favour  of  analysing  these  elements  as  degree 
expressions.  At any rate,  the discussion of the syntactic distribution here will  be 
focused on finding more clues as to the interpretation of these adjectives and their  
interaction with nouns, which may already suggest  an alternative account,  rather 
than directly arguing against a degree analysis. 
 In contrast with  (111),  examples like the following, where a noun  intuitively 
associated with an upper-closed scale is used (cf. the examples in (96)-(97) above), 
are both acceptable and do not seem to exhibit a difference in interpretation:
(112) a. complete certainty
a'. utter silence
b. My certainty was complete. 
b' The silence was utter.306
There are two possible ways of interpreting these data. One would be to say that, if 
these examples contain the normally exclusively prenominal adjective illustrated in 
(111),  then  this  shows  that  it  may  be  used  predicatively,  on  the  relevant 
interpretation, if the right sort of noun is used as a subject. The other option would 
be to take it to suggest that it is in fact the literal completeness adjective (cf. (110)) 
that  is  used  in  both  cases,  namely  (112)a-a'  and  (112)b-b'.  In  other  words,  the 
maximality  modifier  (e.g.  (96)-(97),  (112)) would in  fact  be  the  same  as  the 
descriptive  adjective  which  denotes  completeness  and  which  can  also  be  used 
306 Source: Corpus of Contemporary American English
222 CHAPTER 4
predicatively in other cases (e.g.  (110)),  but, similarly to what we have seen with 
size  adjectives,  due  to  the  nature  of  the  noun  it  would  result  in  an  abstract  
interpretation. In order to decide, we will also look at the behaviour of complete in 
combination with other nouns (e.g. nouns that also allowed the predicative use of 
size adjectives). This seems to support the second type of account of (112).
A comparison of the prenominal  and predicative use of these adjectives with 
nouns that  denote non-human objects characterized by a property turns out to be 
quite revealing. Consider the following examples:
(113) a. The workshop was a complete failure.
b. The failure was complete.
The success or failure of a workshop may depend on multiple aspects such as the 
quality  of  the  talks,  the  atmosphere,  the  contacts  established,  the  quality  of  the 
organisation  etc.  If  the  workshop fails  in  any  of  these  respects  that  the  speaker 
considers most important, then a sentence like (113)a may be felicitously uttered. In 
other words, that would be salient enough an indication that the situation qualifies as 
a failure; it would be sufficient for it to be a clear case of failure in the speaker's 
view.  This  may  also  be  why  speakers  often  report  that  this  is  in  fact  an 
"exaggeration". In contrast, sentence (113)b requires the workshop to have failed in 
all respects and is used with more difficulty in a "partial" scenario. In other words  
the  predicative  complete  predicates  literal  completeness  with  reference  to  the 
mereological structure (component parts  or aspects) of the object which is being 
described as a failure.  Therefore, if the failure is complete, that means that it is a 
subset of 'complete things' in the sense that it is something which has failed in all 
respects, all of its aspects has been afflicted, while a complete failure is complete as 
a failure (cf.  also  Demonte 2008), i.e. it fulfils all the criteria for qualifying as a 
failure.307,308 
This is the interpretation we would like to propose  the exclusively  prenominal 
complete  always  contributes.  Like  perfect,  then,  complete would  apply  to  the 
307 This difference in interpretation seems to be confirmed by examples like the following (from the 
British National Corpus), where abstract nouns are used as subjects. Consider (i)b, for instance, where it  
is clear that even the last thing went wrong and this made the situation be miserable in all respects.
(i) a. My Christmas happiness was complete.
b. But Roper was the only Ballyshannon attacker to get his name on the score sheet, and when 
he failed to tie the game up with that late penalty the misery was complete for De La Salle.
c Clouds shut out the stars; their solitude was complete.
308 The  contrast  may  be  illustrated  more  clearly  in  Romance  languages  where  the  non-intersective 
interpretation is more strictly restricted to its prenominal position, while the postnominal and predicative 
positions exhibit the intersective, literal interpretation of the adjective. This is shown below for Spanish 
(examples from Demonte 2008):
(i) a. un completo fracaso a'. el total desacuerdo      [Spanish]
a complete failure the total disagreement
'a complete failure' 'the total disagreement' 
b. El fracaso es completo. b'. El desacuerdo es total.
the failure is complete the disagreement is total
'The failure is complete.' 'The disagreement is complete.'
Thus,  if  the  disagreement  is  complete,  as  in  (i)b',  then  they  disagree  in  all  respects,  while  el  total  
desacuerdo denotes an act of disagreeing which is such that it represents a clear case of disagreement 
(Demonte 2008:83).
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characterizing property included in the meaning of the noun, and it would say that 
the properties displayed by the individual in question match this definition. This also 
correlates  with  its  restriction  to  the  prenominal  position:  it  is  only  in  this  
configuration that it can target this internal component of meaning of the noun (i.e. 
the  characteristic  function,  cf.  Bouchard  2002,  but  also,  though  in  a  different 
framework,  Siegel  1976  etc.),  and  indicate  that  the  criteria  defining  it  are 
exhaustively satisfied in the speaker's opinion. The "speaker-oriented" complete-type 
adjectives are, therefore, parallel to adjectives like  real  and perfect, as analysed in 
the preceding sections. In what follows we will sketch this view and and show how 
it can account for the distribution and interpretation of these adjectives.
Note  first  that  "all  the  criteria"  should  not  be  taken  literally.  Consider  again 
nouns like failure, idiot etc. Such nouns denote objects or individuals characterized 
by a property that is multi-dimensional (cf. Sassoon 2007a for relevant discussion of 
multi-dimensionality).309 Adjectives like complete, on the relevant interpretation, say 
that, in the speaker's view, this (complex) characterizing property applies; this makes 
it similar to adjectives like real. However, it is not necessary that the object actually 
satisfy the property in absolutely all respects. In other words, these adjectives are not 
maximality  (or exhaustivity) operators over the sets of dimensions or criteria that 
make up the property included in the meaning of the noun. Let us briefly review the 
arguments in favour of this view. First of all,  the discussion of  (113)a above  has 
shown that it may be enough if the characterizing property is clearly manifested in a 
way or aspect that is particularly salient contextually or in an aspect that is most 
important to the speaker (e.g. popularity or quality of talks for a workshop in the  
case of  complete failure). That  seems to  offer a sufficient basis for the speaker to 
conclude that s/he is dealing with a case that fully matches the definition of N (e.g. a 
failure).  Secondly, this view of the  speaker-oriented complete is also supported by 
the non-contradictoriness of examples like  John's a total idiot,  though he's quite  
smart  when  it  comes  to  computers.310 Finally,  complete  cannot  be  modified  by 
309 The presence of a multi-dimensional property may in fact be a condition on the use of complete, and 
this might explain the difference in acceptability between a complete idiot and *a complete smoker. In the 
latter  case,  what  makes  someone  a  smoker  is  simply  the  quantity  of  smoking,  and  under  these 
circumstances the application of complete does not make sense.
310 It should be noted that proportional modifiers are not very natural or common with the noun idiot, as 
might be expected if we were dealing with a closed scale that made it compatible with complete. When 
found  such  modifiers  seem to  be  rather  the  result  of  a  play  upon  words,  taking  advantage  of  the  
availability of modification by complete and the actual totality use of complete (on which it would form a 
series with proportional modifiers like half), or maybe (in some cases) retaining the closed scale that was 
associated with idiot in its initial (now obsolete) use to refer to someone with psychological disabilities.  
Some examples are given in (i).  Note also that  a half idiot  is not 'half  as idiotic'  as compared to  'a 
complete idiot'; nor is it  necessarily someone who is less idiotic than a complete idiot, as suggested by 
(ii).  This  also  confirms  our  proposal  that  the  speaker-oriented complete  is  not  a  maximality  (or 
exhaustivity) operator over the dimensions that make up the characterizing property.
(i) a. He's not a complete idiot, but only a half idiot. 
(http://forums.mangafox.com/threads/Character-Discussion-Thread?p=2953100 ) 
b. He has been variously described as dim-witted, coarse and ignorant, a half idiot, a madman, 
and a lunatic. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hon_Yost_Schuyler) 
(ii) a. I wonder, is a half idiot worse than a regular idiot? No, really. Think about it. 
(http://www.csharphelp.com/forum/topic/breaking-thru-to-sharp) 
b. A: Hey Dr.  Chipmunk,  when  you  call  Mr.  Lincoln  a  "half  idiot"  what  do  you  mean?
B: I mean he is so stupid that he fails to qualify as a full fledged idiot, or in other words, he 
would have to get smarter to be an "idiot".     (http://www.wordnik.com/words/)
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almost in these examples. We will conclude, therefore, that for a complete N to hold, 
on the relevant interpretation, the characterizing property must be exhibited saliently 
enough for the speaker to conclude that that the individual in question fully qualifies 
as an N. So these adjectives are quite strongly speaker-dependent, similarly to what 
we have seen with real.311
The literal completeness adjectives,  on the other hand, which may also occur 
predicatively, do impose an actual completeness requirement. When the adjective is 
predicated  of  a  concrete  object  with  clear,  concrete  parts  (e.g.  set,  description, 
collection etc., but also a noun like idiot, which denotes a [+human] individual with 
body parts), the interpretation is in terms of it having all of its mereological parts –
e.g.  (89),  (110),  and the only possible, though odd, reading of  (111)b. When it is 
predicated of a more abstract noun, either a noun denoting a property (e.g.  misery) 
or one denoting an (abstract) object characterized by a property (e.g.  failure), this 
translates as the object satisfying the property in all its aspects. For example, if the 
failure is complete then the failure must cover all of the aspects of the object referred 
to  (e.g.  the  parts  or  aspects  of  a  workshop  all  need  to  have  failed).  When  the 
adjective is applied to an expression that  inherently involves a finite set of strict  
criteria for application (cf. McNally 2011 for this view of absolute adjectives, which 
may be extended to nouns that are intuitively associated with an upper-closed scale), 
this will result in the maximality interpretation – e.g.  (96),  (97) and (112).312 In all 
these cases, complete may be modified by almost and by exception phrases.
This  view of the "speaker-oriented"  adjectives  of  the complete  family,  which 
makes them more similar to  perfect  and  real,  may also help us understand their 
possible  co-occurrence  with  epithets:313 in  the  speaker's  view  the  individuals  in 
question satisfy all the necessary criteria for qualifying as Ns (here, again, what is  
necessary and sufficient to qualify as such is relative to the speaker's belief world).314
311 Just as in the case of real and evaluative adjectives, we should probably refer to an agent or a judge 
(in the sense of Lasersohn 2005), rather than necessarily the actual speaker, given that these expressions 
can, for example, be embedded, and so allow shifts in perspective.
312 Note that  utter does not seem to be able to modify nouns denoting concrete objects and result in a 
concrete maximality/ completeness interpretation of the type found with complete in examples like (89), 
(110), and (111)b, on the only possible, though odd, reading of this example. Utter seems, therefore, to 
have lost its original literal meaning, which was descriptive of outermost locations in space (cf. Bolinger 
1972), and to have only retained an abstract aspect of the meaning in terms of 'reaching the (far) end, i.e.  
maximum'. This may explain why it seems to be restricted to nouns denoting abstractions. Otherwise,  
however,  it  displays the same patterns of distribution and interpretation as the adjective  complete,  as 
already illustrated at various points in this sub-section. This includes the maximality interpretation (which 
correlates with the availability of modification by  almost and exception phrases, and with the possible 
occurrence in predicate position); the only peculiarity is that it is generally only found with rather abstract 
nouns – e.g. (97) and (112); other examples of this type include (an) utter absence/ lack/ stillness/ loss/  
isolation/ blackness/ solitude/ transformation etc.
313 Differently  from  real,  complete  does  not  seem  to  be  compatible  with  figurative,  stereotypical 
interpretations of nouns, but is rather limited to their literal interpretations, though it can also modify  
epithets – but it is rather the conventionalized ones (e.g. bitch, crap) (cf. relevant discussion in §2.1).
314 The adjective  utter seems to  display a preference for nouns that have a negative connotation, as 
shown by the unacceptability of (i), in contrast with (90) above, as well as with examples such as (114), 
where  garbage  and  rubbish  are  used  to  convey  a  clearly  negative  evaluation,  rather  than  (simply) 
attributing a gradable property.
(i) ??an utter genius
However, examples can also be found where utter modifies nouns with neutral or positive connotations 
(example (ii)a is from The British National Corpus, (ii)b is from Paradis (2000), and (ii)c-d were found 
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(114) a. {total/ complete/ utter} {garbage/ rubbish/ crap}
b. a complete bitch 
In sum,  it  has  been  proposed  in  this  sub-section  that  the  "speaker-oriented" 
complete need  not  be  analysed  as  an  adnominal  degree  expression.  Instead,  its 
contribution seems to be similar to that of adjectives like perfect or real, in the sense 
that it applies to the property defining N and indicates that it is fully satisfied by the 
individual in question in the speaker's opinion. As discussed above, this does not  
mean that the object described has to manifest the property in absolutely all respects, 
or in all of its aspects; the object needs to display the defining property saliently 
enough for the speaker to be able to judge it as clearly qualifying as an N.
4.6 Concluding remarks
This  section  has  studied  a  number  of  adjectives  which  have  been  argued  to  be 
adnominal  degree expressions (cf.  Morzycki 2009 for an explicit analysis of  real, 
complete  etc. as adnominal degree morphemes). It has been shown here, however, 
that  real  is  in  fact  not  a  degree  operator,  but  is  best  treated  as  an  epistemic/ 
evidential adjective. A similar analysis can be extended to adjectives like sheer and 
perfect. As for totality adjectives like complete, it has been shown that they may also 
be given an alternative analysis, on which they do not directly manipulate gradable 
structures but are treated more similarly to real and perfect. The main consequence 
of this section is that the evidence for adnominal degree morphemes has been shown 
to become even more scarce, and that availability of modification by these adjectives 
is excluded as a test for gradability.
5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have examined a number of adjectival modifiers which had been 
argued to be degree modifiers  or  operators in the nominal domain. The result we 
have arrived at after these several case studies is that, in fact, they provide no clear  
on the internet):
(ii) a. It is an utter delight all the way, especially for travellers on foot with time to linger, but 
perhaps not for nervous motorists.
b. complete and utter joy
c. Now this is utter genius!
d. utter perfection
e. an utter mystery
Note that the modified nouns tend to be [-human], abstract mass nouns – compare, in particular, (ii)c to (i) 
above. A count use is, however, also possible, as in (i)a.
Paradis (2000) remarks that in the majority of cases the other adjectives also co-occur with negative 
nouns (in her BNC-based corpus study), but they are not restricted to such environments, as also apparent 
from the examples in (90) above.
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evidence in favour of an explicit gradable structure in the semantics or syntax of 
nouns that would be parallel to that of adjectives. 
First of all, these modifiers are not (always) restricted to what one would want to 
call gradable nouns, which indicates they do not depend on gradability. Secondly, 
although the interpretations obtained are often very similar to those obtained in the 
adjectival domain by means of degree modification, they are in fact arrived at by 
different  mechanisms.  In the case of  size adjectives,  it  was shown that  they are 
always  used  as  modifiers  predicating  size.  When  they  combine  with  nouns  that 
denote or are defined in terms of instances of abstract properties, due to the type of 
object they measure, they give rise to an abstract size interpretation. This mimics a  
degree  interpretation,  though  it  is  arrived  at  in  a  different  way,  without  the 
manipulation of  a gradable structure.  In  the case of evaluative adjectives,  it  was 
shown that the degree(-like) interpretation may may simply arise as an implicature, 
as an effect of reinforcing negative connotations of nouns. Adjectives like real and 
true were probably the clearest cases where a degree analysis could not apply. They 
have  been  analysed  here  as  epistemic/  evidential  adjectives;  in  their  case  the 
apparent  degree interpretation obtained is  a  result  of  the interaction between the 
evidential adjective and the nouns that contain a gradable property in their meaning 
such as  idiot. This is because the more idiotic one is, the less doubt there will be  
about the individual qualifying as an idiot. A similar approach was suggested for 
adjectives like pure, perfect and even complete. All of these, therefore, turn out to be 
'fake degree modifiers'. They may give rise to degree-like interpretations; however, 
these are arrived at by various other mechanisms, which are in fact independently 
needed, without the direct  manipulation of a  gradable structure.  Such a gradable 
structure does not seem to be grammatically accessible to adjectival modifiers.  In 
chapter 5, we will discuss the implications of these findings for the status of nouns 
and the status of gradability in the nominal domain, for the parallel or lack thereof  
with the adjectival  domain, as  well  as for the representation of  gradability more 
generally. 
To  conclude,  the  investigation  in  this  chapter  provides  no  evidence  for  the 
presence of  gradable structure in  the semantics  and syntax of nouns.  Even if in 
certain  contexts, they  may  give  rise  to  particular  interpretations  that  resemble 
interpretations obtained by means of degree modifications in the adjectival domain, 
these are arrived at through different mechanisms.  If one were to  take  these  as an 
indication  of  the  'gradable'  status  of  the  nouns  in  the  context  of  which  such 
interpretations are obtained,  then  what  gradability  means  for  nouns seems to be 
different from gradability in the adjectival domain. This conclusion only comes to 
confirm the results yielded by the previous two chapters.
Chapter 5   CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation started out with the aim of identifying gradability in the nominal  
domain. In order to do that, a number of tests were gathered that had been proposed 
in the literature at some point or other. From an overview in chapter 1, section 2, it 
appeared that different tests yielded different results, which begged for a more in-
depth investigation. This investigation was carried out in chapters 2-4, each of which 
has re-examined various environments that had been claimed to involve gradability 
in some way or another. In case after case, however, it turned out that the proposed 
diagnostics did not work in the expected ways, and that other factors were involved 
in creating the noted effects. In the end, we are left with a rather meagre picture of  
gradability and degree modification in the nominal domain, which is not parallel to 
what  is  found  in  the  adjectival  domain.  In  this  concluding  chapter  we  will 
summarise the results of the "tests" which have been examined (and re-analysed) 
and which have turned out to instantiate phenomena that are different from degree 
modification as we know it from the adjectival domain. We will also present the 
picture of "gradable nouns" that emerges from this investigation. Finally, we will 
discuss the implications this has for our understanding of gradability more generally, 
and specifically for the comparison between the nominal and adjectival domains. 
Although the examination of gradability in the nominal domain leads to a negative 
conclusion,  not  giving  direct  evidence  that  would  provide  a  basis  for  choosing 
between  theories  for  the  representation  of  gradability,  we  will  end  with  some 
speculations as to which approach might be best suited to capture the differences 
between nouns and adjectives with respect to gradability.
In chapter 2 two environments were examined that have been claimed to involve 
gradability, namely N of an N constructions (e.g. that idiot of a doctor) and the small 
clause  complement  of  seem  (e.g.  He seems  a fool.).  It  was argued that  that  the 
distribution of nouns in these contexts is not determined by gradability – whether at  
the  lexical  or  syntactic  level  –  but  by  other  factors  which  partly  overlap  with 
gradability and, under certain circumstances, create similar effects. In the case of N 
of an N constructions, it was shown that the necessary and sufficient condition for a 
noun to occur in the first slot of the structure is that it can express a value judgment.  
It  was  shown  that  gradable  expressions  and  expressions  that  convey  a  value 
judgment constitute two distinct categories, though they may overlap to some extent, 
and that the strength of appreciation/ depreciation may lead to an interpretation that  
can be mistaken for a degree interpretation. In the second case, it was argued that 
seem  is  an  epistemic  verb  that  contains  an  evidential  meaning  component.  The 
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restrictions  on  its  small  clause  complement  were  shown  to  follow  from  a 
combination of two factors. One is the necessary compatibility with the uncertainty 
of assessment involved in the meaning of the verb. The other consists of certain 
restrictions as to what may be used as evidence based on which it can be evaluated 
whether a property holds. Gradable expressions were seen to represent only a subset 
of  expressions  that  may  occur  in  this  environment.  They  generally  make  good 
complements given the vagueness they introduce. However, this is not enough, and 
it  was  seen  that  not  all  gradable  expressions  can  occur  in  the  small  clause 
complement of seem. Consequently, these two environments were excluded as tests 
for  gradability.  The  distribution  of  nouns  in  these  contexts  cannot  be  used  as 
evidence in favour of positing a gradable structure in their semantics or of a degree 
projection in their syntax. The two case studies examined in this chapter have also  
shown  how  various  factors  may  conspire  so  as  to  create  the  impression  that 
gradability and degree are involved.
Chapter 3 focused on the study of such, for which a fundamental distinction had 
been  proposed in  the literature between a  "kind"  such  and a "degree"  such.  We 
argued against this view and showed that the so-called "degree" such is not a degree 
operator. Its distribution is not limited to gradable nouns, nor is the interpretation in 
terms of degree. It was proposed instead that this such (which we labelled "internal" 
such so as to distinguish it from the usual anaphoric and deictic uses of the "kind" 
such) is also a case of a kind-referring expression, but that  it  imposes particular 
requirements concerning the construal of sub-kinds it can select, which accounts for 
the differences in distribution (and interpretation) with respect to the regular "kind" 
such.  More  precisely,  it  was  argued  that  it  selects  salient  sub-types  that  can  be 
identified by natural consequences which are expressible by means of result clauses. 
Once again, nouns that are generally thought to be gradable turned out to be only a 
subset of the nouns that make available the required sort of sub-types, as they easily 
prompt  sub-types  delineated  by  a  high  degree  of  the  property  included  in  their 
meaning (e.g. "big idiot"-type) and which are associated with natural consequences 
that identify them (e.g.  being a sub-type of idiot as defined by a high degree of 
idiocy can naturally determine one's chances of being hired, hence the acceptability 
of an example like  He's such an idiot that no one will hire him.).  In addition to 
gradable nouns, internal such can modify nouns used with a stereotypical (possibly 
figurative) interpretation and situation-type nouns. While in the case of nouns like 
situation,  way etc. it is rather straightforward that they are non-gradable nouns, we 
also argued in this chapter that stereotypical nouns are not gradable either (whether  
inherently or by coercion). Consequently, it turned out that co-occurrence with such 
in exclamatives or with result clauses is not a test for gradability either, and  cannot 
be used as evidence in favour of the existence of gradable structures in the semantics 
and/or  syntax of  nouns.  It  does  not rule out,  however,  that  some nouns may be 
associated with such gradable structures in the semantics, given that some effects are 
seen in the interpretation, namely in the way salient sub-types are made available by 
nouns like  idiot,  courage  etc. In the last part of the chapter we briefly examined 
some related  cases. Wh-exclamatives  were  shown not  to  offer  a  solid  basis  for 
distinguishing between lexically gradable and non-gradable nouns, while for quite-
structures it was suggested that they need not be analysed as degree constructions at 
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all. An interesting case was presented by predicative partitive structures (e.g.  more 
of  an  idiot),  for  which  it  turned  out  that  they  may  well  involve  operations  on 
orderings – interestingly enough, these are only available out of an indefinite NP 
predicate and may be understood in terms of typicality dimensions (in the sense of 
Sassoon 2007a,b). 
Chapter 4 focused on a number of  "degree adjectives". From the overview in 
section 2 of  chapter  1,  it  appeared that  the availability of  modification by these 
adjectives on the relevant reading offered the most reliable test for gradability and 
the  most  promising  candidates  for  adnominal  degree  expressions.  However,  the 
more detailed investigation of size adjectives,  real-type adjectives and evaluative 
adjectives  ended  up  disconfirming  this  hypothesis.  The  distribution  and  the 
interpretation of size adjectives, for example, do not support a degree analysis of 
these  expressions.  The  facts  instead  support an  alternative  account  in  terms  of 
(abstract) size of (instances of) properties. More precisely, it was shown that when 
they combine with nouns that denote or are defined in terms of instances of abstract 
properties (e.g.  big idiot,  enormous generosity,  huge blunder),  due to the type of 
object they measure (namely an instance of a property, or trope), they give rise to an 
abstract size interpretation. This mimics a degree interpretation, but we argued that it 
is arrived at in a different way, without the manipulation of a gradable structure that 
would  be  parallel  to  that  of  gradable  adjectives.  Interestingly,  big  idiots would 
correspond to a salient sub-type that internal such was seen to select in chapter 3; it 
now appears that to arrive at the relevant interpretation, manipulation of gradable 
structure is not needed. Real-type adjectives were a clear case of adjectives that can 
be shown not to be adnominal degree operators.  Real  and  true  were argued to be 
epistemic/  evidential  adjectives.  The apparent  degree  interpretation  obtained  was 
shown  to  be  a  result  of  the  interaction  between  the  evidential  meaning  of  the 
adjective and the nouns that contain a gradable property in their meaning, such as  
idiot:  intuitively,  the more  idiotic  one  is,  the  less  doubt  there  will  be  about  the 
individual qualifying as an idiot. A similar approach was suggested for adjectives 
like pure, perfect and even complete. As for evaluative adjectives, it also seems that 
they do not require a degree analysis. An alternative, non-degree account is possible, 
namely one which capitalizes on their evaluative meaning, and derives the degree-
like  interpretation  as  an  implicature,  an  effect  of  reinforcing  the  negative 
connotation of nouns. In sum, although the interpretations obtained are often very 
similar to those obtained in the adjectival domain by means of degree modification, 
they are in fact  arrived at  not  by operating on gradable structures  in a way that 
would be similar to how degree modification applies to gradable adjectives, but by 
different mechanisms, which are independently attested and needed to account for 
other phenomena as well. The behaviour of "degree adjectives", therefore, turned out 
not to provide any conclusive evidence either in favour of the existence of gradable 
structure  in  the  semantics  or  syntax  of  nouns  that  would  be  parallel  to  that  of 
adjectives.
The investigation carried out in chapters 2-4 shows that in the nominal domain 
there are no grammatical phenomena that are exclusively sensitive to gradability and 
no  expressions  that  perform  the  type  of  operations  that  are  involved  in  degree 
modification as we know it from the adjectival domain, i.e. involving comparison of 
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degrees or operations on ordered sets (depending on the approach). In the nominal 
domain, we have not found expressions that are strictly restricted to co-occurring 
with a particular class of nouns, that one might want to call gradable, and where the 
degree-like interpretation is not brought about by different mechanisms. It has been 
shown  that  abstract  size  modification,  for  instance,  offers  a  way  of  obtaining 
interpretations that  mimic degree interpretations in the nominal domain. In  other 
cases, a degree-like interpretation may arise as an effect of an evidential meaning, or  
comes about as an implicature arising from reinforcing evaluative connotations, or is 
mimicked by value judgmental  expressions.  Various environments or  phenomena 
seem  to  interact  with  gradability,  at  least  intuitively,  such  as  epistemicity  and 
evidentiality (cf. the case of the epistemic verb seem as well as real-type adjectives) 
or the delineation of sub-kinds. The latter was seen with internal such which makes 
use of salient sub-types (defined by natural consequences) that, in some cases, are  
delineated in a way that seems to make use of gradable structure, while in fact they  
are just the sort of sub-types that happen to be salient with this kind of nouns.
We have also not found any evidence in favour of the existence of adnominal 
degree  heads  or,  more  in  general,  of  a  syntactic  projection  dedicated  to  degree 
modification,  i.e.  a  nominal  DegP,  parallel  to  what  has  been  proposed  for  the 
adjectival domain. Take for example those elements that Morzycki (2009) argues to 
be degree heads and on the basis of which he argues in favour of the existence of a 
nominal degree structure:  real,  true,  complete.  On the one hand, these have been 
shown not to be degree operators. On the other hand, even if a degree analysis of 
these elements could be somehow accepted, there would still be a lack of parallel  
with the adjectival domain: their adverbial counterparts (as well as those of other 
adjectives,  such  as  terribly  etc.)  behave syntactically  as  adjuncts,  rather  than  as 
heads,  in  the  adjectival  domain  (as  indicated  by  e.g.  extraction,  adjacency,  non-
interference with head-movement etc. – cf. Doetjes 1997, Neeleman, van de Koot 
and Doetjes 2004).315 As a result, it is not possible to maintain that the same items 
are involved, which may attach either to adjectives or to nouns (and which, function 
of  the  specific  syntactic  context  may  be  spelled  out  slightly  differently,  i.e. 
complete/  terrible  etc.  vs. completely/ terribly  etc., or without any morphological 
difference, as is the case of Dutch:  erg 'terrible/y'). While in the adjectival domain 
items are found which function quite clearly as Deg heads syntactically, such as the 
comparative, superlative, equative morphemes etc. (cf. Corver 1997, Doetjes 1997, 
Neeleman, van de Koot and Doetjes 2004, Doetjes 2008 a.o.), we have not found 
evidence in favour of degree morphemes in the nominal domain. Reflexes of the 
existence of a nominal DegP structure cannot be found elsewhere either. In chapter 
2, it was argued that the distribution of expressions in the small clause complement  
315 This is illustrated below with two Dutch examples, since the possible positioning of the complement 
to the left  of the adjective enables us to check for the possibilities in placing the degree words with  
respect to the adjective. The example in (i.a) illustrates the impossibility of separating the degree heads te  
'too' or even 'as' from the adjective, while (i.b) shows that this is possible when the modifier/ adjunct erg 
'terrible/y' is used. 
(i) a. *een {te/ even} van zijn moeder afhankelijke jongen
  a too/ as of his mother dependent boy
b. een erg van zijn moeder afhankelijke jongen
a terribly of his mother dependent boy
'a boy terribly dependent on his mother' 
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of the verb seem is not determined by gradability – either at the lexical or syntactic 
level. Hence, the possible occurrence of a nominal expression in this environment 
cannot be taken as evidence in favour of the existence of a nominal DegP either 
(contra Matushansky 2002c). In sum, there is no evidence in favour of adnominal 
degree morphemes, i.e. of overt degree morphology, in the nominal domain which 
would motivate postulating the projection of a degree structure in the syntax.316
In  sum,  we  have  found no  evidence  that  nouns  have  gradable  structure  that 
would be grammatically accessible and that would be parallel to that of gradable 
adjectives.  The obvious question that  arises  is what  this  means for  the status  of 
nouns. Can we still talk about  "gradable nouns"? In some sense, yes; though what 
gradability  means  for  nouns  now seems  to  be  different  from gradability  in  the 
adjectival domain. Looking at the intersection of all the phenomena examined in this 
dissertation,  it  can be noticed that  certain nouns recur and give rise to particular 
types of interpretations which mimic the interpretations obtained in the adjectival 
domain by means of degree modification. However, as has been shown throughout 
the dissertation, the mechanisms which lead to these interpretations are not the same 
as those underlying degree modification in the adjectival domain. 
The nouns that can be pointed to seem to fall into three classes, which all have in 
common the fact that they denote or are defined in terms of (instances of) properties. 
One class is that of nouns which denote abstract properties,  whose  instances have 
abstract size (e.g.  idiocy,  courage,  generosity etc.). A second class contains nouns 
which denote sets of [+human] individuals characterized by such a property, such as 
idiot,  which  denotes  the  set  of  individuals  characterized  by  their  idiocy;  other 
examples include: fool, enthusiast, fan, blunderer etc. The third class is that of nouns 
which denote sets of (more or less abstract)  objects characterized by an abstract 
property, such as blunder, mistake etc.. Note that many of these nouns are related to 
gradable  adjectives,  or  are  derived  from  (activity  or  gradable)  verbs  or  other 
("gradable") nouns. As we have already seen, it is the interaction of these particular 
objects (i.e. instances of properties, or tropes) included in the meaning of certain 
nouns  with  certain  modifiers  (e.g.  size  adjectives)  that  leads  to  degree-like 
interpretations.  This  means,  therefore,  that  gradability  is  not  represented  in  the 
lexical semantics of nouns – whether in terms of a degree argument or in terms of an 
ordering, depending on the approach one might want to choose (see below for more 
discussion of this point) – and these nouns are of the same semantic type as regular 
nouns. (See also chapter 4, §2.4.2, for possible ways of implementing the intuition 
that under certain circumstances modifiers may target components in the internal 
semantic make-up of nouns.) Another result of the investigation in chapters 3 and 4 
was to exclude stereotypical, figurative noun interpretations (e.g.  Julie is (such) a  
boy.) from the realm of gradability, and also to distinguish them from nouns of the 
type  idiot.  Unlike  "gradable" nouns  like  idiot,  which  denote  sets  of  individuals 
characterized  by  a  salient  property  (even  though  it  may  be  a  complex,  multi-
dimensional one, such as idiocy), the domain of stereotypical nouns is defined as an 
(unordered) set of (partly intersecting) properties stereotypically associated with N. 
316 In addition, the postulation of this type of syntactic structure gives rise to a number of additional 
problems and complications in the system, such as its location within the extended nominal projection 
relative to other functional projections that are present and to other modifiers.
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This makes it impossible to establish an ordering on the domain. It also makes them 
incompatible with size adjectives, for instance. However, in certain contexts, it is 
possible to  single out just one property of the set, for example in the context of 
internal  such  with  result  clauses  or  in  exclamatives.  This  places  these  nouns 
somewhere in  between ordinary, non-gradable nouns and  nouns like  idiot.  If  we 
accept  this  picture,  and  still  want  to  maintain  that  the  three  classes  of  nouns 
mentioned above are gradable nouns, then gradability turns out not to be a single 
homogeneous phenomenon.
What does all this mean for theories of gradability? Given the rather negative 
conclusion concerning gradability in  the nominal  domain that  emerges from this 
investigation, we do not really have a basis for evaluating different approaches to 
gradability. However, if we assume a vague predicate (or degree-less) approach to 
gradability, we may have an interesting way to understand the difference between 
nouns  and  adjectives,  as  suggested  by  Constantinescu,  Doetjes  and  Součková 
(2011).  On  a  degree-less  account,  gradable  adjectives  are  defined  as vague 
predicates, whose domain is inherently ordered. As such, gradability is a matter of 
the  presence  of  a  (salient)  ordering.  Degree  expressions  such  as  more and  less 
perform operations on these orderings (cf. Kamp 1975, Klein 1980, 1982, Larson 
1988, Van Rooij 2008, to appear, Doetjes, Constantinescu and Součková 2011; see 
also  chapter  1,  §1.1.2,  for  more  discussion).  Within  such  a  framework,  we  can 
interpret  the  (negative)  results  yielded  by  the  investigation  of  gradability  in  the 
nominal  domain,  i.e.  the lack of  degree modification inside the  noun phrase,  as 
indicating that the relevant gradable structure, i.e. orderings, is not available with 
nouns. So while gradable adjectives denote sets of individuals that are  ordered on 
the basis of a property (e.g.  idiotic  denotes a set of individuals ordered based on 
their idiocy), nouns do not introduce orderings. Instead, "gradable" nouns are those 
nouns that either denote sets of objects that have an abstract size,  i.e. instances of 
properties, or are defined in terms of such an object, as indicated in the preceding 
paragraph. These sets, however, are not (inherently) ordered.317
This difference may be related to the claim sometimes found in the literature 
that,  differently  from  adjectives,  nouns  are  inherently  and  irreducibly  multi-
dimensional  (cf.  Wierzbicka  1986,  Kamp  1975,  and  especially  Sassoon  2007a). 
Sassoon  (2007a)  argues  that  adjectives  are  either  uni-dimensional  or  can  be 
interpreted as being uni-dimensional, and this is what makes them compatible with 
the comparative. Phrases introduced by with respect to, for instance, can be used to 
explicitly reduce a multi-dimensional adjective to a uni-dimensional interpretation.
(1) healthy with respect to blood pressure
Nouns, on the other  hand,  are inherently multi-dimensional  and remain so;  their 
dimensions  cannot  be  accessed  by  grammatical  operations,  and  they  cannot  be 
transformed into uni-dimensional objects either e.g. by adding a phrase introduced 
by with respect to, as shown in (2)a. As such an ordering can never be defined and 
317 This may also help us understand the difference between the figurative use of the noun boy and the 
adjective  boyish. Although they seem to be very similar in meaning, the adjective, but not the noun,  
seems to  enable  an  ordering  of  the  individuals  in  terms  of  one  characterizing  property  'boyishness'  
(though it is a multi-dimensional one: one can be boyish e.g. with respect to looks or behaviour). 
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nouns cannot be used in (what Sassoon calls "within-predicate") comparatives , as in 
(2)b.318
(2) a. #Tweety is a bird with respect to flying.
b. #Tweety is {more/ less} (a) bird than Tan is. 
Still,  Sassoon  argues that  nouns  too  have  gradable  structures,  and  she  uses 
"typicality" to refer to gradability in nominal concepts. She argues that nouns are 
associated with grammatically accessible ordering-dimensions which together help 
to  measure the typicality  of  entities  in  the category.  This  claim is  based  on the 
observation that with respect to-modification and comparatives become available if 
"the nouns are slightly modified" or if the particle  of  is added to the comparative 
morpheme: 
(3) a. Tweety is a typical bird with respect to flying. 
b. A robin is more of a bird than an ostrich.
We would like to point out,  however, that these slight modifications to the (bare) 
noun in fact make an essential difference. 
In (3)a the ordering in terms of typicality only becomes grammatically accessible 
due to the insertion of the modifier typical, an adjective interpreted subsectively (as 
'typical for a bird'). And the contrast with (2)a indicates this quite clearly. As pointed 
out by Constantinescu, Doetjes and Součková (2011), nouns may offer in principle 
all  sorts  of  criteria  to  order  the  domain,  but  these  orderings  do  not  seem to  be 
grammatically  accessible.  For  instance,  the  domain of  boys can,  in  principle,  be 
ordered on the basis of height, but without the adjective  tall  explicitly added this 
ordering  is  not  grammatically  active.  We  have  seen  the  same  in  the  case  of 
modification by size adjectives  in chapter  4  (e.g.  big idiot,  enormous generosity 
etc.): once such a modifier is explicitly used, an ordering can be established and 
comparisons can be made; however, (abstract) size is not an inherent criterion for 
idiots/idiocy, generosity etc., just as it is not for boys or houses. It can become an  
ordering criterion only when a modifier is explicitly used.
The example in (3)b is even more revealing from a cross-categorial perspective 
on gradability. It was noted already in chapter 1 that expressions like more, less etc. 
have a cross-categorial distribution, as briefly illustrated again below, and get degree 
and quantity readings:
(4) a. more intelligent
b. to sleep more (than Peter)
c. more wine (than water)/ more books (than pens)
When used in the nominal domain, these degree modifiers select mass and plural  
nouns  and  only  give  rise  to  quantity  interpretations,  whereby  they  measure  or 
compare amounts of stuff or numbers of entities.  Such expressions cannot be used 
within the noun phrase to directly modify the noun and get a degree reading, as 
318 The examples in (2) are from Sassoon (2007a).
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illustrated by the ungrammaticality of (5)a, whose intended interpretation would be 
'someone who is more idiotic', which contrasts with the perfect grammaticality of 
(5)c where more modifies the corresponding adjective and indicates a higher degree 
of the property. Similarly, in  (5)b,  more can only be interpreted as comparing the 
number of individuals that qualify as idiots; it does not have as a possible alternative 
interpretation one where more would compare individuals in terms of their degree of 
idiocy, i.e. 'people who are more idiotic than I thought'.
(5) a. *{a/ the} more idiot (than I thought)
b. more idiots (than I thought)
c. more idiotic (than I thought)
On the one hand, this type of distribution would be puzzling on the view that nouns 
have  a  similarly  accessible  gradable  structure  to  adjectives.  It  is  no  longer  so, 
however, if we assume that adjectives, but not nouns, introduce orderings on which 
degree expressions like  more  can operate.  On the other  hand,  the fact  that  such 
expressions may combine with gradable adjectives (on a degree reading) and with 
mass and plural nouns (on a quantity reading) suggests that it is here that we find a 
parallel with respect to gradability between the adjectival and the nominal domain. 
Given that plural and mass expressions are generally analysed as partially ordered 
sets  –  ordered  by  the  part-of relation  (cf.  Link  1983),  then  the  presence  of  an 
ordering would account for the use of expressions such as more. It should be noted 
here that in fact  older proposals found in the literature that nouns involve gradable 
structures in their semantics (and have defined nouns either as measure functions or 
as containing some sort of degree argument) have been motivated precisely by facts 
bearing  on  quantity-related  interpretations  and  the  distribution  of  quantity  or 
measure phrases in the nominal domain (cf. Cresswell 1976, Krifka 1989, 1990). 
Thus, an analysis of adjectival gradability in terms of orderings accounts for the 
grammatical similarity of quantity and degree.319 It also allows a uniform analysis of 
these cross-categorial degree modifiers, as their interpretation can be parallel for the 
different categories.
But let us go back to example (3)b which indicates that  more can be used with 
nouns, on a non-quantity reading, and which was used as an argument for Sassoon's 
claim that  nouns  have  grammatically  accessible  ordering  dimensions,  namely  in 
terms of typicality. This is in fact an instance of what we have called predicative 
partitive structures, which are significantly different structurally from e.g.  (5)a and 
are rather restricted: the degree expression does not directly modify the noun, but 
occurs  outside the noun phrase,  on top of the indefinite article,  mediated by the 
preposition of, and the modified NP has to be a singular indefinite predicate:320
(6) a. He is more of an idiot than I thought. 
b. *They are more of idiots than I thought. 
319 Given extensions  of  this  type  of  approach to  the  verbal  domain  (Bach 1986,  Krifka  1989),  the 
presence of an ordering would account for the use of expressions such as more in combination with verbs 
as well (cf. Doetjes, Constantinescu and Součková 2011).
320 The example in (7) are from Bolinger (1972).
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(7) a. It is less of a telescope than I had hoped. 
b. *I bought less of a telescope that time.
It was shown above that typicality is not generally available as an ordering criterion 
for nouns. It seems, however, that, under certain conditions, predicative NPs may be 
re-analysed in terms of an ordering based on typicality.  This is what happens in  
examples like (3)b, (6)a and (7)a. Importantly, it is the predicate an idiot/ a bird/ a  
telescope that is thus reinterpreted. The lexical noun itself, used as the head of a 
nominal  extended  projection,  cannot  be  thus  re-analysed  –  witness  again  the 
ungrammaticality of (5)a. Nouns are enter the derivation as multi-dimensional – they 
are inherently and irreducibly multi-dimensional: they characterize complex objects 
in  terms  of  a  number  of  different  properties,  none of  which  can  be  used as  an 
ordering criterion.321 It is only an already built-up predicate that can be re-interpreted 
and forced into a uni-dimensional interpretation which would enable an ordering. 
This  sort  of  interpretation does  not  seem to be compatible with the  argumental, 
referential use of noun phrases, as suggested by their restriction to the predicative 
position (cf. the contrast in  (7)). When they do appear in argument positions, it is 
generally  in  intensional,  non-referential  contexts  or  contexts  that  allow  for  a 
predicative re-interpretation (cf. I {need/ *found} more of an expert for the job. – see 
also chapter 3, §5.3, for discussion). Finally, this reinterpretation can only occur with 
singular indefinite predicates, not with plural ones (cf. the contrast between (6)a and 
(6)b).  If  plurals  introduce  orderings  based  on  plurality,  then  this  incompatibility 
suggests that the part-of relation destroys (the possibility of constructing) any other 
potential ordering that could be defined on the basis of the atoms. Hence, it makes it  
impossible to access/ construe the typicality scale, even in predicative contexts. 
To sum up, on the one hand, the results of the investigation in this dissertation 
indicate that  "degree modification" in  the  nominal  domain in  fact  makes use  of 
mechanisms that are different from those employed in degree modification in the 
adjectival  domain.  This  suggests  a  fundamental  difference  with  respect  to  the 
(accessibility of) gradable structures found in the two domains. On the other hand, 
cross-categorial degree modifiers like  more,  less  etc. do not occur within the noun 
phrase,  directly modifying the lexical noun; and when they do combine with NPs, 
they yield quantity readings only. These two aspects suggest that the only ordering 
that is grammatically accessible with nouns is that introduced by the part-of relation. 
This is  an ordering that  seems to be introduced at a higher level  in the nominal  
structure (cf. Zamparelli 1998, Heycock and Zamparelli 2005, Schwarzschild 2006 
for proposals that the relevant lattice structure based on an ordering in terms of the  
part-of  relation becomes available higher in the DP structure, above the NP-level).  
At the lexical level, nouns do not introduce orderings, as they are and need to be 
inherently  multi-dimensional.  Only  predicatively  used  noun  phrases  may,  under 
specific conditions, introduce orderings in terms of typicality. All these facts seem to 
be straightforwardly accounted for by a theory that models gradability in terms of 
orderings: the parallel between nominal quantity and adjectival gradability, the lack 
321 In this, nouns differ from multi-dimensional adjectives. The latter can be either explicitly (by the use 
of  with respect to  phrases) or implicitly reduced to a  uni-dimensional interpretation, which makes an 
ordering, and hence comparison, possible (see Sassoon 2007a for discussion).
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of  regular  degree  modifiers  with  (lexical)  nouns,  as  well  as  the  possible  (but 
restricted) creation of an ordering in more of an N structures seem to be more easily 
and simply captured by such an approach than by a degree-based account. A vague 
predicate theory, therefore, seems adequate to describe and explain the differences 
and similarities that exist between the nominal and adjectival domains with respect 
to gradability. A fuller understanding of gradability and a more solid choice as to its 
representation requires further investigation of gradability across categories.
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Samenvatting in het Nederlands
Dit  proefschrift  is  een onderzoek naar  scalariteit  in  het  nominale  domein.  In  de 
literatuur  wordt  scalariteit  meestal  onderzocht  in  relatie  tot  adjectieven,  hoewel 
algemeen  wordt  aangenomen  dat  het  ook  toepasbaar  is  op  andere  categorieën 
(nomina,  verba).  Dit  proefschrift  bekijkt  scalariteit  vanuit  een  cross-categoriaal 
perspectief,  en  meer  in  het  bijzonder,  vanuit  een  nominaal  perspectief.  Het 
onderzoek  is  met  name  gebaseerd  op  Engelse  feiten,  maar  bespreekt  op 
verschillende punten Romaanse en Nederlandse data.
Hoofdstuk  1 introduceert  het  begrip scalariteit  en geeft  een overzicht  van  de 
belangrijkste  semantische  benaderingen  van  dit  verschijnsel.  Een  eerste  stap  om 
scalariteit in het nominale domein te identificeren, is het verzamelen van tests die in 
de literatuur zijn voorgesteld om scalaire nomina op te sporen. Een overzicht van de  
resultaten  van  deze  tests  (hoofdstuk  1,  sectie  2),  laat  zien  dat  ze  niet  dezelfde 
uitkomsten hebben. Dat vraagt dan weer om een meer diepgravend onderzoek. 
Dit onderzoek wordt uitgevoerd in de hoofdstukken 2-4, waarvan elk hoofdstuk 
een aantal contexten onderzoekt die verondersteld worden gevoelig te zijn voor de 
aanwezigheid  van  een  scalair  nomen.  Geval  na  geval  blijkt  echter  dat  de 
voorgestelde  diagnostiek  niet  werkt  op  de  veronderstelde  manier,  en  dat  andere 
factoren betrokken zijn bij het creëren van de geobserveerde effecten. Uiteindelijk 
blijft er weinig evidentie over voor graadmodificatie in het nominale domein, en al  
evenmin voor het bestaan van goede tests voor scalaire nomina. Bovendien komen 
de feiten niet overeen met wat er in het adjectivale domein gevonden wordt. 
In hoofdstuk 2 komen twee omgevingen aan de orde waarvan beweerd wordt dat 
ze  alleen  gebruikt  kunnen  worden  met  scalaire  nomina,  namelijk  N  of  an  N-
constructies (bijvoorbeeld  that idiot of a doctor 'die idioot van een dokter') en het 
small  clause  complement  van  het  werkwoord  seem 'schijnen'  (bijvoorbeeld  He 
seems  an  idiot 'Hij  schijnt  een  idioot').  Er  wordt  gesteld  dat  de  distributie  van 
zelfstandige naamwoorden in deze contexten niet bepaald wordt door scalariteit – 
noch op lexicaal  noch op syntactisch niveau – maar door andere factoren.  Deze 
factoren overlappen deels met scalariteit en brengen – onder bepaalde voorwaarden 
– vergelijkbare effecten teweeg. In het geval van de  N of an N-constructie wordt 
aangetoond dat  een  zelfstandig  naamwoord  alleen  in  het  eerste  gedeelte  van  de 
constructie voorkomt als het  een waardeoordeel  kan uitdrukken. In veel gevallen 
gaat het daarbij om zelfstandige naamwoorden die gerelateerd kunnen worden aan 
een scalair adjectief (bijvoorbeeld idiot 'idioot'), maar de constructie is ook mogelijk 
met nomina die duidelijk niet scalair zijn (bijvoorbeeld  box 'doos',  peach 'perzik'). 
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Ook in het geval van seem 'schijnen', blijkt dat, onder bepaalde voorwaarden, niet-
scalaire nomina gebruikt kunnen worden. Hieruit volgt dat deze twee omgevingen 
zijn uitgesloten als tests voor scalariteit. De twee casestudies in dit hoofdstuk laten 
zien hoe scalariteit verward kan worden met nauw verwante verschijnselen zoals het 
toekennen van een waardeoordeel. 
Hoofdstuk 3 richt zich op het bestuderen van  such 'zo'n/ zulk'. In de literatuur 
wordt  een  fundamenteel  onderscheid  voorgesteld  tussen  een  "soort"-such en  een 
"graad"-such.  In het proefschrift wordt stelling genomen tegen deze opvatting en 
wordt aangetoond dat de zogenaamde "graad"-such geen graadoperator is. Net als in 
het geval van N of an N en seem blijkt de relevante constructie ook voor te komen 
met duidelijk niet scalaire nomina (bijvoorbeeld way 'manier' of situation 'situatie'). 
Voorgesteld  wordt  dat  deze  such  (die  we  "interne"  such noemen  om  hem  te 
onderscheiden  van  de  gebruikelijke  anaforische  en  deiktische  toepassingen  van 
"soort"-such of "externe" such) wel degelijk een uitdrukking is die refereert aan een 
soort.  Interne  such  stelt  echter  andere  eisen  aan  de  sub-soorten  die  het  kan 
selecteren,  hetgeen  de  verschillen  in  distributie  en  interpretatie  verklaart  die  er 
bestaan met de gewone "soort"-such. Meer in het bijzonder selecteert interne such 
saillante  subsoorten  die geïdentificeerd  worden aan  de hand van hun natuurlijke 
gevolgtrekkingen.  Deze  gevolgtrekkingen  worden  uitgedrukt  door  middel  van 
adverbiale  bijzinnen  van  gevolg,  maar  kunnen  in  exclamatieven  ook  impliciet 
blijven. Hieruit kunnen we concluderen dat interne such niet gezien kan worden als 
een test voor de scalariteit van het nomen dat het modificeert, en daarom evenmin 
gebruikt  kan  worden  als  bewijs  voor  het  bestaan  van  scalaire  structuren  in  de 
semantiek en/of syntaxis van zelfstandige naamwoorden. In het laatste deel van dit  
hoofdstuk worden een aantal verwante structuren besproken (bv.  more of an idiot, 
quite an idiot en exclamatieven). 
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt een aantal "graadadjectieven" behandeld. Uit het overzicht 
in sectie 2 van hoofstuk 1 blijkt dat de beschikbaarheid van modificatie door deze 
adjectieven (in de relevante lezing) de meest betrouwbare test voor scalariteit biedt.  
Graadadjectieven zijn daarmee de meest veelbelovende kandidaten voor adnominaal 
gebruikte  graadexpressies.  Echter,  het  meer  gedetailleerde  onderzoek  naar 
maatadjectieven  zoals  big  'groot',  adjectieven  zoals  real 'echt',  en  evaluatieve 
adjectieven zoals  terrible  'verschrikkelijk',  laat  zien dat er geen evidentie is voor 
deze  hypothese.  Ten  aanzien  van  de  maatadjectieven  blijkt  dat  de  distributie  en 
interpretatie  ervan  geen  graadanalyse  van  deze  uitdrukkingen  ondersteunen.  De 
feiten wijzen in alle gevallen op een andere analyse. Maatadjectieven kunnen een 
abstracte  interpretatie  krijgen,  ook  in  predicatieve  positie,  waar  ze  niet  als 
graadoperatoren  geanalyseerd  kunnen  worden.  Deze  onafhankelijk  noodzakelijke 
analyse kan naar alle gevallen van maatadjectieven met een graadachtige betekenis 
worden uitgebreid. Voor adjectieven zoals real en true 'echt' wordt beargumenteerd 
dat  ze  een  epistemische,  evidentiële  interpretatie  hebben.  In  combinatie  met 
sommige nomina geeft dit een lezing die vergelijkbaar is met een graadlezing in het 
adjectivale domein. Tenslotte wordt beargumenteerd dat evaluatieve adjectieven een 
expressieve  betekenis  hebben,  en  dat  de  graad-achtige  interpretatie  afgeleid  kan 
worden  als  een  implicatuur,  die  ontstaat  doordat  het  adjectief  de  positieve  of 
negatieve connotatie van een nomen versterkt. 
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Het onderzoek in de hoofdstukken 2-4 laat zien dat de mechanismen die gebruikt 
worden voor graadmodificatie in het adjectivale domein niet gevonden worden in 
het nominale domein. Dit suggereert een fundamenteel verschil in de grammaticale 
toegankelijkheid van scalaire structuren in de twee domeinen. 
Een voor de hand liggende vraag die zich nu voordoet is: Wat betekent dit voor 
de status van zelfstandige naamwoorden? Kunnen we nog wel over scalaire nomina 
praten? In ruimere zin is het antwoord op deze vraag bevestigend. Wel is duidelijk 
dat  scalariteit  iets  anders  betekent  voor  zelfstandige  naamwoorden  dan  voor 
adjectieven. De intersectie van alle fenomenen in deze dissertatie in acht nemend, 
kan geconcludeerd worden dat  bepaalde zelfstandige naamwoorden telkens terug 
komen, en dat deze een bepaald type interpretatie hebben die lijkt op graadbetekenis 
zoals we die kennen in het adjectivale domein. Wat het onderzoek in deze dissertatie 
echter duidelijk maakt is dat de manier waarop dit type interpretatie tot stand komt 
in beide domeinen niet overeen komt. 
De  zelfstandige  naamwoorden  waar  het  hier  om  gaat  vallen  uiteen  in  drie 
klassen.  Een  eerste  klasse  is  die  van  zelfstandige  naamwoorden  die  abstracte 
eigenschappen weergeven, waarvan de individuele instanties gemodificeerd kunnen 
worden door een abstract gebruikt maatadjectief (bv. idiocy 'idiotie', courage 'moed', 
generosity 'vrijgevigheid' etc.). De tweede klasse bevat zelfstandige naamwoorden 
die  verwijzen  naar  individuen  die  gekarakteriseerd  worden  door  een  dergelijke 
eigenschap,  zoals  idiot 'idioot';  andere  voorbeelden  zijn:  fool 'dwaas',  enthusiast 
'enthousiasteling',  fan 'fan',  blunderer 'kluns'  etc.  De  derde  klasse  is  die  van  de 
zelfstandige naamwoorden die verwijzen naar (min of meer abstracte) objecten die 
gekarakteriseerd  worden  door  een  abstracte  eigenschap,  zoals  blunder 'blunder', 
mistake 'vergissing',  failure 'mislukking’.  In  al  deze  gevallen  is  er  dus  een 
betekeniscomponent die overeenkomt met een abstracte eigenschap. Bij het gebruik 
van  abstracte  maatadjectieven  wordt  geprediceerd  over  een  instantie  van  een 
dergelijke  eigenschap,  hetgeen  resulteert  in  een  betekenis  die  lijkt  op  een  hoge 
graadbetekenis.  Het  is  uiteraard  mogelijk  om  bovengenoemde  zelfstandige 
naamwoorden scalair te noemen, maar het is wel van belang daarbij te beseffen dat  
scalariteit in dat geval geen homogeen verschijnsel is, omdat het zich bij nomina 
anders manifesteert dan bij adjectieven. 
Hoofdstuk 5 behandelt kort de implicaties van de resultaten voor theorieën over 
de  representatie  van  scalariteit.  Het  onderzoek  naar  scalariteit  in  het  nominale 
domein leidt tot een negatieve conclusie: er is geen bewijs gevonden voor de stelling 
dat  zelfstandige  naamwoorden  scalaire  structuren  hebben  die  grammaticaal 
toegankelijk  zouden  zijn  en  die  overeen  zouden  komen  met  die  van  scalaire 
adjectieven.  Desondanks  stelt  dit  hoofdstuk  voor  dat  de  resultaten  van  dit 
proefschrift  begrepen  kunnen  worden  als  uitgegaan  wordt  van  een  analyse  die 
scalaire adjectieve definieert in termen van vage, geordende predicaten (cf. Klein 
1980, 1982, Doetjes, Constantinescu en Součková 2011). Een dergelijke analyse, die 
geen  gebruik  maakt  van  graad-argumenten,  werpt  een  interessant  licht  op  het 
verschil  tussen  zelfstandige  naamwoorden  en  adjectieven:  het  gebrek  aan 
graadmodificatie (bijvoorbeeld het gebruik van de comparatief more 'meer') binnen 
de  naamwoordgroep  zou  dan  aangeven  dat  de  relevante  scalaire  structuur 
(ordeningen) niet bestaat voor zelfstandige naamwoorden. Merk overigens op dat 
256 SAMENVATTING
ordeningen wel een rol lijken te spelen bij de uitdrukking van hoeveelheden, zoals in 
more  books  'meer  boeken'.  Scalaire  adjectieven  denoteren  verzamelingen  van 
individuen die geordend zijn op basis van een eigenschap. Zo denoteert het adjectief 
stupid stupid 'dom' een verzameling individuen die geordend zijn door hun domheid. 
Zelfstandige  naamwoorden  daarentegen  introduceren  geen  dergelijke  ordening. 
"Scalaire"  zelfstandige  naamwoorden  zijn  die  naamwoorden  die  ofwel 
verzamelingen van objecten (in dit geval instanties van eigenschappen) aangeven 
met  een  abstracte  omvang,  ofwel  verzamelingen  van  objecten/individuen  die 
gedefinieerd  worden  door  een  instantie  van  een  dergelijke  eigenschap.  Deze 
verzamelingen zijn echter niet inherent geordend. 
Samenvattend  leidt  het  onderzoek  tot  de  conclusie  dat  er  een  fundamenteel 
verschil  is  tussen  zelfstandige  naamwoorden  en  adjectieven  op  het  gebied  van 
scalariteit,  en dat  nominale scalariteit  eerder  een illusie  is  dan een grammaticale 
realiteit.
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